

# A CRITICAL STUDY OF KĀRAKA

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## PREFACE

There are illuminating discussions on Kāraka in the grammatical and the philosophical works in the Sanskrit literature. Sanskrit grammarians and the philosophers of the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā schools define Kāraka and divides it into different groups and sub-groups. They offer exhaustive critical discussions on the definitions and divisions of Kāraka given by them. The conspicuous feature of their discussions is that they lay great emphasis on the philosophy of Kāraka in them. I have devoted the present thesis to a critical and comparative study of the views expressed by these scholars on different aspects of Kāraka. I have mainly confined myself to the philosophy of Kāraka presented by them in their discussion. The thesis consists of seven broad chapters and an introduction and a conclusion. I have discussed in the first chapter mainly the different definitions of Kāraka. In the other chapters, I have discussed the concepts of Karta, Karma, Karana, Sampradāna, Apādāna and Adhikarana.

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Aparba Chandra Barthakuria.

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ABBREVIATIONS

1. BCM. = Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi
2. Bhāṣā. = Bhāṣāvṛtti
3. BŚS. = Brhaccabdendusekhara
4. BVV. = Bhāṣāvṛttyarthavivṛti
5. HNM. = Harinaṃamṛta
6. Kār. cak. = Kāraṇacakra
7. Kāraka. = Kāraka pāda
8. Kās. = Kāśika
9. LMS. = Laghumañjusa
10. LŚS. = Laghuśabdendusekhara
11. Mbh. = Mahābhāṣya
12. Mugdha. = Mugdhabodha
13. Pā. = Pāṇini
14. PNR. = Praudhmanorama
15. PR. = Prayogaratnamālā
16. Śa. = Śādhanaśamudhāra
17. Śara. = Śārasvata
18. ŚK. = Śabdakaustubha
19. ŚKM. = Siddhantakaumudī
20. ŚKS. = Saṃkṣiptaśara
21. ŚMJ. = Śāraṃājārī
22. SRC. = Śārasvata with the commentary of Candrakīrti
23. SRR. = Śārasvata with the commentary of Rāmaśara

22. SS. = Śabdānusaṁsāra  
23. SSP. = Śabdasaṁskṛtiśāstra  
24. Su. = Sūtra  
25. VBS. = Vākyakaraṇabhāṣyaśāstra  
26. VTP. = Vyutpattivaḍa

## INTRODUCTION

1. The verb occupies a central position in a sentence in the Sanskrit language and kārakas or cases are directly related to it. The verb and kārakas together present a complete unit of thought, that is, the sentence. It shows that kārakas also occupy a very important position in a sentence in the Sanskrit language. This is one of the reasons for which we have chosen kārakas as an appropriate topic for research in Sanskrit grammar. Sanskrit grammarians and the philosophers of the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā schools critically discuss the meaning of kāraka and divides kāraka into different groups and sub-groups. These thinkers lay special emphasis on the philosophy of kāraka and the different groups and sub-groups of it. They present some very important ideas in their discussions. These are also some other reasons for selecting the topic for research.

2. The school of Sanskrit grammar is founded by Pāṇini, the celebrated author of the Aṣṭādhyāyī. We hear the names of some pre-Pāṇinian grammarians like Śākatāyana, Āpiśali, Śākalya etc. in the Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini. But, no work of these grammarians is available to us. There is a regular and systematic development of the grammatical school since the days of Pāṇini till modern times. Pāṇini is one of

the greatest grammarians of the world. The *Aṣṭādhyāyī* of Pāṇini is treated as a very great grammatical work in the world. We have discussed the *sūtras* of Pāṇini on *kāraka* laid down by the grammarian in his *Aṣṭādhyāyī* first.

3. Kātyāyana who is the second grammarian of the Paninian school thinks that some *sūtras* of Pāṇini are inadequate for the topics to which they are related. Therefore, he presents a number of *vārtikas* or supplementary rules in order to make up the deficiency of the *sūtras* of his great predecessor. He presents a few such rules in the section of *kāraka* in Pāṇini's grammar. We have clearly explained these rules.

4. Patañjali, the celebrated author of the *Mahābhāṣya* or the great commentary on the *sūtras* of Pāṇini is another greatest grammarian of the Paninian school who explains the *sūtras* of Pāṇini in an appropriately critical manner. He interprets the term *kāraka* for the first time. He also offers some very important views in his interpretations of the definitions of *Kartā*, *Karma*, *Karaṇa* etc. given by Pāṇini. These views are accepted by many grammarians coming after him. We have explained the views of Patañjali on the different aspects of *kāraka* very clearly and exhaustively. We have properly shown in our discussions on the views of the



grammarians Bhartṛhari, Kaiyata, Haradatta etc. how they have been influenced by the celebrated author of the Mahābhāṣya.

5. Bhartṛhari, the illustrious author of the Vākya-pādīya follows the tradition of Patañjali to a very great extent in his discussions on kārakas. But, the grammarian presents some independent views also on different kārakas. He lays special emphasis on the philosophical aspects of kārakas. We have exhaustively dealt with the views of Bhartṛhari on kārakas in this thesis. We have explained his philosophical ideas properly in it.

6. The Vṛttikāra is another grammarian of the Paninian school who presents some important original views on kārakas. He departs from the tradition of Patañjali on several occasions. The grammarian follows his predecessor Bhartṛhari in his interpretations of the definitions of Karana, Sampradāna etc. given by Pāṇini. We have discussed the views of the Vṛttikāra on kārakas very clearly and critically in the thesis. We have laid due emphasis on the philosophical views presented by him on kārakas.

7. Puruṣottama writes a brief commentary on the Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini, namely, the Bhāṣāvṛtti. We have critically interpreted his views on kārakas. We have shown in our interpretations that the grammarian mainly follows the Vṛttikāra in his commentary on the Paninian rules on kāraka.

8. Rāmacandra also writes a brief commentary on the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* of Pāṇini known as the *Prakriyākaumudī*. We have clarified the interpretations of Rāmacandra of the Paninian rules on *kāraka*. We have clearly shown that the grammarian follows the *Vṛttikāra* to a great extent in his interpretations of the rules.

We see a new trend in the *Prakriyākaumudī* of Rāmacandra. The grammarian rearranges the rules of Pāṇini. He starts the chapter on *kāraka* with *Karma* and finishes it with *Adhikaraṇa*. He probably does so under the influence of the author of the *Mugdhabodha*.

9. Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita who flourishes after Rāmacandra interprets the *sūtras* of Pāṇini briefly in his *Siddhāntakaumudī* and exhaustively in his two other works namely, the *Sabḍakaustubha* and the *Praudhamanoramā*. He accepts the new order of the Paninian rules given by his predecessors Rāmacandra. Bhaṭṭoji rigidly follows Rāmacandra in his interpretations of the *sūtras* of Pāṇini on *kāraka* in his *Siddhāntakaumudī*. But, the grammarian gives a new definition of *kāraka*. He has also some contribution to some other aspects of *kāraka*. We have clearly but critically explained the views of the grammarian on different aspects of *kāraka* in this thesis.

10. Among the followers of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, Kaundabhaṭṭa, Hari Dīkṣita and Nāgeśa deserve special mention and attention.

Kaundabhaṭṭa upholds some important views of Bhaṭṭoji in his illuminating discussions on kāraka in the Vaiyākaraṇa-bhūṣanaśāra. He lays emphasis on philosophical interpretations of different karakas. We have discussed at length the concept of karaka presented by the grammarian. We have also discussed the philosophical interpretations of Kartā, Karma etc. given by him. Further, we have shown that Kaundabhaṭṭa accepts or deals with some important views of the philosophical schools on some cases.

11. HariDīkṣita mainly interprets the views of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita in a critical manner. He has no other contribution.

12. Nāgeśa is the last stalwart of the Paninian school. His views on kāraka, Kartā, Karma etc. are mainly recorded in his Laghuśabdendusekhara, Laghumañjusā, and Bhṛāccabdendusekhara. His Paramalaghumañjusā appears to us as an abridgment of his Laghumañjusā. He has another very important work namely, Vaiyākaraṇasiṣṭāntomañjusā. He presents the same views on different aspects of kāraka in it as in his other works. He writes a sub commentary on the Mahābhāṣya also known as Udyota. But, he mainly explains

the views of Kaiyata clearly in it. We have presented his views on different aspects of *kāṛaka* in an elaborate manner in our thesis.

13. We have critically examined the sub-commentary of Halārāja on the *Vākyapadīya*, the two sub-commentaries on the *Kāśikāvṛtti* namely, the *Nyāsa* of Jinendrabuddhi and the *Padamāñjarī* of Haredatta, the sub-commentary of Śṛṣṭidhara on the *Bhāṣāvṛtti* of Puruṣottama known as *Bhāṣāvṛttyarthavivṛti*, the *Prasāda* sub-commentary of Viṭṭhalācārya on the *Prakriyākauśudī* of Rāmacandra and the *Darpana* commentary of Harivallabha on the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra* of Kaṇḍaḥhaṭṭa. The authors of these commentaries and sub-commentaries present some very important views on different aspects of *kāṛaka*. The sub-commentary of Śṛṣṭidhara is in the manuscript form. We have collected the materials necessary for our research from the sub-commentary from the manuscript of it preserved in the Asiatic Society Library of Calcutta.

14. There are some grammarians who do not accept the rules formed by Pāṇini but offer their own rules in their grammars. These grammarians are.

- (i) Sarvavarma, the author of the *Kalāpa*.
- (ii) Candragomī, the author of the *Candra*.
- (iii) Kṛṣṇadīśvara, the author of the *Saṅkṣiptasāra*.
- (iv) Devanandī, the author of the *Jainendra*.

- (v) Hemacandra, the author of the Śabdānuśāsana.
- (vi) Bopadeva, the author of the Mugdhabodha.
- (vii) Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, the author of the Śārasvata.
- (viii) Padmanābha Datta, the author of the Śapadma.
- (ix) Jīvaśvāmī, the author of the Harināmāṃṛta.
- (x) Puruṣottama Vidyāvāgīśa, the author of the Prayōgarathamālā.

These grammarians along with the commentators and the sub-commentator on their works belong to the so called non-Paninian schools of grammar. We have presented the views of the grammarians of the non-Paninian school on kāraka, Kartā, Karma etc. properly in our discussion. We have critically interpreted some of their important views.

15. The early philosophers of the Mīmāṃsā schools and the philosophers of the old Nyāya school do not pay proper attention to kāraka though they appropriately and exhaustively discuss some other topics of grammar. But, a latter Mīmāṃsaka namely Śāga Bhaṭṭa, the author of the Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi and a few philosophers of new Nyāya school namely, Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa, the author of the Kārakacakra, Jayakṛṣṇa, the author of the Sāraṃajarī, Jagadīśa Tarkālakāra, the author of the Śābdasaktiprakāśikā and Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya, the author of the Vyutpattivāda present illuminating discussions on kāraka. We have presented

their views in the present thesis and have offered critical discussion on some of their views.

16. We have not followed the order of the Paninian rules on kāraka. We have followed the order now universally accepted by all grammarians of the world. In other words, we have arranged kārakas as Kartā, Karma, Karana, Sampradāna, Apādāna and Adhikāraṇa.

## A critical study of Kāraka

### CHAPTER I

#### Kāraka

The concept of a case is universal in all known grammars of the world excepting the pictorial ones. In ancient grammars, specially of the Indo-European family, cases and verbs play the most important role. Let us take, for example, the cases of the Vedic language, the Greek language, the Latin language etc. in which we notice the above feature prominently. In the next period of the development of the Indo-European language, Sanskrit, German, English and other languages follow the ancient tradition. All the languages in India derived from Sanskrit and the languages which are derived from Dravidian etc. maintain this tradition till today. In the present discussion, we shall devote ourselves mainly to a critical study of the concept of a case and its classification etc. in Sanskrit grammar. In this connection, we shall also occasionally refer to English grammar, and corresponding Greek terms denoting cases.

A case in Sanskrit grammar is known as kāraka. In Sanskrit grammar, kāraka is one of the most important

factors of a unit of thought, that is, the sentence. A kāraka is invariably related to a verb. The verb and the kāraka together present a complete unit of thought. This shows that the verb also plays a significant part in a sentence. But, in Sanskrit grammar, the sole attention has been paid to a kāraka itself and not to the verb which is related to it. A kāraka is generally related to a verb directly. But, on some rare occasions, it is also related mediately to the verb. The relation to a verb or an action constitutes the essence of a kāraka. Sanskrit grammarians and the Indian philosopher namely, the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas lay due emphasis on this point in the definition of kāraka given by them. They offer illuminating discussions on kāraka in their works.

Let us now trace out the evolution of the concept of kāraka with the help of a systematic discussion on the definitions of kāraka given by the grammarians and the philosophers. Pāṇini, the greatest of Sanskrit grammarians introduces the term kāraka for the first time in a sūtra in his *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, namely kāraka.<sup>1</sup> But, we do not attain a clear idea of the term from the grammar of Pāṇini. Patāñjali (150 B.C.) is the first Sanskrit grammarian who tries to define the term in an appropriate manner. His example is followed by a number of grammarians belonging to the Paninian and the



non-Paninian schools, and a few distinguished philosophers of the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā schools. The Paninian school starts with the Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini. The Paninian school culminates in Nāgeśa or Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa. Several systems of grammar such as the Kalāpa, the Cāndra etc. belong to the non-Paninian schools. We shall try to present the definitions of kāraka given by the grammarians and the philosophers in our discussion in order to show the evolution of the concept of kāraka through centuries.

#### Definitions of kāraka

(Paninian school)

#### Patañjali

Patañjali, the celebrated author of the Mahābhāṣya or the "Great commentary" on the sūtras of Pāṇini accepts the etymological meaning of the term kāraka, presented by Pāṇini in the said rule. The term kāraka is derived from the root kr. (to do) by attaching the suffix ṇwī to it. The suffix ṇwī denotes the active voice. Therefore, the etymological meaning of the term kāraka is 'a kāraka is a doer'.<sup>2</sup> The term doer denotes in the present context the subject or the agent who accomplishes an action (kriyā). Patañjali explains

this point very clearly. He says that the term *kāraka* as introduced by Pāṇini denotes *sādhaka* or *nirvartaka* (doer).<sup>3</sup> Then, the grammarian explains the term *kāraka* as the *nirvartaka* of a *kriyā* (action).<sup>4</sup>

Now, if we accept the definition of *kāraka* offered by Patañjali, a serious difficulty arises. According to this definition, *kāraka* denotes only the subject or the agent (*Kartā*). But, it is accepted on all hands that the term *kāraka* possesses a much broader meaning than that. *Kāraka* does not denote *Kartā* alone in grammar. It is a <sup>general term</sup> ~~general term~~ for *Kartā*, *Karma*, *Karana*, *Sampradāna*, *Apādāna* and *Adhikarana*. This shows that the definition of *kāraka* as given by Patañjali is too narrow. Patañjali fully realises the problem arising from his definition. Therefore, he tries to offer a solution to this problem. He says that every *kāraka* in Sanskrit grammar possesses the sense of *Kartā* or the agent. He cites a few suitable examples in order to substantiate this view.

Let us now discuss the view of Patañjali clearly. A *kriyā* or an act in Sanskrit grammar is not a single operation. But, it is the combination of a number of operations. These operations are located in different *kāra*kas. The speaker always selects any one of these operations as the principal one according to his intention. The locus of this operation

becomes the Kartā or the agent in the sentence used by him. Patañjali clarifies this idea with the help of a few suitable examples of Karana (instrumental case), Adhikarana (locative case) and Apādāna (ablative case) related to the acts of cooking etc. He first refers to the act of cooking. Various factors such as a person, a cooking pot, fuel, water etc. are associated with the act. All these factors possess some specified operations. These operations are known by the general term pākakriyā or the act of cooking. Patañjali clearly shows the operations which are located in the above factors.<sup>5</sup> The locus of the principal operation among them is the Kartā or the agent of the act under consideration. Generally, the person who is associated with the act is treated as the agent by the speaker while the cooking pot and fuel are used as cases of Adhikarana and Karana. Let us clarify it with the help of an example namely, Devadattah kāṣṭhah sthālyam odanāṁ pacati. Patañjali shows that sometimes the speaker selects the operation belonging to the cooking pot or fuel as the principal one. In that case, these objects also become the agent. Thus, we can use the expressions kāṣṭhāṁ pacanti and sthālīṁ pacati also.<sup>6</sup> Patañjali says that even the ablative case can be reduced to the subjective case in a similar manner. He refers to the sentence balāhakaḥ vidyotate vidyut in this connection. He shows that the ablative case used in the term

balāhaka in the sentence can be changed into the subjective case with the help of a slightly different expression, that is, balāhako vidyotate.<sup>7</sup> Let us now clarify the sense in which the subjective case is used in the word balāhaka in this expression. The first sentence indicates that the flash of lightning which appears to our view is separated from a piece of cloud. But in the sentence, balāhako vidyotate, the speaker lays emphasis on the sense that the piece of cloud is the locus of the separation which takes place between the cloud and the flash of lightning. Therefore, the term balāhaka becomes a case of Kartā in the sentence.

Patañjali shows great originality in the concept of kāraka discussed above. But, it should be noted here that the grammarian does not cite a single instance of Karmakāraka and Sampradānakāraka in his discussion. This raises doubt in our mind that probably there is some limitation of this definition. But, even if there is some limitation of the definition, we must appreciate his maiden attempt for finding a definition of kāraka.

Patañjali offers a second interpretation also on the term kāraka. According to this interpretation, kāraka denotes kriyā or action. He says that Pāṇini uses the singular number of the seventh inflexion in the term kārake. It shows that the term kāraka is not a case of nirdhāraṇa. Therefore, it

denotes *kriyāyām*.<sup>8</sup> In other words, he means to say that the term *kāraka* in Pāṇini's grammar means *kriyā* or action. It is clear from this that the grammarian does not lay emphasis on a substance in his concept of *kāraka* but he treats the action located in it as the *kāraka*.

### Kaiyata

Kaiyata, the commentator on the Mahābhāṣya faithfully follows its author in explaining his standpoint on *kāraka*. He interprets every important and difficult passage of the Bhāṣya on the rule *kārake* very clearly in order to give us an appropriate idea of the Bhāṣyakāra's concept of a case. In this connection, we can refer to his interpretation of the passage *anvartam iticed akartari Kartṛśabdānupapattiḥ*.<sup>9</sup>

Kaiyata shows that the definition of *kāraka* as given by the Bhāṣyakāra is an appropriate one. The definition signifies that a *kāraka* is the same as *Kartā*. We have already seen that the Bhāṣyakāra shows a number of *kāra*kas as cases of *Kartā* in order to justify his definition. But, a case of *Sampradāna* cannot be changed into a case of *Kartā* in a similar manner. Thus, we cannot use the expression *Brāhmaṇo dadāti* for *Brāhmaṇāya dadāti*. It shows that the

definition is not applicable to Sampradānakāraka or the dative case. It is also not applicable to all cases of Apādānakāraka. Let us take, for example, the sentence grāmād āgacchati. We cannot change the ablative case grāma in it into the subjective case. Thus, the definition appears to us as too narrow. But, Kaiyata shows that the definition is not too narrow as it appears to us but it is a comprehensive one. A Kāraka always accomplishes an act by means of an operation or operations belonging to it. According to Kaiyata, Apādānakāraka plays the role of avadhī or a limit to the act of separation. This is the operation of this particular case with the help of which it accomplishes the act of separation. It is in this particular sense, the definition is applicable to Apādānakāraka. He says that Sampradānakāraka also accomplishes the act of giving with the help of some specified operations such as approving the said act of the giver. Thus, the definition karotīti kārakam is applicable to this kāraka also.<sup>10</sup> In this way, Kaiyata tries to solve a puzzling question.

The grammarian discusses the meaning of the seventh inflexion which is used in the term kāraka by Pāṇini. He gives the exact meaning of the seventh inflexion attached to this term in accordance with the spirit of the Bhāṣyakāra. He says that it is a case of viśaya and not a case of nirdhāraṇa.<sup>11</sup> But, the term viśaya possesses a wide meaning. Sometimes, it

means a subject matter. Sometimes, it means an object. Sometimes, the term denotes a relation between two objects as we see in such sentences as *sāstre naipunyaṃ*, *dharma matih* etc. Kaiyata does not specify the sense in which it is used in the rule *kāraka*. He cleverly evades the question. This method does not help us to understand the intended sense of the term *kāraka*.

### Bhartrhari

Bhartrhari, the illustrious Sanskrit grammarian offers an entirely different definition of *kāraka* from that of Patañjali in his *Vākyapadīya*. He does not use the term *kāraka* in the definition but he uses a synonymous word of *kāraka* namely, *sādhana* in it. Patañjali uses the word *sādhana* for the first time in his *Mahābhāṣya* in the sense of *kāraka*.<sup>12</sup> Bhartrhari follows his predecessor in his definition. He defines *sādhana* as the *sāmarthya* or *śakti* (efficiency) which generates an intended act. According to Helārāja and some other grammarians, the said *śakti* invariably remains in a particular substance. But, the author of the *Vākyapadīya* does not express any such view in his definition of *sādhana*. He says that the act which *śakti* generates<sup>is</sup> either transitive or intransitive. In this manner, Bhartrhari presents a new concept of *kāraka* in his grammar.

Let us now critically discuss the above concept of Bhartrhari. The concept of śakti is not an original contribution of Bhartrhari. The philosophers of the Buddhist and the Mīmāṃsā schools already recognise śakti or efficiency in their philosophical doctrines. In the Buddhist philosophy, the concept of causal efficiency (arthakriyākāritva) is very famous. In the Mīmāṃsā philosophy also, the doctrine of śakti is well known. It appears to us that Bhartrhari is influenced by either of these two philosophical schools. There is a fundamental difference between the Bhāṣyakāra and Bhartrhari regarding the meaning of the term kāraṇa. The Bhāṣyakāra does not lay emphasis on śakti in his definition of kāraṇa. He lays emphasis on kriyā in the definition of kāraṇa offered by him. The standpoint of Bhartrhari is entirely different from that of his predecessor. He examines the definition of his predecessor in a critical manner and discovers an inner meaning beneath the superficial meaning of kāraṇa as given by his predecessor. He finds that it is śakti or efficiency which plays the dominating role in the concept of kāraṇa. According to him, a kriyā or an action is subordinate to śakti from the metaphysical point of view. Therefore, he lays emphasis on śakti.

Bhartrhari explains the term kriyā properly in his definition. Patañjali refers to the principal operation only



in his definition of *kāraka*. He does not evaluate the role played by the subordinate operations in the accomplishment of an act. But, Bhartrhari lays equal emphasis on both principal and subordinate operations. The expression *svāśrayasamaveta* refers to the principal operation and the expression *āśrayāntarasamaveta* refers to minor operations in his definition.

### Helārāja

Bhartrhari writes his *Vākyapadīya* in a purely metrical form. He offers some new ideas in his *kārikās*. But, the statements of Bhartrhari are very often cryptic. Therefore, it is not always possible for us to understand the ideas of the grammarian properly. Moreover, the grammarian presents the important traditional views in the *kārikās*. We cannot understand the exact import of these views without the help of traditional sources. It is for these reasons, an appropriate commentary on the *Vākyapadīya* is essentially necessary for us. Helārāja renders a very valuable service to us by offering such a commentary on the work of Bhartrhari. He explains the *kārikās* of Bhartrhari very clearly in the commentary. The style of his language is simple and lucid. He refers to the traditional sources wherever necessary in order to clarify the *kārikās*. So, in our view, Helārāja is the spokesman of Bhartrhari. He

offers a very important discussion on the concept of *sādhana* or *kāraṇa* presented by Bhartṛhari.

Let us now discuss the contribution of Helārāja to the definition of *sādhana* offered by Bhartṛhari. Bhartṛhari defines the term *sādhana* as the *sāmarthya* or the efficiency which brings about an action. Helārāja interprets this definition in a critical manner. He uses the popular term *śakti* for *sāmarthya* in his interpretation.<sup>14</sup> He clearly shows the relation of *śakti* with its container, that is, substance. He says that *śakti* or efficiency is a property which cannot exist in an isolated manner without being located upon an appropriate locus. He accepts the view of Bhartṛhari that it is *śakti* or efficiency which generates an intended action. But, this *śakti* invariably remains in a substance. Therefore, Helārāja interprets *śakti* as *śaktāḥ dravyam* or the substance which possesses the efficiency essential for accomplishing an intended act.<sup>15</sup> However, this interpretation of Helārāja does not indicate that *sādhana* or *kāraṇa* is a substance. Helārāja clearly states that a substance bereft of *śakti* cannot produce an effect. It is *śakti* which alone is capable of generating an intended action.<sup>16</sup> The substance acts only as a locus of this *śakti*. Thus, the substance is always subordinate to its efficiency.

Helārāja says that the Bhāṣyakāra lays emphasis on substance and not its efficiency in defining sādhana. He quotes the passage sādhanan vai dravyam etc. in order to substantiate his view. But, he justifies the standpoint of the Bhāṣyakāra. According to him, the Bhāṣyakāra treats śakti and its locus as non-different in the above statement.<sup>17</sup> The Bhāṣyakāra probably intends that no emphasis should be laid on the distinction between śakti and its locus. The standpoint of the Bhāṣyakāra, however, does not affect the role played by śakti in the accomplishment of an act. We have already explained clearly <sup>the view of Helārāja</sup> that śakti alone can accomplish an act while substance acts as a locus of it and thus, it remains subordinate to śakti.

Helārāja shows in his commentary that the concept of sādhana is not a new contribution of Bhartṛhari. He quotes a few passages from the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali in order to prove that the Bhāṣyakāra himself uses the term sādhana on several occasions in the sense of kāraṇa.<sup>18</sup> He also shows that Patañjali defines sādhana as guṇa in one of the passages. According to him, the term guṇa denotes śakti.<sup>19</sup>

Helārāja gives us an exact idea of the two types of activities mentioned by Bhartṛhari in his definition.<sup>20</sup>

### Kāśikā

The Vṛttikāra defines kāraka as the nimitta or the hetu or condition of an act.<sup>21</sup> This shows that the grammarian departs from the standpoints of both Patañjali and Bhartrhari on kāraka. He does not assign any reason for such a sudden departure from the two earlier definitions of kāraka. But, it is not difficult for us to guess the reason. The concept of śakti which is so famous in the Mīmāṃsā school has been rejected by many rival thinkers of the school. On the other hand, the definition of kāraka offered by Patañjali is also not accepted by all scholars. It is probably for this reason, the Vṛttikāra searches a new definition of kāraka which becomes acceptable to all. He finds that a kāraka is invariably a condition of an act. Therefore, he defines the term accordingly. He cites a few suitable illustrations of kāraka such as *prāṇā āgacchati*, *parvatād avarohati* etc. in order to give us an appropriate idea of his definition.<sup>22</sup> He says in this connection that a word which is not the condition of an act is not treated as a kāraka in grammar. He shows that in the sentences *vrkṣasya paṭṇan patati*, *kudiyasya piṇḍaḥ patati* and *mānavakasya pitarāṃ panthānaṃ prohati*, the words *vrkṣa* etc. ending in the sixth inflexion are not the conditions of the acts denoted by the verbs *patati* and *prohati*. They simply denote a non-

specified relation with the words parma etc. Therefore, they are not cases of kāraka.<sup>23</sup>

The Vṛttikāra has a very important contribution to the concept of kāraka. His definition is accepted by a number of grammarians belonging to the Paninian and non-Paninian schools. But, there is a serious drawback in the definition. He does not explain the term nimitta properly. Therefore, the definition is challenged in later times by many scholars.

#### Jinendrabuddhi

Jinendrabuddhi, the celebrated commentator on the Kāśikāvṛtti upholds the definition of kāraka offered by the Vṛttikāra. He shows some important reasons for accepting the definition. He says that the term kāraka possesses two distinct meanings namely, the etymological meaning and the technical meaning. According to the etymological meaning, kāraka is synonymous with Kartā or the agent. Pāṇini defines Kartā as svatantra (independent). Now, if we accept the interpretation that a kāraka denotes Kartā, in that case, we cannot treat Apādāna, Sampradāna etc. as kāraka because, they are not svatantra or independent. They are always paratantra or dependent upon the agent. Of course, we can use them as cases of Kartā also as shown by the author of the Mahābhāṣya.

But in that case, a new problem arises. According to the grammatical convention, the third inflexion is attached to Kartā. Therefore, the third inflexion should be used in the words grāma and upādhyāya in the sentences grāmād āgacchati and upādhyāya gāṁ dadāti. In the first sentence, the word grāma is an ablative case and in the second sentence, the word upādhyāya is a dative case. The use of the third inflexion in these words in the sentences is not acceptable to scholars. If we accept the etymological meaning of the term kāraka, another serious discrepancy will arise. We have already discussed that the term kāraka denotes Kartā according to its etymological meaning. When we accept this meaning, we must first understand the term Kartā properly from its definition in order to understand the term kāraka correctly. But, the definition of Kartā is invariably related to kāraka. The definition is not complete unless the term kāraka is combined with it. Thus, both Kartā and kāraka are mutually dependent on each other. It is for the above reasons, Jinendrabuddhi rejects the etymological meaning of kāraka. He accepts the technical meaning only as given by the Vṛttikāra.<sup>24</sup> He justifies the technical meaning of the term by critically explaining the illustration grāmād āgacchati offered by the Vṛttikāra. He shows that the term grāma (village) in the said illustration is a clear case of nimitta or condition of the act of coming.

He explains that the village in the illustration denotes *avadhī* or a limit of the act. Therefore, it is treated as an ablative case. The village plays an essential role in the accomplishment of the act. If the village does not play the role of *avadhī*, it is impossible to accomplish the act. This shows clearly that the village is a condition of the act under consideration. Therefore, the definition offered by the *Vṛttikāra* on *kāraka* is justified.<sup>25</sup>

In the course of his discussion on the meaning of the term *kāraka*, Jinendrabuddhi explains the significance of the seventh inflexion (*saptamī*) which is attached to the term *kāraka* by Pāṇini in the *sūtra* *kārake*. He says that the seventh inflexion is attached to the term *kāraka* in the sense of *nirbhāraṇa*. He admits that the plural number should be used in a word denoting *nirbhāraṇa*. But, Pāṇini uses the singular number only in the term *kāraka*. Jinendrabuddhi says that in spite of this apparent irregularity, it is a case of *nirbhāraṇa*. According to him, the singular number in this case may denote *jāti* or a universal or it may be an exceptional use of the grammarian.<sup>26</sup>

Jinendrabuddhi is an excellent critic endowed with great originality. He justifies the standpoint of the *Vṛttikāra* on *kāraka* with brilliant arguments. The *Vṛttikāra* does not assign any reason for offering a new definition of *kāraka*.

It is Jinendrabuddhi who clearly explains the reason. He also throws light on the significance of the seventh inflexion which is attached to the term *kāraka*. This is essentially necessary for us to understand the relation between the rule *kāraka* and the subsequent rules like *dhruvam apāye apādānam* etc. correctly.

### Haradatta

Haradatta, the other commentator on the *Kāśikāvṛtti* also offers an illuminating discussion on the definition of *kāraka* given by the *Vṛttikāra*. He justifies the definition with the help of appropriate arguments. Haradatta follows his predecessors to a great extent in his interpretations. But, in spite of this, the interpretations of Haradatta bear the stamp of original thinking.

The grammarian firmly supports the view of the *Vṛttikāra* that the term *kāraka* denotes the condition of an action. He rejects the definition *karotīti kārakam* as inadequate. But, Haradatta does not criticise the definition severely like his predecessor Jinendrabuddhi. He says that the definition is applicable to *Kartā* alone and not to other *kāra*kas. However, the other *kāra*kas also become the cases of *Kartā* under special circumstances. In that case, the definition



applies to these kārakas also. This shows that the definition is only conditionally applicable to Karma, Kārana, Sampradāna etc. But, the definition offered by the Vṛttikāra is applicable to every kāraka without any condition. Therefore, Haradatta prefers this definition to the earlier one. In this way, the grammarian justifies the definition as given by the Vṛttikāra.<sup>27</sup>

Haradatta explains the term kriyā in an appropriate manner in his discussion on kāraka. He says that the term kriyā denotes the meaning of a root but not motion. He rejects the view of the Vaiśeṣikas on kriyā.<sup>28</sup>

The grammarian has some other important contributions to the concept of kāraka. He clearly discusses the operations which are possessed by every kāraka.<sup>29</sup> He also clarifies the meaning of the term hetu. He shows that the term hetu which is a synonym of nimitta denotes a specified sense in the definition of kāraka.<sup>30</sup>

### Bhaṭṭoji Dīksita

We see a further evolution of the concept of kāraka in the grammatical works on Bhaṭṭoji Dīksita. The grammarians Puruṣottama and Rāmacandra who are the predecessors of Bhaṭṭoji do not define kāraka in their grammatical works. Viṭṭhaleśvara,

the commentator on the *Prakriyākaumudī* of Rāmacandra is also supposed to be a predecessor of Bhaṭṭoji. He defines *kāra*. But his definition is exactly the same as that of the *Vṛtti-kāra*.<sup>31</sup> This shows that these grammarians have no contribution towards the development of the concept of *kāra*.

Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita throws new light on the meaning of the term *kāra*. He accepts the definition *karotīti kārakam* offered by Patañjali. But, he shows that there is a deeper meaning of this definition. According to him, it implies that a *kāra* denotes that which is syntactically related to a verb.<sup>32</sup> This is a significant interpretation of Bhaṭṭoji. We see a further evolution of the concept of *kāra* in this interpretation. Bhaṭṭoji strictly confines the scope of *kāra* in a sentence in the interpretation.

There is a great advantage of the above interpretation. The definition *karotīti kārakam* is not applicable to the cases of *Sampradāna* in its usual sense. The usual sense of the definition is that a *kāra* is the generator (*janaka*) of an action. But, *Sampradānakāra* is not the generator of any action. The same problem arises in the case of *Apādānakāra* also. Bhaṭṭoji says that we can easily tide over these difficulties with the help of the new interpretation. Even if a *kāra* is not the *janaka* of an action, it is at least

syntactically related to the verb in a sentence. Therefore, the definition can be easily accepted by all.<sup>33</sup>

Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita justifies his standpoint with the help of a suitable illustration namely, Brāhmaṇasya putraṃ panthāṃ<sup>av</sup> prcchati. In this sentence, Brāhmaṇa is related to the word putra (son) as its adjective. But, it is not syntactically related to the verb prcchati. Therefore, the word Brāhmaṇa is not a kāraka.<sup>34</sup>

Bhaṭṭoji, however, accepts the other meaning also of the term kāraka. He says that even if we accept kāraka as kriyājanaka or the generator of an action, it will apply to the cases of Sampradāna etc. The term janaka denotes the invariable, immediate antecedent to an effect. Ordinarily, this sense is not applicable to the above kārakas. But, Bhaṭṭoji says that these kārakas remain ideally present prior to the accomplishment of the act. Thus, they can also be treated as kriyājanaka or the generators of intended actions.<sup>35</sup> This is a new contribution of Bhaṭṭoji to the concept of kāraka which deserves our serious attention. The grammarian does not explain this point clearly. But, some latter grammarians interpret the view accurately.

Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita accepts the second interpretation also of the term kāraka as offered by the Bhāṣyakāra. But, he interprets it further in his own way in order to substantiate the view that a kāraka denotes that which is syntactically related to a verb.<sup>36</sup>

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### Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa, the author of the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇ-sāra* strictly follows Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita in defining *kāraṇa*. He says that the term *kāraṇa* is equivalent with the term *kriyā*.<sup>37</sup> This interpretation is based on the second interpretation of the Paninian rule *kāraṇa* offered by the *Bhāṣyakāra*. According to this interpretation the term *kāraṇa* means *kriyāyām*. The Paninian rule *kāraṇa* is an *adrikāra* rule. It is related to the subsequent rules like *dhruva apāye Apādāna* etc. which define the terms *Apādāna*, *Sampradāna* and the like. We have already stated that the *Bhāṣyakāra* interpretes the term *kāraṇa* as *kriyāyām*. Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa says that when we combine the term *kriyāyām* with the definitions of *Apādāna* etc., we immediately attain the meaning that the terms *Apādāna*, *Sampradāna* and the like are syntactically related to a *kriyā* (*kriyāyām* ~~anvayī~~). It is clear from the above observation that a *kāraṇa*, according to the *Bhāṣyakāra* is *kriyānvayī* or that which is syntactically related to a verb.<sup>38</sup>

Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa shows no originality in the above interpretation. He simply reiterates the view of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita.<sup>39</sup>

### Hari Vallabha

Hari Vallabha, the commentator on the *Valyākarana-bhūṣaṇasāra* does not offer any new definition on the term *kāraka*. He quotes the view of Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa that the term *kāraka* means *kriyājānaka* or the generator of an act.<sup>40</sup> Nāgeśa says in his *Laghuśabhendūśekhara* that this interpretation follows from the very definition *karotīti kārakam* given by the *Bhāṣyakāra*.<sup>41</sup> Nāgeśa, however, says in his *Bṛhasabhendūśekhara* that the same interpretation follows from the second definition also of the term *kāraka* as given by the *Bhāṣyakāra*.<sup>42</sup> Hari Vallabha does not refer to the second view of Nāgeśa.

### Nāgeśa

Nāgeśa is one of the greatest Sanskrit grammarians of the modern age. He also offers a critical discussion on the term *kāraka*. But, Nāgeśa has no original contribution to the definition of *kāraka*. He defines *kāraka* as *kriyājānaka* or the generator of an action. He says that this definition follows from the first interpretation of the term *kāraka* given by Patañjali namely, *karotīti kārakam*.<sup>43</sup> He further shows that the interpretation given by Patañjali on the Paninian rule

kārake also leads upto the same meaning. Patañjali interprets the rule kārake as kriyāyām. The seventh inflexion used in kriyāyām denotes a particular relation namely, viśayatā. He does not define viśayatā. Nāgēśa interprets viśayatā clearly. He says that viśayatā here involves the cause and effect relation. It means that a kāraka is the cause and a kriyā or action is its effect.<sup>44</sup>

Nāgēśa justifies his definition of kāraka with the help of the example Brāhmaṇasya putraṃ panthānaṃ prachati. The example is already cited by Bhaṭṭoji in defining kāraka. Nāgēśa says that the word Brāhmaṇa in the above example is not the generator of the act of asking as denoted by the verb prachati. It is only an adjective of the term putra (son) in it. Therefore, it is not a case of a kāraka.<sup>45</sup>

Nāgēśa Bhaṭṭa critically examines the definition kriyānvayitvaṃ kārakeṣām, as given by Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita. He rejects this definition on two strong grounds. According to this definition, a kāraka is directly related to an act. Nāgēśa does not accept this view. He shows that a kāraka is always directly related to bhāvanā or the inner effort which generates a kriyā. Thus, it is only indirectly related to a kriyā. Secondly, the definition is not applicable to the locative case, because the locative case is only indirectly related to a kriyā. Therefore, the definition is too narrow.<sup>46</sup> The

objections of Nāgeśa are justified. It is probably in order to avoid such objections, the author of the Sārasvata defines kāraka as kriyāsiddhyupakāraka.

Nāgeśa rejects the definition kriyānvitapratyasar thānvayitvaṃkārakatvam also. According to this definition, a kāraka denotes that which is syntactically related to the suffix attached to a verb. The grammarian says that this definition is not applicable to such examples of kāraka as pakva odanaḥ (rice is boiled) in which the suffix attached to the verb itself denotes a kāraka. Let us examine the sentence pakva odanaḥ in order to justify the statement. In this sentence, the suffix kta which is attached to the root pac (to cook) denotes the objective case. The term odana is only a case in apposition with the objective case denoted by the verb. It shows that the definition is not applicable to the above instance and similar other instances. Further, the definition counters the well established view namely, kārakaṃ bhavanānvayi or a kāraka is directly related to bhāvanā or the inner effort which generates an action. It is for the above reasons, the grammarian discards the definition.<sup>47</sup>

He offers a critical interpretation on his own definition of kāraka also. But, he shows very little originality in this interpretation. He mainly follows the views of his predecessor in it. He says that all kārakas generate the

intended action through the operations which are located in them. The only problem arises in the case of the remote dative case which does not remain present at the time of accomplishing the act of giving. But, Nāgesā says that even such a remote dative case remains at least ideally present in the mind of the giver and thus it inspires him to accomplish the act. Hence, it is also a case of janaka or the generator of the act. He shows that this interpretation is applicable to a Nirvartya karma and a Prāpya Karma also. He refers to ghaṭam karoti and ghaṭam amarati in this connection.<sup>48</sup>

The grammarian accepts the view of Bhartṛhari that kāraka is a śakti. But, he agrees with Halāraja that this śakti invariably remains in a substance.<sup>49</sup>

Nāgesā is a grammarian endowed with great scholarship and originately. But, his contribution to the concept of kāraka is not great.

#### Definitions of kāraka in the non-Paninian schools

##### Kalāpa

Sarvavarmā, the author of the Kalāpa defines all the kārakas appropriately in his grammar. But, the grammarian does not offer any definition on the term kāraka.



### Durgasiṅha

Durgasiṅha, the celebrated commentator on the Kalāpa, defines the term and critically interprets the definition. According to him, a kāraka is the nimitta or the condition of an act.<sup>50</sup> The grammarian follows the Vṛttikāra in this definition.

He divides kāraka into principal and subordinate.<sup>51</sup>

### Trilocana

Trilocana, who is another reputed commentator on the Kalāpa accepts the definition of kāraka given by Durgasiṅha. He says that the etymological meaning of the term kāraka is applicable to the Kartā or the subjective case alone and not to the other kārakas. Therefore, he does not accept it.<sup>52</sup>

### Suśeṣācārya

Suśeṣācārya, the third commentator on the Kalāpa critically examines the definition of Durgasiṅha. The term kriyānimitta in this definition denotes the invariable, immediate antecedent to an action. But, Suśeṣa shows that in the

case of Nirvarty Karma, kāraka is not the antecedent to the action but the action itself precedes the kāraka. He cites the illustration ghaṭan karoti in order to substantiate it. This shows that the definition kriyānimittam kārakam is too narrow. But, the grammarian does not subscribe to such a view. He says that in the case of Nirvartya Karma, the kāraka remains ideally present prior to the action and therefore, the definition is not too narrow.<sup>53</sup> It should be noted here that the grammarian follows Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa in this interpretation.

### Cāndra

Candragomī, the renowned author of the Cāndra gives us an idea of the different types of kāraka in his grammar. But, he does not define kāraka. Similarly, he does not Kartā and Karaṇa.

### Ṣaṅkṣiptasāra

Kramadīśvara, the author of the <sup>ṣa</sup>Ṣaṅkṣiptasāra offers a comprehensive discussion on the kāraka system in Sanskrit grammar. But, the grammarian does not define kāraka. Jamaranandi, the celebrated commentator on the Ṣaṅkṣiptasāra also

does not define the term. Goyicandra is the only grammarian of the Jannara school who offers a definition on kāraka. He strictly follows the Vṛttikāra in the definition.<sup>54</sup> He also presents the views of the Bhāṣyakāra on kāraka along with this definition.<sup>55</sup> The grammarian does not criticise the definition like many of his predecessors.

#### Jainendra

Pūjyapēda Devanandī, the celebrated author of the Jainendra introduces the term kāraka in his grammar in the adhikāra rule kārake.<sup>56</sup> The grammarian does not define the term. The reason for this is best known to him.

#### Abhayānandī

Abhayānandī, the commentator on the Jainendra defines kāraka as kārakan nirvartakam<sup>57</sup> heturvā.<sup>57</sup> It shows that the grammarian synthesises the views of both Patañjali and the Vṛttikāra on kāraka in the interpretation. The commentator explains the significance of the seventh inflexion which is attached to the word kāraka in the adhikāra rule kārake offered by Devanandī. He rigidly follows Jinendrabuddhi in this explanation.<sup>58</sup>



Śabdānuśāsana

Hemacandra, the author of the Śabdānuśāsana defines kāraka as kriyāhetuh kārakam.<sup>59</sup> The definition shows that the grammarian accepts the well known view of the Vṛttikāra on kāraka. But, it does not signify that he rejects the etymological meaning of kāraka. He clearly states in his interpretation of the definition that the term kāraka denotes karotīti kārakam.<sup>60</sup> He critically interprets the term hetu in his definition in order to justify his view. He shows that the term hetu in the definition denotes a specified condition of an act. According to him, such a condition invariably possesses some operation or operations by means of which it accomplishes the act.<sup>61</sup> In this way, Hemacandra proves for the first time that there is no distinction in meaning between the definition of kāraka offered by Patāñjali and the definition of kāraka offered by the Vṛttikāra. The grammarian corroborates the view of Bhartrhari that kāraka is a śakti or efficiency. He further states that this śakti is invariably located in a substance.<sup>62</sup>

### Magdhabodha

Bopadeva, the author of the Magdhabodha uses the monosyllabic technical term ka for kāraka. He gives an enumerative definition of ka or kāraka. The definition runs thus - <sup>dha</sup>dhaghabhajadāh kaseṇṇāḥ syuh.<sup>63</sup> The technical term dha, dha, gha etc. in the definition stand for six distinct kārakas, namely, Kartā, Karma, Kāraṇa, Sampradāna, Apādāna and Adhikarṇa. It shows clearly that the definition is enumerative in character.

### Durgādāsa Vidyāvāgīśa

Durgādāsa Vidyāvāgīśa, the commentator on the Magdhabodha offers a critical discussion on kāraka. He accepts the definition kriyānimittam kārakam offered by Durgasiṃha. He critically explains the sentence Caitrasya gaucha in order to justify the definition. He says that the term Caitra in the sentence is related to the word dhana (wealth) but it is not syntactically related to the verb gaucha, and therefore, it is not the nimitta or the condition of the act of going. Thus, Caitra is not a kāraka according to him for the above reason.<sup>64</sup>

Rāma Tarkavāgīśa

Rāma Tarkavāgīśa, the other commentator on the Mugdhabodha also accepts the definition of Durgasiṅha. In this connection, he refers to the sentence Caitrasya taṇḍulāṁ pacati. He says that the word Caitra in this sentence is related to such words as dhana etc. but it is not syntactically related to the verb pacati and therefore, it is not the condition of the act of cooking denoted by this verb. Thus, the grammarian shows that Caitra is not a case of kāraka in the sentence.<sup>65</sup> The grammarian offers the above discussion in order to prove that the definition of Durgasiṅha is the appropriate definition of kāraka.

The learned commentator also discusses the standpoint of a section of grammarians who justify the definition of Durgasiṅha in a different manner. These grammarians say that the terms Śivaṁ, paraśunā etc. cannot express the complete idea as intended by the speaker unless the verbs as intended by him are properly used with them. According to them, the verb as intended by the speaker in the first case is paśyati while in the second case, it is ochinatti. When these verbs are duly supplied, we attain two complete sentences, namely, Śivaṁ paśyati and paraśunā ochinatti. After the sentences are thus completed, we see that the term Śiva in the first sentence is

a case of Karma in relation to the verb paśyati. Similarly, in the second sentence, the term parāśa is a case of Karana in relation to the verb cchinatti. These two terms are syntactically related to the verbs. Therefore, they are the conditions (nimitta) of the verbs.<sup>66</sup>

Rāma Tarkavāgīśa critically examines the definition vibhaktiyarthadvārā kriyānvayitvaṁ kāraakatvam. This definition is offered by some philosophers of the Nyāya school. According to this definition, the term kāraaka denotes that which is syntactically related to a verb through the meaning of the inflexion attached to it. Tarkavāgīśa shows that this definition is also not applicable to the illustration viśavṛkṣopi saṁvardhya swayen cchettum asāmpratam.<sup>67</sup> In this illustration, the term viśavṛkṣa is related to two verbs, namely saṁvardhya and cchettum. It is a case of kāraaka in the sentence. But the first inflexion is attached to the word viśavṛkṣa due to its connection with the indeclinable asāmpratam (improper) only. The term viśavṛkṣa is not related to the verbs through its inflexion. Therefore, the definition is too narrow.

Some scholars realise the limitation of the definition, and therefore, amend the definition by adding a clause to it namely, avyaktiyarthadvāraakatve sati. According to this amendment, a kāraaka is syntactically related to a verb through

the meaning of the lakāra which is attached to it and also through indeclinables.<sup>68</sup>

The condition *avya* (meaning *avyaya* or indeclinable) is necessary in the definition in order to justify the word *viśavṛkṣa* in the example quoted above and similar other words as cases of *kāraka*. It should be noted here that Nāgēśa, the celebrated grammarian of the Paninian school explains the sentence *viśavṛkṣopi samvārdhya* etc. in a different manner. He says that the verb *isyate* should be supplied in order to complete the sentence. When the verb *isyate* is added to the sentence, the term *viśavṛkṣa* will be related to this verb. It will be a case in apposition now, and thus the earlier difficulty will be solved.<sup>69</sup> The second condition, namely *vyarthadvāṛakatve sati* (i.e. through the meaning of the *lakara*) is also essentially necessary in the definition. Rāma Tarkavāgīśa cites the example *Caitrasya taṇḍulāṃ pacati* in order to justify the use of it. He says that the term *taṇḍula* is related to the act of cooking through the meaning of the suffix *ti* in this sentence. Therefore, it is a case of a *kāraka*. But, the term *Caitra* is not related to the said act in the above manner. Therefore, it is not a *kāraka* in the sentence.

The grammarian says that the definition as discussed above is not applicable to the *Adhikarāṇa kāraka* even



after it is amended. Adhikaraṇa kāraka is related to a kriyā only indirectly through the medium of either Kartā or Karma. Therefore, he opines that the above definition is not applicable to it.<sup>70</sup>

Tarkavāgīśa accepts the view of Bhartrhari that kāraka is a śakti or efficiency. He agrees with Helārāja that this efficiency is invariably located in a substance. He also supports the view of Helārāja that the grammarians always treat efficiency and its locus as non different and therefore, the substance itself is used as kāraka in grammar.<sup>71</sup>

#### Sārasvata

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya, the author of the Sārasvata offers a slightly different definition of kāraka from that of his predecessors. He defines kāraka as kriyāsiddhyupakāraṇa kārakaṁ.<sup>72</sup> Scholars have not paid proper attention to the definition. But, the problems arising from some other definitions of kāraka can be easily avoided with the help of it.

#### Candrakīrti

Candrakīrti, the commentator on the Sārasvata clearly explains the term kriyāsiddhyupakāraṇa. According to

him, it denotes the efficient cause which contributes towards the accomplishment of an act. It is also clear from the interpretation that a Kāraka is an immediate antecedent to an act.<sup>73</sup> Candrakīrti also offer a definition of kāraka. But, this definition is exactly the same as that of Hemacandra.<sup>74</sup>

Rāmāśrama

Rāmāśrama, another commentator on the Sārasvata avoids any discussion on the definition of kāraka.  
Supadma

Padmanābha Datta, the author of the Supadma also defines kāraka as kriyānimittan kārakam.<sup>75</sup> He does not offer any critical discussion on the definition.

Viṣṇuśara

Viṣṇuśara, the commentator on the Supadma appropriately explains the above definition of Padmanābha. He clarifies the meaning of both kriyā and nimitta in the definition. He says that the term kriyā denotes either the primary meaning of a root or it denotes the auxiliary sense of the verb karoti.<sup>76</sup> The second interpretation of Viṣṇuśara deserves our special attention. We very often use the verb karoti as an auxiliary verb in order to denote a specified action. Let us clarify our statement with the help of a illustration namely, pākaṁ karoti. Viṣṇuśara refers to such a usage in

his second interpretation. He gives us the exact meaning of the term nimitta also. He says that in the definition *kriyā-nimittam kārakam*, the term nimitta denotes that particular condition which is invariably modified by operation or operations.<sup>77</sup> Viṣṇumisra assigns the reason for such an interpretation of the term. According to him, the above interpretation is essentially necessary in order to exclude such terms from the scope of kāraka as denote a non-specified or remote relation with an action.<sup>78</sup>

Viṣṇumisra presents the definition of kāraka as given by the Bhāṣyakāra along with a critical interpretation of it. But, he says that the author of the *Supadma* rejects this definition as gratuitous and accepts the definition offered by the *Vṛttikāra*.<sup>79</sup>

### Harināmāṃṛta

Jīvaśvāmī, the author of the *Harināmāṃṛta* subscribes to the view of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita that the term kāraka denotes that which is syntactically related to a *kriyā* or an act. It is clear from his definition of the term, namely *kriyāsambandhaviśeṣi kārakam*.<sup>80</sup> The grammarian tries to specify the relation which holds between a kāraka and a *kriyā* and serves as the basis of the syntactical relation between

them. According to him, the specific relation that exists between the two is that of cause and effect. In other words, he means to say that a kāraka is the cause or the generator (janaka) of an action.<sup>81</sup> This is not an original view of the grammarian. He simply reiterates a well known view of Nāgārja.

Jīvagoswāmī says that the predicate viśeṣa serves an important purpose in his definition of kāraka. It excludes all such terms as denote a non-specified relation from the scope of kāraka. Thus, the term Kṛṣṇe in the example Kṛṣṇasya pacati is not a kāraka.<sup>82</sup>

The above discussion clearly shows that the author of the Harināmāmṛta has no original contribution to the concept of kāraka.

#### Prayogaratanmālā

Puruṣottama Vidyāvāgīśa, the author of the Prayogaratanmālā is one of the greatest Sanskrit grammarians of the modern age. The grammarian tries to give us a comprehensive idea of different kārakas with the help of appropriate definitions and illustrations. But, he does not define the term kāraka. He probably thinks that an elaborate discussion on different kārakas with appropriate illustrations will more easily give us a correct idea of kāraka than a definition of the term.

### Definitions of kāraka in philosophical schools

We have so long discussed the definitions of kāraka in the grammatical schools. We have critically examined the definitions of kāraka as given by the grammarians belonging to the Paninian and the non-Paninian schools in our discussion. Let us now discuss the definitions of kāraka as we meet with in the philosophical schools. By the term philosophical schools, we mean only the Navyanyāya and the Mīmāṃsā systems because, in other systems of philosophy, there is hardly any discussion on the definition of kāraka. Only four philosophers define the term kāraka. These philosophers are Bhavananda Siddhāntavāgīśa, the author of the Kārakacakra, Jayakṛṣṇa, the author of the Śāramāñjarī, Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra, the author of the Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā and Gāgā Bhaṭṭa, the author of the Bhāṭṭacin-tāmaṇi. Among these authors, the first three belong to the Navyanyāya school and the fourth belongs to the Mīmāṃsā school. Bhavananda Siddhāntavāgīśa is the earliest among these philosophers.

### Kārakacakra

Bhavananda Siddhāntavāgīśa criticises the definition kriyānimittatvaṃ kārakatvam as offered by some thinkers of the

grammatical school. He accepts this definition as the representative definition of the grammatical school. He says that if this definition is accepted, the word *Caltra* in the sentence *Caltrasya tandulam pasati* will also be a *kāraṇa*. He argues that the term *Caltra* is a remote condition of the act of cooking. He makes necessary arrangements for performing the act of cooking and thus he plays an important part in bringing about the action. It is a fact that *Caltra* is not an immediate condition of the action. But, according to the grammatical school, even the remote conditions like *Sampradāna*, *Apādāna* etc. can be the cases of *kāraṇa*. Therefore, we can easily treat *Caltra* also as a *kāraṇa* in the above sentence. But, the grammarians never accept such an interpretation. It shows that the above definition of *kāraṇa* is too wide.<sup>83</sup> At the same time, it is too narrow also in another sense. In the sentence *gaṇḍati kapalam*, the verb *gaṇḍati* stands for the portion of the face. The sentence implies that a part of the face is taken as the whole face. Now, in the above sentence, the term *kapala* is not the condition of the verb *gaṇḍati*. Similarly, when we say *gaganam drawyan bhavati*, it also does not indicate that the sky (*gagana*) is a condition of the verb *bhavati*. The sentence *gaganam drawyan bhavati* simply implies that the sky is a substance. It is for the above limitations, *Bhavananda* does not accept the definition.

Bhavānanda now tries to offer a perfect definition of kāraka. He says that a kāraka means that which is syntactically related to a verb through the medium of an inflexion. He is, however, not satisfied with this definition also. Therefore, he adds a clause to it in order to make it applicable to the principal kārakas. The clause is a kāraka should as well be the condition of a verb (kriyanimittatva-sahitam).<sup>84</sup> This definition of Bhavānanda also is not without limitations. Let us take for example an illustration, namely, guruvipratapavīdurgatānāṃ pratikurvīta bhiṣak swabheṣajaiḥ. In this sentence, the words guru, vipra etc. are directly related to the verb pratikurvīta. Thus, the meaning of the sixth inflexion is directly connected with the verb ex hypothesi. But, in grammar, the above words are not treated as kārakas. Therefore, the definition as presented by Bhavānanda becomes too narrow.

Siddhāntavāgīśa realises his flaw. Therefore, he amends his own definition and holds that kāraka denotes that which is syntactically related to a verb through any of the six cases, namely Kartā, Karma, Karana etc.<sup>85</sup>

A critical examination of Bhavānanda's standpoint shows that his definition of kāraka is not a definition at all. He does not offer any scientific argument in support of his definition. According to him, a kāraka denotes that which is syntactically related the verb through Kartā, Karma, Karana

etc. Now, a question arises. "Are Kartā, Karma etc. cases of Kāraka or not?" Bhavānanda does not provide an answer to this question. Further, if we closely examine the definition we find that this definition is rather a description than a definition proper.

But, inspite of all these odds, Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa is able to influence the grammarians and philosophers coming after him to a great extent.

### Sāramañjarī

Jayakṛṣṇa, the author of the Sāramañjarī follows to a great extent his predecessor Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa in defining kāraka. He however, does not accept the final definition of kāraka given by his predecessor. Like Bhavānanda, Jayakṛṣṇa also criticises the definition *kriyānimittatvam kārakatvam*. According to him, the definition is too wide to cover such illustrations as *Matrasya tandulāṃ pacati*. It is for this reason, he rejects this definition and accepts the new definition of kāraka, namely, *vibhaktiyarthadvārā kriyānvayitvāṃkārakatvam*. Jayakṛṣṇa says that the meaning of the substantive (nāma) cannot directly enter into a syntactical relation with the meaning of a verb. Therefore, the meaning of the inflexion must be accepted as a connecting link between the two.<sup>86</sup>



Jayakṛṣṇa states clearly that second inflexion is not used in the term *stoka* in the sentence *stokaṁ pascati* as a connecting link between the verb *pascati* and the said term. The term is used as an adverb in the sentence. The second inflexion is attached to it only in order to maintain the correctness of the usage.<sup>87</sup>

He also interpretes the sentence *guruviṣṇatapasvīdurgatāṁ pratikurvīta* in a different manner. He says that the term *roga* should be inserted in the sentence in order to attain the appropriate meaning of it. In this way Jayakṛṣṇa solves the problem which besets his predecessor Bhavanānda.<sup>88</sup>

### Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra

Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra, the author of the *Śabdasaṅkīrtiprakāśikā* offers an entirely independent definition of *kāraṇa*. His definition of *kāraṇa* is as follows : *dhātvarthasamprakāro yaḥ subantaḥ sotrakāraṇam*.<sup>89</sup> He interpretes this definition very clearly in his *vṛtti*. Jagadīśa lays emphasis on the meaning of the inflexion *sup* in his definition rather than on the word to which it is attached. It is also clear from his discussion that in order to understand *kāraṇa* properly, we must understand the meaning of the verb with which it is used.

Let us now clarify the concept of *kāraka* as presented by Jagadīśa. Jagadīśa says that the inflexion called *sup* is attached to a substantive either in the sense of *kāraka* or in some other sense.<sup>90</sup> He then clarifies the meaning of the term *kāraka*. He states that the term *kāraka* denotes a specific meaning of the inflexion *sup*. This meaning of the inflexion is syntactically related to the verb and it always acts as a predicate of the verb in such a syntactical relation. He offers a number of illustrations representing different *kāraka*s in order to bring home to us the meaning of his statement. Let us explain one of these illustrations namely, *vr̥kṣāt patati*. In the above illustration, the verb *patati* denotes a motion which is characterised by separation. Thus, the separation in the above context plays the role of a predicate in relation to the verb. Jagadīśa says that the sense of the said separation is presented to us by the fifth inflexion itself which is attached to the word *vr̥kṣa*. He opines that the meaning of the fifth inflexion itself is the *kāraka* in the sentence. This meaning is syntactically related to the verb.

Jagadīśa further says that because the fifth inflexion is inseparably related to the stem *vr̥kṣa* the word *vr̥kṣa* is also a *kāraka* in a remote sense.<sup>91</sup>

It is clear from the above discussion that Jagadīśa's concept of kāraka is entirely different from the earlier concepts of kāraka. He certainly deserves appreciation for this new concept. He solves some difficult problems which beset the earlier philosophers like Bhavānanda with the help of the new interpretation. There is a great difference between Jagadīśa and his predecessors, namely, Bhavānanda and Jayakṛṣṇa. Bhavānanda and Jayakṛṣṇa also lay some emphasis on the meaning of the inflexion (vibhaktiyartha) in their definition of kāraka. But, they accept it only as a connecting link between the kāraka and the verb. But, Jagadīśa treats the subartha itself as the kāraka proper. He does not assign any reason for departing from the age-old tradition. The success of his new venture will depend mainly on the willingness of scholars to accept the new standpoint.

#### Bhāttacintāmaṇi

Ugāḇ Bhaṭṭa clearly discusses the standpoint of the Naiyāyikas on the meaning of the term kāraka before giving his own definition of the term. He says that the Naiyāyikas reject three important definitions of kāraka. These definitions are :

1. Kriyāprayojakatvaṃ kārakatvaṃ
2. Kriyājanakatvaṃ kārakatvaṃ
3. Dhatvārthānvitavibhaktiyarthānvayitvaṃ kārakatvaṃ.<sup>92</sup>

According to him, the Nāṭyāyikas reject the first definition on the ground that it is too wide, because, it is applicable even to such a prayojaka or a condition as Devadatta in the sentence Devadattasya taṇḍulam<sup>2</sup> pacati. Scholars are not ready to accept the term taṇḍula in the sentence as a case of kāraka.

Gāgā Bhaṭṭa says that the Nāṭyāyikas reject the second definition also as too wide. The expression kriyājanakatva indicates an immediate, invariable antecedent to an action. We all know that the knowledge of an action is such an antecedent to the action. Therefore, the definition is applicable to the word jñāna also in the sentence yathā-jñānam<sup>3</sup> pacati. But, this view is not correct. Gāgā Bhaṭṭa states that the Nāṭyāyikas reject the definition on this very ground.

The third definition is able to remove the defects of the two earlier definitions. But, the Nāṭyāyikas show that there is a serious defect in this definition also. According to this definition, a kāraka denotes that which is syntactically<sup>4</sup> the meaning of a root related to through the meaning of the inflexion attached to the root. Now, if we accept this

definition, even the word dhana in the sentence dhanāya gacchati and the word svarga in the sentence svargāya yatate will also be the cases of kāraka. But such a view is not acceptable to us. There are some other defects of this definition. The particle na in the sentence na pacati is syntactically related to the meaning of the root pac (to cook) through the meaning of the inflexion ti attached to the root. But, it is not a kāraka. Similarly, the definition is not applicable to the word nakta (night) in the sentence naktan pacati in spite of the fact that the term nakta denotes the sense of the locative case. Gāgā Bhaṭṭa says that it for these reasons, the Naiyāyikas reject the definition.

He shows that these philosophers present a new and more appropriate definition of kāraka. According to this definition, kāraka denotes Karta, Karma, Karana, Sampradāna, Apādāna or Adhikarana.<sup>93</sup> We have already discussed this definition.<sup>95</sup>

Gāgā Bhaṭṭa rejects this definition without showing any reason for it. He gives an entirely different definition of kāraka. According to this definition, a kāraka denotes that which is syntactically related to a verb through the inflexion attached to it.<sup>94</sup>

Let us explain the above view clearly. A verb in Sanskrit grammar consists of two parts namely, the root and

the inflexion. The root generally denotes an operational part and a result. A kāraka is related to either the operation or the result through the inflexion which is attached to the root. The inflexion which is used in a particular kāraka also acts a medium of this relation. We can clarify it with the help of an illustration namely, Devadattah sthālyam odanam pacati. In this illustration, the verb pacati occupies a significant position. This verb consists of two distinct parts namely, the root and the inflexion ti. The root denotes an operation and a result. The inflexion ti in the verb denotes Kartā who is the locus of the operation. The term Devadatta in the sentence is the case in apposition with the said Kartā or the agent of the operation. The first inflexion which is attached to the word Devadatta itself serves as the connecting link between the case in apposition and the said Kartā. The terms odana and sthālī in the sentence are related to the result denoted by the verb as Karmakāraka and Adhikarana kāraka. The meanings of the second and the seventh inflexions attached to the words odana and sthālī are the medium of the relation between the kārakas and the result. The second inflexion attached to the word odana denotes the direct locus of the result while the seventh inflexion used in the term sthālī denotes the ~~indirect~~ <sup>ternoḥ</sup> indirect locus of the result.

The definition of *kāraka* given by Gāgā Bhaṭṭa is certainly able to remove some of the serious limitations of earlier definitions of *kāraka*. But, according to Nāgasa even such a definition is not an appropriate one because, there is only an indirect relation between *kriyā* and *kāraka*. Nāgasa states that a *kāraka* is directly related to *bhāvanā* and it is not directly related to a *kriyā*. Hence, the predicate *ākhyātārthanvita* is not appropriate in it.

#### The classification of *kāraka*

We have so long discussed the definitions of *kāraka* in different grammatical and philosophical schools. A *kāraka* is traditionally classified into *Kartā*, *Karma*, *Karana*, *Sampradāna*, *Apadana* and *Adhikarana*.<sup>95</sup> We shall now discuss the views of the grammarians already referred to by us and the philosophers of the *Nyāya* and the *Mīmāṃsā* schools including Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya, the celebrated author of the *Vyutpattivāda* on *Kartā*, *Karma*, *Karana* etc. in a systematic manner.

Reference notes

1. Pā 1.4.23.
2. Karotīti kārakam Mbh. p.243.
3. Ibid. p.240.
4. Ibid. p.246.
5. Ibid. pp.243-244.
6. Ibid. p.243.
7. Ibid. p.244.
8. Athavā yāvad brūyāt kriyāyām iti tāvat kārake iti.....  
itarathā hi kārakeṣu iti brūyāt. Ibid. p.246.
9. Ibid. p.242.
10. Vastutastvapādānasya.....kāraka -  
vyapadeśanibandhanam. Ibid. p.244.
11. Ibid. p.246.
12. Yat sarveṣu sādhanēṣu.....bhavati under Pā 1.4.23.  
Ibid. p.245.
13. Svāśraye samavetanām tadved evāśrayāntare kriyānām  
abhinispattau samarthyaṁ sādhanam viduh. Vāk. Sā. 1.
14. Kriyānirvṛttau dravyasya śaktiḥ sādhanam. Ibid.p.231.
15. Śaktan hi dravyaṁ sādhanam. Vāk. p.230.
16. Evan hi śaktereva kriyā.....dravyaṁ na pratyāyyate  
Vāk. p.231.
17. Bhāṣye dravyasya.....śaktiśaktimatorabhedavi vakṣaye-  
tyavagantavyam. Vāk. p.231.



18. Vāk. p.230.
19. Ibid. p.230.
20. Kartṛkarmasthā tu.....śāśvāntarasamavetā. Ibid. p.231.
21. Kārakaśabdāśca nimittaparyāyah.....Kasya hetuh?  
Kriyāyāḥ. Kās. under Pā. 1.4.23.
22. Ibid. p.433.
23. Ibid. p.433.
24. Kartā ca svatantrah.....nimittaparyāyasya tu kāraka-  
śabdasya grāhaṇe na doṣaḥ syāt, Ibid. pp.431-432.
25. Yadi gramavadvibhāvena.....kārakam. Ibid. p.433.
26. Kāraka iti nirdhāraṇe saptamī etc. Ibid. p.431.
27. Pradhānena hi Kartā.....nimittabhāva evābhyupagato  
bhavati. Ibid. p.432.
28. Na ca Vaiśeṣikāṇāṃ iva.....na pariśpanda eva. Ibid.  
p.432.
29. Ibid. p.432.
30. Āśritavyāpāram (nimittam) kārakam. Ibid. p.433.
31. Kārakam nimittam Pr. Kau p.387 cf. Kārakaśabdāśca  
nimittaparyāyah. Kās. under Pā. 1.4.23.
32. Karotīti Kārakam iti. Tena kriyānanvayino na bhavati.  
SK. p.112.
33. SK. p.113.
34. FMR. p.466. SK. p.113.
35. Sampradānāderapi.....buddhyārohat kārakatā SK. p.112.

36. Yād vā kārakasabdāḥ kriyāparāḥ. Karoti Kartṛkarmādi-  
vyapadeśān iti vyutpattāḥ. Tathā ca.....kriyānvayi-  
nāmeva tattatsamjñā vidhiyante. FRM. p.467, SKB. p.115.
37. VBS. p.96.
38. Tathā cāgrimeṣvapādānādisamjñāvidhiḥ.....kriyānva-  
yinām eva samjñeti Bhāṣye spaṣṭam. Ibid. p.96.
39. Yād vā kārakasabdāḥ kriyāparāḥ.....tat-tat-samjñā  
vidhiyante. FRM. p.467.
40. Anyeta uttarabhāṣye.....kārakatvam. VBS. p.96.
41. LSS p.620.
42. BSS. p.798.
43. Ibid. p.798.
44. Ibid. p.798.
45. Ibid. p.800.
46. LMS. p.1195-1196.
47. LMS. p.1196.
48. Sarveśān tadvyāpāradvāra.....ityādyupapattiḥ.  
LMS. p.1197.
49. Dravyagatakriyājanakatvasaktireva kārakaḥ. LMS. p.1193.
50. Kriyānimittam kārakam lokataḥ śiddham. under Kalāpa  
śū. 221.
51. Kalāpa. p.218.
52. Ibid. p.218.
53. Ibid. p.218.
54. Kārakam nimittam heturiti paryāyan. SKB. p.994.

53. Ibid. p.995.
54. Jainendra. 1.2.108.
57. Ibid. p.81.
58. Ibid. p.81.
59. ŚS. 2.2.1.
60. Ibid. p.68.
61. Ibid. p.68.
62. Ibid. p.68.
63. Kāraka Sū. 37.
64. Mugdha kāraka. p.101.
65. Ibid. p.103.
66. Śivaṃ parasunā.....katvam ityēke. Ibid. p.103.
67. Ktyarthadvāra.....avyāpteh, Ibid. p.103.
68. Ibid. p.103.
69. LMS. p.1316.
70. Mugdha. p.103.
71. Kārakam taccā saktih.....avi vakṣat tatvat. Ibid. p.102.
72. Sāra. p.81.
73. Kriyāśiddhyupakāraka.....Kriyarthasiddhau sāhāyya-  
dayakabhedanādikriyāśiddhau upasannihitatvena  
kārakam. SRC. p.154.
74. Kriyāhetuḥ Kārakam. Ibid. p.132.
75. Supadma under kāraka. Sū. 1.
76. Kriyā dhātvarthah karotyarthovā. Ibid. p.60.

77. Kriyāśiddhau vyāpāravattayā avasyāpekṣanīyam. Ibid. p. 60.
78. Iha vyāpāravattayeti sambandhasya vyavacchedārtham.  
Ibid. p. 60.
79. Ibid. p. 60.
80. HNM. śū. 961.
81. Tasya janyajanakāntarbhūtakriyāyāḥ.....tat kriyā-  
kāraṇam ucyate. Ibid. p. 373.
82. Ibid. p. 374.
83. Kār. cak. pp. 1-2.
84. Vibhaktiyarthadvārā kriyanvayitvan.....kāraṇatvam  
kriyānimittatvasahitaṁ mukhyamiti. Ibid. p. 3.
85. Ibid. p. 5.
86. SMJ. pp. 37-41.
87. Ibid. p. 41.
88. Ibid. pp. 41-42.
89. ŚS. P. kārika. 67.
90. Ibid. kārika 67.
91. Ibid. p. 295.
92. BCM. p. 91.
93. Ibid. p. 91.
94. Ibid. p. 92.
95. Kartā Karma ca Karaṇam  
Sampradānam tathai va ca  
Apādānādhikaraṇam ityāhuḥ Kāraṇāni  
sat. Sāra. p. 90.

## CHAPTER II

### Kartā

#### Kartā in the Pāṇinian school

### Pāṇini

Pāṇini defines Kartā or the agent as svatantraḥ Kartā.<sup>1</sup> This definition is the keystone of future discussions on the concept of Kartā in the grammatical schools and also some of the philosophical schools.

### Kātyāyana

Kātyāyana, the author of the vārtikas apprehends some inconsistency in the above definition and tries to supplement it by an aphorism (vārtika) i.e. svātantrasya Kartṛsañjñāyān hetumatyupasaṅkhyānaḥ kartavyam.<sup>2</sup> The vārtika means that if the agent (Kartā) is defined as svatantra or independent, in that case, the definition will not apply to that particular agent who acts under the direction of some other agent. Therefore, we must specifically mention that such an agent is also a case of svatantra.

### Patañjali

Patañjali shows that the amendment advanced by the author of the vārtikas to the definition svatantraḥ Kartā is

not necessary. We shall discuss it elaborately in this very chapter in an appropriate place.

The Bhāṣyakāra critically interprets the term svatantra in his commentary. He says that the term tantra denotes a number of meanings. There is a popular meaning of the term. According to this popular meaning, tantra stands for the spread out threads of a weaver. The Bhāṣyakāra does not accept this meaning of the term in the definition of Kartā. Thus, he also does not accept the meaning of svatantra arising from this interpretation. He explains that if we accept the popular meaning of the term tantra, in that case, the term svatantra will denote a weaver only.<sup>3</sup> But, the term Kartā is used in a much wider sense than that in grammar. It is for this reason, the Bhāṣyakāra does not accept the popular meaning of svatantra. He accepts another meaning of the term namely, svapradhāna or self-sufficient.<sup>4</sup> This is undoubtedly the most appropriate meaning of the word in the definition of Kartā. The Bhāṣyakāra explains clearly that Kartā or the agent is self sufficient because, it alone moves the other kārakas for the accomplishment of an act.<sup>5</sup> This interpretation is readily accepted by Bhartrhari and many other grammarians. Bhartrhari explains the role of the agent as the prime mover of other kārakas in interpreting the rule svatantraḥ Kartā.

We have already referred to the amendment which is suggested by the author of the *vārtikas* to the *sūtra svatantraḥ Kartā*. The grammarian opines that the definition *svatantraḥ Kartā* is not applicable to that particular agent which acts under the mandate of another agent. He suggests in the said *vārtika* that if *Kartā* is *svatantra*, it must be *svatantra* in the absolute sense. There must not be any limitation to his independence. The *Bhāṣyakāra* critically examines this view and finally arrives at the conclusion that this amendment is not necessary. He says that even when the agent accomplishes an act under the direction of another agent, he remains independent. The grammarian already explains that the agent is *svatantra* in the sense that it moves the other *kāra*kas for the accomplishment of an act. He does not lose this independence even when he performs an activity under the command of another agent. He further says that the agent sometimes may not obey the order of his director to accomplish an act. He may not respond to such an order when he sees that it does not serve his purpose. It is in this sense also, the agent is independent.<sup>6</sup>

*Pāṇini* treats the *prayojaka* or the director of an agent as described above as a distinct class of *Kartā* which is not covered by the definition *svatantraḥ Kartā*. Therefore, he offers a separate definition for it, that is, *tatprayojako hetuśca*.<sup>7</sup>

Patañjali already discusses the role of Prayojaka Kartā. He lays emphasis on the independence of Prayojya or the agent who is directed instead of the role of Prayojaka in his interpretation on the second definition.

We have discussed above the views of Patañjali on the two definitions of Kartā given by Pāṇini. But, our discussion will remain incomplete if we do not refer to another important view of Patañjali. He implicitly states under the Paninian rule kārake that the agent is the locus of the principal operation denoted by a verb.

### Kaiyaṭa

Patañjali offers some important views in his interpretation of the Paninian rule svatantraḥ Kartā. But, the method which he adopts in offering the views does not help us to attain a correct idea of them. There are at least two cryptic statements in the interpretation namely, nākurvatīti cet svatantraḥ and kurvan svatanthro akurvan na a clarification of which is essentially necessary in order to understand the meaning of svatantra given by him. Kaiyaṭa explains these and other statements of Patañjali so clearly that we can easily grasp the meaning of the Paninian rule given by the Bhāṣyākāra.<sup>8</sup>



Kaiyata justifies the view of the Bhāṣyakāra that the agent is the principal among kārakas. Bhartrhari advances some important arguments in support of the view of Pāṇini that the agent is svatantra or independent. Kaiyata advances these very arguments in order to justify the said view of Patanjali.<sup>9</sup>

The commentator offers a new explanation on the term svatantra in the Paninian rule svatantraḥ Kartā. According to him, the agent is called svatantra because, he acts as the locus of the principal operation denoted by a verb.<sup>10</sup> It is easily understood from his discussion on such instances of Kartā as kṣāṭhāni paṇanti and sthālī paṇanti already referred to by us.

### Bhartrhari

Bhartrhari presents some original views on Kartā in his Vākyapadīya. He does not define the term Kartā. He accepts the definition svatantraḥ Kartā given by Pāṇini as the most appropriate definition of the term. The grammarian critically interprets the definition. He also offers some important philosophical views in his discussion on Kartā.

Let us now explain our statements in a systematic manner. Bhartrhari explains the rule svatantraḥ Kartā in the

most exhaustive manner. According to him, Kartā or the agent is called svatantra or independent for the following reasons :

Kartā acquires its efficiency independently of other karakas from a different source. It renders the other karakas to a subordinate position. These karakas always operate under the direction of the agent. The agent is the prime mover of them. It restrains their operations as soon as the intended act is accomplished. Kartā is not represented by another karaka. Lastly, it contributes its quota even as a remote factor towards the accomplishment of the act.<sup>11</sup>

The above points are very clearly explained by Helārāja in his commentary. Haradatta also explains them in his Padamanjari in a proper manner.

Bhartrhari discusses a few more important points regarding Kartā in Sanskrit grammar. He says that sometimes we use even an inanimate object as a case of Kartā. A question naturally arises in the case of such an agent : "How is it possible for it to play the independent role as described by Bhartrhari?" Bhartrhari appropriately replies to this question. He says that we should not consider such cases from the point of reality. But, we should always attribute the characteristics of an agent described above to such instances.<sup>12</sup>

Bhartrhari solves a knotty problem in the course of his discussion on the subjective case. He says that there are some rare cases in which the same object is treated as the agent and some other cases in the same sentence. Helārāja clarifies the point with the help of an illustration namely, *bhṛtyātmanā atmanā* (the self kills the self by the self). Bhartrhari suggests that in such cases, we should imagine the same object as three distinct *kāraṇas* under three distinct circumstances.<sup>13</sup>

Another important contribution of Bhartrhari is that he elaborates the different philosophical views regarding the origination of an object. The philosophical concepts of the origination of an object play an important role in the concept of *Karta*.<sup>14</sup>

### Helārāja

Bhartrhari explains the Paninian rule *svatantraḥ Karta* in the *kārikās prāganyataḥ śakti-lābhāt* etc. of his *Vākyapadīya*. The grammarian presents some new and important views in the explanation. Helārāja interprets every significant expression of Bhartrhari in these *kārikās* very clearly in order to give us an appropriate idea of the statements of Bhartrhari.<sup>15</sup>

The commentator also critically interprets the different philosophical views presented by Bhartṛhari on the origination of an object in the course of his discussion on the concept of Kartā.<sup>16</sup>

### Kasika

The Vṛttikāra very often offers an independent interpretation on the sūtras of Pāṇini. But, in interpreting the rule svatantraḥ Kartā, he primarily follows the author of the Mahābhāṣya. However, he shows some originality in this interpretation also. He explains the term <sup>svatantra</sup>svatantra not only as pradhānabhūta (principal) but also as agunabhūta.<sup>17</sup> The second interpretation certainly deserves our attention. The Vṛttikāra does not explain the term in his commentary. But, he cites two significant illustrations of svatantra namely, Devadattaḥ pacati and sthālī pacati in order to bring out the subtle distinction between pradhānabhūta and agunabhūta.<sup>18</sup> The distinction is clearly understood from the interpretation of Jinendrabuddhi.

### Jinendrabuddhi

The commentator Jinendrabuddhi tries to explain the significance of the expression agunabhūta. He says that

the predicate *pradhāna* or *princīpalis* is applicable to an agent only when it is considered in terms of other *kārakas* in a sentence. But, sometimes the agent alone remains present in a sentence. He clarifies the point with the help of the illustrations *Devadatta āste* and *śeta Devadattah*. Jinendrabuddhi says that only the second interpretation of the term *svatantra* is applicable to such a solitary agent. The term *agunabhūta* in the present context means that particular *kāraka* which is not subordinate to any other *kāraka*, and the solitary agent in a sentence is always non-subordinate to any other *kāraka*.<sup>19</sup>

The *Vṛttikāra* says in his commentary on the rule *svatantrah Kartā* that the speaker singles out a particular *kāraka* as *svatantra* according to his intention. Jinendrabuddhi clearly explains this view.<sup>20</sup>

He also gives us an appropriate idea of *Prayojaka Kartā*. He divides *Prayojaka* into primary and secondary. According to him, the term *bhikṣā* in the sentence *bhikṣā vāsayati* is a case of the second type of *Prayojaka Kartā*.<sup>21</sup>

### Haradatta

Haradatta, the other commentator on the *Kāśikāvṛtti* also critically explains the concept of *Kartā* presented by the *Vṛttikāra* in his commentary on the rule *svatantrah Kartā*.

He synthesises the views of Bhartr̥hari with those of the Vṛttikāra in his interpretation. He gives us three distinct meanings of the term svatantra. He accepts only the third meaning of the term. According to the third meaning the term svatantra is an equivalent of the term pradhāna.<sup>22</sup> Haradatta says that the term svatantra is well known in this sense only.<sup>23</sup> He quotes the relevant kārīkās of Bhartr̥hari and properly interprets them in order to bring home to us the exact significance of the term svatantra in the Paninian definition.<sup>24</sup> Haradatta also accepts the interpretation agunabhūta as offered by the Vṛttikāra for the term svatantra. He agrees with his predecessor Jinendrabuddhi that the term pradhāna is not applicable to a solitary agent in a sentence. Therefore, the second interpretation of the Vṛttikāra is necessary.<sup>25</sup> He also assigns another reason for this interpretation of the term svatantra. He says that the concept of svatantra as propounded by Bhartr̥hari is not applicable to an inanimate agent. But, when the term svatantra is explained as agunabhūta, the above problem does not arise.<sup>26</sup> He also quotes the view of Kaiyata that Kartā is the locus of the principal operation denoted by a verb,<sup>27</sup> and it is the meaning of agunabhūta.<sup>27</sup>

Haradatta presents the interpretation of the term agunabhūta as given by Kaiyata in his commentary on the rule svatantraḥ Kartā.

The grammarian subscribes to the view of the

Bhāṣyakāra that an agent does not lose his independence even when he acts under the direction of another agent.<sup>28</sup>

A critical examination of the above views of Haradatta shows that the grammarian not only possesses a thorough knowledge of the views of his predecessors on the subjective case but also tries to synthesise these views in an excellent manner. We see the entire development of the concept of Kartā from the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali down to his time in his commentary. Haradatta says that the concept of svatantra as presented by Bhartṛhari in his kārīkās prāganyataḥ śaktilābhād etc. is not applicable to an inanimate agent. Therefore, the interpretation agunabhūta for the term svatantra is necessary. There lies a fundamental difference between Bhartṛhari and Haradatta. Bhartṛhari says that the main characteristics of a Kartā as described by him should be attributed even to an inanimate object when it plays the role of an agent.

#### Puruṣottama

Puruṣottama follows the Vṛttikāra in interpreting the rules svatantraḥ Kartā and tatprayojako hetuseḥ. He accepts the view of the Vṛttikāra that the term svatantra in the first rule denotes that particular kāraṇa which is treated as non-subordinate to any other kāraṇa by the speaker according

to his intention. He offers three appropriate illustrations in order to justify this view.<sup>29</sup> He does not offer any new idea in the interpretation of the second rule except following the Vṛttikāra rigidly in it.<sup>30</sup>

### Sr̥ṣṭidhara

Sr̥ṣṭidhara appropriately explains the standpoint of Puruṣottama on Kartā.<sup>31</sup> But, he also does not show any originality in his discussion.

### Rāmacandra

Rāmacandra explains the rule svatantraḥ Kartā very briefly.<sup>32</sup> We cannot understand the exact significance of the term svatantra from this explanation. He does not discuss the second definition of Pāṇini on Kartā in his grammar.

### Vit̥ṭhalācārya

The commentator Vit̥ṭhalācārya explains the term svatantra in the rule mentioned above in an exhaustive manner. He accepts the view of the Vṛttikāra that the term svatantra denotes principal or non-subordinate in this rule.<sup>33</sup> He explains



this view in a clear manner. According to this explanation, the term svatantra or Kartā denotes that particular kāraṇa which moves all other kāraṇas but it is not moved by any of them.<sup>34</sup> This is partly a new concept of Kartā. Patañjali already states that the agent is the mover of all other cases. But, he does not state that it is not moved by any other case. Viṭṭhala finds that the interpretation given by him on svatantra is not applicable to the solitary agent in a sentence. Therefore, he further explains the term Kartā as the locus of the principal operation indicated by a verb.<sup>35</sup> The grammarian finally states that the agent is by all means non-subordinate to other kāraṇas.<sup>36</sup>

#### Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita

Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita explains the term svatantra in the Paninian rule svatantraḥ Kartā as the locus of the principal operation denoted by a verb. He justifies this explanation by referring to the statement of Bhartṛhari, namely, dhātunoktakriya nityaṁ kāraṇe Kartṛteṣyate.<sup>37</sup>

### Kaundabhatta

Kaundabhatta, the author of the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa-sāra* offers an illuminating discussion on the concept of Kartā in Sanskrit grammar. He lays emphasis on the meaning of the Paninian rule *svatantraḥ Kartā* and the meaning of the third inflexion which is attached to the subjective case in his discussion. Kaundabhatta primarily follows Bhattoji in interpreting the definition *svatantraḥ Kartā*. He says that the term *svatantra* in the definition implies that the agent is the locus of the principal operation denoted by a verb.<sup>38</sup>

But, he thinks that this interpretation is not able to give us a correct idea of the concept of Kartā. Therefore, he clarifies this interpretation. We have already stated that the speaker himself selects one particular operation from among a group of operations denoted by a verb as the principal one. The locus of the said operation is known as Kartā or the agent in grammar. Thus, even a cooking pot, fire and the fuel may be the cases of Kartā when the emphasis is laid on the operations located in them. Kaundabhatta emphasises this age-old concept of Kartā in the clarification of the said interpretation.<sup>39</sup>

The grammarian does not remain confined to the traditional views alone. He also offers some new interpretations

which contribute greatly towards the development of the concept of Kartā. He explains the significance of the third inflexion which is attached to the subjective case. He says that the third inflexion attached to the subjective case denotes locus (i.e. the locus of the operation). His argument is that the sense of the vyāpāra or the operation is communicated by the verb itself. Therefore, when we define the term Kartā as the locus of the principal operation, naturally the sense of the locus is denoted by the third inflexion itself because we do not attain the sense of the locus from any other object.<sup>40</sup>

Kaundabhatta rejects two important definitions of Kartā, namely, kāraṇacakra-prayoktṛtvaṃ Kartṛtvaṃ and kṛtyāśrayatvaṃ Kartṛtvaṃ. According to the first definition, the agent is that which moves the other kāraṇas for the accomplishment of an intended action. The second definition finds its origin in the Nyāya school. According to the Naiyāyikas, it is the kṛtā or the volition of the agent which is responsible for bringing about an action. Thus, Kartā is he who possesses volition which generates an intended action.

Kaundabhatta says that these two definitions are too narrow to cover such examples of Kartā as daṇḍaḥ karoti. He shows the following reasons for this. In the example daṇḍaḥ karoti, the agent daṇḍa (staff) is an inanimate object.

Therefore, it does not possess volition. Secondly, it does not move any other kāraka in the sentence for the accomplishment of the act. But, it accomplishes the act by itself.<sup>41</sup>

The grammarian refers to an Upanisadic passage, that is, *etanītaḥ pretyābhisaṃbhavitāsmi* in which the same jīva (individual soul) is treated as both the subjective case and the objective case. This is apparently self-contradictory. The grammarian clearly states that the same object (in the present case the jīva) can be a case of Kartā and Karma in two different contexts. According to him, there is no contradiction in such a use. But, he says that it cannot be a case of both the kārakas at a time because, such a use is prohibited in grammar.<sup>42</sup>

He divides the subjective case into three classes namely, *Suddha*, *Prayojaka* and *Karmakartā*. The term *Suddha* denotes that particular agent who is independent in the true sense of the term. The term *Prayojaka* is well-known to us. The term *Karmakartā* stands for *Prayojya* or that particular agent who acts under the direction of another agent.<sup>43</sup> The grammarian shows no originality in this division.

### Harivallabha

Harivallabha clearly explains every significant statement of Kaundabhatta on the subjective case.<sup>44</sup> He presents in this connection the definition of Kartā given by Nāgasa in his *Laghumañjusa* and interprets it in an appropriate manner.<sup>45</sup> He has no original contribution to the concept of the subjective case.

### Nāgasa

Nāgasa tries to present the inner meaning of the term Kartā instead of its superficial meaning. He critically examines the logical import of the term before giving an exact definition of it. We can understand this logical import clearly only when it is taken in relation to a vyāpāra or an operation which exclusively belongs to the agent. Nāgasa first explains the significance of the third inflexion which is attached to the subjective case. He says that this inflexion denotes a particular sakti or properly known as Kartṛtva.<sup>46</sup> He interprets the term Kartṛtva in a logical manner in order to give us a correct idea of the logical import of the term Kartā. It is clear from his interpretation that the agent is invariably the possessor or the locus of an operation as denoted by a verb in the active voice. Nāgasa clearly explains

that this operation is not qualified by any predicate.<sup>47</sup> This statement is very significant. The predecessors of Nāgasa commonly use such expressions as *saṃyogānūkulavyāpāra*, *viklitṭyanukūlavyāpāra* etc. in order to indicate the acts of going, cooking and the like. In such expressions, the *vyāpāra* or the operation is invariably predicated by the *phala* or the result indicated by the verb. But, such expressions are applicable only in the case of transitive verbs which denote both an operation and a result. The case of intransitive verbs is entirely different from that of transitive verbs. Intransitive verbs denote only an operation but not a result. Therefore, the question of the operation being predicated does not arise at all in this case. It is for this reason, Nāgasa lays emphasis on the unpredicated operation in his definition of *Kartā*. Nāgasa means to say that the agent is the locus of the operation denoted by a verb irrespective of whether the verb is transitive or intransitive. He suggests that if any, qualifying term is used to the operation, it will make the definition of *Kartā* too narrow.

Nāgasa discusses the role of the agent in the active voice only. There is a definite reason behind this. We get a clear idea of the role played by the agent in a sentence in the active voice alone. In the passive voice, *Karmakāraka* itself plays the dominant role.

The grammarian also states that there is a determining relation (avacchedaka sambandha) between the agent and the operation.<sup>48</sup> It implies that the particular operation belongs exclusively to the agent and it does not belong to any other kāraka. Let us clarify this point with the help of an illustration namely, Rāmaḥ pacati (i.e. Rama is cooking). When we use the expression Rāmaḥ pacati, it implies that the agent Rāma exerts some physical and mental efforts in order to bring about the act of cooking. It clearly shows that Rāma is the possessor or locus of these efforts. These efforts or operations do not belong to any other kāraka in the sentence. Now, the specific relation which exists between Rāma and the said operations is the so called determining relation.

Nāgeśa says that he lays emphasis on the determining relation in order to eliminate the time relation which holds between the agent and the operation. The determining relation is the specific relation between the agent and the operation.<sup>49</sup>

Let us now present the definition of Kartā given by Nāgeśa. After considering all the points which are discussed above, Nāgeśa defines Kartā as Kartṛpratyayasambhivyāhāre vyāpārātāvachchedakasambandhena tadddhatvarthanisthaviśeṣyātānirūpitaprakāratānāśrayataddhātvarthāśraya. He says that this is the logical import of the Paninian definition svatan-

trah Kartā.<sup>50</sup>

Nāgasa employs the Nyāya method in defining Kartā. But, it is worth noting that the grammarian does not accept the Nyāya standpoint that Kartā is the possessor of volition in the definition of the term. He strictly follows the grammatical school in defining Kartā. He lays emphasis on vyāpāra or operation and not on kṛti or volition.

According to the Naiyāyikas, only an animate object can play the role of an agent in the true sense of the term, because it alone possesses volition. Nāgasa says that this rigid view is wholly unacceptable to him. He sticks to the well known standpoint of the grammatical school that even an inanimate object like a chariot may become a regular case of Kartā. The Naiyāyikas hold that an insentient being like a chariot is used as the agent in a sentence only in a secondary sense. Nāgasa refutes this view. He argues that the secondary sense is not attained from the meaning of the inflexion which is attached to the agent.<sup>51</sup> In fine, Nāgasa follows the grammatical tradition in a faithful manner, in his concept of Kartā.



### Kartā in non-Paninian schools

#### Kalāpa

Sarvavarṇa defines the term Kartā in his Kalāpa as *yah karoti sa Kartā*.<sup>52</sup> This definition follows from the etymological meaning of the term Kartā. He also treats the Prayojaka as a distinct type of agent.<sup>53</sup>

#### Durgasiṃha

Durgasiṃha illustrates the definition by two examples, namely *Chātreṇa haḍyate* and *Caitreṇa kṛtam*. The second example of Kartā is significant. Durgasiṃha says that the second example is cited by him in order to show that the term *karoti* in the definition denotes even a past action.<sup>54</sup>

#### Trilocana

Trilocana reiterates this view of Durgasiṃha in the *Panji*.<sup>55</sup>

#### Suśenācārya

Suśenācārya discusses within the framework of a brief commentary all the important definitions of Kartā met

with in the grammatical and philosophical schools. He starts with the definition of Kartā given by Pāṇini and tries to bring out the exact significance of it. While doing so, he rejects a number of definitions of earlier grammarians and philosophers. He first criticises the view according to which the term svatantra means that the agent is not moved or directed by any other kāraṇa. He says that this view is not applicable to such examples of Kartā as rājñā ājñaptāḥ karyāṁ karoti in which the agent is directed by the prayojaka to accomplish an act. He also says that the term svatantra does not denote a person who always directs some other person to accomplish an act. He shows that such an interpretation is not applicable to the solitary agent in a sentence. He clarifies the idea with the help of the illustration Devadatto bhavati. Then, he refers to an important view of the Nyāya school. According to this view, the agent invariably possesses an appropriate knowledge of the act which he accomplishes. Further, he possess the desire and an inner effort for accomplishing the act. Sūreṇa says that this view is not applicable in the case of an inanimate agent. He refers to the sentence ratho gacchati (i.e. the chariot is moving) in this connection. He critically examines another important definition of Kartā namely, kriyāśrayatvaṁ Kartṛtvaṁ. He opines that kriyā is a broad term. It denotes the result also. We all know that the

objective case itself is the locus of the result. But, Kartā is not the locus of the result. Therefore, if we accept the above definition, a new problem will arise. The problem is that the objective case itself will be the subjective case. Suṣeṇa, however, says that there is no such usage as *odanah paṇati* in the Sanskrit language. Therefore, the problem as anticipated by us does not arise. But, he shows that even then the definition is not applicable at all to such illustrations of Kartā as *ghaṭo naṣṭah* (i.e. the jar has perished) in which the jar is not the locus but the <sup>T</sup>correlative of the act of perishing. Suṣeṇa also rejects the view that Kartā denotes the locus of the particular operation which generates the operations of all other kārakas. He says that such a view is not applicable to such instances as *Devadatto bhavati* where the agent remains alone in a sentence. Some scholars again interpret the term *svatantra* as the locus of that particular operation which does not stand as an obstacle to the operations of other kārakas. Suṣeṇa does not accept this view also. He adheres only to the view of Durgasiṅha that the term *svatantra* denotes the locus of the principal operation indicated by a verb. In this way, the celebrated commentator upholds the commonly accepted view of the grammatical school on Kartā.<sup>56</sup>

Cāndra

Candregomī says that the third inflexion is used in the sense of Kartā. We have already discussed that Candregomī does not define Kartā. He cites one illustration of Kartā namely, Caitreṇa kṛtam. In it, the third inflexion is used in the word Caitra in order to indicate that it is a case of Kartā.<sup>57</sup> The word Caitra in the sentence is an example of Anukta Kartā. Anukta Kartā means that the suffix which is used with the verb in the sentence does not indicate the agent. But, the third inflexion itself indicates the agent. The above characteristic is clearly noticed in the case of the word Caitra in the sentence.

In Sanskrit grammar, the scope of Kartā is not confined to Anukta Kartā alone. There is also a so called Ukta Kartā. It stands for the case in apposition in English grammar. The essential characteristic of Ukta Kartā is that the suffix attached to the verb to which it is related in the sentence itself indicates the agent. Therefore, the first inflexion is used with Ukta Kartā in order to denote that it is a stem (prātipadika) but not the third inflexion. We have already discussed the cases of Prayojaka Kartā and Prayojya Kartā clearly. Patañjali and other Sanskrit grammarians show that even the cases of Karaṇa, Adhikaraṇa etc. can be used as the

agent. Thus, they also show that even an inanimate object can play the role of the agent in a sentence. The purpose of this discussion is to show that the discussion offered by Candragomī on the subjective case is quite inadequate for giving us a comprehensive idea of the case.

### Saṅkṣiptasāra

Kramadīśvara, the celebrated author of the Saṅkṣiptasāra combines the Paninian rules svatantraḥ Karta and tat-prayajako hetusce into a single definition of Karta namely, kriyāmukhyaḥ prayojakau Karta.<sup>58</sup> He substitutes the term svatantra by the term kriyāmukhya in the definition. He also lays proper emphasis on the Prayojaka as a distinct case of Karta, in the definition.

### Jumaranandi

Jumaranandi explains the term kriyāmukhya in an appropriate manner. He says that the term kriyāmukhya denotes the principal among kāraṅkas. According to him, the agent is the principal among kāraṅkas, because he alone possesses the capacity of moving other kāraṅkas for accomplishing an intended act.<sup>59</sup>

### Goyīcandra

Goyīcandra, the other commentator on the Śāṅkṣip-  
tasāra accepts the above views of Jumarānandī. He discusses  
a very important point in this connection. He says that some-  
times the agent does not play the role of a mover of other  
karakas in certain sentences. He refers to the sentence  
asta Viprah in order to clarify the point. He says that even  
in such cases, the agent remains the agent. Jumarānandī uses  
the expression tadāyōjanārha in the interpretation of the  
definition of Kartā given by Kramadīśvara. The term arha  
means capable. This very term indicates that the agent posse-  
sses the capacity of moving the other factors.<sup>60</sup> This capacity  
remains sometimes latent and sometimes it becomes kinetic.

### Jainendra

The author of the Jainendravṛkaraṇa defines Kartā  
by the very rule of Pāṇini namely, svatantrah Kartā.<sup>61</sup> He  
adopts the same technic in defining some other technical  
terms. He also defines the Prayojaka Kartā by the rule tadyo-  
jako hāṛśca.<sup>62</sup> The term yojaka in the definition stands for  
the term prayojaka in the rule of Pāṇini.

Abhayānandi

The celebrated commentator Abhayānandi rigidly follows the Paninian tradition in interpreting the above definitions. He explains the term *svatantra* as *ātmapradhāna*. He reiterates the view of Patañjali that even when the agent is directed by another agent to accomplish an act, he remains independent because he may not start the action when he is not willing to accomplish it.<sup>63</sup> He also corroborates the view of the Bhāṣyakāra that even the inanimate objects like the cooking pot can be the cases of *Kartā* if it is so intended by the speaker.<sup>64</sup>

Abhayānandi explains the definition *tadyajako hetusca* also in a proper manner. He accepts the view of Jinendrabuddhi that *yojaka* or *Prayojaka* is of two types, namely, primary and secondary. He illustrates the second type of *Yojaka Kartā* by the very example of Jinendrabuddhi, that is *bhikṣā vāsayati*.<sup>65</sup>

Śabdānuśāsana

Like the author of the Jainendra, Hemacandra also defines *Kartā* by the Paninian rule *svatantraḥ Kartā* itself.<sup>66</sup> Hemacandra follows the well-established grammatical tradition

in his interpretation of the definition. He interprets the term svatantra as pradhāna or principal. He also states that a particular kāraka is determined as svatantra or independent by the speaker himself according to his intention.<sup>67</sup>

Hemacandra illustrates the definition of Kartā in an exhaustive manner. He cites a large number of examples of the subjective case in order to give us a comprehensive idea of the different types of Kartā. He first cites the example Devadattah pacati. In this example, the verb pacati itself denotes the agent. The term Devadatta in the above example is only a case in apposition with the agent denoted by the verb. Such a case is known as Ukta Kartā or Abhihita Kartā in Sanskrit grammar. The second example of Kartā as given by Hemacandra is Jinadattena kṛtam. In it, the third inflexion which is attached to the term Jinadatta itself denotes Kartā. Such a Kartā is known as Anukta Kartā in Sanskrit grammar. The grammarian shows in the third example, namely, sthālī pacati that an inanimate object also can play the role of Kartā in grammar. He goes a step further in the fourth illustration namely, corasya rujati rogah. In this illustration, the grammarian shows that even an abstract object like a disease may become a case of Kartā. He also illustrates Prayojya and Prayojaka Kartā by the example Devadattena pācayati Caitraḥ.<sup>68</sup>



Hemacandra clearly explains the term *pradhāna* in his interpretation of the definition of *Kartā*. He reiterates the views of Bhartrhari in the above explanation.<sup>69</sup>

#### Mugdhabodha

Bopadeva introduces a monosyllabic technical term *gha* in the sense of *Kartā*. The grammarian does not interpret *gha*.<sup>70</sup>

#### Durgādāsa Vidyāvāṣiṣa

Durgādāsa Vidyāvāṣiṣa strictly follows Sarvavarma, the author of the *Kalapa* in interpreting *gha* in his commentary. He also presents the view of the logicians that the term *Kartā* denotes that particular object which possesses volition.<sup>71</sup>

#### Rāma Tarkavāṣiṣa

Rāma Tarkavāṣiṣa interprets the term *Kartā* as denoted by the technical term *gha* according to its etymological meaning. He interprets the etymological meaning of the term also very clearly. He synthesises the views of Pāṇini and the *Vṛttikāra* in this interpretation. He finally states

that the term Kartā denotes the direct locus of an action. He defines it as the direct locus in order to distinguish it from the locative case.<sup>72</sup>

#### Sārasvata

The author of the Sārasvata is third grammarian in the non-Paninian school who defines the term Kartā by the Paninian rule Svatantra Kartā. He explains the term Svatantra as the locus of the principal operation denoted by a verb.<sup>73</sup> This is a well known standpoint of the grammatical school.

#### Candrakīrti

The celebrated commentator Candrakīrti also interprets the term Svatantra in the above manner.<sup>74</sup>

#### Rāmāṣṭana

The commentator Rāmāṣṭana is silent regarding the meaning of Kartā or the subdivisions etc. of the case.

### Supadma

Like the author of the Sankṣiptasāra, the author of the Supadma also combines the Pāṇinian rules svatantraḥ Kartā and tat-prayojako hetusca into a single definition of Kartā, namely, svatantratatprayojakau Kartā.<sup>75</sup>

### Viṣṇumīśra

Viṣṇumīśra offers an elaborate and scholarly interpretation on the above definition. He first interprets the term svatantra in the same way as Jamaranandi interprets the term kriyāṃukhya in the definition of Kramadīśvara. He says that the agent possesses the capacity of moving the other kārakas for the accomplishment of an act even when he actually does not do so in certain cases. He finally explains the term svatantra as the locus of the principal operation signified by a verb in a sentence. He also clearly explains the role of Prayojaka Kartā.<sup>76</sup>

### Harinamanta

Jīvagowāṃ strictly follows Pāṇini in defining the term Kartā. The definition of the term as given by him is svatantratatprayojakaṅca Kartr.<sup>77</sup> The term Kartr is used in

the definition as an adjective of the term *Kāraka*. Jīvaśwami clearly explains the terms *Ukta Kartā* and *Amukta Kartā* in his interpretation of definition. He also explains the term *Prayojaka* appropriately and cites a suitable illustration of it.<sup>78</sup>

### Prayogaratnamālā

Parasottama Vidyāvāgīśa presents the very definitions of *Kartā* offered by Pāṇini in his *Prayogaratnamālā* by briefly interpreting them.<sup>79</sup> The grammarian properly illustrates the definitions.<sup>80</sup> He shows that the speaker sometimes uses certain terms as cases of *Kartā* in a secondary sense. He refers to the sentences *asiśchinatti* and *bhikṣā vāsayate*<sup>81</sup> *dvija* in this connection.<sup>82</sup>

### Kartā in philosophical schools

#### Kāraṇakakra

Bhavananda Siddhāntavāgīśa offers an illuminating discussion on the concept of *Kartā* in the *Kāraṇakakra*. He first examines a few important definitions of *Kartā* as given by the grammarians. He finds that these definitions are not appropriate. Therefore, he offers a new definition of *Kartā*.

Bhavananda starts the chapter on Kartā in his Kāśakṛa with a critical interpretation of the definition *kriyāśrayatvaṃ Kartṛtvam* given by the grammarians. According to this interpretation, the definition *kriyāśrayatvaṃ Kartṛtvam* implies that the meaning of a verb in the active voice is itself the Kartā or the agent.<sup>83</sup> Bhavananda clarifies the above idea by citing three suitable illustrations namely, *pacati*, *jānāti* and *naśyati*. These three verbs are in the active voice. The verb *pacati* is derived from the root *pac*. The root *pac* denotes the act of cooking. This act again means a particular operation which generates the result known as *paka* or *viklitti*. Bhavananda says that the verb *pacati* denotes the locus of this operation. This very locus is otherwise known as the Kartā or the agent of the act of cooking. Similarly, he shows that the verb *jānāti* denotes the locus of the act of knowing. Like the previous instance, this locus is also the agent of the act. But, a verb in the active voice does not necessarily denote the locus of an operation. It is clear from Bhavananda's interpretation of the verb *naśyati*. There is an exception in the case of the verb *naśyati*. It does not denote a locus of the act of perishing but it denotes only a correlative of the act. This correlative is the Kartā or the agent.<sup>84</sup>

Let us now explain the above ideas with the help of a few suitable illustrations namely, Devadattaḥ pacati, Rāmo jānāti and ghaṭo nasyati. In the first illustration, Devadatta is the locus of the particular operation denoted by the root *pac* in the verb *pacati*. In the illustration, Rāmo jānāti, Rāma denotes the locus of the act of knowing indicated by the root *jñā* in the verb *jānāti*. Again, in the illustration ghaṭo nasyati, the word *ghaṭa* or the jar denotes the co-relative of the act of perishing indicated by the root *nas* in the verb *nasyati*. Because, the jar becomes non-existent as a result of the act of perishing, it cannot become a locus of the act. Now, the terms Devadatta, Rāma and ghaṭa in the above illustrations are cases of Kartā according to the interpretation of Bhavānanda of the definition *kriyāśrayatvaṁ Kartṛtvam*.

Bhavānanda says that the speaker sometimes uses such expressions also as *kāṣṭhaḥ pacati*. The term *kāṣṭha* is generally used as a case of Karama with the verb *pacati*. But, the intention of the speaker in the above illustration is that the verb *pacati* should denote the term *kāṣṭha*.<sup>85</sup> In other words, he intends that the term *kāṣṭha* should be the Kartā of the act of cooking. Therefore, he uses the above expressions.

It is clear from this discussion that an inanimate object also can be a case of Kartā according to the definition discussed above. Bhavānanda is not ready to accept such a view.

He holds the view that the agent is invariably an animate object.

He discusses another important definition of Kartā of the grammatical school. This definition is Kāra-kāntarā-prayojyatve sati kārakāntarāprayojakatvaṁ Kartṛtvam.<sup>83</sup> We meet with this definition for the first time in the commentary of Viṭṭhala in a slightly different form. According to this definition, Kartā is the mover of all other kārakas while he himself is not moved by any other kāraka.

This definition is very scientifically framed. Some scholars have rightly pointed out that the definition is not applicable to the cases of Karma etc. for the reason that the clause kārakāntarāprayojyatve sati is used in it.<sup>87</sup>

Bhavananda rejects this definition on a very strong ground. He says that all living beings are moved by God for accomplishing different activities. If the definition is accepted, in that case, no living being will be a case of Kartā in relation to his activities.<sup>88</sup>

Some scholars interpret the term kārakāntarāprayojyatva in a different manner. According to this interpretation, the term means that the agent is not the āśraya or the locus of the operation of another kāraka which generates the result as intended by the agent.

Bhavananda Siddhāntavāgīśa rejects this view also. He says that if the above interpretation is accepted, the potter who makes a pot will not be the agent of the act of making the pot. The potter moves the wheel by a stick at the time of making the pot. The contact between the stick and the wheel generates the result as intended by the potter. But, the potter himself is not the locus of the said contact. Thus, according to the above interpretation of the term *kāra-kāntarāpravyojyātva*, the potter cannot be the agent of the act of making the pot. This view is not acceptable to us. The potter is a clear case of *Kartā* of the said act.<sup>89</sup>

After a critical examination of the above definitions of *Kartā*, Bhavananda realises that a new and appropriate definition of *Kartā* is necessary. Therefore, he offers the definition *anukūlakṛtimattvaṃ Kartṛtvam*. According to this definition, *Kartā* or the agent is one who possesses the volition (*kṛti*) which is favourable for an action. Bhavananda says that the term *Kartā* is derived from the root *kr* by adding the suffix *trc* to it. The root *kr* denotes *yatna* or volition while the suffix *trc* denotes locus and hence, the above definition is justified.<sup>90</sup>

He further says that the etymological meaning of *Kartā* itself indicates that the agent is invariably a living or animate object. Therefore, an inanimate being cannot be a



a case of Kartā in the proper sense of the term. But, the inanimate objects are also very often used as Kartā. Such usages are purely secondary.<sup>91</sup>

Bhavananda Siddhāntavāgīśa is a philosopher endowed with great originality. He offers a new definition of Kartā which can be easily justified from the Nyāya standpoint. But, we cannot agree with him that whenever an inanimate being is treated as a Kartā, it is a purely secondary use. However, his view is accepted by all the logicians coming after him.

### Sāraṃajarī

The author of the Sāraṃajarī strictly follows Bhavananda Siddhāntavāgīśa in defining Kartā. He defines the term as kriyānūkūla kṛtimattvaṃ Kartṛtvam. Like his predecessor, he also states that this definition follows from the etymological meaning of Kartā. He corroborates the view of Bhavananda that the above definition is applicable exclusively to an animate being, and therefore, whenever an inanimate object is used as Kartā in a sentence, such a use should be treated as a secondary one.<sup>92</sup>

Śabdāśaktiprakāśika

Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra says that the meaning as denoted by a verb in the active voice is itself the Kartā or the agent.<sup>93</sup> He explains this view with the help of the verbs pacati, jñāti etc. These verbs are used in the active voice. He says that the verb pacati denotes a person who possesses the inner effort (yatna) which is favourable for accomplishing the act of cooking. According to him, this very person is the Kartā or the agent of the act of cooking. Let us clarify the idea with the help of an example namely, Devadattah pacati. In this example, Devadatta is the person as denoted by the verb pacati. Therefore, he is the Kartā in the example. Jagadīśa says that the verb jñāti denotes the locus of the act of knowing, and this locus is the Kartā of the said act. Jagadīśa also discusses the meanings of the verbs naśyati and pratibimbate. According to him, the verb naśyati denotes the co-relative of the act of perishing. Thus, when we use the expression puruṣo naśyati, the word puruṣa is the co-relative of the act of perishing as denoted by the verb. He says that this is the Kartā of the act. He opines that the verb pratibimbate denotes the sense of an adjective or a qualifier of the image which is illusory. It shows that when we use the expression mukhaṁ pratibimbate, the word mukha is the agent in the sentence in this specified sense.<sup>94</sup>

It may appear to us from the above discussion that Jagadīśa follows the view of the grammatical school on Kartā namely, *kriyāśrayatvaṃ Kartṛtvam* as presented by Bhavānanda in his *Kāraṇacakra*. But, it is not so. Jagadīśa clearly states that he does not subscribe to this view. According to this view, even an inanimate object like a chariot can become a case of Kartā. The followers of this definition interpret the term *kriyā* in three different ways. According to one school, *kriyā* denotes motion. Jagadīśa says that if this interpretation is accepted, the animate being namely, a man who also cooks but does not move from his place at the time of cooking will not be a case of Kartā. On the other hand, the rice which moves in the cooking pot at the time of being boiled will be a case of Kartā. This view is not accepted by scholars. According to the second school, the term *kriyā* denotes *dhatvartha* or the meaning of a root. Jagadīśa shows that if the second meaning of *kriyā* is accepted, the locus of an action will remain unspecified. In that case, an inanimate object will also be the agent. But, he is not ready to accept this view. There is a third school according to which the term *kriyā* means an operation which is favourable for generating a motion. Jagadīśa states that if this explanation is accepted, every case which generates motion through its operation will be a Kartā. It is for the above reasons, he rejects the defi-

nition. He finally adheres to the view of the Nyāya school that Kartā invariably denotes the locus or the possessor of the volition (kṛti) which is favourable for accomplishing an intended act.<sup>95</sup>

### Vyutpattivāda

Gaḍādhara Bhaṭṭācārya, the author of the Vyutpattivāda is one of the greatest philosophers of the Navyanyāya school. He does not define kāraka. But, he defines Kartā, Karma etc. and critically interprets the definitions given by him on the terms.

Let us now discuss the concept of Kartā presented by him. Gaḍādhara accepts the view of the new logicians that Kartā invariably possesses the volition (kṛti) which is favourable for the accomplishment of an intended act.<sup>96</sup> He agrees with his predecessors Bhavānanda, Jayakṛṣṇa etc. that the root kṛ (from which the term Kartā is derived) denotes yatna or volition and therefore, the agent is naturally an animate being. But, he states that sometimes, even an inanimate object is also treated as the agent. He refers to the sentence kāṣṭhaṁ pacati in this connection. The word kāṣṭha in this sentence is an inanimate object. Gaḍādhara reiterates the view of his predecessors that such a use is purely

secondary.<sup>97</sup> The philosopher says that the definition of Karta given by Pāṇini namely, svatantra<sup>Kartā</sup> is applicable to an inanimate object also. He explains the term svatantra as non-subordinate to any other karaka in the sentence. The word katha in the sentence katham pacati also possesses this sense and thus, it is a case of svatantra or Kartā according to the Paninian rule.<sup>98</sup>

Gaḍādhara Bhaṭṭācārya shows that kṛti or volition plays a significant role in the concept of Kartā. He states that when a person hurls the weapon called Nārāca at his enemy but accidentally kills a Brāhmaṇa, he need not perform full prāyascitta for the act of killing the Brāhmaṇa because, he does not apply his volition for this act at the time of hurling the Nārāca. He, however, admits that the person who so kills the Brāhmaṇa is himself the Kartā of the act.<sup>99</sup>

It appears from the above standpoint of Gaḍādhara that the view of the grammarians that the agent is the locus of the principal operation denoted by the verb is more logical than the view of the new logicians that the agent <sup>denotes</sup> is the possessor of kṛti or volition.

Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi

Gāgā Bhaṭṭa accepts the well known view of the grammatical school that the term Kartā denotes the locus of the principal operation signified by a verb. He rigidly follows the author of the Kārakasūtra in interpreting this view.<sup>100</sup>

The philosopher rejects three important definitions of Kartā. Of these three definitions, the first two are offered by the Naiyāyikas. According to these definitions, the agent invariably possesses yatna or kṛti (volition). According to the second definition, again, the agent must possess the direct knowledge of the act he accomplishes and also the desire to accomplish this act. Gāgā Bhaṭṭa shows that these definitions are not applicable to an inanimate agent in a sentence. He refers to the sentences kūlāṃpipatisati and rathe gacchati in this connection. He rejects the definitions on the above ground. The third definition appears for the first time in the commentary of Viṭṭhala. According to this definition, the agent is invariably the mover of other kārakas. Gāgā Bhaṭṭa rejects this definition on the ground that it is not applicable to the examples of Kartā mentioned above.<sup>101</sup>

The above discussion clearly shows that the philosopher shows very little originality in the concept of Kartā presented by him.

Reference notes

1. Pā. 1.4.54.
2. Mbh. p.278.
3. Kim cātaḥ? Tantuṃ vāyo prāpnoti. Ibid. p.277.
4. Svapradhāna iti ganyate. Ibid. p.277.
5. Kim punaḥ pradhānam? Kartā.....Yat sarveṣu sādhanēṣu sannihiteṣu Kartā pravartayitā bhavati. Ibid. p.245.
6. Praṣṭe ca kilāyam.....na karoti svatantryam bhavati. Ibid. p.279.
7. Pā. 1.4.55.
8. Mbh. p.279.
9. Ibid. p.278.
10. Ibid. p.278.
11. Prāganyate.....svānttryam Kartur ucyate Vāk. Sā. 101-102.
12. Ibid. Sā. 103.
13. Ibid. Sā. 104.
14. Ibid. Sā. 105-108.
15. Ibid. p. 312.
16. Ibid. pp.314-316.
17. Svatantra iti pradhanaabhūta ucyate. Agunaabhūto yaḥ kriyāsiddhau svāntreyena vivakṣyate tat kārakaṃ Kartṛ - samjñam bhavati. Kās. 583-584.
18. Ibid. p.584.

19. Yatra tu tesam avivaksā.....Kāṛakāntara-vivaksāyāṁ  
āpyagunābhāvostyeveti sarvatrabhavati. Ibid. p.584.
20. Ibid. p.584.
21. Ibid. p.585.
22. Svam tantram asya.....svam dhanam tantram sādharanam  
asya.....Sva ātmā tantram pradhanam asya.....Ibid.  
p.583.
23. Ibid. p.583.
24. Ibid. p.584.
25. Ibid. p.583.
26. Agunābhāvah acetanasa cetanāsvapi sambhavati. Ibid. p.584.
27. Anyatu.....agunābhūta-dhatupāttavyāpārah Kartetyar-  
thah. Ibid. p.584.
28. Nanu ca prayojakasannidhan.....na madhye vicchinā.  
Ibid. p.584.
29. Kriyāsiddhau agunatvena vivakṣito yah sa Karta syāt  
Viprena paśyate. Kriyā jayate. Odanah siddhyati Bhāṣā.  
p. 47.
30. Svātantrasya prayajako arthah.....Devadattah. Ibid.  
p.47.
31. BVV. p. 106.
32. Kriyāyāṁ svātantrayena vivakṣitorthah Karta syāt Pr. kau.  
pp. 404-403.



33. Kriyāsiddham..... agunībhāvena vivakṣito yorthaḥ....  
Ibid. p.404.
34. Svātantryaṇ nama itarakāraḥkāprajoyatve sati sakalakāraḥkā -  
prayokṣtvam. Ibid. p.404.
35. ....Yadiyo vyāpāro dhātunoocyate sa Kartā. Ibid. p.404.
36. Sarvathāgunībhāvaḥ svātantryam.....Ibid. p.404.
37. Dhātupāttavyāpārāśrayatvan svātantryam EK p.139.
38. VBS. p.167.
39. Ibid. p.167.
40. Śvañca.....āśrayamatran tritīyārthaḥ. Ibid. p.169.
41. Ibid. p.169.
42. Jīvasyaiva.....yuktam. Ibid. p.169.
43. Ibid. p.171.
44. Ibid. pp.166-169.
45. Ibid. p.167.
46. Kartṛtvañca Kartṛsañjñābodhita-kartṛtvasaktimattvam  
LMS. p.1342.
47. Sā saktiśca.....taddhātvarthanigṣṭhaviśeṣyatānirūpita  
prakāratāunśrnya.....vartate. Ibid. p.1342.
48. Sā saktiśca.....vyāpāratāvachedakasambandhena.....  
vartate. Ibid. p.1342.
49. Ibid. p.1342.
50. Ibid. p.1342.

51. Yattu.....rathena gamyate ityādāvacetane asambhava<sup>cc</sup>ce  
vibhaktau lakṣaṇānaucityasya prāḡ niveditatvāt. Ibid.  
p. 1344.
52. Kalāpa Sū. 220.
53. Kārayati yah sa hetusca. Ibid. Sū. 221.
54. Ibid. p.216.
55. Ibid. p.217.
56. Tathā ca Pāṇinih.....dhatuvācyavyapāratiyuktam.  
Ibid. p.217.
57. Cāndra. p.174.
58. SKS Sū. kāraka p.94.
59. Kārakeṣu yo mukhyas tadāyōjanarhaḥ sa Kartṛsānjño bhavati.  
Ibid. p.94.
60. Ibid. p.95.
61. <sup>Jainendra</sup> ~~SS~~, 1.2.124.
62. Ibid. 1.2.125.
63. Svatantra atnapradhānaḥ.....aniccāyām akaraṇat.  
Ibid. p.102.
64. Ibid. p. Iha' sthālī paṇṇati iti svāntantṛayam vivakṣyate.  
Ibid. p.102.
65. Ibid. p.103.
66. SS 2.2.2.
67. Ibid. p.68.
68. Ibid. p.68.

69. Tat Karanādīn prayunkta.....na tāni tena. Ibid. p.68.
70. Sādhana-hotu-viśeṣaṇa-bhadekāṁ Kartā ghastrī. Mugdha.  
kāraka. Sū. 9.
71. Yāḥ karoti sa Kartā iti Sarvavarmā kṛtyāśrayaḥ Karteti  
tārkikāḥ. Ibid. p.57.
72. Karotiḥ Kartā svatantraḥ kriyāsiddhāvagunatvena vivakṣitaḥ  
śekṣāt kriyāśraya ityarthah. Ibid. p.58.
73. Svatantraḥ Kartā.....pradhānibhūta-dhatvarthāśrayaḥ  
Kartā. Sāra. p.90.
74. Under, svatantraḥ Kartā.
75. Supadma. p.59.
76. Ibid. pp.61-62.
77. HMM Sū. 964.
78. Ibid. pp.379-384.
79. Kriyāsiddhau yāḥ svatantraḥ sa Kartā.....Kartṛprayo-  
jakaḥ hetuḥ Kartā.....PR. pp.413-415.
80. Ibid. pp.413-415.
81. Ibid. p.413.
82. Ibid. p.415.
83. Kriyāśrayatvaṁ Kartṛtvam iti vailākarāṇah.....  
Yaddhātūttarākhyātena.....tatkriyākartṛtvam. Kār.  
cak. p13.
84. Evañca pacatītyādaḥ.....tattatkriyākartṛtvam. Ibid. p13.
85. Tadā tu tātparyeṇa.....kāṣṭhaṁ pacatītyādaḥ teṣāṁ  
Kartṛtvam iṣṭameva. Ibid. p.13.

86. Ibid. p.13.
87. Satyantaoca.....kutharāḍau nāti vyāptirityapare.  
Ibid. p.13.
88. Tadapyasat, īśvaraprayojyānāṃ saṃsārināṃ tattatkriyā-  
svakartrtvāpatteh. Ibid. p.13.
89. Aprayojyatvañca.....kulāladāvavyāptih. Ibid. p.13.
90. Ibid. p.15.
91. Ibid. p.15.
92. SMJ p.42.
93. Tīṇā vikaraṇāktasya dhatorarthastu yādṛśaḥ svārthe yādṛśi  
bodhyas tat Kartrtvam tadihocyate ŚSP. kārīkā. 75.  
Savikaranena yaddhatupasthapyo.....tadeva Kartrtvam.  
Ibid. p.337.
94. Pacati jñāstītyāḍau.....bhramātmanah pratibimbasya  
prakāratrameva Kartrtvam. Ibid. p.337.
95. Kartrśabdastu avayavavṛttilabhye kṛtyāśraye yaugika  
eva.....kāraḥ kamātrasya calana-kartrtvāpatteh. Ibid.  
pp.337-338.
96. Kartrtvāñca mukhyam kriyānūkulakṛtīreva. VTP p.256.
97. Kartrpadamapi vyāpāramatyaoṣṭanāḍau bhāktameva.....  
Ata eva kṛṇo yatnavācakatvam. Ibid. p.261.
98. Sūtrastha-kartrpadānām.....Kāraḥ kantarādhiṇatre sati  
kāraḥ katvam. Ibid. p.261.

99. Anyoddesena Nārācakṣpād yatra Brāhmaṇavadhastatra.....  
 na tasya sampūrṇaḥ Prāyascittas. Ibid. p.264.

100. BCM. p.98.

101. BCM. p.98.

### CHAPTER III

#### Karma

#### Karma in the Paninian school

#### Pāṇini

Pāṇini defines Karmakāraka (objective case) as Kartur īpsitatamaṁ Karma.<sup>1</sup> But he finds that this definition is not able to cover a large number of instances of the objective case. Therefore, he gives two more definitions of Karma, namely (i) tathāyuktam cānīpsitam, and (ii) akathitañca.<sup>2</sup>

#### Patañjali

Patañjali interprets these definitions in the most appropriate manner. He gives us a comprehensive idea of the objective case in Sanskrit grammar in the interpretations.

He lays special emphasis on the term īpsita in the first definition. Patañjali accepts the popular meaning of the term īpsita i.e. a favourite object.<sup>in the definition</sup> The suffix tamap has been added to the term in the sense of the superlative degree.

Therefore, the boiled down meaning of the term īpsitatama according to Patañjali stands as the most favourite

object.<sup>3</sup> If we accept this interpretation, the meaning of the first definition of Karma will stand as : the most favourite object of the agent is known as Karma.

Now, the Bhāṣyakāra raises a question regarding the use of the suffix tamap in the word īpsitatama. The suffix appears to be redundant at the first sight. But Patañjali justifies the use of the suffix by referring to a few suitable illustrations. The first illustration is agner mānavakam vārayati (he saves the boy from falling into the fire). In it, the word agni is the ablative case, which is attained by the rule vāranārthanām īpsitah (Pā 1.4.27). The word mānavaka is the objective case of the verb vārayati. The objective case is prescribed by the rule Kartur īpsitatamaṁ Karma (Pā 1.4.49). This analysis shows that there is a clear distinction between the two words. The first word i.e. agni is defined as the īpsita of the agent, and the second one, that is, mānavaka is defined as the īpsitatama. Now, the question arises : "Where lies the actual distinction between the two?" The suffix tamap certainly plays the most essential role in distinguishing between the two. But, such a reply is not enough. In order to understand the distinction clearly, we must first understand the meaning of the term īpsita correctly. We have already referred to the popular meaning of the term. But, apart from the popular meaning, there is also an etymological meaning of

it which we cannot ignore. The word *īpsita* is derived from the root *ap* by adding the suffixes *san* and *kta*. The root *ap* denotes to establish relation with. The suffix *san* is attached to this root in the sense of desire. Therefore, the term *īpsita* also means an object with which somebody intends to establish a relation through the verb. In the case of *vāra-nārthānamīpsitaḥ* and *Kartur īpsitatamaḥ Karma*, it is the agent who intends to establish such a relation.

Now, let us examine the sentence *agner mānavakan varayati*. In this sentence, the agent intends to enter into a particular relationship with the boy, when he keeps him away from the fire. But such a relationship is not confined within a narrow limit. It has a wider scope. Apart from its relationship with *agni*, the intended relationship with *mānavaka* is not possible. Thus, both *agni* and *mānavaka* enter into a relationship with the agent through the medium of the verb *varayati*. It is clear from this discussion that both the terms are the *īpsita* of the agent. Now, the question arises, "How is it possible to select one of them as the objective case to the exclusion of the other?" In order to solve this difficulty, the superlative suffix *tama* has been used after the word *īpsita* in the definition of the objective case. It implies that the object which is most intended by the agent through his action is the *Karmakāra* or the objective case.



The emphasis which is laid on a particular object is not arbitrary. There is a logical reason behind it. In the sentence, *agner mānavakam vārayati*, the most intended object of the agent is the boy and not the fire. The prime concern of the agent is to save the boy from the fire and not vice versa. It is in this sense, *mānavaka* is the *īpsitatama* of the agent.

Now, if we remove the suffix *tama* from the definition, it will be extremely difficult for us to distinguish between the objective case and the ablative case. It will pose a serious problem for us. In the sentence, *agner mānavakam vārayati*, the word *agni* is also the *īpsita* of the agent. After the removal of the suffix *tama*, this word will also be an objective case. But *agni* is not the most intended object of the agent. Therefore, the suffix *tama* is necessary in the definition *Kartur īpsitatamaḥ Karma*.

*Patañjali* elaborates this point with the help of Paninian methodology. He says that according to the methodology of *Pāṇini*, the subsequent rule prevails over the preceding rule. Therefore, the revised definition of *Karma*, that is, *Kartur īpsitaḥ Karma* will set aside the rule *vāsanānāṁ īpsitaḥ*. As a result of this, the word *agni* which is actually a case of the ablative case will be changed into a case of *Karma*. This is wholly unacceptable to scholars. All this shows

that Pāṇini is justified in using the suffix *tamp* in the definition.<sup>4</sup>

Patañjali offers a few more illustrations in order to clarify the significance of the term *Īpsitatama*. He refers to the sentences *dadhṇā odanan bhañjīya* and *payasā odanam bhañjīya*.<sup>5</sup> In these sentences, the object of the verb *bhañjīya* is *odana* or rice. But, it is clear from the context that this rice is mixed with curd or milk. Now, a question arises : "Why rice alone is the objective case in the sentence and not curd or milk which remains mixed with it?" We all know that when the agent takes this rice, he also takes the curd or the milk along with it. Therefore, these objects also may be treated as the *Īpsitatama* of the agent. Patañjali gives a befitting reply to this question. He says that in the sentences furnished above, only rice is the most intended object of the agent and not curd or milk. The prime intention of the agent

is to take rice and not to taste milk or curd. As curd or milk is used as a means to an end and not an end in itself, its efficacy lying in bringing about a qualitative change of rice, they are not the most intended objects of the agent.

Patañjali discusses another important issue. There are some actions which completely change a particular object. Let us refer to the act of cooking. The act of cooking changes completely the object that is cooked. Now, our question is "In such cases which will be the exact Karma of the verb that denotes the action? Is it the original object or the new one?" Patañjali puts the question in a concrete form. He asks whether the expression *odanaṁ pacati* is correct or the expression *tanḍulaṁ pacati* is correct. He himself gives a suitable reply to this question.

There are two distinct philosophical views. According to one, there is identity in difference between the cause and the effect. According to the other view, there is only identity. Therefore, there is no distinction between *tanḍula* and *odana* though the object which is accomplished by cooking is *odana* or boiled rice. But, in the concept of Karma, we must lay emphasis on the object which is accomplished by an act. This is the *Īpsitatama* of the agent. The agent always starts an action in order to achieve an end, namely, the object. Therefore, the expression *odanaṁ pacati* is correct, and not the expression *tanḍulaṁ pacati*. *Odana* or boiled rice is the result

of the act of cooking. The agent starts the act of cooking in order to attain this particular object. Hence, *odana* is the objective case *par excellence*. Patañjali lays emphasis on it and not on *tandula* for the said reason.<sup>6</sup>

The grammarian finally discusses the following problem and properly solves it. He refers to certain special cases in which the act itself is the *Ipsitatama* of the agent. In such cases, it is extremely difficult for us to find out the objective case. He clarifies the idea by citing an illustration namely, *guḍaṇ bhakṣayati* (i.e. he eats molasses). In this illustration, the act of eating is the *Ipsitatama* or the most intended object of the agent. He selects molasses for accomplishing this act. But he does not start the action for the sake of molasses. Therefore, we cannot argue that molasses is the object of the verb *bhakṣayati*.

This is certainly an intricate problem for us. But Patañjali finds a solution to this problem also. He says that both the act of eating and molasses are the *Ipsita* (tama) of the agent. The agent is not satisfied by merely looking at or touching molasses but he is satisfied by tasting it. Therefore, the act of tasting is the *Ipsitatama* for him. He is also not satisfied by tasting any other object. Therefore, molasses is also equally the *Ipsitatama* for him. Now, molasses will be the objective case of the verb, because the agent intends

it most through the medium of the verb.<sup>7</sup>

Some of the opponents of Patañjali offer a different example in order to establish the view that sometimes the act itself becomes the most intended object of the agent, but not the so called object. They say that sometimes among the employees of a king, somebody requests another to prepare a mat for him, but the other employee replies in the negative with the remark "I have been ordered to make a jar. I cannot make a mat for you". This clearly shows that the person referred to above is interested in the act but not in the object. In this content, how can we accept an object as the *īpsitatama* of the agent?

Patañjali replies appropriately to this effect that the person who is requested to make the mat certainly interested in the act but the person who requests him to make the mat is interested in the act as well in the object.<sup>8</sup> Therefore, the mat is certainly a case of Karma.

Patañjali explains the concept of Anīpsita Karma presented by Pāṇini in the rule *tathāyuktan cānīpsitam* very clearly by citing a few appropriate illustrations. He first offers the illustration *viṣaṁ bhunkte*. But, he realises that it may be a case of *īpsitatama* also under abnormal circumstances.<sup>9</sup> Therefore, he presents some other illustrations of Anīpsita. He divides Anīpsita into two sub-groups. He illus-

brates the first sub-group of it with the help of a single sentence. It runs thus : grāmāntaram ayaṁ gacchan (Gorān paśyati ahim laṅghayati kantaṅkām mṛdṇēti (while a person is going to another village, he accidentally beholds a thief, by mistake crosses a snake and incidentally treads over thorns),<sup>10</sup>

We have said on an earlier occasion that Patañjali lays emphasis on the popular meaning of the word Ipsita i.e. a desired or favourite object. It is a matter of common sense that nobody desires to see a thief or cross over a snake, because both a thief and a serpent can endanger his life. Similarly, no body desires to trample thorns under his feet because they will prick his feet. Therefore, the thief, the snake and the thorns are undesirable objects (anipsita) for the agent. But, it is a fact that in the Sanskrit language, such undesirable objects are also treated as objective cases in the same way as the Ipsitatama objects.

Patañjali refers to some other cases of Karma which are also not embraced by the first definition. He presents them in the sentence grāmāntaram ayaṁ gacchan vrkṣamūṭānyupasarpati kūḍyamūṭānyupasarpati (i.e. while going to another village, he touches the roots of a tree and the <sup>bottom</sup> side of a wall).<sup>11</sup> In this sentence, the roots of a tree and the <sup>bottom</sup> side of a wall are not cases of Ipsitatama, because the agent

always shows an indifferent attitude towards them. These objects are also anīpsita in another sense. This will be clear from the discussion of Patañjali.

Patañjali interprets the term anīpsita in an appropriate manner. We have a general idea that the term is used as a contrary to īpsita i.e. an undesirable or hated object. According to Patañjali, the term is not used in such a restricted sense in the definition of Pāṇini. It denotes a wider meaning than that. If Pāṇini had used the term anīpsita in the restricted sense only, it would have covered only the first example and the like. In that example, a thief a snake and thorns are such objects as are contrary to the desired one.

Pāṇini uses the term anīpsita in a wider sense which denotes an emphatic denial but not a bare denial. The bare denial means contradictorily opposed to īpsita, that is, what is not īpsita (i.e. desired). But, emphatic denial has a positive meaning with a negative embroidery. It denotes such objects as are other than īpsita. Thus, the roots of a tree or the sides of a wall etc. are the concrete examples of Anīpsita Karma. This is the drift of the discussion of Patañjali on the meaning of the term anīpsita.<sup>12</sup>

There is a third group of objects in the Sanskrit grammar. The number of these objects is, however, very limited.

There are certain verbs in the Sanskrit language which consists of a series of operations. These operations may be divided into two broad heads. Now, in the context of the third group of object, each head of operation occupies an equally important position. It is a fact that these operations are connected with different sets of cases. When these cases enter into a relation with the above operations, they sometimes become the cases of Karma and sometimes become some other karakas. It all depends on the emphasis of the speaker. Some operations exclusively belong to the agent. There are some other operations which may belong to the agent or some other cases. The first class of operation comes within a particular head and the second class of operation which may be termed as common operation come under the second head. The direct object is only connected with the first head of operation. The indirect object is connected with the second head of operation.

The main purpose of the above discussion is to show that an indirect object may be used as some other relevant case. Let us now take an example from the English language. In the English language, the expression "this cow gives me milk" may be expressed as "this cow gives milk to me". A parallel example from the Sanskrit literature is *gām dogdhi payah* which can be expressed as *goti payoh dogdhi*.



This idea may be expressed in some other popular way so that the difference between the direct object and the indirect objects may be clearly understood. The popular way may be illustrated thus. In the sentence, *gān dogdhi payah gopah* (lit. a cowherd milks a cow), the speaker does not lay emphasis on the ablative case of the term *go* (cow). Now, what case-ending will be applied to the term *go* in the absence of other case-endings? We shall clarify this matter in the following paragraph.

Let us explain the very example from the new point of view. In the case of the word *go*, there is the possibility of another case, namely, the ablative case. If we closely examine the process of milking the point will be easily understood. The person who milks the cow pulls the udder of the cow in order to squeeze out the milk from it. In this way, the cow is acted upon. The effect of the above operation is that the milk is separated from the cow. Hence, the cow is a clear case of *Apādāna*. Therefore, we can use the expression *goh dogdhi payah* also. But, when the speaker does not intend to express the sense of *Apādāna*, what will be the alternative case for the cow? It is the Karma by the rule *akathitañjā*. We have already said that in the course of milking, the cow is also acted upon. Therefore, no body can raise any objection if it is treated as a case of Karma. In contradistinction from

the cow, payah or milk is invariably a case of Karma. The following is the reason for this.

The milk is drawn out of the udder of the cow. Here, the main operation of the agent is directed to attain the milk only. Therefore, it is an indisputable case of Ipsitatama. The difficulty regarding the cow is that it is neither a case of Ipsitatama nor it is a case of Ipsita. Therefore, the third definition has become necessary.

Patañjali makes a significant contribution to the concept of the third group of Karma. He not only interprets the term Akathita but also enumerates the verbs, with which Akathita Karma is actually used. He also offers a critical analysis of his view. The commentator says that only the following roots govern Akathita Karma when they are used as verbs in a sentence. These roots are duh (to milk), yas (to beg), rudh (to obstruct or confine in), praccha (to ask), bhikṣa (to beg with entreaty), ei (to pluck), brū (to tell or narrate) śāś (to preach) nī (to carry), vah (to carry), hr (to carry), and the roots denoting the sense of going.<sup>13</sup> He substantiates his statement by citing apt illustrations for all these roots.

We have already discussed the first illustration of Patañjali, namely, gāṁ dogdhi payah. Let us now examine some other illustrations such as anvarunaddhi gaṁ vrajam and putraṁ

dharmāṃ brūte etc. The meaning of the first sentence, that is, anuvāṣaṇapaddhi gām vrajam is that the agent confines the cow in a cow-pen (vraja). The word vraja is in fact, a case of Adhikarāṇa. But, when the emphasis is not laid on it, it becomes a case of Akathitakarma. Patāñjali presents this idea in an implicit manner. He adopts a similar technic in interpreting the illustrations gām doḡdhi payaḥ, putrāṃ dharmāṃ brūte etc.<sup>14</sup> We shall interpret them in an explicit manner like the two earlier illustrations.

In the sentence putrāṃ dharmāṃ brūte, the word putra (son) may be treated as an instance of dative case, because the imparting of instruction with regard to the son may be implied by the sentence. But, here the dative case is not intended by the speaker. Hence, putra comes under the class of Akathita.

We can explain the other illustrations like mānavakaṃ panthānaṃ prcchati, paṇḍitāṃ gām bhikṣate, vṛkṣam avacinoti phalāni and putrāṃ anuśāsti dharmāṃ also in a similar way. In the sentence, mānavakaṃ panthānaṃ prcchati, mānavaka is a clear case of Apādāṇa if he replies to the questioner. If he does not reply, in that case, there is a problem for us. We shall not be able to place him in any other kāraṇa. The problem is solved by the rule akathitaṃ ca.

In paṇḍitāṃ gām bhikṣate, yācate etc. also a similar problem arises which can be solved by this rule.<sup>15</sup>

In *vrkṣam avacinoti phalāni*, there is a clear case of *Apādāna* because there is a separation between the tree and the fruits. But, this sense is not emphasised by the speaker. He includes the act of separation in the main operation itself. Therefore, the tree contains the result of the subordinate operation. Because, it is the container of the result of the subordinate operation, it is not covered by the definition *Kartur Iṣṭitatanam Karma*. It also does not belong to the second type of Karma namely *Aniṣṭita*. Therefore, it is placed under *akathitañca*. This idea has been expressed in the popular way that the ablative case has not been emphasised, and hence it comes under *Akathita Karma*. In the earlier illustrations also, the speaker includes the subordinate operation in the principal operation itself and we express that idea in the popular way as we do in the above case.

*Patañjali* discusses another very important view in explaining the concept of *Akathita Karma* in *Pāṇini's* grammar. He clearly states that the *kāraka* which is treated as indirect object in grammar must remain associated with the direct object before the operation takes place.<sup>16</sup>

So long, we have discussed the cases of transitive verbs only. But, in the Sanskrit language, sometimes even the intransitive verbs also govern some specific objects. There are two *vārtikas* according to which these intransitive verbs

govern time, action, place and distance only as objective cases.<sup>17</sup> These vārtikas have been added to the sūtras of Pāṇini by Kātyāyana as an amendment. Patañjali accepts this amendment and explains the idea of the vārtikas clearly.

Now, a question arises "Under which particular class or Karma, these karakas will be placed?" Patañjali says that these are not cases of a full-fledged Karma, and therefore, he offers a nick name for them, namely Kalma. The word Kalma is a corrupt form for Karma. This corrupt form is used by those persons who cannot pronounce ra-kāra properly. The very purpose of Patañjali is to show that these cases of Karma are still in the making.<sup>18</sup>

#### The contribution of Patañjali to Karmakāra

Patañjali makes a very great contribution to the development of the Paninian concept of Karma. He interprets the definitions of Pāṇini in the appropriately exhaustive manner.

We explain the term Īpsitatana from a popular point of view. It is a fact that Patañjali is aware of the logical meaning of the term. But, he lays emphasis on the popular meaning only under the impression that it will be more appropriate in imparting its significance to the average reader. He elaborates the significance of the suffix tamap.

He shows it clearly that the suffix *tanap* is, in fact, the distinguishing factor between *Karmakāraka* and such other cases as *Apādāna* etc.

In the interpretation of the second definition, the grammarian clarifies the meaning of the term *anīpsita*. Thus, the grammarian removes our confusion regarding its meaning. The term occupies a key position in the definition.

His contribution to the third definition is equally significant. He interprets the term *akathita* with suitable illustrations. The more important contribution of the grammarian is that he furnishes a comprehensive list of the roots which govern *Akathita Karma*, when they are used as verbs.

### Kaiyata

Kaiyata devotes himself primarily to the main task of explaining the text of the *Bhāṣya*. He explains every implicit statement of the *Bhāṣyakāra* in a clear and explicit manner. In this connection, we can refer to his interpretation of the passage *tādarthyāt tācchabdyam bhaviṣyati* etc.<sup>19</sup> It is difficult to understand the intended meaning of the passage, without the help of his interpretation. *Patañjali* raises a highly controversial question in connection with the rule *Kartur īpsita-tanap Karma*. He asks whether the expression *odanan pacati* is correct. *Patañjali* himself replies to the question

with the words *tadarthyat* etc. But the reply is given in a cryptic language which is clearly noticed in the statement. We can easily understand the significance of the statement from the interpretation given by Kaiyata on it. He explains the meaning of the root *pac* (to cook). In his opinion, the root *pac* consists of two processes. The first process is the softening of parts of an object. The second process given the object the final form of being boiled. The first process in the act of cooking is the means to the second process. Now, when we say *odanaṁ pacati*, it means that *tanḍula* or unboiled rice is being softened with the end in view that this process of softening will give it (*tanḍula*) the intended form known as *odana* (boiled rice). *Odana* is the finished form of *tanḍula* which is attained through the act of cooking. We do not cook *odana* but *tanḍula*. Therefore, the expression *odanaṁ pacati* is used only in a secondary sense. Kaiyata justifies it in the following manner. The secondary usage serves an important purpose in the above sentence. It indicates the result of the action also.<sup>20</sup> The result is the Karma *pār* excellence.

A critical examination of the commentary of Kaiyata shows that Kaiyata utilises all sources of knowledge available to him in his discussion. He possesses <sup>a</sup> unique capacity of grafting new ideas in the views of the Bhāṣya. The blending is so nice that the enlarged knowledge appears

to follow from the text of the Bhāṣya itself.<sup>201</sup> This is a great merit of the commentator for which he deserves high appreciation from critical thinkers.

### Bhartrhari

Bhartrhari divides Karmakāraka into different groups and sub-groups in a systematic manner. He does not define the term Karma. But, he defines the sub groups of Īpsitatama Karma in an appropriate manner. He also presents the views of the philosophical schools on different types of Karma.

Pāṇini classifies Karmakāraka into three broad groups namely, (1) Īpsitatama (2) Anīpsita and (3) Akathita. Bhartrhari accepts this classification. He places those cases of Karma which do not belong to the above groups in an entirely new group. He divides the Īpsitatama Karma into three sub groups namely, Nirvartya, Vikārya and Prāpya. He divides the other cases or Karma into four groups :

- (i) The cases towards which the agent is indifferent belong to the first group.
- (ii) The second group comprises those instances which excite hatred of the agent.



- (iii) The examples of Akathita Karma are also included in the third sub-group.
- (iv) Pāṇini changes some cases of Sampradāna, Karaṇa and Adhikaraṇa into the cases of Karma by the rules *divaḥ Karma ca* (1.4.43), *krudhadruhor upasr̥stayoh Karma* (1.4.38) etc. These cases of Karma are placed in the fourth group by Bhartṛhari.<sup>21</sup>

We see a very important development of the concept of Karma in the Vākyapadīya. Bhartṛhari interprets the terms Nirvartya, Vikārya and Prāpya from the philosophical point of view. He refers to two distinct theories of origin in this connection, namely, (a) the Vaiśeṣika theory of new beginning, and (b) the Sāṅkhya theory of transformation while interpreting the above terms.<sup>22</sup>

According to the Vaiśeṣika view, every object has a new beginning. The Sāṅkhya philosophy, on the other hand, preaches that every effect is simply a transformation of its cause.

Without entering into the above controversies, Bhartṛhari says that when the agent creates an effect which is unreal before its creation and becomes real after its creation, it is called Nirvartya Karma. This is the well-known Vaiśeṣika view of the unreality of an effect before it comes into existence. This Nirvartya Karma is explained

by Bhartṛhari from the Sāṅkhya point of view in another way. He also refers to the Sāṅkhya view that the effect is real before its appearance and lies concealed in its cause in a potential form before its appearance. The cause simply makes it manifest by the relevant operations.<sup>23</sup>

Let us cite a typical instance of Nirvartya Karma, that is, ghaṭam karoti (i.e. the potter is making a pot).

Bhartṛhari defines Vikārya Karma in the following way.

- (i) When the agent produces the effect by destroying the cause, or
- (ii) when he imparts a qualitative change to the cause in order to attain the effect, the effect in either case is known as Vikārya Karma.

Bhartṛhari illustrates Vikārya Karma by citing suitable examples.

- (i) He says that when somebody burns the fuel, it produces ashes. As we all know, the ashes are produced only when the fuel is completely destroyed in the process of burning. Now, the ashes are thus produced by the agent are a case of Vikārya Karma according to him.
- (ii) He then cites the instance of golden ear-rings. The jeweller makes ear-rings from gold. In order to make this ornament, he first melts a piece of gold and then

gives it a particular shape by his instruments. Now, the piece of gold which possesses this new shape is known as ear-ring. The ear-rings so made are another case of *Vikārya Karma*. In this case, a piece of gold simply undergoes a formal change but not a material change.<sup>24</sup>

Bhartrhari distinguishes between *Vikārya Karma* and *Nirvartya Karma* in the following way. When the emphasis is not laid by the speaker on the cause but on the effect, it is a case of *Nirvartya Karma*. We have already cited an example of *Nirvartya Karma* namely, *ghaṭam karoti*. In this example, the speaker does not lay emphasis on the substance of which the pot is made. But, he intends to say that the pot is being made (*nirvartayate*). When, however, the emphasis is laid on the cause, the effect is treated as a case of *Vikārya Karma*. An example of *Vikārya Karma* as cited by Halāraja is *mṛdaṁ ghaṭam karoti* (i. e. the potter transforms a lump of clay into a jar).<sup>25</sup>

In the cases of *Nirvartya Karma* and *Vikārya Karma*, we notice that the agent produces a change in the cause in order to bring to effect. In the case of *Nirvartya Karma* the change in the cause is directly perceived or inferred. Let us illustrate it. In the case of a jar, a formal change of a lump of clay is directly grasped. In the case of an

ear-ring, a piece of gold undergoes a qualitative change, and this change is also perceptible. Sometimes, such a change is inferable only. Thus, when the news of the birth of a child creates joy in the mind of his father, the jovial mood of the father is inferred only from his facial expressions.

The case of the Prāpya Karma is entirely different from the two earlier sub-groups. When no change is perceptible in an object as a result of the operation of the agent, the object comes under the third sub groups of Karma.<sup>26</sup> Let us cite an illustration to bring home the concept of Prāpya Karma presented by Bhartrhari. The illustration is ādityam pasyati (i.e. he beholds the sun). Now, when a person beholds the sun, he does not bring about any change in the sun by his operation. Thus, the word āditya in the above illustration is a case of Prāpya Karma. The agent merely establishes a relation with the object through his operation and therefore, the term Prāpya is appropriate.

#### The contribution of Bhartrhari to the concept of Karma

Bhartrhari makes a highly critical approach to the Paninian concept of Karma. He does not define the term. He mainly confines himself to the classification of Karmakāraka.

Pāṇini divides Karma into three broad groups, namely, Īpsitatama, Anīpsita and Akathita. Kātyāyana divides Īpsita-

tama into three sub-groups. He names two of these sub-groups as Nirvartya and Vikārya but does not give any name to the third sub-group.<sup>27</sup> Patañjali accepts this division. He also divides Anīpsita into two sub-groups. Bhartṛhari accepts all these sub-groups of Karma. He explains the terms Nirvartya, Vikārya etc. very clearly. He also shows the different types of Vikārya Karma. Thus, the author gives us a comprehensive idea of the objective case in his Vākyapadīya.

Another important contribution of the grammarian is that he lays greater emphasis on the philosophical aspects of the concept of Karma.

### Halārāja

Halārāja explains the views of Bhartṛhari on the objective case very clearly and exhaustively. In this connection, we can refer to the interpretation given by him on the kārīkāś nirvartyañca vikāryaṇ ca etc. of Bhartṛhari in which the grammarian offers a classification of Karmakāraka.<sup>28</sup>

The commentator also appropriately interprets the different philosophical views presented by Bhartṛhari in the course of his discussions on the objective case.<sup>29</sup> He agrees to differ from a section of philosophers who opine that the knowledge of an object brings about a distinct change in the object. According to him, knowledge simply discovers but does not remodel an object.<sup>30</sup>

### Kāśikā

The Vṛttikāra interprets the definition Kartur Ipsitatamaṁ Karma as follows : Kartuh kriyayā yad aptum istatamaṁ tat kārṣaṇaṁ Karmasamjñam bhavati.<sup>31</sup> It means that when the agent intends most to establish a relation with a particular object, <sup>through his action,</sup> the object is known as Karma.

It is evident from the above interpretation that the Vṛttikāra accepts the logical meaning of the term ipsitatama. This is a significant departure from the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali where the emphasis is laid on the popular meaning of the term. The interpretation of the Vṛttikāra is accepted by all the grammarians coming after him.

The grammarian illustrates the definition with the examples katan karoti and grāmam gacchati. The first example belongs to the sub-class of Nirvartya Karma and the second example belongs to the sub-class of Prāpya Karma.

Like the Bhāṣyakāra, the Vṛttikāra also explains the significance of the suffix tamap in the definition. He does not offer any detailed discussion on the significance of use of the suffix. He simply presents a suggestive example, namely, payasaudanam bhunkte.<sup>32</sup> We can easily infer from this instance that the Vṛttikāra follows the footsteps of the Bhāṣyakāra in justifying the use of the suffix in the definition.

The Vṛttikāra also lays emphasis on the term Kartuh in the definition. He cites the illustration māṣeṣvaśvaṃ badhnāti in order to show that the most intended object of the agent (Kartuh) alone is a case of Karma.

In the illustration, māṣeṣvaśvaṃ badhnāti, the pulses (māṣa) are the īpsitatama of the horse which is the objective case in the sentence. It is the horse which intends most to establish a relation with the pulses through the act of grazing. The agent of the sentence, however, does not intend to establish any such relation with the pulses.<sup>33</sup> Therefore, the word māṣa is not a case of Karma, but a case of Adhikaraṇa only. This <sup>shows</sup> is the significance of the term Kartuh in the definition. The Vṛttikāra is the first Sanskrit grammarian who explains the significance of the term. He surely deserves our appreciation for this.

There is another significant contribution of the grammarian. He says that the term Karma seems to be redundant in the definition, at the first sight. If we carefully note the order of the sūtras of Pāṇini, we see that the sūtra adhiśāsthāsāpKarma precedes the rule under consideration. Thus the term Karma follows from the previous sūtra itself. It is for this reason, the term appears as redundant in the second sūtra. The Vṛttikāra justifies the repetition in the following manner.

The previous rule follows within the scope of the definition of Adhikaraṇa, that is, ādhāro Adhikaraṇam. Now, if the term Karma is tagged on from the rule adhīśīsthāsāṇi Karma, in that case, the word ādhāra will also come down along with it. As a result of this the definition of Karma will apply only to such illustrations as gr̥haṃ pravīśati in which there is a clear case of ādhāra or locus of an action. But, the definition will not be applicable to such illustrations as odanaṃ pacati (i.e. he is cooking rice) from which the sense of ādhāra is absent.<sup>34</sup> It shows that Pāṇini is right when he repeats the term in the second sūtra.

The Vṛttikāra interprets the rule tathāyuktam canīpsitam also in an exhaustive manner. Patañjali does not interpret the terms tathā yuktam. The Vṛttikāra explains them appropriately. According to this interpretation, the agent intends to establish a relation with Anīpsita exactly in the same manner as he does in the case of īpsitatama.<sup>35</sup> It indicates that logically there is no distinction between the two types of Karma.

Following in the wake of Patañjali, the Vṛttikāra also explains the term anīpsita as īpsitād anyat i.e. other than īpsita meaning (i) dveṣya or an object of hatred and (ii) neither dveṣya nor īpsita (desired).<sup>36</sup>



The Vṛttikāra illustrates Dveṣya Karma with the examples *viṣaṁ bhakṣayati* (i.e. he is swallowing poison) and *śorāṇ paśyati* (i.e. he sees thieves).<sup>37</sup> The selection of the examples of the Vṛttikāra is not very happy, since they are suggestive of adverse meanings also. The above examples of the Vṛttikāra reflect only the psychology of the average people. But, he does not anticipate the psychology of the abnormal and antisocial persons.

The grammarian cites the example *grāmān gacchan vṛkṣamūlānyupasarpati* in order to illustrate the second subgroup of *Ānīpate* Karma.<sup>38</sup> In the above example, the object of the verb *upsasarpati* is not an object of hatred for the agent. It is neither his favourite nor his unfavourite. He carries a neutral feeling towards the roots of the tree. Thus, the above example is a case of *udāsīna* or neutral.

The Vṛttikāra follows the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* in interpreting the sūtra of Pāṇini namely, *akathitānce*.<sup>39</sup> He has no new contribution to *Akathita* Karma. He simply reiterates the views of the *Bhāṣyakāra* and explains them in a clear manner. He quotes the *kārikā duhiyācirudhi* etc. cited by the *Bhāṣyakāra* and explains it briefly.<sup>40</sup> But, he does not quote the second *kārikā* cited by the *Bhāṣyakāra* nor does he throw any light on the issue that the verbs *harati*, *vahati*, *nayati* etc. also govern the indirect object.

Jinendrabuddhi

We have discussed above that the Vṛttikāra offers some important views in his interpretation of the rule Kartur Īpsitatamaṁ Karma. Jinendrabuddhi explains these views in an exhaustive manner. He shows great originality in the explanations. He justifies the interpretation of the term Īpsitatama given by the Vṛttikāra. The term Īpsitatama consists of two distinct parts namely, Īpsita and tama. Jinendrabuddhi says that the first part of the term, that<sup>is</sup>, Īpsita has two different meanings, namely, a popular meaning and a logical meaning. He clearly shows that if we accept the popular meaning of the term Īpsita, that is abhipreta (desired object) in the rule Kartur Īpsitatamaṁ Karma, we cannot interpret the rule. There is a significant term in the rule namely, Kartuh. Kartā or the agent is invariably associated with a kriyā or an operation. Therefore, when we interpret the rule, we attain the term kriyā also in the interpretation. If we accept the popular meaning of the term Īpsita, we cannot establish a logical relation among the terms Kartuh, kriyā and Īpsitamaṁ. In other words, we cannot explain the rule as Kartuh kriyāṁ abhipretatamaṁ, because, such an explanation will be without any meaning. It is for this reason, Jinendrabuddhi accepts the logical meaning of the term Īpsita given by the Vṛttikāra.<sup>41</sup> He derives the term Īpsita properly.<sup>42</sup>

Jinendrabuddhi discusses a very important point which is related to the said definition of Pāṇini. There is a reference to the intention of the agent in the definition. Jinendrabuddhi shows that in the sentence *nādi kūlaṃ karṣati*, an inanimate object (i.e. a river) is the agent. An inanimate object cannot possess intention. Therefore, a question arises "How can we justify the term *kūlaṃ* in the sentence as Karma-kāraka?" The grammarian intelligently evades this question. He says that there is a distinction between the grammatical world and the real world. In grammar, we are interested only in seeing the correct usage of a word in a sentence (*padasaṃskāra*). The term *kūlaṃ* is correctly used in the sentence *nādi kūlaṃ karṣati*. It is a fact that the river which is an inanimate object does not possess intention. But, that question is only *bahirāṅga* and the correctness of the sentence is the *antarāṅga* and thus, it is not considered.<sup>43</sup>

#### Haradatta

Haradatta follows his predecessor to a great extent in interpreting the views of the *Vṛttikāra* on the definition of Karma given by Pāṇini.

He reiterates the view of Jinendrabuddhi that the term *īpsita* has two distinct meanings. He accepts the logical

meaning of the term. But unlike Jinendrabuddhi, he does not show any reason for rejecting the popular meaning of the term.<sup>46</sup>

He explains the passage māṣeṣvaśvaṃ badhnāti in the Vṛtti very clearly. He says that the horse is the agent of the act of grazing in the sentence asvo masan bhaksayati and the term masa is the objective case in it. But, when the keeper of the horse ties it in a different place, it enters into a new relation with a new verb namely, badhnāti. Now, it becomes a case of Karma. Hence, the rule Kartur Ipsitatama Karma is not applicable to the term māṣa. Thus, it is not used as Karma-kāraka in the sentence māṣeṣvaśvaṃ badhnāti.<sup>47</sup>

It is clear from the above discussion of Haradatta that the verb used in a sentence plays a very important role in the concept of a kāraka.

Haradatta mainly follows Patanjali and Kaiyata in interpreting another significant passage in the Vṛtti namely, tamab grahaṇan kim? Payasaudanam bhunkte. He mainly follows the Bhāṣyakāra and Kaiyata in this interpretation. He says in the course of the interpretation of this passage that the Karmakāraka in such sentences as pascatyodanam (i.e. he cooks rice) is a case of Ipsitatama in relation to the verb which is used with it in the absence of any other object. He gives the following reason for this. The agent always starts an action with the aim of attaining an intended result. Because,

the action is only a means to an end, it is an *īpsita* and not the *īpsitatama* of the agent. On the other hand, the aim of the agent is to attain the result. Therefore, it is the *īpsitatama* of the agent.<sup>48</sup>

Haradatta examines a few important definitions of Karma-kāraṇa probably given by the philosophers of the Nyāya school. The first definition is *kriyāphalabhāgitvaṃ Karmaṭvam*. It means that the objective case is the locus of the result of an operation. This definition appears in the works of later grammarians and some philosophers like Gāṅgā Bhaṭṭa and Maṇḍana Bhaṭṭācārya in different forms such as *kriyājanya-phalāśrayaṇ Karma*, *kriyāphalāśālitvaṃ Karmaṭvam*, *kriyājanya-phalāśālitvaṃ Karmaṭvam* etc. Haradatta rejects the definition on the ground that if this definition is accepted it will be applicable even to the agent of the act of going because, he is also the locus of the result of the act namely *sanyoga* or contact with a latter place. He also rejects the definition *parasamavetakriyā-phalayogi Karma*. The predicate *parasamaveta* in this definition removes the defect of the earlier definition. It indicates that the locus of the result is different from the locus of the action or the operation which generates it. But, Haradatta shows that this definition is also not applicable to the objective case *ātman* (soul) in the sentence *ātma jñātavyaḥ* because, in this

case the locus of the result and the locus of the operation  
<sup>are</sup> the same.<sup>49</sup>

Haradatta accepts the seven-fold division of Karma-kāraka given by Bhartrhari. He clearly shows the result which is related to Nirvartya, Vikārya and Prāpya Karma.<sup>50</sup>

The grammarian shows that the indirect object is used with the verb *muṣnāti* also.<sup>51</sup>

#### Puruṣottama

Puruṣottama writes a brief commentary on the definitions of Karma as given by Pāṇini. He follows the traditional line in the interpretation of these definitions.

Puruṣottama accepts the logical meaning of the term *īpsita*. It is clear from his interpretation of the sūtra *Kartur īpsitatanam Karma*.<sup>52</sup>

The grammarian also accepts the three important subdivisions of Karma, namely, Nirvartya, Vikārya and Prāpya which fall within the scope of *īpsitatanam*. He illustrates them with the following examples : (i) *saṃyogam janayati* (ii) *tanḍulān oḍanam pacati* (iii) *Vedaṃ adhīte*.<sup>53</sup>

Puruṣottama interprets the term *anīpsita* in the traditional manner. According to him, the term *anīpsita* means both *dveṣya* and other than *īpsita* but not *dveṣya*. He illus-

trates Anīpsita Karma with two appropriate examples. He also illustrates Akathita Karma with a few suitable examples.<sup>54</sup> But his contribution in this field is negligible. He primarily depends on his predecessors in this matter. The predecessors of Puruṣottama enumerate the roots which govern the Akathita Karma when they are used as verbs. The illustrations of Puruṣottama cover all these roots except *sās*, *chī*, *rudh*, *bhikṣa* and *mug*.<sup>55</sup> The reason for the omission of the above roots is best known to Puruṣottama himself.

#### Srṣṭidharācārva

Srṣṭidhara shows great originality in his interpretation of the vṛtti of Puruṣottama on Karmakāraka.

Puruṣottama explains the definition Kartur īpsitamāṇ Karma as Kartuh kriyayā vyāptum īṣṭatamaṇ Karma syāt. Srṣṭidhara justifies this explanation. He says that the term Karma comes under the adhikāra rule kārake. The term kāraka denotes the nimitta or the condition of an act. Now, if we remove the qualifying terms Kartuh etc. from the interpretation, the term Karma will denote a condition in general of an act. But, an act is invariably performed by the agent. Therefore, the term Karma will finally mean a condition of an act of the agent. In that case, the definition of Karma will be

applicable even to the instances of other kārakas such as grheṣu viśati and sthālyāṃ paśati. The terms grheṣu and sthālyāṃ are instances of Adhikaraṇa in the above illustrations. But, because they also fulfil the terms of the definition, we must treat them as cases of Karma. Śrītiḍhara says that it is in order to avoid such problems, Puruṣottama uses the adjective Kartuh kriyāya etc. in his interpretation of the rule Kartur īpātataṃ Karma. The word Kartuh, here, is very significant. As we all know, Karta is so called, because he performs a particular activity. Now, in the definition of Karma, we do not consider the preexistent activities with which the agent is connected. But, we consider only that particular activity which is generated by the agent by means of his volition with a definite aim of attaining an intended result. It is for this particular activity, the agent (Karta) is called the agent in this context. The adjective vyāptum īpātataṃ is also equally significant. It implies that the Karmakāraka or the objective case is the locus of the result of the said activity. Śrītiḍhara explains the term vyāptum as prakṛtakriyāśrayāṃ kartum. The word kriyā here, does not mean the operational part of the activity. The operational part is invariably located in the agent. It denotes only the second part, that is, the result.<sup>55</sup>

Śrītiḍhara discusses the cases of inanimate objects acting as the agent. He cites the example puṣpaṃ ākarṣayati



bhramarān in this connection. He boldly asserts that such sentences are correct in a secondary sense only. Jinendra-buddhi explains such cases in an entirely different way. Śrītiḥhara is most probably influenced by the Naiyāyikas of the modern age in this respect.<sup>57</sup>

He mentions some objects of illusory experience in his discussion. He cites such examples as śuktiṃ rajatam manyate (i.e. the person wrongly thinks a shell to be a piece of silver), in order to illustrate these objects. Though he does not discuss his point clearly, his intended meaning is that an illusory object cannot be the locus of the result of the action since it is absent. But he says that even then they are treated as Karma in Sanskrit grammar. He does not offer any convincing solution to the problem.<sup>58</sup> He does not refer to the explanations offered by different philosophers on this point. However, he is the only commentator who takes note of the problem.

There is another important contribution of Śrītiḥhara. He removes some of the drawbacks of the vṛtti of Paraśottama. Paraśottama omits the roots ci, radh, bhikṣa and śās in illustrating Akathita Karma. Śrītiḥhara quotes the relevant kārīkā from the Mahābhāṣya in order to make up this deficiency. He also explains the kārīkā in a critical and elaborate manner.<sup>59</sup>

### Rāmacandra

Rāmacandra explains the definitions of Karma offered by Pāṇini in a very lucid manner. His commentary is very brief. He follows his predecessors Patañjali and the Vṛttikāra closely in his interpretations.<sup>60</sup> He has no original contribution to the concept of Karma. But he adopts a new technic in illustrating Akathita Karma. He shows the uses of the Akathita Karma with the help of a devotional song written in honour of Lord Viṣṇu.<sup>61</sup>

Rāmacandra has another important contribution to the concept of Akathita Karma. He furnishes a comprehensive list of sixteen roots which govern Akathita, when they are used as verbs. The list contains not only the roots which are enumerated by Patañjali, Jinendrabuddhi and Haradatta but also the roots mantha (to churn), graha (to hold) and paca (to cook).<sup>62</sup>

### Viṭṭhaṭācārya

Viṭṭhaṭācārya writes a lucid and elaborate commentary on the vṛtti of Rāmacandra on the Paninian definitions of Karma. The commentator is well acquainted with the grammatical works of his great predecessors. He has no original contribution to Karmakāra. He mainly presents the views of his predecessors in the commentary. But, his presentation is

so nice that it immediately gives us a correct and comprehensive idea of Karmakāraka. <sup>63</sup>

### Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita

Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita interprets the Pāṇinian rule Kartur Īpsitatamaṃ Karma in the traditional manner. He says that according to this interpretation, the term Karma denotes the locus of the result of an action of the agent. Bhaṭṭoji shows that this meaning of the term Karma is attained from the rule in the following way. The agent desires to accomplish an act in order to attain an intended result. Because, the act is accomplished with the aim of attaining the result, it is always subordinate to the result. Thus, it is an Īpsita of the agent but it is not the Īpsitatama of him. The result itself is the Īpsitatama or the object of the utmost desire of the agent. But, the result invariably remains in a particular locus. The agent intensively desires to establish a relation with this locus in order to attain the result located in it. Thus, the locus of the result becomes the Īpsitatama of the agent. Therefore, it is treated as Karmakāraka. <sup>64</sup>

Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita interprets the two other definitions of Karma also given by Pāṇini in the traditional manner. He enumerates twenty two Sanskrit roots which govern akathāṭita

Karma when they are used as verbs. He collects these roots from different sources, including the Dhātuvṛtti of Mādhava.<sup>65</sup>

Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita proves his great originality in the interpretation of the rule Kartur Īpsitatamaṁ Karma. The manner in which he proves that the term Karma according to this definition denotes the locus of the result of an operation is worth noting.

#### Kaundabhaṭṭa

Kaundabhaṭṭa offers some important views on Karma-kāreka in his Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra. He shows that the second inflexion which is used in Karma-kāreka is significant. According to him, the Paninian rule Kartur Īpsitatamaṁ Karma denotes kriyājanyaphalāśraya or the locus of the result of an operation. He corroborates the view of Bhaṭṭoji that the objective case act as the locus of the result of an action (intended by the agent) and thus it is the Īpsitatama of the agent.<sup>66</sup> He says that the root in a verb denotes the operation and the result and the second inflexion used in the objective case denotes the locus of them. Kaundabhaṭṭa defines this locus as the unanalysable determinant common to all the cases of Karma.<sup>67</sup> It is an entirely new philosophical concept. It helps us to discover a common bond among the innumerable cases of Karma.

The grammarian does not distinguish between *Īpsita* Karma and *Anīpsita* Karma. According to him, the distinction between these two types of Karma is a formal one and it has no utility in the philosophical interpretation of Karma. He means to say that both *Īpsita* and *Anīpsita* are the locus of the result of an operation denoted by a verb and hence any distinction these two types of objective case is immaterial.<sup>68</sup>

Kaundabhatta clarifies his concept of an objective case with the help of a few suitable illustrations, namely, *odanaṃ pacati*, *ghaṭaṃ karoti* and *ghaṭaṃ jānāti*. He says that in the illustration *odanaṃ pacati*, the term *odana* (rice) denotes the locus of the result known as *vikṛitti* which is generated by the act of cooking of the agent, and thus, *odana* is a case of Karma in the sentence. He shows that in the second illustration, the jar is the locus of the result known as *utpatti* (origination) and hence, it is an objective case. According to him, the verb *jānāti* in the third illustration indicates the result namely, *āvaraṇabhanga* or the disappearance of ignorance. He opines that the word *ghaṭa* in the sentence *ghaṭaṃ jānāti* denotes the locus of this result and hence, it is treated as *Karmakāraka* in the sentence. Kaundabhatta says that even a past object or a future object also can become the locus the said result. According to him, this is not his independent view but it is a view of the *Naiyāyikas* and the philosophers of the *Sāṅkhya* school.<sup>69</sup>

Kaundabhaṭṭa shows that the interpretation given by him on the Paninian rule gives rise to a knotty problem. He solves this problem intelligently. Let us discuss the problem. When a person goes to a particular place, he establishes a contact between himself and the place by the action. This contact is the result of the act of going and the person is the locus of the result. Thus, he is a case of Karma. But, he is already a case of Karta. Thus, a knotty problem arises. Kaundabhaṭṭa says that according to the above explanation, we can use the expression Caitraś Caitraṃ gacchati for Caitro grāmaṃ gacchati. But, this expression is not accepted by anybody. It is clear from the discussion of Kaundabhaṭṭa that a problem similar to the above problem arises even when a person departs from a place. The grammarian shows that when a person departs from a place, he generates separation between himself and the place by the action. The place in the present context is a locus of the said separation. Therefore, the grammarian says that it is a case of Karma. He clarifies the above idea with the help of an illustration namely Prayāgāt Kāśīṃ gacchati Caitraḥ. He states that the term Prayāga in this illustration is a case of Karma according to the above explanation. But, it is clear from the sentence that it is a case of Apādāna. Thus, we face another knotty problem. Kaundabhaṭṭa solves the problems in the following manner. It is the

established convention in Sanskrit grammar that a subsequent rule invariably prevails over a preceding one. In Pāṇini's grammar, the rule *svatantraḥ Kārtā* which defines *Kartā* is a subsequent one to the rule *Kartur ipsitatanaṁ Karma* that defines *Karma*. Thus, the term *Caitra* in the first illustration cannot be a case of *Karma*. Again, the term *Karma* denotes the locus of the result of an action of the agent denoted by the verb in the sentence. No other result which is not covered by the meaning of the verb is not considered in the definition of the objective case. Therefore, the term *Prayāga* in the second illustration also cannot be a case of *Karma*.<sup>70</sup>

Kaundabhaṭṭa refers to the amendments suggested by the Naiyāyikas to the interpretation *kriyājanya* etc. in this connection. But, he discovers some defects in it and therefore, discards it. Kaundabhaṭṭa says that the Naiyāyikas suggest two amendments to the interpretation *kriyājanyaphalāśraya* given by him on the Pāṇinian rule *Kartur ipsitatanaṁ Karma* in order to avoid the problems discussed by him. According to him, they suggest that the predicate *parasamaveta* (i.e. having a different locus) should be used to the term *kriyā* in the interpretation and the predicate *dhātvarthatācchedaka* (i.e. that which indicates the meaning of the root) to the term *phala* in it. Kaundabhaṭṭa shows that these amendments will lead to further complications. Therefore, he rejects

them. He says that if the first amendment is accepted in that case even the word *Kṛṣṇa* in the sentence *Kṛṣṇena pācayati gopam* will be a case of Karma and thus, the second inflexion will be used in it. But, this is not correct. It is a fact that *Kṛṣṇa* is the locus of the result of the operation of a cow herd who is other than *Kṛṣṇa*. But, there is a special rule of Pāṇini namely, *gatibuddhi* etc. (Pa 1.4.52) by which the use of the second inflexion is prohibited in such a case. Kaundabhatta also argues that if the first amendment is accepted, the expression *tandulāṃ pācyate svayameva* will be correct. Harivallabha clearly shows that the subjective case will set aside the objective case in the sentence.<sup>71</sup> Kaundabhatta further shows that some logical problems will arise from accepting the amendment.<sup>72</sup> There is some truth in the last reason shown by him in rejecting the amendment. It should be noted here that the Naiyāyikas like Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra and Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya also reject the amendment on a different ground. Kaundabhatta does not refer to the second amendment suggested by the logicians. The amendment is essentially necessary in order to avoid such expressions as *nadī tīraṃ vardhate*. We shall discuss this point appropriately when the occasion will arise.



### Harivallabha

Harivallabha justifies the view of Kaundabhaṭṭa that the Paninian rule Kartur Ipsitatamaṃ Karma denotes kriyā-janyaphalāśraya or the locus of the result of an operation with the help of appropriate arguments. He lays emphasis on the term Ipsitatama in the rule. He accepts the etymological meaning of the term. He shows that when this meaning is combined with the word Kartuh, the rule signifies that Karma means an object with which the agent intensively desires to establish a relation through his operation. Harivallabha says that the operation of the agent generates a particular result, and Karmakāreka is inseparably related to it. According to the grammarian, this kāreka is an object of ardent desire of the agent for this particular relation of it with the result. Therefore, he concludes that the interpretation given by Kaundabhaṭṭa of the rule Kartur Ipsitatamaṃ Karma is justified.<sup>73</sup>

Harivallabha shows that when the desiderative suffix san is attached to the verb āpnoti, the verb becomes intransitive in character, and thus the term Ipsitatama does not denote the desired meaning. Let us explain the idea clearly. When the suffix san is used with the verb āpnoti, it means the desire for āpti or attainment. But, it does not denote the desire for an object. Thus, the term Ipsityatama fails to give us the expected meaning. Harivallabha solves this problem.

According to him, we should lay emphasis on the object of the basic verb to which the suffix *san* is used. In this way, the commentator gives up the desiderative portion of the verb.<sup>74</sup>

We have already shown that Kaundabhaṭṭa does not distinguish between *Īpsita Karma* and *Anīpsita Karma*. Harivallabha justifies it. He says that there is no material distinction between these two types of Karma. He refers to the sentence *Harim bhajati* in this connection. He shows that the term *Hari* in this sentence does not give us any idea of *Īpsitāva*. According to him, it simply denotes an object of adoration.<sup>75</sup>

Harivallabha clarifies the concept of Karma presented by Kaundabhaṭṭa in order to eliminate the scope of any controversy over it. He rigidly follows Nāgeśa in this clarification.<sup>76</sup>

### Nāgeśa

Nāgeśa exhaustively interprets the Paninian rule *Kartur Īpsitatsman Karma*. This interpretation helps us to understand the exact significance of the term Karma in the rule in an easy manner. According to this interpretation, the term Karma in the rule denotes the locus of the result generated by the operation of the agent indicated by a verb. Nāgeśa clearly shows in the interpretation that the locus of

the result is different from the locus of the operation. He states that this locus is the uddesya or the object of the utmost desire of the agent.<sup>77</sup> He reiterates the view of Bhattoji Dikshit that the locus of the result becomes the object of the utmost desire of the agent for the result it contains.<sup>78</sup>

Nagesa says that the second inflexion which is used in Karmakāraka denotes the locus or the possessor of the śakti or the property known as Karmatva. He rejects the view of his predecessor Kaundabhatta that the second inflexion used in the objective case denotes locus. He advances two strong reasons for rejecting the view. Let us discuss these reasons clearly. Kaundabhatta says that the seventh inflexion denotes āśraya or locus. According to this interpretation, the term Karma in the rule Karmam dvitīya given by Pāṇini indicates that the second inflexion is used in the locus of Karma. But, Kaundabhatta says in his interpretation of the term Karma that the second inflexion is used in the locus of the result. Thus, there is a contradiction in his statements. Secondly, the Bhāṣyakāṇva and some other grammarians opine that Kāraka is a śakti or property. They also maintain the view that śakti and its locus are non-different. Thus, the term Kāraka denotes the locus of a śakti. According to this interpretation, Karmakāraka is the locus of Karmatva śakti. In grammar, the second inflexion is used in a word to denote Karmakāraka. It shows that the new view of Kaundabhatta is not correct.<sup>79</sup>

Nāgēśa shows that the agent of the verb *gacchati* in such sentences as *Devadatto gacchati* etc. is a locus of the result namely, *sanyoga* or contact generated by the operation indicated by the verb. But, he opines that the agent in such cases is not a case of *Karma*. He shows the same reason as his predecessor *Kaṇḍabhaṭṭa* for this. He however, justifies the expression *ātmanam ātmā hanti*. He says that in this sentence, the term *ātman* used as the agent denotes the soul remaining in the body while the term *ātman* used as the instrumental case denotes the body and thus there is a difference between the two.<sup>80</sup>

Nāgēśa clearly explains the reason for specifying the result in the definition. He states that the specification is necessary in order to exclude the term *agni* in *agner mānavaḥkāṃ vārayati* from the scope of *Karma*. Similarly he shows that *mānavaka* is also not a case of *Apādāna*.<sup>81</sup>

The grammarian examines the definition *parasamavetakriyājanadhātvarthaphalāśrayatvam Karmatvam*. He shows with the help of strong arguments that the definition is not an appropriate one. He discusses the futility of the view that we can avoid such absurd expressions as *Caitraś Caitraṃ gacchati* and *Devadatto dravyaṃ gacchati* with the help of the definition.<sup>82</sup>

Nāgeśa gives us a very clear and comprehensive idea of Anīpsita Karma and Akathita Karma in Sanskrit grammar. But, he does not offer any new idea in the discussion on these two types of Karma. He reiterates the traditional views in it.<sup>83</sup>

### Karma in non-Pāṇinian schools

#### Kalāpa

The author of the Kalāpa defines Karma as yat kriyate tat Karma.<sup>84</sup> The definition is simple but it has a wide implication. It covers all the instances of Karmakāraka in Sanskrit grammar. Durgasiṃha clearly shows it in his short commentary (vṛtti).

#### Durgasiṃha

Durgasiṃha supplies the term Kartā in the interpretation of the definition. He says that every activity is performed by an agent, and therefore, the verb kriyate in the definition suggests the presence of the agent in the definition. Thus, the definition stands as  $\text{kartrā yat kriyate tat Karma}$ . Durgasiṃha further interprets the definition as  $\text{Kartuh kriyayā yad vyāpyate tat Karma}$ . In this way, Durgasiṃha synthesizes the view of the Vṛttikara with that of Sarvavarṇa.

Macritically discusses the various groups and sub-groups of Karma.<sup>85</sup>

### Trilocana

Trilocana corroborates the views of Durgasinha on the meaning of the rule *yet kriyate* tat Karma given by Sarvavarmā. He also discusses the different groups and sub-groups of Karma.<sup>86</sup>

### Suśeṣācārya

Suśeṣa offers an illuminating discussion on the definition of Karma given by Sarvavarmā. He explains it more clearly than his predecessors. He accepts the view of Durgasinha that the expression *yet kriyate* means *Kartrā yet kriyate*. But, he interprets the verb *kriyate* as *sambadhyate* (i.e. that which is related to). As a result of this interpretation, the meaning of the definition stands as follows : the particular *kāraka* which is related to the activity of the agent is known as Karma. But, we all know that the agent himself is related to his own activity. Thus, the agent becomes a case of Karma in relation to the activity he performs. Suśeṣa realises this difficulty. Therefore, he interprets the term *kriyate* in the

definition clearly. According to him, the term *kriyate* denotes the result of an action. *Suṣeṇa* shows that as a result of this interpretation, the meaning of the term *Karma* stands as the locus of the result of an action. But, this interpretation also does not give us a correct idea of the term *Karma*. *Suṣeṇācārya* refers to the sentence *grāmaṃ gacchati Devadattaḥ* in which the agent *Devadatta* is the locus of the result namely, *samyoga* or contact which is generated by his own act of going. Thus, he is also a case of *Karma* according to the above view. Therefore, the grammarian offers the definition *paraśmavata-kriyājanya-phalabhāgitvaṃ Karmatvaṃ* in order to remove above discrepancy. This definition indicates that the locus of the result is different from the locus of the operation which generates it. The locus of the operation which generates the intended result is invariably *Kartā* or the agent. Therefore, the distinction between the subjective case and the objective case is clear from the definition. But, some grammarians opine that this definition is also not an appropriate one. The predicate *para* in the definition is interpreted as other than the locus of the result of an action. They show that in the sentence *Devadatto grāmaṃ gacchati*, the word *grāma* is a case of *para* in the above sense because, the agent *Devadatta* is the locus of the result namely, contact and the village (*grāma*) is other than him. This interpretation poses a new

problem for Suṣeṣa. Therefore, he amends the definition as *tatkriyānāśrayatve sati tatkriyājanaphalabhāgitvaṁ Karmatvaṁ*. It denotes that the objective case is the locus of the result of an action but it is not the locus of the action. But, he finds that this definition is applicable to the ablative case also. He shows it with the help of an illustration namely, *parvatād avarohati* (i.e. he is descending from the mountain). In this illustration, the term *paravata* or the mountain is not the locus of the motion of the agent but it is the locus of the separation which is generated by his motion. Thus, the separation is the result of the operation. Suṣeṣa amends the definition further in order to remove the above discrepancy. He specifies the *kriyā* or the operation mentioned in this definition in this amendment. He says that the term *kriyā* in the definition denotes that particular operation which is indicated by the verb under consideration. According to him, the locus of the result generated by this particular operation only is the *Karmakāraka* in grammar. We can easily exclude the term *parvata* in the sentence *parvatād avarohati* from the scope of Karma if we accept the above concept. If we critically examine the sentence *parvatād avarohati*, we see that the term *parvata* or the mountain mentioned in it is the locus of the separation generated by the motion of the agent but it is not the locus of the subsequent contact of the agent



with the foot of the mountain which is the result of the act of descending. Thus, the word parvata in the sentence is not a case of Karma. Suśaṅgācārya shows that like the operation, the result mentioned in the definition should also be specified. He proves the necessity of such a specification by critically interpreting the sentences bhūmau parṇam patati and naditīre plavo vardhate. Let us now discuss the idea offered by him in the interpretation. The sentence bhūmau parṇam patati indicates a contact of a falling leaf with the earth. This contact and result of the act of falling are denoted by the verb patati in the sentence. The earth is the locus of this result. It is clear from the sentence itself that the earth is not the locus of the act of falling. Thus, the earth in the sentence is a case of Karma according to the view discussed above. But, the earth is not accepted as Karma in the sentence by scholars. Again, the sentence naditīre plavo vardhate indicates that the waters of the river come into a contact with the bank of the river. This contact is the result of the act of swelling of the river indicated by the verb vardhate in the sentence. In this case, the bank of the river is the locus of the above result. Therefore, like the previous locus, this locus is also a case of Karma according to the said concept. But, scholars are not ready to accept the term naditīra in the sentence as Karmakāraka. It

is clear from the above discussion that the result mentioned in the definition of Karma discussed above should be specified. Therefore, Suṣeṣa offers his last amendment on the definition by using the predicate dhatuvācya to the term phala (result) in it. It indicates that like the operation, the result also must be denoted by the verb itself. Thus, the result which is not denoted by the verb is not to be considered in the definition of Karma.<sup>87</sup> The commentator follows the Navya nyāya school in the above discussion.

### Candra

Candraśomī uses the term kriyāpya for Karmakāraka. The term kriyāpya denotes that particular object with which the agent intends to establish a relation through his action. Candraśomī shows that the sense of kriyāpya is present in all the types of Karma introduced by Pāṇini.<sup>88</sup>

### Saṅkṣiptasāra

Kramaśīśvara defines Karma as tatsamuddiṣṭam Karma.<sup>89</sup> The word tat stands for Kartā or the agent. The word samuddiṣṭa is an equivalent of the term Īpsitatama in the first definition of Karma given by Pāṇini. It is clear from the commentaries of Jamarāṇḍī and Goyicandra. Thus, the definition of

Kramadīśvara is different from that of Pāṇini in form only but not in sense.

### Jumarānandī

The commentator Jumarānandī interprets the definition in a proper manner. He clearly explains the significance of the term samuddiṣṭa. He says that the term samuddiṣṭa denotes the locus of the result (phala) of a particular activity.<sup>90</sup> Thus, when we say Devataddo grāmaṃ gacchati, it means that the village (grāma) is the locus of the result (phala) of the act of going. This result is nothing else than the contact between Devadatta and the village. Now, because the village acts as the locus of the said result, it is a case of Karma.

Jumarānandī classifies Karmakāraṇa into four groups namely, Prāpya, Nirvartya, Vikārya and Anīpsita. The first three groups of Karma are only three subdivisions of the Īpsitatama, according to Bhartṛhari. Jumarānandī does not accept Akathita as a separate group. But, he also does not place it under any other group of Karma. He prefer to remain silent on the issue.<sup>91</sup>

### Goyicandra

Goyicandra justifies the view of Jumarānandī that the objective case is the locus of the result of an operation by critically explaining the illustrations Devadatto grāmam gacchati and Devadatta odanam pacati.<sup>92</sup>

Goyicandra interprets the terms Prāpya, Nirvartya etc. in an appropriate manner. He reiterates the views of Bhartrhari in this connection, without referring to him directly. Jumarānandī shows that the term pāpa in the illustration pāpam tyajati, is a case of Anīpsita Karma. Goyicandra justifies this with appropriate reason. He says that the agent dislikes sin and therefore, gives it up. This is a quite reasonable argument. But, the commentator says that the term āditya (sun) in the sentence ādityam paśyati is a case of Anīpsita.<sup>93</sup> This is a favourite example of Prāpya Karma according to such famous grammarians as Haradatta, Jinendrabuddhi and Halārāja. But, Goyicandra suddenly departs from tradition in this matter. He probably intends to say that the agent accidentally beholds the sun but he has no interest in it.

### Jainendra

It has been already discussed that Pāṇini defines Karmakāraka with the help of three rules, namely, Kartur

Īpsitatamaṃ Karma, tathāyuktam cāṇīpsitam and akathitañca. The author of the Jainendra combines the first two rules into a single definition, that is, Kartrāpyam (Karma).<sup>94</sup> He, however, defines indirect objects by the very definition of Pāṇini, namely, akathitañca.<sup>95</sup>

The grammarian apparently follows the Kāśikāvṛtti in the definition Kartrāpyam. We have already noted that the Vṛttikāra interprets the term Īpsitatama of Pāṇini from an etymological point of view. He interprets it as āptum iṣṭatamaam. The author of the Jainendra accepts this interpretation with a slight modification. He uses the term āpyam for āptum iṣṭatamaam. The grammarian omits the superlative degree from the definition. The reason for this is difficult to guess. The commentator Abhayānandī, however, says that the word āpya itself denotes the sense of āpyatama in the definition.

#### Abhayānandī

Abhayānandī faithfully follows the tradition of the Kāśikā in commenting on the rules Kartrāpyam and akathitañca.

He interprets the rule Kartrāpyam as Kartrā kriyayā yad āpyam tat kārakaṃ Karmasamjñam bhavati.<sup>96</sup> He supplies the word kriyā in the above interpretation. He says that the term is suggested by both the terms Kartā and āpya, in the defini-

tion.<sup>97</sup> Now, the boiled down meaning of the definition stands as follows : when the agent establishes a relation with an object through his activities, the object is known as Karma. But this interpretation has a serious drawback. The commentator himself admits that the agent establishes a similar relation with all other cases through his activities. Therefore, Abhayānandī says that the word āpya denotes āpyatama. It is an equivalent of the word īpsitatama of Pāṇini. The commentator opines that because the term āpya communicates the sense of āpyatama, any other kāraka which is a case of āpya only is not treated as Karma in grammar. He quotes the illustration payasaudaṇḍa bhunkte from the Kāśikā in order to substantiate his view. In the above illustration, the term payaḥ (milk) is a case of āpya only (otherwise known as īpsita) and not a case of āpyatama. The āpyatama in this illustration is odana or rice.<sup>98</sup> Now, the idea that the term āpya denotes āpyatama indicates that Devanandī derives the sense of the superlative degree even from a secondary expression where the suffix tamap or an equivalent suffix is not directly used. There lies the distinction between him and Pāṇini.

Abhayānandī also explains the significance of the term Kartā in the definition. The term āpya in the definition should not be taken as an isolated one. It has a relational character. It is invariably related to the agent (Kartā) in

the definition of Karma. Abhayānandī cites the example māśeś-vasvaṃ badhnāti in order to show that when this condition is absent, an object cannot be treated as a case of Karma. In the sentence māśeś-vasvaṃ badhnāti, the word māśeś is related to the objective case, that is, the horse. It is not related to the agent. Therefore, the definition does not cover the word māśeś.<sup>99</sup>

Abhayānandī does not offer any new idea on the concept of Akathita Karma. He rigidly follows tradition in this regard. The grammarian gives us a comprehensive list of the verbs which govern two objects.

### Hemacandra

Hemacandra places all the varieties of Karma under a single definition namely, Kartur vyāpyam Karma.<sup>100</sup> The definition is very much similar to the definition of Devanandī. But, Hemacandra makes some significant improvement upon the author of the Jainendra. He attaches the prefix vi' to the term āpya. The prefix plays an important role in determining the meaning of the term Karma.

Hemacandra interprets the rule Kartur vyāpyam Karma as follows : Kartrā kriyayā yad viśeṣeṇa āptum iṣyate tad vyāpyam tat kārakaṃ Karmasaṃjñam bhavati.<sup>101</sup> The interpre-

tation clearly shows that the prefix vi in the word vyāpyam plays the part of the suffix tamap in the Paninian rule Kartur īpsitataman Karma.

The grammarian classifies Karmakāraka into three broad groups, namely, Nirvartya, Vikārya and Prāpya. He defines the above terms in the same way as Bhartṛhari. He further divides these three groups of Karma into (1) Iṣṭa (2) Anīṣṭa and (3) Anubhaya.<sup>102</sup> The term anīṣṭa stands for the term dveṣya. The term anubhaya is a substitute for the term udāsīna in other systems of grammar.

The grammarian has no significant contribution to the concept of Akathita Karma. He adds the roots graha and pao to the list of roots governing two objects.<sup>103</sup>

#### Mazhabodha

Bopadeva presents a new, monosyllabic term for Karma namely, dha. The term dha not only denotes the objective case but also denotes adverb etc.<sup>104</sup>

#### Durgādāsa Vidyāvāgīśa

Durgādāsa Vidyāvāgīśa explains the definition dha very clearly. He accepts the definition of Karma offered by Sarvavarṇā namely yat kriyate tat Karma. He critically inter-



prets this definition in order to show that Kramadīśvara presents the very idea as conveyed by this definition in the rule.<sup>105</sup>

Durgādāśa divides Karmakāraḥ in the traditional manner into Nirvartya, Vikārya and Prāpya. He quotes the relevant kārīkās of the Vākyapadīya in order to justify the division.<sup>106</sup>

#### Rāma Tarkavāgīśa

Rāma Tarkavāgīśa offers an important discussion on Karma. Tarkavāgīśa quotes the views of the Kalāpa school in interpreting the term dha or Karma. He accepts the definition yat kriyate tat Karma as given by the author of the Kalāpa. He interpretes it as Kartuh kriyayā yad vyāpyate tat Karma.<sup>107</sup> This is the well known standpoint of Durgachōha. But, this standpoint is also based on the interpretation of the Vrtti-kāra of the Paninian rule Kartur Ipsitatamañ Karma.

Rāma Tarkavāgīśa classifies Karma into three sub-groups, namely, Nirvartya, Vikārya and Prāpya. He defines and illustrates them in the traditional manner. He quotes the relevant kārīkās from the Vākyapadīya in this connection. He does not accept Anīpsita as a separate group of Karma. According to him, it is included in Prāpya Karma.<sup>108</sup>

### Sārasvata

The author of the Sārasvata defines Karmakāraṇa by the Paninian rules Kartur īpsitatanaṁ Karma, tathāyuktān cānīpsitam and akathitaṁ. He interprets these rules in the traditional manner.<sup>109</sup>

The grammarian departs from tradition in dividing Īpsitatana Karma. He divides it into four sub-groups namely, (i) Utpādya (ii) Āpya (iii) Saṅskārya and (iv) Vikārya.<sup>110</sup> The term Utpādya is a substitute for the term Nirvartya in other systems of grammar while the term Āpya stands for the term Prāpya in these systems.

Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya critically explains the term Saṅskārya. He offers three illustrations of Saṅskārya Karma.<sup>111</sup> One of these illustrations namely, *vāhīnyavān vā prokṣati* is intelligently chosen by the grammarian from the Mīmāṃsā school in order to prove that Saṅskārya is entirely different from Utpādya, Vikārya etc. But, if we critically examine the illustrations of Saṅskārya Karma offered by him, we see that Saṅskārya Karma is not different from Vikārya Karma.

He first offers the illustration *vāhīn yavān vā prokṣati*. It means that a Vedic priest sprinkles holy water on sacrificial paddy seeds or barley corns in order to impart some religious merit to them. Thus, they are clear cases of Vikārya Karma. Similarly, the other two illustrations namely,

vastraṃ rañjayati Devadattaḥ and rajako vāstaṃ kṣālayati also indicate that agent imparts some new quality to the garment he washes or colours. Thus, the word vastra in these illustration is a case of Vikārya Karma.

### Candrakīrti

Candrakīrti defines Karma as Kriyate yat tat Karma. He has no other contribution to the concept of Karma.<sup>112</sup>

### Rāmāśrama

Rāmāśrama remains silent on the views expressed by the author of Sārasvata on the objective case. He also does not offer any new idea on the concept of the case.

### Supadma

Padmanābha defines Karmakāreka as kriyāvyāpyam Karma. He explains the definition as Kartuh kriyā yad vyāpyate tat kārakaṃ Karmasamjñam bhavati. It appears to us from the interpretation that the grammarian presents the logical meaning of the Paninian rule Kartur Ipsitatam Karma in it.<sup>113</sup>

The grammarian classifies the objective case into *Ipsita*, *Anīpsita* and *Itarat* or other than these two types. The third type of Karma stands for those cases of Karma which are neither desired by the agent nor despised by him. It is termed as the *Udāsīna* type in some other systems of grammar. Padmanābha says that the verbs *dogdhi* etc. govern two objects. But, he does not accept *Akhatita* as a separate class of Karma. He clearly illustrates the different classes of Karma.<sup>114</sup>

#### Viṣṇuśiśra

Viṣṇuśiśra explains the term *kriyāvyāpṛa* in a critical manner. He utilises some important views of the *Vṛttikāra* in his explanation in order to bring home to us the significance of the term. He says that the author of the *Supadma* rightly uses the term *Kartuh* in his interpretation of the definition. Viṣṇuśiśra says that the term *kriyā* in the definition *kriyāvyāpṛam Karma* denotes the activity of the agent alone and not of any other *kāraka*. In other words, *Karmakāraka* is that which is exclusively related to the activity of agent. Viṣṇuśiśra argues that it for this very reason the term *māsa* in the illustration *māsaḥ vasvaṁ badh-  
nāti* is not a case of Karma. The term *māsa* is related to the act of grazing of the horse. But, the horse is a case

of Karma in the above illustration, and it is not a case of Kartā. Hence, the definition does not apply to the term māṣa.<sup>115</sup> He also shows that the term vyāpya denotes avāśya-vyāpya in the definition. The term avāśyavyāpya is a substitute for the term Īpsitatama in the rule Kartur Īpsitatamaṁ Karma of Pāṇini. He gives us an appropriate idea of the term avāśyavyāpya with the help of an illustration namely, paya-saudanam bhunkte. In this illustration, both the terms payaḥ (milk) and oḍana (rice) are related to the verb. But, Viṣṇu-mīśra shows that the term oḍana alone is the case of avāśya-vyāpya in it while the term payaḥ is only a case of vyāpya. Therefore, the term oḍana is the case of Karma in the illustration but not the term payaḥ.<sup>116</sup> The commentator does not show any originality in this discussion. He presents a well known view of Patañjali in it in a different language.

He explains the different types of Karma presented by Padmanābha very clearly. He states that kuñjaṁ tyajati khagaḥ is a clear case of Prāpya Karma. According to him, kuñjaṁ tyajati indicates kuñjatyāgaṁ prāpnoti.<sup>117</sup>

### Harināmamṛta

Jivagoṣvami defines Karma in his Harināmamṛta as kriya yatsadhika tat Karma.<sup>118</sup> It is clear from the definition that the grammarian lays emphasis on kriyā in it and

ignores Kartā (agent) totally. He uses the term kriyā as the agent in the definition. He shows adequate reason for this.

Now, we can raise an objection against the definition. The term kriyā is used as the agent in the definition. The special capacity of the agent is that he can operate independently for which he is called svatantra. But, a kriyā or an action does not possess this capacity. It always depends on a particular kāraṇa in order to attain an intended object. Therefore, a kriyā is not svatantra but paratantra (dependent). It is for this reason, the nominative use of the term kriyā in the definition is not justified. On this point, the author of the Harināmamṛta says that the sense of svāntarya (independence) is imposed upon the term in the definition. He says that Pāṇini also adopts a similar technic in the rule sādha-kāraṇam. 119

Jīvaśvāmī says that the use of the kriyā as the agent in the definition serves an important purpose. Because kriyā is inanimate, the distinction between Īpsita and Anīpsita automatically disappears in its case. Therefore, the definition applies equally to the case of Īpsita and Anīpsita. The grammarian cites the illustration bhramād viṣam bhakṣayati (i.e. he takes poison by mistake) in this connection. He says that viṣa or poison is anīpsita of the agent. In spite of this, it is case of Karma by the above definition. 120 Thus,

the definition has an advantage over the definitions Kartur Īpsitatamen Karma etc. Jīvagoswāmī simplifies the Paninian definitions of Karma with the help of the present definition. The definition covers all the examples of Karmakāraka.

He divides Karma into five classes, namely, Utpādya, Vikārya, Saṁskārya, Prāpya and Tyājya.<sup>121</sup> But, Saṁskārya and Tyājya can be easily placed under Vikārya and Prāpya.

#### Prayogaratnamālā

The author of the Prayogaratnamālā accepts the well known traditional view of the grammatical school that the term Karma denotes that particular object with which the agent intends to establish a relation through his action. It is clear from the definition of Karma given by the grammarian namely, yat Kartuh kriyayā vyāpṛāṇat Karma parikīrtitam.<sup>122</sup> The grammarian, however, interprets the definition as para-samaveta-kriyāphalāśrayatvaṁ Karmatvam.<sup>123</sup> Puruṣottama does not clarify the significance of parasamavetākriyāphalāśrayatvam.

He divides Karmakāraka into different groups and sub-groups. He rigidly follows the grammatical tradition in this division.<sup>124</sup>

He furnishes a long list of sixteen roots including kṛ and grah which govern the indirect object when they are reduced to verbs.<sup>125</sup>

### Karma in philosophical schools

#### Kāraṇasakṛa

Bhavananda Siddhāntavāgīśa critically examines some important definitions of Karma in the Kāraṇasakṛa. He clearly shows that there are some serious limitations in these definitions. Therefore, he offers an independent definition of Karma in which he tries to remove the defects of the earlier definitions.

He first examines the definition Karanavyāpāryatvam<sup>126</sup> Karmatvam. The meaning of this definition is Karmakāraṇa or the objective case denotes the locus of the operation generated by the instrumental case which is favourable for an intended action.

Bhavananda rejects this definition as too wide. He says that the definition is applicable to the term dātra (sickle) also in the sentence dātreṇa dhānyam lunāti because, it denotes the locus of the operation which helps the instrumental case of the verb lunāti to accomplish the act of reaping.<sup>126</sup> Let us explain it clearly. When the reaper uses a sickle for reaping paddy, the sickle comes into a contact with the instrumental case of the act of reaping such as the hand of the reaper. The sickle is the locus of this contact. The contact between the sickle and the instrumental case is



essentially necessary for accomplishing the act of reaping. Thus, the sickle is also a case of Karma according to the said definition. But, in fact it is not so. Therefore, the definition is too narrow.

Bhavananda criticises the definition *parasamaveta-kriyājananyaphalāśālitvaṃ Karmatvam* also. The definition means that the term Karma denotes the locus of the result which is generated by the operation of another Karaka. Bhavananda shows with the help of suitable illustrations that this definition is also not an appropriate one. The following are the objections of Bhavananda against the definition.

The roots *gam* and *pat* denote the acts of going and falling. These two acts indicate the separation of a particular object from a particular place and its subsequent contact with another place. The said separation and the contact are the results of the motion of the object. Now, the scholars treat the place with which the object comes into a contact as a case of Karma but not the place from which it is separated. Bhavananda says that if we accept the above definition of Karma, even the place from which the object is separated will be a case of Karma, because, it is the locus of the said separation.

A similar problem arises in the case of some other roots also such as *tyaj*, *spand* etc. It will be clear from

the following discussion.

The root *tyaj* denotes the act of leaving. This act also indicates a similar separation of an object from a particular place and its contact with a yonder place. In Sanskrit grammar, only the place from which the object is separated through the act of leaving is alone the case of Karma. Thus, we use the expressions *taruṃ tyajati*, *nagaraṃ tyajati* etc. But, according to the above definition, the place with which the object comes into a contact is also a case of Karma. The reason for this is clear. The contact of the object with the latter place is the result of the motion of the object indicated by the root *tyaj*, and the place with which such a contact takes place is its locus. The above discussion shows that the definition is too wide. Let us now take the case of the root *spand*. The root denotes the act of moving. This act is also characterised by a separation of an object from a particular place through motion and its subsequent contact with another place. Bhavānanda states that both the places are cases of Karma by the said definition. But, we all know that the verb *spandate* is intransitive.

Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa shows that the definition is applicable to the term *tīra* in the sentence *nadī tīre vardhate* also. The sentence *nadī tīre vardhate* means 'the river is swelling to its bank'. We all know that when

the river swells to its bank, the waters of the river come into a contact with the bank. This is the result of the act of swelling indicated by the root *vr̥dh*. Thus, the term *tīra* (bank) is a case of Karma by the definition. But, such a view is never accepted by scholars. The term *tīra* is only a locative case in the sentence. It is for the above reasons, Bhavaṇanda does not accept the definition in its original form. He does not reject the definition outright but suitably amends it.

Some scholars critically examine the arguments of Bhavaṇanda and then state that the term *phala* in the definition does not denote all the results which are related to the meaning of root but it means only the specific result which is denoted by a root. According to them, the root *gam* (to go) denotes the contact of an object with a latter place, the root *tyaj* (to leave) denotes the separation of an object from a particular place and the root *pat* (to fall) denotes the contact of an object with a place lying below. They show that the roots *spand* and *vr̥dh* on the other hand, do not denote any result. They opine that these roots denote only an operation.

Now, Bhavaṇanda Siddhāntavāgīśa says that if the term *phala* is used in such a specific sense, it must be clearly stated in the definition. He suggests that the definition should be amended as *tattaddhātā<sup>tār</sup>ta<sup>ar</sup>va<sup>ar</sup>cohedakaphalaśālitvaṃ*.

tattaddhātvartha-karmatvam. It implies that the term Karma means the locus of the particular result which is denoted by a verb.

But, the philosopher finds that even the above definition is too wide to cover such instances as *even tyajati* etc. Therefore, he suggests that the predicate *parasamaveta* (i.e. that which belongs to some other kāraṇa) should be used to the term *dhātvartha* in the definition. The predicate *parasamaveta* implies that the locus of the result is different from the locus of the operation which generates it.<sup>127</sup>

The author of the *Kāraṇacakra* rejects a third definition of Karma namely, *tatkriyānadhikaraṇatve sati tatkriyāvacchedakaphalaśālitvam Karmatvam* on the ground that it is a gratuitous definition.<sup>128</sup>

He tries to give us an appropriate idea of the concept of Karma presented by him by amending the definition *parasamaveta-kriyājanya-phalaśālitvam Karmatvam* with the help of a few suitable illustrations. He clearly discusses the meanings of the verbs used in the illustrations. He first gives the illustration *Vipraya gāṇ dadāti*. The verb *dadāti* denotes the act of giving. He clarifies the sense of this act. He says that the verb *dadāti* denotes that a particular person renounces his ownership of an object and transfers it to another person without receiving any price for it. This

renunciation of the ownership and its subsequent transference to another person without any price is the result of the act of giving. Bhavānanda clearly explains that in the illustration *Viprāya gāṁ dadāti*, the Vipra or the Brāhmaṇa is the person for whom the giver gives up his ownership of the cow. The cow as mentioned in the illustration is the locus of the result denoted by the verb *dadāti*. It is for this reason, the term *go* (cow) in the illustration is a case of Karma according to Bhavānanda.

Bhavānanda explains the other illustrations also appropriately. These illustrations are *Viṣṇuḥ yajate*, *ghṛtaṁ juhoti*, *gaṁ विक्रीते* etc. According to him, the verb *yajate* denotes that a particular person renounces his ownership of an object in honour of a god. This renunciation of the ownership is the result as denoted by the verb. He shows that in the sentence, *Viṣṇuḥ yajate*, *Viṣṇu* is the locus of such a result. Therefore, he says that it is a case of Karma in the sentence. Again, the verb *juhoti* denotes that a person renounces his ownership of an object and sacrifices the object in the fire. In this case, the renunciation of the ownership of the object and its sacrifice in the fire are the result. Bhavānanda clearly states that the term *ghṛta* in the third illustration is the object which acts as the locus of the said result and hence, it is a case of Karma. He shows the

distinction between the act of giving and the act of selling. He says that when some price is taken for renouncing one's ownership of an object and transferring it to another person, it becomes a case of selling. The verb *vikrīṇīte* denotes the above sense. The renunciation of the ownership as described above against a price is the result as denoted by this verb. Now, Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāṇīśa shows that the term *go* in the sentence *gāṁ vikrīṇīte* is the locus of such a result. Therefore, he opines that it is a clear case of Karma. He also explains the sentences *gāṁ krīṇāti* and *gāṁ pratigrhṇāti* in the following ways. The sentence *gāṁ krīṇāti* means that a person buys a cow. The second sentence means that a person formally receives a cow which is donated to him. When a person buys a cow, he attains the ownership of the cow from the seller against a certain price. This ownership is the result as denoted by the verb *krīṇāti*. The cow is the locus of the result. Hence, it is treated as *Karmakāraka* in the sentence. In the second sentence, the cow is the locus of the ownership which is attained by the recipient through the act of giving. This ownership is the result of the act. Thus, the cow is a case of Karma in the sentence.<sup>129</sup>

Bhavānanda divides *Karmakāraka* in the traditional way into three sub-groups namely, *Prāpya*, *Vikārya* and *Nirvartya*.<sup>130</sup> He does not define *Prāpya Karma* clearly. He simply

states that this type of Karma contains contact etc. as the result of an action.<sup>131</sup> The complete list of such results is not given by the philosopher. Moreover, these results cannot be generalised. Therefore, this division appears to us as a group of miscellaneous objects. He defines and illustrates the Vikārya type of objects in an appropriate manner.<sup>132</sup> He shows clearly that the Nirvartya type of Karma is an object in the secondary sense only. It does not contain the result in the same way as the two other types of Karma do. He presents the illustrations katan karoti and ghatan karoti in order to substantiate his view. The first sentence indicates that a person is preparing a mat from the grass known as vīraṇa. The second sentence indicates that a person is making a jar from clay. The verb karoti generally denotes an activity associated with a result. But, in this case, the verb does not denote any activity characterised by a result.<sup>133</sup> The activity as denoted by the verb in the sentences is directed to the material cause of the mat and the jar and not the mat or the jar itself. It shows that the term Kāṭa or the term ghaṭa is used as a case of Karma only in a secondary sense. Similar is the case of all other examples of Nirvartya Karma.

Bhavanānda refers to the example odanah paṣati in the course of the above discussion. He says that like the previous instance, it is also a case of Karma in a secondary

sense. But, he shows that if the changes of the unbilled rice such as the softening of its parts are indicated by the term *odana*, then it is a case of *Vikārya Karma*. Again, if the emphasis is not laid on this idea, it is a clear case of *Prāpya Karma*.<sup>134</sup>

He justifies the use of the second case ending in the adverb *stoka* in the sentence *stokam pacati*. He says that there is the relation of identity between adverb and the act of cooking in the sentence.<sup>135</sup>

### Sāraṃāli

Jayakṛṣṇa defines Karma as *parasamavetakriyājanya-phalaślitva*.<sup>136</sup> We have already shown that this definition is criticised by the author of the *Kārikacakra* on different grounds. Jayakṛṣṇa is fully aware of the defects critically discussed by his predecessor. Therefore, he interprets the definition in an intelligent manner in order to remove these defects. He shows in this interpretation that the term *phala* in the definition denotes only a specified result namely, the result which is indicated by the verb itself. It is clear from his interpretation of the meaning of the verbs *gacchati*, *pacati* and *dadāti*.<sup>137</sup>

Jayakṛṣṇa divides *Karmakāraka* into *Nirvartya*, *Vikārya* and *Prāpya* in the traditional manner.<sup>138</sup> But, he further



divides them into two broad groups namely, primary and secondary. According to him, the definition of Karma is applicable to Prāpya Karma alone in the primary sense. He says that in the cases of Nirvartya and Vikārya Karma, the sense of the effect is imposed upon the cause by lakṣaṇā.<sup>139</sup> Therefore, the definition is applicable to these two sub-groups of Karma only in a secondary sense.<sup>140</sup> Jayakṛṣṇa shows the distinction between these two types of Karma and Akathita Karma very clearly.<sup>141</sup>

He differs from Bhavananda on an important point. Bhavananda says that Prāpya Karma and Vikārya Karma are cases of primary objective case while Nirvartya Karma is a case of secondary objective case.<sup>142</sup>

### Śabdasektiprakāśikā

The author of the Śabdasektiprakāśikā departs from the established tradition of the Nyāya school in defining Karma. He offers a definition of Karma which is entirely different from the earlier definitions of the term as given by Bhavananda Siddhāntavāgīśa, Jayarāma Bhaṭṭācārya and others. He presents the idea in this definition that the meaning as denoted by a verb in the passive voice is itself Karmakāṇḍaka or the objective case.<sup>143</sup>

Let us explain the idea clearly. A verb in Sanskrit grammar consists of two parts namely, the operation (vyāpāra) and the result (phala). The operational part is related to Kartā or the agent. The other part of the verb, that is, the result is related to another case. The case to which it is related is called Karma (object). Jagadīśa expresses this very idea in his definition in a technical language. The philosopher intelligently chooses the verb in the passive voice in his definition. In the passive voice, a verb primarily means the result contained by it. The relation between the result and the Karma is clearly cognised by us in this voice.

Jagadīśa presents a critical and comprehensive discussion on Karmakāraṇa. He mainly shows the use of the objective case with different verbs in the Sanskrit language in this discussion. He clearly explains the meaning of every verb and shows the exact relation which holds between the verb and the objective case. Jagadīśa first discusses the meaning of the verbs gacchati and tyajati. He reiterates the view of Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa that the verb gacchati denotes a motion which generates the result known as <sup>sp</sup>samyoga (contact) and the verb tyajati denotes a motion which generates the result namely, vibhāga (separation). He rejects the view of a section of scholars that the verb gacchati denotes

a separation between two objects.<sup>144</sup> He shows that the objects which are used with these verbs are related to the results denoted by the verbs in a specified sense. Let us explain it clearly. When we use the expression *Caitra grāmaṃ gacchati*, it denotes that the village is the locus of the result denoted by the verb *gacchati* in the sentence. This result is the contact between the village and the agent *Caitra*. The result here is generated by the motion of *Caitra*. The word *grāma* is used as Karma with the verb *gacchati* in the sense of the locus of the result contained by the verb. *Jagadīśa* shows that in the sentence, *vrkṣaṃ khagastyajati*, the word *vrkṣa* denotes the *avadhi* or the limit of the separation of the bird which is generated by the motion of the bird. Thus, *vrkṣa* is the locus of the separation. According to him, in this sentence, the word *vrkṣa* becomes a case of Karma with the verb *tyajati* in this specified sense.<sup>145</sup>

We have discussed above that the motion of *Caitra* generates the contact between the village and *Caitra*. When there is a contact between two objects, both of them are loci of the contact. Thus, *Caitra* in the said example is also the locus of the contact which takes place between himself and the village. Now, if the word *grāma* is a case of Karma because, it acts as the locus of the contact which is generated by the motion of *Caitra*, the agent *Caitra* is also

the case of Karma on the same ground. But, this view is not acceptable to us. Jagadīśa fully realises the problem. He offers a suitable solution to the problem. He shows that the result as denoted by the verb *gaucheti* (and other transitive verbs) is of a specified nature. He states that it is generated by the operational part of the verb and it invariably belongs to a locus which is different from the locus of the operation. Such a result does not belong to Caitra. Jagadīśa says that it is for this reason the problem does not arise at all.<sup>146</sup>

Jagadīśa can easily avoid the problem discussed above with the help of the definition *parasamavetaskriyājanya-phalāśālitvam* *Karmatvam* offered by the ancient logicians. But, he does not do so for an important reason. He shows that the definition possesses a serious defect. There is a term in the definition namely, *parasamaveta*. According to Jagadīśa, the use of the term in the definition is not logical. The ancient logicians say that the inflexion which is used by us to denote the objective case itself denotes the sense of *parasamaveta*. Jagadīśa does not accept such a view. He says that according to the standing rule in Sanskrit grammar, the inflexion attached to a root in the passive voice does not denote any additional sense apart from that of number and tense. Further, he says that in the active voice, the second inflexion

attached to a word in the sense of Karma also does not denote an additional sense namely, parasamaveta. Thus, he shows that the use of the term parasamaveta in the definition is arbitrary. He also states that such expressions as Caitreṇa gacchate dravyaṇḥ, Caitreḥ dravyaṇḥ gacchati etc. are utterly absurd. Therefore, the amendment is not necessary. <sup>147</sup>

Jagadīśa Tarkālāṅkāra shows with the help of appropriate illustrations the use of the objective case with different verbs such as pacati, ḥchinatti etc. He clarifies the meanings of these verbs and also the specific relation of the objective case with the verbs. He discusses the meaning of the sentence taṇḍulam pacati as follows. The verb pacati denotes that particular activity which results in such contact with fire as brings about a qualitative change of an object. When we say taṇḍulam pacati, taṇḍula or rice is possessor of such a contact. Thus, it is a case of Karma. He explains the sentence trṇam ḥchinatti in the following manner. The verb ḥchinatti denotes such a separation as is opposed to the contact which holds between the two parts of an object. In the sentence, trṇam ḥchinatti, trṇa or the grass is the locus of such a separation. Hence, it is an objective case. Then, he presents the illustration puṣpēṇa Viṣṇum yajate and says that in this illustration, the verb yajate denotes the renunciation of an object with love and affection towards a person by citing appropriate hymns. Such a person is Viṣṇu in the

example. Jagadīśa says that the result of the action as denoted by the verb *yajate* is *prīti*, that is, love and affection. He shows that in the above illustration, *Viṣṇu* is the locus of the said result. According to the philosopher, it is in this specified sense, *Viṣṇu* is a case of Karma in the illustration. He distinguishes between the verbs *yajate* and *ārādhayati*. He says that the verb *ārādhayati* denotes devotion towards a person which generates love and affection for him. He clarifies the idea with the help of the illustration *pīṭaram ārādhayati*. The sense of love and affection is present in the verb *yajate* also. But, Jagadīśa states that in the case of *ārādhayati*, the chanting of hymns is not necessary, while in the case of *yajate* it is a must. He shows that the verb *juhoti* denotes the act of pouring an object into the fire by reciting appropriate mantras. He clarifies the idea with the help of the illustration *ghṛtaṁ juhoti*. The word *ghṛta* (clarified butter) is the locus of the result namely the contact denoted by the verb. According to the philosopher the connection with the fire is an essential condition in this act. Therefore, when a person pours clarified butter on an image, it is not a case of *homa*. Jagadīśa discusses the meanings of some other verbs also.<sup>145</sup>

He lays due emphasis on indirect objects in his discussion. *Tarkālaṅkāra* exhaustively illustrates the indirect

objects. He discusses the meanings of the verbs *dogdhi* etc. clearly and shows that the indirect objects are related to the result of the acts denoted by these verbs.<sup>149</sup>

The philosopher offers a new concept of *Karmakāraka*. His new enterprise is certainly praiseworthy. But, it is upto the scholars to accept or reject his view.

#### Vyutpattī vāda

Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya defines the objective case as *kriyājanyaphalāśrayatva* or the locus of the result which is generated by a particular operation.<sup>150</sup> According to him, both the operation and result mentioned in the definition are denoted by the root of the verb itself used in the sentence while the inflexion used in the objective case denotes *adheyatra* (i.e. the object located on).<sup>151</sup>

We have discussed on an earlier occasion that a section of scholars use the predicate *parasamaveta* to the term *kriyā* in the definition in order to avoid some expressions such as *svaṁ gacchati* etc. Gadādhara says that the predicate is not necessary. He shows with the help of very strong arguments that such expressions as *svaṁ gacchati* etc. are utterly absurd. Therefore, the question of using the above predicate in the definition does not arise.<sup>152</sup>

The philosopher critically interprets the various cases of Akathita Karma. He clearly presents the meanings of the roots duh, yāc etc. in this connection.<sup>153</sup> He states that both the expressions gāṁ <sup>payo</sup>payodogdhi and gubhyaḥ payodogdhi are correct. He assigns adequate reasons for this.<sup>154</sup>

Gaḍādhara accepts the division of Karṇakāraka presented by Bhartṛhari. He explains the meaning of Nirvartya, Vikārya and Prāpya appropriately.<sup>155</sup>

#### Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi

Gāṇ Bhaṭṭa defines Karma as kriyājanyaphalasālitvaṁ<sup>6</sup>Karmatvaṁ.<sup>156</sup> This is not a new definition of the philosopher. He shows in his discussion on the definition that the definition is already examined and suitably amended by the philosophers of the Nyāya school. He tries to prove with the help of a suitable illustration that this is the appropriate definition of Karṇakāraka. But, he discovers that the definition is too wide. He says that the definition applies even to the agent in the sentence Caitro grāmaṁ<sup>6</sup>gacchati, because he is a locus of the result which is generated by his act of going to the village. He also shows that the term phala (result) in the definition denotes all the results generated by an operation and thus, the distinction in meaning between



the verbs *tyajati* and *gacchati* totally disappears. We have discussed this point very clearly on an earlier occasion. Gāgā Bhaṭṭa accepts the amendments of the Naiyāyikas on the definition in order to avoid the above discrepancies.<sup>157</sup>

He divides *Karmakāraka* into two broad groups namely, *Īpsitatama* and *Anīpaita*. He subdivides the first board group into four subgroups. These sub-groups are *Utpādyā*, *Prāpyā*, *Vikāryā* and *Saṃskāryā*. He follows Bhartṛhari in subdividing *Anīpaita Karma*.<sup>158</sup>

Reference notes

1. Pā 1.4.49.
2. Pā 1.4.50, 1.4.51
3. (1) Dadhñā khalu bhunjīya payasā khalu bhunjīyeti.....  
Taddhi tasyepsita-tamaṁ bhavati. Ibid. p.261.  
(11) Viśabhakṣaṇapāpi kasyacid īpsitam<sup>†</sup> bhavati. Ibid. p.263.
4. Karturīpsitam Karma itīyatyucyamāne ihāgner mānavakaṁ  
vārayatīti.....punastamagrahaṇe kriyamāne tadupa-  
pannam bhavati. Ibid. p.260.
6. Ibid. pp.260-261.
7. Īpsitasya Karmasamjñāyān nirvṛttasya kāṛakatve karanaśamjñā  
na prāpnoti gudaṁ bhakṣayati.....ubhayam hi tasyepsitam.  
Ibid. p.262.
8. Ye tvete rājakarmīno manasyāsteśāṁ.....tasyobhayaṁ  
īpsitam. Ibid. p.262.
9. Viśaṇ bhakṣayatīti. Naitadasti.....viśabhakṣaṇameva  
jyāyo māṣyate. Ibid. p.263.
10. Ibid. p.263.
11. Ibid. p.263.
12. Anīpsitam iti nāyam prasajyapratīśedhaḥ. Kim tarhi?  
Paryudāsoyam. Yad anyad īpsitād tad anīpsitam iti.  
Ibid. p.263.
13. Duhiyācīrudhi.....akīrtitam ācaritam kavinaḥ.  
Ibid. p.264.

14. Duhi - gāṁ dogdhi payah. Naitad asti. Kathitātre pūrvā-  
pādānasañjñā.....putraṁ brūte dharmam...kathitātre  
pūrvā Sampadānasañjñā. Ibid. pp.265-266.
15. Na praśnād evāpāyo jāyate.....bhikṣitaḥ saṁ yadi  
dadāti tatopāyena yujyate. Ibid. p.266.
16. Dahiyāci.....brubīśagigunena ca yat sacate. Ibid.  
p.264.  
Gumah sādhanam pradhāmekarma.....tenayat sacate  
sambadhyata ityarthah. Kaiyata. Ibid. p.266.
17. Kalabhāvādhagantavyah Karmasañjñāhykarmānam Deśasā. Ibid.  
pp.270-271.
18. Viparītaṁ tu yat Karma tat Kalma kavayo viduh.....  
Asamāptaṁ Karma Kalma. Ibid. p.271.
19. Ibid. p.261.
- 20.(1) Upayujyate ityupayogaḥ payahphalādi tasya nimittam  
gavādi.....payasaḥ upayijyamanatvad ipsitataman-  
tvam, Under Mh dūtiyāci.....upayoganimittam etc. Mh.  
p.264 of. upayujyataityupayogaḥ payahprabhrti tasya  
nimittam gavādi etc. Kās. p.570.
21. Nirvartyaṁ ca Vikāryaṁca.....yaccāpyanyapūrvakam  
Vak. Sā. 45-46.
22. Ibid. Sā. 49.
23. Yadaśijjyate sadvā.....tat Nirvartyaṁ. Ibid. Sā.49.
24. Prakrtyucchedasambhutam.....suvarṇādi vikaṛavat. Ibid.  
Sā. 50.

25. Vāk. p.268.
26. Kriyākṛta-viśeṣaṇam.....tat Prāpyam iti kathyate.  
Ibid. Sā. 51.
27. Under Karmāpyan. Pā 3.2.1.
28. Ibid. p.268.
29. Ibid. pp.268-270.
30. Darśanādikriyākṛtaviśeṣalābho vikārah sarvatra vidyate..  
.....na kriyākṛto vikārah kaścit. Ibid. pp.270-271.
31. Kāś. p.564.
32. Tena grahaṇam kim? Payasaudanam bhunkte. Ibid. p.565.
33. Māṣeṣvaśvam badhnāti. Karmaṇa īpsitā māsa na Kartuh.  
Ibid. p.565.
34. Karmetyanuvartamāne punah Karmagrahaṇam ādhāraṇi vṛttyar-  
tham.....sarvam siddham bhavati. Ibid. p.566.
35. Tena prakaraṇe Kartur īpsitatamam.....anīpsitam  
yuktam bhavati tasya Karmasāñjñā vidhīyate. Ibid. p.568.
36. Ibid. p.568.
37. Ibid. p.568.
38. Ibid. p.568.
39. Kenākathitam? Apādanādiviśeṣakathābhīḥ. Ibid. p.569.
40. Ibid. p.570.
41. Īpsitāśabdo hyasti rudhīśabdah.....Tatreha kriyā-  
śabdo grāhyate netarah. Na hi rudhīśabdasya kriyayā  
Kartṛśabdīyā sambandha upapadyate. Ibid. pp.564-565.

42. Ibid. p.563.
43. Atha nadi kulan karsatityadau katham Karma saññā?.....  
Kathañca na syāt? Nadyāderacetamatvat.....antaranga-  
saññā karyan na śaknoti nivartayitum. Ibid. pp.566-567.
44. Bhikṣā yācāyām.....Evaṃ tarhi yācitrānūnaya-  
vartate. Ibid. p.573.
45. Ibid. p.576.
46. Ibid. p.564.
47. Karmaṇa iti. Aśvasya. Sa hi bhakṣaṇakriyayā māśaṃ āptum  
icchati.....māśaṇam Karmaśaṃñā na bhevati. Ibid.  
p.564.
48. Yatra tarhi paya eva.....odanaṃmatrepsitatamaṃ,  
payasaṃsaṃsāraṃkatvat Karsatvam. Ibid. p.564.
49. Yaduta kriyāphalayogitvam Karturapi tarhi Karmaṭvaṃ  
syāt, kriyāphalasya saṃyogasya tatrāpi bhāvāt.....  
evamapi Ātmā jñātavya ityatra na syāt sanvidagṇaḥ svayam  
prakasabhimatayah Karmaṭvaṃ syat. Ibid. p.564.
50. Ibid. pp.564-565.
51. Ibid. p.574.
52. Kartuh kriyayā vyāptum istatamaṃ Karma syāt.
53. Ibid. p.45.
54. Ibid. pp.45-46.
55. Ibid. pp.46.

56. Kārakādhikārat kriyānimittatvam āyati tacca śrutatvāt  
Kartuh kriyānimittam Karma tarhi grheṣu viśatītyādau  
.....kriyayā Karta yadeva vyaptum prakṛta-  
kriyāśrayam kartum yatate tadeva Karma.....BVV, p. 102.
57. Ibid. p. 102.
58. Karmetyanuṣṛttau punaḥ Karmagrahaṇam yatra kathaṁcid  
vyāptum iśtatamānyattadeva Karmeti sūktīm rajatam  
manyate bhrāntaḥ candram agniṁ jātati virahī.....  
viśayepi Karmatvam. Ibid. p. 102.
59. Ibid. p. 103.
60. Pr. kau. pp. 383-387.
61. Yo dudoḥa dharam annanyayāce vasudhām Balim.....  
tan Hariṁ bhaje. Ibid. pp. 389-392.
62. Duhyāoyartharudhiprasochicibruśāsujī -karmayuk  
Nihkrīṣṣanthavahedaṁdigrahaṁśuṣ pacakarmabhāk. Ibid.  
p. 398.
63. Kartuh kriyayeti. Īpsitasabdoyam asti rudhoḥhiprete asti  
kriyasabdah.....Apādānādiviśeṣairakathitam Kārakam  
Karmasamjñam ayād ityuktam. Ibid. pp. 393-397.
64. Yadvyāpārād asau.....Tacca dhātunopāttamiti tadvi-  
śiṣṭivenaśchāviśayotra sañjī. SK. p. 128.
65. Ibid. p. 130.
66. Tacca KarturĪpsitatamam. Kriyājñyaphalāśraya ityarthah.  
Kriyājñyaphalavattvena Karmaṇa eva Kartur Īpsitatamat-  
vāt. VBS. p. 145.

67. Tatra ca kriyāyāḥ phalasya ca dhātunaiva lābhād ananya-  
lābhya āśraya evārthaḥ. Tattvañcākhandaśaktirūpam avacche-  
dakam. Ibid. p.149.
68. Īpsitānipsitatvayoh śābdabodhe bhanābhāvena.....  
na vācyakotau tat-pravesah. Ibid. pp.148-149.
69. Odanam pacatītyatra.....jñānāsratāya  
Naiyāyikānām iva satkāryavādasiddhāntād vopapādyate.  
Ibid. pp.141-142.
70. Manu Gaitro grāmam gacchatītyatra..... samabhi vyā-  
hrtadhātvarthaphalāsālitvasyaiva kriyājanya ityenena  
vivakṣaṇasya uktaprayatrat. Ibid. pp.147-149.
71. Manmate tu Kartṛsañjaya bodhahyena tadāpattiriti bhavati.  
Ibid. p.148.
72. Naiyāyikāstādyadoṣavāranāya parāsamavetatvam.....  
śakyatveti paratvasya parāsamavetatvasya ca īstānāvaya-  
lābhāyānakaśah kāryakāraṇabhāvāvyupagame gauravānta-  
ratvād iti spastam Bhūṣaṇe. Ibid. pp.147-148.
73. Ayam bhāvaḥ———sūtre Īpsitatanasābda.....  
Karmatā-lābha iti. Ibid. pp.147-148.
74. Na cecchākarmābhutārthadhātoreva.....sakarmakatvam  
bodhyam. Ibid. p.148.
75. Ibid. p.149.
76. Etena Kartṛgataprakṛtavyapāraprayojatadvyadbikāraṇa-  
prakṛtadhātvarthaphalāsārayatvam uktam bhavati. Ibid. p.149.

77. Tatra.....Karmatvam Kartṛgataprakṛtadhātvartha-  
vyāpāraprayojyavyāpṛāvyadhikaranaphalāśrayatvena Kartur  
uddēśyatvam. LKS. p.1301.
78. Uddēśyatvañca saksāt phalarūpe dhātvarthe kriyāyāḥ phale-  
ochapūrvakecchāviśayatvāt tēdūlādīnām api tattvam.  
Ibid. p.1302.
79. Karmanī vihitadvitīyāyāḥ Karmatvasēktimān arthah.....  
sēktimata eva dvitīyarthatayā Bhaṣyādīsanmatatvāt. Ibid.  
pp. 1305-1306.
80. Gacchatīyoge.....Bhāṣye kṛtam. Ibid. p.1302.
81. Ibid. p.1303.
82. Yattu parasaṁavetakriyājanyadhatvarthaphalāśrayatvam  
vyarthatvāt. Ibid. pp.1323-1324.
83. Ibid. pp.1321-1331.
84. Kalāpa kāraka. Sū. 219.
85. Ibid. pp.205-206.
86. Ibid. p.208.
87. Kartāram antarena kriyā na sambhavati.....phalasya  
dhātuvācyeti viśeṣaṇamdeyam. Etena tatikriyanāśrayatve  
sati dhātvarthatāvacchedakībhūtatatikriyajanyaphalabhāgi-  
tvamKarmatvam. Ibid. p.209.
88. Candra. p.138.
89. SKS. Kāraka. Sū. 2.



90. Tena Kartrā sanyak kriyābhāgitayā.....Karmasamjñā  
bhavati. Ibid. p.996.
91. Taccaturdha vibhajante Prāpyam, Nirvartyam, Vikaryam  
Anīpsitanēti. Devadatto grāmam gacchati.....  
Kamsam ghātayati. Ibid. p.996.
92. Devadatta odanam pacatītyādaṁ pākakriyāmayam bhajatā  
Devadattena odanaḥ sanyaguddiṣṭaḥ. Devadatto grāmam  
gacchatītyādaṁ gamanakriyāyāḥ phalam sanyogamayam bhajatā  
Devadattena grāmam sanyag uddiṣṭa iti. Ibid. p.996.
93. Ibid. p.996.
94. Kartuh kriyā vyāptimātram yatra pratīyate na niṣpatir  
na ca vikṛtiṣṭat Prāpyam.....Yat punaḥ na Prāpyam  
na Nirvartyam na Vikaryam kevaḥ anīpsitatvena tyājyāt  
Kartrā samuddiṣṭam tad anīpsitam. Yatha papam tyajati,  
adītyam paśyati, ahim langhayati.....Ibid. pp.996-997.
95. Jainendra. Śū. 1.2.119.
96. Ibid. Śū. 1.2.120.
97. Ibid. p.96.
98. Kartṛgrahanād āpyagrahanasāmarthyād vā kriyā labhyate.  
Ibid. p.97.
99. Atha sarvāṇi kārakāṇi Kartrāpyanta iti Karmasamjñā  
prāphoṭi.....āpyatame sampratīyayā. Tena Karaṇā-  
digu na bhavati payasā odanam bhunkte. Ibid. p.97.
100. Māṣeṣvaśvam badhnāti. Aśvena Karmanā.....Karmasamjñā  
mā bhūt. Ibid. p.97.

101. SS. 2,2,2.
102. Ibid. p.68.
103. Ibid. p.68.
104. Ibid. p.68.
105. Karmakriyāviśeṣaṇabhini viśadhisināsthāsāmbudhyupavāsa-  
daṁ dhan dvi Mugdha. kāraṇa. Su. 2.
106. Yat kriyate tat Karma. Karoter nikhila-kriyāvācakatvāt  
Kartur vyāpārair yat sādhyate tat Karmetyarthah. Itā eva  
kriyāvyāpyam Karmeti Kramadīśvarah. Ibid. p.38.
107. Ibid. pp.38-39.
108. Ibid. p.38.
109. Tat trividham Kirvartyaṁ, Vikāryaṁ, Prāpyaṁ ceti.....  
Tad asmanmate Kirvartyavikārbhinnaṁ Prāpyaṁ iti lekṣa-  
nena Prāpyāntarbhūtaṁ. Ibid. pp.38-39.
110. Sāra. p.89, p.91.
111. Tacca Karmakāraṇam caturvidham Utpādyam. Āryaṁ, Saṁs-  
kāryaṁ, Vikāryaṁ. Ibid. p.83.
112. Saṁskāro nāma prāktan<sup>ā</sup>karmaḥ gunah, kaścid gunātīśayo  
vā gunādhānam malāpakarṣo vā..... Gunātīśayaṁ saṁskāryaṁ  
yathā <sup>vṛthiṇ</sup> ~~vṛthiṇ~~ yavān vā prokṣati. Prokṣaṇena <sup>vṛthiṇ</sup> ~~vṛthiṇ~~ kaścid  
gunātīśayo janyate. Gunādhānamalāpakarṣayorudāharaṇam  
yathā - vastram rañjayati Devadattah rajako vastram  
kaśalayati. Ibid. p.83.
113. SRC. p.152.



129. Yattu tatkriyānādhikaranatve sati.....kriyāvyaktibhēd -  
 bhēdānantasāktikalpanāpetteh. Ibid. p.25.
130. Ibid. pp.26-30.
131. Karma ca trividham Prāpyam, Vikāryam, Nirvartyam ceti.  
 Ibid. p.35.
132. Sanyogedirūpakriyājanaphalaśāli Prāpyam.....grāmādiḥ.  
 Ibid. p.35.
133. Kriyā yaddharmanāśekam phalam janayati tad Vikāryam.  
 Ibid. pp.35-36.
134. Nirvartyam ca niṣpādyam, yathā kaṣam ghaṭam vā karoti..  
 .....kaṣādestādṛsaphalānāśrayatvena gaunam  
 Karmatvam. Ibid. pp.36-37.
135. Odanam pacatītyādau.....anyathā tu Prāpyamādhye-  
 syantarbhāvaḥ. Ibid. p.37.
136. Ibid. p.37.
137. SMJ. p.44.
- 138.(i) Parasamaveteti viśeṣaṇāt grāmaḥ pacchatītyādau  
 sanyogarūpaphalaśālitvepi Kartari nāti vyāptiḥ.  
 Ibid. p.44.
- (ii) Taṇḍulāḥ pacatītyādāvadhahsantāpanajanyaviklittiḥ  
 phalam..... Ibid. p.45.
- (iii) Gaṇādadāti ityatra tu svasvatva-dhvaṃsapūrvake  
 parasvatvotpattyavaacchinatyāgo dānam.....Ibid. p.44.
139. Ibid. p.46.

140. Evaṃ ghaṭaṃ karotītyādeu sarvatra ghaṭādipade mṛtipi-  
dādeu lakṣaṇa. Ibid. p.47.
141. Evaṃ trīvidhakarmakāraṇamādhye Prāpyam Karma mukhyaṃ,  
Nirvartyam Vikāryaṃ ca gaṇṇam iti saṃkṣepaḥ. Ibid. p.49.
142. Ibid. p.48.
143. Yagantadhātor artho yastiṇā svārthenubhāvyete  
Tatrāsau Karmatā nāma kāraṇaṃ Kartṛteteraḥ.  
ŚSP. Nāraka. 73.
144. Grāmaḥ samyate ityatra.....saṃyoge evānvayo, na tu  
tyajati tyādāva vibhāgādau, dhātvarthāvacchedakasyaiva  
phalasya bodhane Karmāvihitepratyayanāṃ dhātusākāṃkṣa-  
tvād atah saṃyogaeve tatra gatikriyāyāḥ Karmatvaṃ na  
vibhāgādih.....Ibid. p.318.
145. Vṛkṣaṃ khagastyajati tyādau.....tadvān khaga ityā-  
kāraṇas tatra bodhaḥ. Ibid. p.321.
146. Nam Caitrakartṛkagamenajanyasaṃyogasya grāma iva  
Caitrepi sattvāt.....Caitrakartṛkagatyāśraya-  
pratiyogikātvaviśiṣṭasya saṃyogasya Caitre bādhaḥ.  
Ibid. p.318.
147. Yattu phalaṃ iva kriyāyāṃ anvitam parasaṃavetatvam api  
.....dravyānya saṃavetasya gatyāderaprasiddha-  
tvena ayogyatāpattesca. Ibid. pp.319-320.
148. Taṇḍulaṃ pacati tyatra.....tatra bodhaḥ. Ibid.  
pp. 315-317.

149. Duhōdayastu phalāvacchinna-kriyāhetu-vyāpārāvacitvādeva  
dvikarmakāh.....yad vrkṣeḥ viḥatṭanam calanam  
tadvān ityevam tatra bodhaḥ. Ibid. pp.331-332.
150. VFF. p.184.
151. Dvitiyāder ādheyatvam arthah, phalāvacchinnavyāpārasca  
dhātor ityeva yuktaḥ. Ibid. pp.191-192.
152. Grāmaṁ gacchatīti vat svam gacchatīti prayogavāraṇāya  
parasamavetatvamapi dvitīyārtha iṣyate.....svanīṣṭha  
saṁyogajanaka-kriyāyam avabhinna-samavetatvasya bādhat  
svātmanam gacchatīti na prayogaḥ. Ibid. p.207.
153. Gaṁ dogdhi paya itiyādaḥ.....Ajām grāmaṁ nayati-tyādaḥ  
grāmaṁ bhāraṁ vahatītyādaḥ ca uttaradeśasaṁyogavāvacchinna-  
kriyānukūla-vyāpārārūpaṁ prāpanam arthah. Ibid. pp.196-200.
154. Yatra kṣaraṇānukūlavāpāramātram dhātvarthatayā vivakṣi-  
tam keraṇānvayibibhagāsyavibhajyārthastatra Apādānatva-  
bodhikā pañcamī. Etena kadācid gaṁ dogdhi payaḥ kadācid  
gaṁ dogdhi paya ityatra nūniyamah. Atha vā.....vrkṣad  
vibhajete ityatrevāvadhitvarūpāpādanatvāvivakṣyānti  
pañcamī, āśrayatvāvivakṣyāmdvityā. Ibid. p.197.
155. Ibid. pp.237-242.
156. BCM. p.96.
157. Atra Nālyāyikāḥ parasamavetatvam kriyāviśeṣaṇam dhātvar-  
thatāvachchedakatvam phalaviśeṣaṇam.....ityāhuh.  
Ibid. p.96.
158. Ibid. p.96.

## CHAPTER IV

### Karana

#### Karana in the Paninian school

### Pāṇini

Pāṇini defines Karana or the instrumental case as  
sādhakatamaṁ Karanam.<sup>1</sup>

### Patañjali

Patañjali clearly explains the significance of the superlative suffix tamap used by Pāṇini in the above definition. He shows with the help of an illustration that in the Sanskrit language, the sense of the superlative degree can be presented even without using a superlative suffix. Pāṇini, the greatest of Sanskrit grammarians is certainly aware of such a usage in the Sanskrit language. But, he does not apply this method in the rule sādhakatamaṁ Karanam. Patañjali infers from this that according to Pāṇini, the sense of the superlative degree is not attained from a rule in the section of kāraka in an indirect manner if a superlative suffix such as tamap is not used in it.<sup>2</sup> He says that this is the reason for which the rules dhruvam apāye

Apādānam and ādhāro Adhikarāṇam do not convey the sense of the superlative degree in spite of the fact that two synonymous words occur in each of these rules. In the first rule, the words apāye and Apādāna are synonymous. Similarly, in the second rule, the words ādhāra and Adhikarāṇa convey the same idea of a locus. But, we do not attain the sense of the superlative degree in these rules.

Patañjali clearly explains the grammatical utility of the superlative suffix used in the definition of a particular kāraka. He says that because no superlative suffix is used by Pāṇini in the rules mentioned above, they become applicable not only to the primary case of Apādāna and Adhikarāṇa such as grāmād āgacchati, tileṣutailam etc. but also to the secondary cases of these kārakas such as Sāṅkṣāyakebhyah Pāṭaliputrakā abhirūpatarāḥ, Gangāyān gāvah etc. But, the definition sādhekatamanākaraṇam is applicable to Karana in its strictly primary sense.

### Kaiyata

Patañjali critically interprets the Paninian rule sādhekatamanākaraṇam. He offers some important views in this interpretation. Kaiyata explains these views very clearly in his sub-commentary. Let us clarify this point by citing an



instance. The Bhāṣyakāra suggests an important reason for the use of the suffix *taṃap* by Pāṇini in the term *sādhakatama* in his definition of *Karana*. But, he expresses the idea through a cryptic statement. Kaiyata explains it so clearly that it leaves no scope for any confusion in our mind.<sup>4</sup> He also nicely elaborates the concept of primary and secondary locative cases as presented by the Bhāṣyakāra under the said rule of Pāṇini.<sup>5</sup>

Kaiyata does not offer any new idea on the concept of *Karana*. The commentator deserves high credit for his clarity of expression.

### Bhartrhari

Bhartrhari offers a new definition of *Karanakāraka* in which he tries to synthesise the views of earlier thinkers on the topic. He defines *Karana* as follows :

Kriyāyāṃ pariniṣpattir yadvyāpārād anantaram  
Vivakṣyate yadā yatra tattadā Karanaṃ smṛtam.<sup>6</sup>

Patañjali does not try to explain the meaning of the term *sādhakatama* in the definition of Pāṇini. It is Bhartrhari who for the first time interprets this term in his definition as *kriyāyāṃ pariniṣpattir yadvyāpārād anantaram* etc. It implies that the term *sādhakatama* denotes that parti-

cular factor the operation of which immediately brings about an intended action.

Bhartrhari uses the term *vivakṣyate* (i.e. that which is intended) in his definition. The term *vivakṣyate* plays a significant part in the definition. Bhartrhari realises the fact that it is impossible on our part to single out a particular *kāraka* as the *sādhakatama* in the absolute sense of the term. There is a section of logicians who clearly show that an act comes into being when it is preceded by a collection of all invariable conditions of it. This is a very significant observation of the logicians. The result of their finding is that the assemblage of all conditions which brings about an action should be treated as *Karana* or *sādhakatama* in the objective sense of the term. Bhartrhari realises some element of truth in the above hypothesis. But, he also cannot ignore the fact that Pāṇini uses the term *sādhakatama* in the sense of a single factor only. He does not treat an assemblage of factors as *sādhakatama* or *Karana*. But, he lays emphasis on a particular *kāraka* in his definition of *Karana* to the exclusion of all other *kārakas*. This gives rise to a problem for us. Bhartrhari solves this problem by appropriately using the expression *vivakṣyate* in his definition. The grammarian explains his view on *Karana* very clearly. He states that there is no particular *kāraka* in Sanskrit grammar which alone

is a case of *sādhakatama*. He shows with the help of the illustration *sthālyā pacyate* that even a case of *Adhikaraṇa* is also a case of *sādhakatama*. He, however, says that the agent never becomes a case of *Karana*.<sup>7</sup>

### Halārāja

Bhartrhari lays emphasis on the *vivakṣa* or the intention of the speaker in his definition of *Karana*. He says that the speaker himself selects a particular *kāraka* as *Karana* according to his intention. Halārāja clarifies this view of Bhartrhari with the help of a few illustrations. He says that the speaker sometimes uses the expressions *balena lunāti* and *ālokena paśyati* instead of *dātrena lunāti* and *cakṣuṣā paśyati* if he intends such uses.<sup>8</sup>

Halārāja justifies another important view of Bhartrhari that the sense of *sādhakatama* or *Karana* is not confined to a particular factor of an action with the help of an appropriate illustration namely, *aśvenapathā dīpikayā yāti*.<sup>9</sup> He clearly explains that all the factors related to the act of going in this illustration are cases of *sādhakatama* in one sense or another.<sup>10</sup>

The commentator renders a very valuable service to us by presenting the views of Bhartrhari on *Karana* in a clear and lucid manner.

### Kāśikā

The Vṛttikara also states that the speaker himself selects a particular kāraka as the sādhanatama or the most essential one in the accomplishment of an act according to his intention and this kāraka becomes a case of Karana. He cites two illustrations of Karana namely, dātreṇa lunāti and parāśunā nichinatti. These illustrations do not express the significant role played by vivakṣā in the concept of Karana.<sup>11</sup>

The grammarian explains the significance of the use of the suffix tamap in the Paninian rule sādhanatamam Karanam in a suggestive manner. He follows the Bhāṣyakāra in this suggestive explanation.<sup>12</sup>

### Jinendrabuddhi

The Vṛttikara interprets the term sādhanatama in the definition of Karana given by Paṇini as prakṛttopakāraḥ. Jinendrabuddhi explains the term prakṛta very clearly.<sup>13</sup>

The commentator critically discusses the significance of the role played by the vivakṣā or the intention of the speaker in the concept of kāraka. He says that the speaker uses the expression dhanuṣā vidhyati in stead of dhanor vidhyati. Again, he uses the expression dhanur vidhyati also in stead of the second expression. It all depends on the sweet intention of the speaker.<sup>14</sup>

Jinendrabuddhi explains the view of the Vṛttikāra on the significance of the use of the suffix tamap by Pāṇini in the rule sādhekata<sup>va</sup>mā<sup>ṇ</sup> Karanā<sup>m</sup> appropriately. He states that the suffix tamap indicates that in the section on kāraka, the sense of the superlative degree is not attained in any rule if a superlative suffix is not used in it.<sup>15</sup>

#### Haradatta

The commentator Haradatta appropriately explains the view of the Vṛttikāra on the instrumental case. He quotes the relevant passages from the Vākyapadiya in order to support his view.<sup>16</sup> He discusses the role of vivakṣā in the concept of Karanā very clearly.<sup>17</sup>

Haradatta clarifies the suggestive view of the Vṛttikāra on the use of the suffix<sup>tamap</sup> in the rule sādhekata<sup>va</sup>mā<sup>ṇ</sup> Karanā<sup>m</sup> by Pāṇini. He rigidly follows Jinendrabuddhi in the clarification.<sup>18</sup>

#### Puruṣottama

Puruṣottama strictly follows the Vṛttikāra in interpreting the definition sādhekata<sup>va</sup>mā<sup>ṇ</sup> Karanā<sup>m</sup> given by Pāṇini. He follows ~~at~~ the footsteps of Jinendrabuddhi and states that an example of Karanā may be changed into a case

of Kartā if the speaker intends to <sup>do</sup> so. Puruṣottama cites two illustrations namely, paraśunā vrkṣaṁ ṣchinatti (i.e. the wood-cutter cuts the tree with an axe) and paraśuḥ vrkṣam ṣchinatti (i.e. the axe is cutting the tree) in order to justify his statement.<sup>19</sup>

#### Srṣṭidhara

Srṣṭidhara mainly explains the concept of Karaṇa presented by Bhartṛhari while interpreting the vṛtti of Puruṣottama on the Paninian definition of Karaṇa.<sup>20</sup> He also does not show any originality in his discussion.

#### Rāmacandra

Rāmacandra offers a very brief interpretation on the rule sādhakatamaṁ Karaṇam. He follows Puruṣottama to a great extent in this interpretation. We see only one exception in it. Rāmacandra does not lay emphasis on the vivakṣā or the intention of the speaker in the interpretation.<sup>21</sup>

#### Viṭṭhalācārya

Viṭṭhalācārya tries to give us an appropriate idea of the instrumental case in Sanskrit grammar through an exhaus-

tive commentary on the said interpretation of Rāmacandra. He presents some important views of his great predecessors on the rule *sādhakatāmam Karanam* in this commentary. He follows the interpretation of Jinendrabuddhi of the said rule. But he says that this interpretation is based on the concept of *Karana* Presented to us by Bhartrhari in his *Vākyapadīśa*.<sup>22</sup>

He also accepts the argument of Jinendrabuddhi which he advances in defence of the use of the suffix *tāmam* in the rule *sādhakatāmam Karanam*.<sup>23</sup>

#### Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita

Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita accepts the view of Bhartrhari on the instrumental case. It is clear from his interpretation of the Paninian rule *sādhakatāmam Karanam* in the *Śabdakaustubha*.<sup>23a</sup>

#### Kaundabhaṭṭa

Kaundabhaṭṭa accepts the meaning of the term *Karana* given by Bhartrhari in his *kārikās kriyāyāḥ parinispattir yad vyāpārād anantaram* etc. He says that this meaning follows from the Paninian rule *sādhakatāmam Karanam* itself.<sup>24</sup> He explains the significance of the expression *vivakṣyate* used by Bhartrhari in the above *kārikā* very clearly.<sup>25</sup> Kaundabhaṭṭa says that the third inflexion which is used in the instrumental case denotes both the operation which accomplishes the intended act and the locus of this operation.<sup>25</sup> This is an original interpretation of the grammarian.

Harivallabha

Harivallabha explains the views of Kaundabhaṭṭa on Karanākāraka in a critical but easily intelligible manner.<sup>27</sup> He also gives a critical interpretation of the kārīkās of Bhartṛhari quoted by Kaundabhaṭṭa in his discussion on Karanākāraka. Harivallabha follows Helārāja to a certain extent in his interpretation.<sup>28</sup> He presents the important views of the Māyā school on Karana in his commentary.<sup>29</sup>

Nāgasa

Nāgasa says that Karana denotes that particular object which possesses the property called Karanatā.<sup>30</sup> He does not give any new definition of Karana. He accepts the well-known definition of Karana given by his great predecessor Bhartṛhari. He explains this definition appropriately.<sup>31</sup> Nāgasa discusses the significance of the expression vivekasyate in the definition of Bhartṛhari. He mainly follows Helārāja in this discussion.<sup>32</sup>



### Karana in non-Paninian schools

#### Kalāpa

Śarvavarṇa defines the term Karana in his Kalāpa as *yena kriyate tat Karanam*.<sup>33</sup> This definition is based on the etymological meaning of the term.

#### Durgasiṅha

Durgasiṅha appropriately interprets the above definition in the *Tīkā*. The commentator mainly follows the well-established grammatical tradition in interpreting the term Karana. He reiterates the views of Bhartṛhari and the Vṛttikāra on Karana in this interpretation.<sup>34</sup> Durgasiṅha says that the terms gotra etc. in the illustrations gotrena Gārgyaḥ and the like are also cases of Karana.<sup>35</sup>

#### Trilocana

Trilocana also lays emphasis on the views of Bhartṛhari on the instrumental case in his interpretation of the definition.<sup>36</sup>

Suseṇācāryya

Suseṇācāryya accepts the views of his predecessors. He clearly explains the role of vivakṣā or the intention of the speaker in the concept of Karaṇa. He says that a case of Kartā cannot be a case of Karaṇa. This is a view of Bhartṛhari.<sup>37</sup>

Candra

Candraśomī says that the third inflexion is used in the sense of Karaṇa. We have discussed on an earlier occasion that the grammarian does not define Karaṇa. The reason for this is best known to himself. He gives a few suitable illustrations of Karaṇa-karaka. According to him, the terms prakṛtya etc. ending in the third inflexion in the sentences prakṛtyābhirūpakāḥ, prayana yājñikāḥ and the like are cases of Karaṇa.<sup>38</sup>

Samśiptasāra

The author of the Samśiptasāra follows the Paninian definition of Karaṇa. But, he remodels this definition in his grammar. He substitutes the term sādhanatama by a new term namely, kriyātsādhana in the new definition.<sup>39</sup>

Jumaranandi

Jumaranandi reiterates the well known view of Bhartṛhari on Karana kāraṇa in interpreting the above definition of Kranadīśvara.<sup>40</sup>

Goyīcandra

Goyīcandra says that the term sādhanā in the definition is significant. He interprets it as sādhyate anena iti sādhanam. He states that this interpretation of the term justifies the interpretation given by Jumaranandi on the definition.<sup>41</sup> He reiterates the view of Bhartṛhari that the sense of sādhatama may be present in more than one factor. He presents an illustration namely, as'vena pathā gacchati in order to justify it.<sup>42</sup>

Jainendra

The author of the Jainendravākyakaraṇa defines Karana by the Paninian rule sādhatamam Karanam.<sup>43</sup>

Abhayānandi

Abhayānandi explains the term sādhatama as kriyāyām atīśayena sādhatam. This interpretation does not help us

to understand actual significance of the term. He discusses the significance of the suffix *tama* used in the term *sādhakatama*. He reiterates the well known traditional view in order to justify the use of the suffix in the term.<sup>44</sup>

### Sādhakakāraṇa

Hemacandra follows the example of Devanandī and defines *Kāraṇa* by the Paninian rule *sādhakatamaṇ Kāraṇam*.<sup>45</sup>

The grammarian interprets this definition in the traditional manner. He nicely synthesises the views of Bhartṛhari and the Vṛttikāra in his interpretation.<sup>46</sup>

Hemacandra justifies the use of the suffix *tama* in the term *sādhakatama* in the same manner as his predecessors.<sup>47</sup>

He also accepts the view of Bhartṛhari that there is no *kāraṇa* in Sanskrit grammar which can be exclusively treated as a case of *sādhakatama*. He shows that more than one *kāraṇa* can be cases or *Kāraṇa* in a sentence for the above reason.<sup>48</sup>

### Mugdhabodha

Bopadeva introduces a new technical term namely, *dha* in his grammar. He says that the term *dha* denotes *sādhana*,

netu, viśeṣana and bhedaka.<sup>49</sup> The term sādhanā stands for Karana in his grammar.

### Durgādāsa Vidyāvāṇīśa

Durgādāsa Vidyāvāṇīśa clearly interprets the term sādhanā as Karana. He shows that the above sense of the term sādhanā follows from its etymological meaning. He accepts the definition of Karana as given by Bhartrhari indirectly from a secondary source.<sup>50</sup>

### Rāma Tarkavāṇīśa

Rāma Tarkavāṇīśa accepts the interpretation of Durgādāsa of the term sādhanā. He quotes the definition of Karana as given by Bhartrhari in his interpretation of the term sādhanā.<sup>51</sup> He reiterates the view of Bhartrhari that the sense of sādhanatama is not confined to a particular kāraṇa alone.<sup>52</sup>

### Sarasvata

The author of the Sarasvata also defines Karana as sādhanatama Karanam. The grammarian follows the Vṛttikāra in his interpretation of the definition.<sup>53</sup>

Candrakīrti

Candrakīrti accepts the above definition of Karana.<sup>54</sup> He does not throw new light on the concept of Karana in his interpretation.

Rāmāśrama

Rāmāśrama states that the third inflexion is used in the sense of the instrumental case.<sup>55</sup> He does not try to give us any idea of the instrumental case.

Supadma

Padmanābha Datta also follows the technic of Devanandī and others and offers the very definition of Pāṇini, namely, sādhanakatanāi Karanam as the definition of Karana in his grammar.<sup>56</sup>

Viṣṇumīśra

Viṣṇumīśra critically interprets the above definition. But, he also mainly follows the traditional views in his interpretation.<sup>57</sup>

### Karṇamārtta

Jīvagoswāmī offers a lengthy definition on Karṇa, namely, Kartur adhīnam prakṛṣṭam sahāyam Karṇam.<sup>58</sup> He substitutes the Paninian term sādhekātama by the words prakṛṣṭam sahāyam in the definition. He also adds the clause Kartur adhīnam meaning that which is controlled by agent in order to distinguish between Karṇa and a hetu in general.<sup>59</sup> The clause immediately reminds us of a well known aphorism of the grammatical school namely, hetvadhīnaḥ Karta Kartradhīnam Karṇam.

### Prayogarātnamāla

The author of the Prayogarātnamāla strictly follows Pāṇini in the definition of Karṇa offered by him. His definition is Karṇam sādhekātama.<sup>60</sup> He gives a new interpretation of the definition. According to him, the term sādhekātama indicates that particular case which generates a result through an operation but it is not the locus of the said result.<sup>61</sup>

Purusattoma classifies Karṇa into two types, namely internal and external. He illustrates them appropriately.<sup>62</sup>

Karana in philosophical schools

Bhavananda Siddhantavāgīśa offers a critical discussion on Karanākāraka in his Kārikacakra. He first examines the definition of Karana as given by the ancient thinkers of the Nyāya school. According to this definition, the direct or the proximate cause of the result is Karana. The philosophers who offer this definition of Karana argue that the kārakas like Kartā, Karma, Sampradāna etc. are not directly related to the result. They are only indirectly related to it through some other kāraka. Karma is the only exception to this. As for example, when the agent cuts a tree by an axe, he first lifts the axe and strikes it against the tree. Thus, the operation of the agent is directly related to the axe. It is the operation of the axe which only divides the tree. Similar is the case of other kārakas.

Now, the proximate cause of the result clearly means the vyāpāra or the operation of an object which generates the result. Thus, the operation of the axe in the above example generates the result, namely, the division of the tree into parts.

According to this concept of Karana, the particular object which possesses the said operation is not a case of Karana. Such objects are treated as Karanākāraka only in a secondary sense.<sup>63</sup>



Bhavananda Siddhāntavāgīśa does not accept this definition. He also does not criticise the definition. But, he offers a new and easily acceptable definition on Karana, namely, *vyāpāravat kāraṇam Karanaṁ*.<sup>64</sup> According to this definition, a Karana is a cause which brings about the result by means of its process or processes. A great advantage this definition is that it is applicable to any object which produces the result through its operation. It is clear from the discussion of Bhavananda that a particular philosopher suggests an amendment to the definition. He says that the clause *Kartṛbhinnam* should be added to the definition.<sup>65</sup> The philosopher probably takes note on the view of Bhartṛhari that the agent cannot be a case of Karana. Bhavananda does not comment on this view.

He clearly shows that his definition is uniformly applicable to the Karana of inferential knowledge, visual perception auditory perception etc. He says that in the case of inferential knowledge, *vyāptismṛti* or the recollection of the reason as is universally connected with the probandum (*sādhya*) is the Karana. The *vyāpāra* (process) in this case is *parāmarśa*. The term *parāmarśa* means a particular judgement that the object of inference is possessed of probang which is universally pervaded by the probandum.

Bhavananda states that in the case of visual perception, the organs of sight play the role of Karana. The contact between the organ of sight and the object which is seen is the vyāpāra or the process in this case.

The philosopher shows that the process is different in the case of the perception of sound. There is a contact between the auditory sense organ and the inner organ called manas in this case.<sup>66</sup>

### Sāraṃājārī

The author of the Sāraṃājārī follows the definition of Karana as given by Pāṇini. He critically interprets the definition in order to give us a clear idea of the term Karana. According to this interpretation, Karana-kāraka denotes the immediate cause of the result.<sup>67</sup> It appears from the interpretation that the philosopher subscribes to the view of ancient logicians on Karanākāraka as recorded by Bhavananda in his Kārikacakra. But, Jayakṛṣṇa does not offer any critical discussion on his interpretation. Therefore, it is difficult for us to arrive at a definite conclusion on this point. Jayakṛṣṇa cites two illustrations of Karana, namely, parśunā vrkṣaṃ śchinatti and manaśa Pāṭaliputranagaraṃ gacchati. The first illustration is a case of external Karana while the second example is a case of internal Karana.<sup>68</sup>

He says that the third inflexion which is attached a case of Karana denotes the property known as Karanatva.<sup>69</sup>

Sabdasaṅkīrṇikā

Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra offers a new definition on Karana in the Sabdasaṅkīrṇikā.<sup>70</sup> He presents the following idea in the definition.

When the third inflexion which is attached to a particular word denotes a specific sense in relation to the meaning of a verb which is duly inflected by its vikarana, the particular sense of the third inflexion becomes a case of Karana in relation to the verb.<sup>71</sup>

Jagadīśa cites two illustrations of Karana, namely, dātreṇa śchinatti and ghaṭatvaṇa jānāti and critically explains them in order to clarify his definition. He says that in the first illustration, the verb śchinatti denotes the act of cutting. The third inflexion which is attached to the term dātra denotes that the said act is generated by the dātra (knife) through its operation. This particular sense of the third inflexion is the Karana. In the second illustration, the verb jānāti denotes jñāna or knowledge. The third inflexion which is used in the term ghaṭatva signifies that the said knowledge is qualified by the property known as ghaṭatva.

This meaning of the third inflexion is the case of Karana in the second example.<sup>72</sup> Similarly, in other examples also, the meaning of the third inflexion itself as determined by the meaning of the verb duly inflected by its vikarana is Karana-karaka.

Jagadīśa Tarkalāṅkara lays emphasis on the use of the vikarana to the root in his definition of Karana. He clearly states in his commentary that the third inflexion is attached to the word Caitra in the example Caitrena pakvam. But, because the vikarana suffix *ap* is not used to the root *pac* in the term *pakva*, we do not attain the sense of Karana from the third inflexion in the above example.<sup>73</sup>

This argument of the philosopher does not appear to us as a sound one. The sense of Karana may be expressed by the third inflexion even when the vikarana is not used to the root. Thus, we can use the expression *Caitrena darvya pakvam* in which the word *darvī* (दर्वी) is a case of Karana.

The philosopher justifies the use of the term *vikaranākta* in his definition. He says that he uses the term *vikaranākta* in stead of using the term *vikaranānta* because, the vikarana is not always used after the root. In such verbs as *runaddhi*, we clearly see that the vikarana is always used after the last sound of the root.<sup>74</sup>

Jagadīśa observes that a problem arises from the use of the term *vikarāṇākṛta* also in the definition. He cites two illustrations of *Karāṇa*, namely, *ghṛteṇa atti* and *ghṛteṇa juhoti* in order to show that the *vikarāṇa* is conspicuous by its absence from the verbs in these illustrations. But, the term *ghṛteṇa* in it is a clear case of *Karāṇa*. It appears from this that the definition of Jagadīśa is too narrow to cover such cases of *Karāṇa*.

A section of philosophers try to offer a solution to the above problem. They say that in the cases of *atti*, *juhoti* etc., the *vikarāṇa* is elided after it is duly attached to the root. Therefore, the definition is rightly applicable to the term *ghṛta* in said illustrations. In the same way, it is also applicable to similar other instances of *Karāṇakāraka*.

Jagadīśa probably realises that the definition of *Karāṇa* as given by him is not an appropriate one. Moreover, it is not easily intelligible to the readers. Therefore, he defines the term *Karāṇa* in the *vṛtti* as the generator of the result through a process or processes belonging to it.<sup>75</sup> The definition is the same as that of Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa. He shows in the same way as Bhavānanda that this definition is uniformly applicable to the *Karāṇa* of inferential knowledge, visual perception and auditory perception.<sup>76</sup> But, he realises that the definition is not applicable to the illustration

atmanā jñāti where the intermediary operation is conspicuous by its absence. Therefore, he offers a third definition on Karana. According to this definition, Karanākāraka denotes the cause which invariably produces an effect.<sup>77</sup> Jagadīśa shows that this definition has a great advantage. If we accept this definition, the soul may become both the agent and the instrumental cause of knowledge. He states that the soul without violating any rule or contradicting experience may play the dual role of Kartā and Karana. Though agency and instrumentality converge in one substance, namely, the soul, he says that they preserve their distinction but do not overlap.<sup>78</sup>

The philosopher critically explains the sentences paśunā Rudrañ yajate and daṇḍena ghatah. He states that in the first sentence, the word paśu is actually a case of Karma. But, it is treated as the instrumental cause by a special rule. In the second sentence, again, the word daṇḍa is not the instrumental cause because, it is not syntactically related to a verb.<sup>79</sup> Jagadīśa does not present any new idea in these explanations. He simply reiterates some well known traditional views in them. It is accepted on all hands that the terms daṇḍa (staff) in the second sentence is a case of hetu and not Karana and we have no objection regarding this view. But, in the first sentence, the word paśu can be treated as a

regular case of Karana. Even the last definition of Karana given by Jagadīśa can easily cover this.

We have discussed above the views of Jagadīśa on the instrumental case. A critical examination of these views shows that the philosopher applies his best talent in order to find an appropriate definition of the case. Jagadīśa ultimately gives a definition of it which is able to remove the defects of the earlier definitions.

#### Vyutpattivāda

Gaḍādhara Bhaṭṭācārya first defines Karanatva or Karanākāraka as vyāpāravatkāranatva or that particular cause which generates the intended effect by means of its operation. But, he realizes that this definition is applicable to the subjective case also. Therefore, he amends the definition by using the predicate Karṭṛvyāpārādhīna to vyāpāra in the definition.<sup>80</sup> After this amendment, the meaning of the definition stands as follows : Karana or the instrumental case denotes that particular cause which generates the intended

effect by means of its operation but this operation is invariably subordinate to the operation of the agent.

A critical examination of the above standpoint of Gadādhara shows that the philosopher follows his predecessor Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa to a great extent in it. Bhavānanda also defines Karana as vyāpāravat kāraṇam Karanam. The original contribution of Gadādhara is that he amends this definition in an appropriate manner before presenting it in his Vyutpattivāda.

Gadādhara states that the definition of Karana given by him is applicable to inferential knowledge. He presents the same arguments as his predecessors Bhavānanda and Jagādīśa in this case. The philosopher, however, does not say that the definition is applicable to visual perception, auditory perception etc.<sup>81</sup>

The author of the Vyutpattivāda clearly distinguishes between hetu and Karana. He states that in the sentences dhanena kulam, vidyayā yasaḥ etc. the words dhanam, yasaḥ and the like are not cases of Karana because, they are not syntactically related to a verb.<sup>82</sup>



Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi

The author of the Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi also accepts the definition of Karana given by Pāṇini as the appropriate definition of the term.

He offers three different interpretations on the definition. According to the first interpretation, Karana denotes the locus of that particular operation which immediately generates the result.<sup>83</sup> This interpretation is based on the definition of Karana given by Bhartṛhari in his Vākya-padiya which is again, an interpretation of the definition sād bhakatamam Karanam offered by Pāṇini.

Gāgā Bhaṭṭa realises that the first interpretation is not applicable to such examples of Karana as ātmanā jānāti. The following is the reason for this. The vyāpāra or the process is an essential factor in the case of sensory perception such as the visual perception, the auditory perception etc. But, no such process is necessary in the case of the ātman or the self. Therefore, the philosopher offers a second interpretation on the definition of Pāṇini. According to this interpretation, Karana denotes the productive cause of the result.<sup>84</sup>

In the third interpretation, Gāgā Bhaṭṭa presents the idea that the term Karana denotes that particular factor which is moved by the agent through its operation for the

attainment of the result. Bhavananda discusses this concept of Karana in his Kāraṇasūtra.

Gāgā Bhaṭṭa says that the third interpretation is necessary for such examples of Karana as kuthārena chinatti.<sup>85</sup> In the example kuthārena chinatti, the term kuthāra (axe) is used as a case of Karana. The sentence kuthārena chinatti means that the agent cuts a tree or a piece of wood by an axe, he lifts the axe and strike it against the tree on the piece of wood. It is through this particular process, the agent attains the intended result. The above analysis shows that the axe becomes a case of Karana only when the agent moves it for the attainment of the result. The implication of the third interpretation of Gāgā Bhaṭṭa is now clear to us.

Reference notes

1. Pā 1.4.42.
2. Evaṃ tarhi.....kāraka-sañjñāyāṃ taratamayogo na bhavati. Mbh p.249.
3. Apāyāṃ acāryaḥ kinnyāyāṃ menyate?.....Tenehaiva syāt - grāmāḍ āgacchati. Sāṃkṣāyakebhyaḥ Pāṭaliputrekā abhirūpataṛā ityatra na syāt. Kārakasāñjñāyāṃ taratamayogo na bhavati ityatrāpi siddham bhavati. Tathādharaṃ acāryaḥ.....Tenehaiva syāt tileṣu tailaṃ dadhni sarpīriti. Gangāyāṃ gāvah, kupe gargakulam ityatra na syāt. Kāraka-sañjñāyāṃ taratamayogo na bhavati ityatrāpi siddham bhavati. Ibid. p.259.
4. Tatra tamaśrutiretañjñāpayati prakarṣapratyayagrahaṇaṃ antareṇa prakaraṇe sāmāthyagamyaprakarṣo nāśrīyate. Ibid. p.259.
5. Ibid. p.259.
6. Vāk. Sā. 90.
7. Ibid. Sa. 91,92,94.
8. Ibid. p.306.
9. Ibid. p.307.
10. Tathā hyaśvo doṣāntaraprāptau.....atīśayam. Ibid.p.308.
11. Kṛtyāsiddhau yat prakṛtopakāṛakam viveksitam tat..... Kāraṇasañjñāṃ bhavati āstrena lunāti paraśunā dāhinatti Kāś p. 557.

12. Tamab grahanam kim? Gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ. Ibid. p.558.
13. Prakṛstaṁ = <sup>4</sup>atyantam upakāraṁ. Athavā prakarsaḥ prakṛstaṁ Ibid. pp.557-558.
14. Ibid. p.558.
15. Etadanena jñāpyate.....vinā tamab-grahanena prakāśo nāśriyate. Ibid. p.559.
16. Ibid. p.557.
17. Ibid. p.557.
18. Ibid. p.558.
19. Kriyāsiddhau prakṛstopakāraṁ Karanaṁ ucyate.....  
Vivakṣāvasāt parasūśchinatti. Bhāṣā. p.45.
20. BVV. p.100.
21. Kriyāsiddhau prakṛstopakāraṁ Karanaṁ syāt Pr.kau.  
p.476.
22. Yat kriyāsiddhau viśaye prakṛstaṁ atyartham upakāraṁ  
.....Karanatvam tadā smṛtam iti. Ibid. p.476.  
of. Prakṛstaṁ atyantam upakāraṁ.....sādhakatamam.  
Jinendrabuddhi Kāś. p.559.
23. Etad anena jñāpyate.....anukhyasyāpyādhārasya Gaṅgāder  
Adhikarane samjñā syāt. Ibid. pp.405-406 cf. Iha kārakā-  
dhikāre,.....Gaṅgāderādhārasyādhikarane samjñā siddhā  
bhavati. Jinendrabuddhi. Kāś. p.559.
24. VBS. p.172.

25. Sa cāvyavadbhānena phalajanakavyāpāravattā..... Vivakṣa  
dr̥śyate yataḥ iti. Vivakṣyate ityanena sakṛd anekeṣāṃ  
tadābhavati..... sūcayati. VBS. p. 173-174.
26. Karaṇatṛtīyāyāstvāśrayavyāpārau vācyau. Ibid. pp. 171-172.
27. Prakarsasca kārakāntarāpekṣo na..... tenāśvena  
dīpikayā vrajati iti prayogopapattiḥ. Ibid. p. 172.
28. Tatra Harisammattimapyāha..... Vivakṣayā ityanena.....  
ata eva dātrāṇādarēṇa balasya tattvavivakṣāyaṃ balena  
lunāṭīti prayogaḥ. Ibid. pp. 172-173.
29. Ibid. p. 173.
30. Karaṇatṛaṇca Karaṇatāśaktimattvaṃ. LMS. p. 1251.
31. Ibid. p. 1251.
32. Vivakṣya<sup>te</sup> ityanena..... ata evāśvena pathā dīpikayā  
vrajatīti bhavati. Ibid. pp. 1251-1252.
33. Kalāpa. Sū 218.
34. Ibid. p. 204.
35. Gārgyasya bhavane gotraṃ Karaṇam. Ibid. p. 204.
36. Ibid. p. 204.
37. Ibid. pp. 204-205.
38. Cāndra. p. 174.
39. EKS. Kāraka. Sū 16.
40. Yadvyāpāraṇāntarāṇy..... Karaṇasam<sup>3</sup>jan<sup>3</sup> bhavati. Ibid.  
p. 1006.

41. Sādhyaṭe aneneti Karaṇa.....etadeva spaṣṭayitum aṇāya-ya---  
dvyāpāraṇantaramKartretyāha Ibid. p.1006.
42. Ibid. p.1006.
43. Jainendra. 1.2.113.
44. Ibid. p.94.
45. ŚS. 2.2.24.
46. Kriyāsiddhau yat prakṛṣṭopakāraṇatvenāvyavadhānena  
vivakṣitam.....Karaṇasaṃjñam bhavati. Ibid. p.74.
47. Tamagrahaṇam Apādānādīsaṃjñāvidhau taratamayogu nāsti...  
.....Adhikaraṇatvañ-ca bhavati. Ibid. p.74.
48. Aṣya ca Kāraṇāntarāpekṣayā prakarṣo.....sūpona  
sarpiṣā lavanena pāṇinandanam bhunkte. Ibid. p.74.
49. Mugdha kāraka. ŚS.9.
50. Sādhyaṭe karma niṣpādyate aneneti.....yadvai vivak-  
ṣitam teṣu Karaṇam tat prakīrtitam iti. Ibid. p.57.
51. Yad vyāpārād anantaramKartṛa kriyā niṣpādyate tat  
sādhanaṃ.....Yaduktam kriyāyāḥ pariniṣpattir.....  
.....samtam iti. Ibid. pp.57-58.
52. Aśvena pathā yāti.....trayaṇāmapi vyāpāravattvāt  
sādhanaṭvam. Ibid. p.58.
53. Sāra. ŚS. 460. Kriyāsiddhau prakṛṣṭopakāraṇamKaraṇasaṃ-  
jñam syāt. Ibid. p.20.
54. SRG. p.154.
55. SRR. p.307.

56. Supadma. p.72.
57. Ibid. p.72.
58. HNM. Su 1051.
59. Kartur adhīnam iti kim? Kṛṣṇa-prasādāt sukham labhatē.  
Ibid. p.456.
60. PR. p.386.
61. Vyāpārānyavyavahitaṃ phalānāśrayakāraṇam. Ibid. p.386.
62. Ibid. p.386.
63. Karaṇatvaṃ ca.....<sup>18</sup> Kūthārēdau Karaṇāpādau gaṇameva.  
Kār. cak. pp.43-44.
64. Ibid. p.46.
65. Ibid. p.46.
66. Itthañcānumitau vyāptiśortih karaṇam..... vyāpārah,  
Ibid. p.46.
67. SMJ. p.50.
68. Ibid. p.50.
69. Ibid. p.50.
70. Yortho vikaraṇāṅkaśya dhātorarthe tritīyā.  
Bodhyate Karaṇam nāma kāraṇam tadihocyate. ŚSP.  
Kārika. 71.
71. Savikaraṇasya.....kāraṇamucyate. Ibid. p.311.
72. Dātrena phinattī.....tatra Karaṇam. Ibid. pp.311-312.
73. Ibid. p. 312.
74. Ibid. p.312.

75. Karaṇasābdastu.....vācakaḥ. Ibid. p.312.
76. Cākṣuṣādau.....vā tatra vyāpārah. Ibid. pp.312-313.
77. Phalāyogavyavacchinnaṃ phalopadhayaṃ vā Karaṇameva  
Karaṇam.....īśatvāt. Ibid. p.313.
78. Ibid. p.313.
79. Ibid. p. 314.
80. VTP. p.268.
81. Ibid. p.269.
82. Tatra hetāviti sūtreṇa.....<sup>x</sup>Kriyāyogābhāvāt.  
Ibid. p.268.
83. Karaṇatvaṃ tu sādṛśakatamatvam. Sādṛśakatamaṃ Karaṇam iti  
sūtrāt. Sādṛśakatamatvaṃ-cāvyavadhānena phalajanakavyā-  
pāravatkāraṇatvam. BCK. p.98.
84. Phalāyogavyavacchinatvaṃ vā (Karaṇatvam). Ibid. p.99.
85. Phaloddeśapravṛttakartr̥vyāparopakāryatvaṃ vā.....  
ityādyupapattiḥ. Ibid. p.99.



## CHAPTER V

### Sampradāna

#### Sampradāna in the Paninian school

##### Pāṇini

Pāṇini defines Sampradānakāreka or the dative case as *karmaṇā yam abhipraiti sa Sampradānam*. But, he finds that this definition does not cover all the examples of Sampradāna. Therefore, he offers some other definitions also namely, *rucyarthānām priyamāṇaḥ*, *spṛherīpsitaḥ*, *ślāgha-<sup>nū</sup>sthāsāpānīnīpsamāṇaḥ*, *dhārer uttamāṇaḥ*, *spṛherīpsitaḥ*, *krudhadruherṣasūyārthanām yam prati kopah*, *rādhikayor yasya viprasṇaḥ*, *pratyābhyāṁ śruvaḥ pūrvasya Kartā and anuprati-<sup>gr</sup>ṇasca*.<sup>1</sup>

##### Kātyāyana

Kātyāyana suggests that the term *kriyā* should be added to the definition *karmaṇā yam abhipraiti sa Sampradānam*. He offers this suggestion through a cryptic statement namely, *kriyāgrahanam*.<sup>2</sup> The grammarian exactly means that the definition should be remodelled as *karmaṇā kriyayā vā yam abhipraiti sa Sampradānam*. Patañjali says that Kātyāyana suggests this amendment for such examples of Sampradāna kāreka as *patye śete*, *yuddhaya sannahyate* etc.<sup>3</sup>

Kāṭyaṇḍya finds that sometimes the dative case is replaced by the objective case in certain sentences while the instrumental case is used in the place of the objective case. Therefore, he offers an important vārtika namely, Karmanah Karanasañjā Sampradānasyaca Karmanasñjā in order to justify such cases.<sup>4</sup> Patañjali illustrates the vārtika in a suitable manner. We shall discuss it elaborately in a proper context.

### Patañjali

Patañjali interprets the definition Karmanā yam abhipraiti sa Sampradānam in an exhaustive manner. He critically explains the significance of every term used in the definition. He first examines the necessity of karmanā in the sūtra. He shows that the term karmanā is essentially necessary in order to differentiate the dative case from the accusative case. He argues that if the term is not used in the definition, the definition will be reduced to yam abhipraiti sa Sampradānam. He states that in that case, the definition will denote the accusative case and not the dative case.<sup>5</sup>

He shows that the terms yam and sa are also essentially necessary in the definition. In the absence of these

two terms, the definition will be reduced to *karmanā abhi-  
praiti*. In that case, the definition will be applicable to  
the *Kartā* alone and not to *Sampradāna*.<sup>6</sup>

*Patañjali* says that *Pāṇini* uses the prefixes *abhi*  
and *pra* in the definition in order to eliminate the time  
factor from the concept of *Sampradāna*. According to him, the  
prefixes indicate that the definition of *Sampradāna* given by  
*Pāṇini* is uniformly applicable to a person related to a past,  
present or future gift.<sup>7</sup>

Now, the *Bhāṣyakāra* reviews the amendment of the  
*Vārtikā* <sup>on</sup> the definition. He says that this amendment is  
redundant since the term *karma* in *karmanā* denotes two senses :  
(i) principal and (ii) secondary. In the secondary sense,  
*karma* denotes an act.<sup>8</sup> Therefore, the amendment loses its  
significance. According to this interpretation of *Patañjali*,  
the definition is applicable even to an example of dative  
case in which the intransitive verb is used.

*Pāṇini* shows that the dative case is used with  
some specified verbs in a specified sense. As for example,  
the dative case is used with the verb *dhārayati* in a sen-  
tence in order to denote a money-lender. Thus, we use the  
expressions *Devadattāya śatāṁ dhārayati* etc. *Pāṇini* frames  
a number of rules in order to show the use of the dative case  
with different verbs in different senses. But, if we criti-

cally examine these rules, we shall see that they are illustrative of the rule, *karmaṇa yam abhipraitisa sampradāṇam* itself, though each of the rules has its peculiar use and meaning. According to Patañjali, the term *karma* denotes *kriyā* also and when this sense is accepted, we find that the rules *dhāreruttarmanah* etc. are redundant.

Patañjali illustrates the *vārtika Karmaṇah Karana-saṁjñā sampradāṇasya ca Karmasaṁjñā* by the example *pasūnā Rudraṁ yajate*. He says that this example actually conveys the sense of *pasūn Rudrāya dadāti*.<sup>9</sup>

### Kaiyata

Kaiyata examines the view of the *Vrttikara* that *sampradāṇakāraka* is invariably related to the act of giving. He rejects this view, because, the *Bhāṣyakāra* does not subscribe to such a view. He shows that the *Bhāṣyakara* rejects the Paninian rule *gatyarthakarmaṇi dvitīyācaturthyau cāstāyām anadhvani* and the *vārtika kriyāgrahanaṁ* as redundant. The *Bhāṣyakāra* clearly states that *sampradāṇakāraka* may be used with any verb and hence, these rules are without any utility in grammar.

Kaiyata also does not accept the meaning of the root *dā* or *dāna* as given by Jinendrabuddhi. According to Jinendrabuddhi, the root *dā* or *dāna* denotes the act of re-

nouncing one's possession over an object and the transference of the possession to another person. Kaiyata quotes two sentences from the Mahābhāṣya namely, khaṇḍiko-pādhyāyas tasmāi capetāṁ dadāti and na Śūdrāya matim dadyāt in order to show that the root da in these sentences do not indicate the above sense. Therefore, he rejects the meaning of the root given by Jinendrabudhi.<sup>10</sup>

The grammarian clearly explains the significance of the expression yan pratikopah in the Paninian rule: krudhadruharṣā etc. Patañjali says that the sense of anger is involved in the meaning of every root mentioned in the above rule. But, Kaiyata shows that there is some exception to this in the case of the root īrṣa. He refers to the sentence bhāryā īrṣati in order to show the exception clearly. According to him, the sentence means that a particular person cannot tolerate the hungry looks of other persons on the beautiful body of his wife. It is clear from this that the sense of anger is not involved in the meaning of the root īrṣa in the sentence. Kaiyata says that Pāṇini uses the expression yan pratikopah in the rule in order to indicate that the dative case is not used with the verb īrṣati when the sense of anger is not denoted by it.<sup>11</sup>

The commentator gives the meanings of the terms krodha, droha, īrṣā and asūya denoted by the roots mentioned in the said rule of Pāṇini.<sup>12</sup>

He shows that the root *dvig* is not covered by the rule. Therefore, the dative case is not used with the verb *dveṣṭi*. Thus, he justifies the expressions *asmān dveṣṭi* and *ausadham dveṣṭi*.<sup>13</sup>

### Bhartrhari

Bhartrhari lays emphasis on the etymological meaning of the term *Sampradāna*. It is implied by the very term *tyāgāṅga* used by him in his first definition of *Sampradāna*.<sup>14</sup>

Let us now explain the term *tyāgāṅga*. *Tyāgāṅga* has a specified meaning in the definition of Bhartrhari. When a person gives up his own possessorship of an object and transfers it to another person, it is called *tyāga* in Sanskrit. This very act is described as *dāna* or *samyak pradāna* by latter Sanskrit grammarians. The term *tyāgāṅga* in the definition denotes a condition of the *tyāga* or the said act of the agent. Bhartrhari uses the predicate *karmenepsitam* in order to specify this condition. It means that the said condition is invariably related to the act through the Karma or the object of it. The exact implication of this expression is that the term *tyāgāṅga* in the definition of Bhartrhari denotes a person for whom the agent renounces his possessorship of an object and transfer it to him.

Bhartrhari says that the person may become a condition of tyāga in three different ways. In some cases, when another person renounces his ownership over an object in favour of him, he approves the act and formally accepts the object given to him and thus, he becomes a condition of the act. In some cases, though he does not formally approve the act, he does not refuse to accept the object. In such cases, he becomes tyāgānga in this manner. In certain cases, again he induces the giver to give him a thing. The giver then gives away the object to him and thus, the recipient of it becomes a condition of the act. This idea is presented by him in the definition of Sampradāna by using the terms anirākaraṇāt and preraṇānumatibhyām.

A critical examination of the above concept of Sampradāna shows that Bhartrhari follows the Paninian definition *karmanā yam abhipraiti sa Sampradānam*. But, the grammarian offers an original interpretation on the definition. He accepts the etymological meaning of the term Sampradāna in it.

Bhartrhari corroborates the view of the Bhāṣyakāra that the term karma in the definition denotes kriyā or an act also. Therefore, he rejects the amendment offered by Kātyāyana on the definition.<sup>15</sup>

He accepts the other definitions of Sampradāna as given by Pāṇini. But, he says that the dative case is used with the verb rocate etc. in the sense of the objective case or a hetu or a non-specified relation as denoted by the sixth inflexion. This is another important original view of the grammarian.<sup>16</sup>

Bhartrhari shows great originality in his concept of Sampradāna kāraṇa. Some of his views on Sampradāna are accepted by all grammarians coming after him.

### Helārāja

Helārāja explains the views of Bhartrhari on Sampradānakāraṇa in a clear and elaborate manner. Bhartrhari defines Sampradāna as tyāgāṅgākarmaṇapsitam. Helārāja lays emphasis on the term tyāgāṅga in his interpretation of this expression. He shows that the term tyāga denotes dāna and the term āṅga means a condition, of it. He draws the conclusion from this that Bhartrhari offers the etymological meaning of the term Sampradāna in the definition anirākarāṇāt Kartus tyāgāṅgākarmaṇapsitam etc.<sup>17</sup> Helārāja explains the term tyāga or dāna in an appropriate manner. He utilises some important views of the Kāśikā school in his explanation of the term. According to him, when a person gives up his



possession over an object and transfers it to another person with the motive of benefitting him in some way, it is called *dāna*. He lays emphasis on the said motive of the person in his concept of *dāna*. This is a significant departure of the grammarian from the standpoint of his predecessors. One of his great predecessors namely Jinendrabuddhi explains the term *dāna* for the first time as the act of renouncing one's ownership over an object and the transference of it to another person with the motives of showing honour etc. But, he does not state that the motive may be the motive of benefitting another person also. We shall discuss the above point properly in the proper context. Helārāja examines the sentences *rajakasya vastram dadāti* and *ghnataḥ prṣṭhaṃ dadāti*. He says that in these sentences, the verb *dadāti* does not denote the sense of *dāna*. Therefore, the dative case is not used with the verb in them,<sup>18</sup> Jinendrabuddhi offers this view for the first time. Helārāja simply reiterates it in order to clarify the concept of *Sampradāna*. He offers a critical discussion on two significant examples of *Sampradānakāraka* namely, *na Śūdrāya matiṃ dadyāt* and *khandikopādhyāyas tasmāi capetāṃ dadāti*. These examples are quoted from the *Mahābhāṣya*. It appears from the above examples that the verbs used in them do not denote the sense of *dāna*. But, Helārāja shows that the verbs in the examples clearly denote the sense of *dāna*. He

says that when a teacher imparts knowledge to a student, he renounces his ownership over it and transfers the same to the student. The knowledge which the student acquires from his teacher, benefits him in various way. Thus, the verb *dadāt* denotes the sense of *dāna* in the first example. This concept is difficult to understand. Helārāja admits that the concept is not accepted by some scholars. He also offers a similar explanation on the second example.<sup>19</sup> We see from this discussion that Helārāja offers a diametrically opposite view to that of Kaiyata. Kaiyata opines that the sense of *dāna* is not denoted by the verb in the said examples.

Helārāja clearly shows the distinction between *Sampradāna* and *tadartha* in Sanskrit grammar. Kātyāyana offers a *vārtika* according to which the fourth inflexion is used in the sense of *tādarthya*. The fourth inflexion is used to a word in the sense of *Sampradāna* also. Therefore, some people might have confused between *tadartha* and *Sampradānakāraka*. Helārāja says that they are not the same. The word *tadartha* denotes that which serves the purpose of a particular person etc. Thus, when we say *Brāhmaṇāya gauḥ*, it means that the cow is meant for the *Brāhmaṇa*. Therefore, the cow is a case of *tadartha*. Helārāja states that *Sampradāna* is a *kāraka*. When the agent intends to establish a relation with a person through the act of *dāna*, it is called *Sampradāna*. *Tadartha* does not denote

this sense. Hence, there is a clear distinction between the two.<sup>20</sup>

Bhartrhari offers two definitions of Sampradāna-kāraṇa. Helārāja says that in the first definition Bhartrhari discusses the popular meaning of the case. But, there are some examples of the case to which the first definition does not apply. Therefore, he offers a second definition which covers the remaining examples.<sup>21</sup>

### Kāśikā

Like the author of the Vākyapadīya, the Vṛttikāra also accepts the etymological meaning of the term Sampradāna. He says that the term Sampradāna is a significant one. He interprets the term karmaṇā in the Paninian rule karmaṇā yam abhipraiti sa Sampradānam as dadātikarmaṇā in order to maintain its logical relation with the above meaning of the term Sampradāna.<sup>22</sup>

He does not accept the view of the Bhāṣyakāra that the term karma in the above definition denotes kriyā or an action also. He rigidly follows the view of Kātyāyana that the definition should be amended by adding the term kriyā to it. He shows that this amendment is necessary in order to

justify such examples of Sampradāna as *patye śete, yuddhāya sannahyate* and *śrāddhāya nigalhate*.<sup>23</sup>

He also cites the *vārtika Karmanah Karanasaḥ* *Sampradānasya ca Karmasamjñā* and illustrates it with the example *pasunā Rudrahyaajate*.<sup>24</sup>

### Jinendrabuddhi

Jinendrabuddhi explains the views of the *Vṛttikāra* on *Sampradānakāraka* in a significant manner. He mainly follows the *Vṛttikāra* in his explanations. But, he does not miss the salient points mentioned in the great commentary of *Patañjali*.

The commentator justifies the view of the *Vṛttikāra* that the term *Sampradāna* in *Pāṇini's* grammar is a significant one. He says that the term *Sampradāna* as introduced by *Pāṇini* is a long one. According to the grammatical norm, a technical term should be as short as possible. Therefore, he draws a conclusion that the term *Sampradāna* is a significant one. He states more clearly that it denotes its etymological sense, namely, *samyak prakarṣaṇa diyate yasmāi tat Sampradānam*.<sup>25</sup> It implies that when an object is completely given away to a person, he is called the *Sampradāna kāraka*. It is for this reason, the *Vṛttikāra* interprets

the term *karmaṇā* in the Paninian definition of *Sampradāna-kāraṇa* as *dadāti-karmaṇā*. The term *dadātikarmaṇā* means through the objective case of *dāna*.

Jinendrabuddhi clearly explains the term *dāna* or a complete gift. He says that the term *dāna* denotes the renunciation of one's ownership over an object and the transference of the same to another person to whom it is given. According to him this is the *samyak pradāna* or the complete gift of the object. Jinendrabuddhi shows three distinct motives for such a gift. Sometimes, the giver worships or honours a god or a venerable person by such a gift. Sometimes, he shows favour to a person such a beggar by the gift. And sometimes, he desires to receive some favour from a god through a complete gift.<sup>26</sup> Now, the man or the god who becomes the new owner of the object through the transference of ownership is the *Sampradānakāraṇa*.

The commentator says that the sentences *rajakasya vastraṃ dadāti* and *ghnataḥ prṣṭhaṃ dadāti* do not suggest the sense of *samyak pradāna* or a complete gift. Therefore, *Sampradānakāraṇa* is not used in the terms *rajaka* (washerman) and *ghnat* (murderer) in the sentences.<sup>27</sup>

This is an important original view of the grammarian. Let us now clarify the view. The grammarian means to say that the verb *dadāti* in the first sentence does not

indicate that the washerman becomes the owner of the garment which is given to him for washing. The person who gives it to washerman<sup>6a</sup> remains its owner. Therefore, the washerman<sup>7</sup> returns the garment to him after it is washed. Similarly, in the second sentence, the verb *dadāti* denotes that a person turns his back to the assassin out of fear. It is for these reasons, the dative case is not applicable to the above examples. This view of Jinendrabuddhi is accepted by a large section of grammarians coming after him. But, the grammarians like Kaiyata, Kaundabhatta and Nāgeśa reject the view. We shall discuss it clearly in the proper places.

Jinendrabuddhi discusses the utility of every term in the definition *karmanā yam abhipraiti sa sampradānam* like his great predecessor Patañjali. He follows the views of Patañjali to a great extent in his discussion. But, he does not subscribe to the view of the Bhāṣyakara that the prefixes *abhi* and *pra* are used by Pāṇini in the definition to remove the limitation of time from the concept of *sampradāna*. He says that Pāṇini uses these prefixes in the definition for some other important purpose.<sup>28</sup>

### Haradatta

Haradatta appropriately explains the concept of *sampradāna* presented by the Vrttikāra. He utilises some

important views of Bhartṛhari and Jinendrabuddhi on Sampradānakāraka in order to clarify the concept.

The Vṛttikāra interprets the Paninian rule *karmaṇā yam abhipraiti sa Sampradānī* as *dadātikarmaṇā Karanabhūtena Kartā yam abhipraiti* etc. Haradatta clearly shows that the very idea expressed by Bhartṛhari in the *kārikā anirākanāt Kartus tyāgāṅgāṅkarmaṇepaitam* etc. is presented by the Vṛttikāra in the above interpretation.<sup>29</sup>

We have already discussed that the Vṛttikāra explains the term Sampradāna as a significant one. Haradatta critically explains the idea in his sub-commentary. He follows the views of Jinendrabuddhi in this explanation. He shows that the sense of dāna is invariably present in the concept of Sampradāna. He reiterates the view of Jinendrabuddhi that when somebody gives away an object to another person by renouncing his ownership over it and transferring the same to him with a definite motive, it is called dāna and the person to whom the object is so given away is known as Sampradāna kāraka. Haradatta says that when the ownership is once renounced, the object should not be returned to its previous owner. The grammarian clearly points out that the sense of dāna as discussed above is denoted by the verb *dadāti* in the sentences *vrkṣāya jalam dadāti, devebhyah sumanaso dadāti, yācakāya bhikṣām dadāti* etc. Therefore, he opines that the terms *vrkṣa*

etc. in these sentences are cases of Sampradāna kāraka in the sentences. But, he shows that the same verb does not denote the sense of dāna in the sentences *rajakasya vastram dadāti* and *ghnatah prathamam dadāti*. Therefore, the dative case is not applicable to the washerman or the murderer referred to in the sentences. According to Haradatta, the verb *dadāti* is used in a secondary sense in the above examples.<sup>30</sup>

Haradatta differs from Kaiyata on an important point. Kaiyata says that the verb *dadāti* in the sentence *khandikopādhyāyas tasmāi capetām dadāti* and the verb *dadyāt* in the sentence *na Sūdrāya matim dadyāt* do not convey the sense of renouncing the ownership over an object. But, Haradatta says that these verbs denote that particular sense in the sentences.<sup>31</sup>

He follows his predecessors Patañjali and Jinendra-buddhi and explains the utility of the terms *karmanā* etc. in the definition *karmanā yam abhipraiti sa Sampradānanam*. He says that the suffixes *abhi* and *pra* serve two important purposes in the definition. Firstly, they signify that there is no limitation of time in the concept of Sampradāna. Secondly, the term *abhipraiti* denotes *īpsati* (i.e. desires to establish a relation with).<sup>32</sup>



Puruṣottama

Puruṣottama shows in his illustrations of the Paninian rule *karmanā yam abhipraiti sa sampradānam* that *sampradānakāraka* is invariably related to the verb *dadāti* or an equivalent of this verb. But, he does not accept the view of Jinendrabuddhi that the sense of *dāna* or a complete gift as defined by him is necessarily involved in the concept of *sampradāna*. He presents a few significant illustrations such as *śātrave bhayaṁ dadāti*, *gurave dhanam niryatayati* *rustah* etc. which suggest it.<sup>33</sup>

Let us explain the point clearly. According to Jinendrabuddhi, the sense of showing honour, favour etc. to a person is invariably associated with *dāna*. But, the illustration *gurave dhanam niryatayati* mentioned above does not suggest such a sense. Again, the verb *dadāti* in the illustration *śātrave bhayaṁ dadāti* does not denote the sense of *dāna*. But, it denotes the sense of generating (fear). Similarly, the verb *adāt* in the illustration *pattikopādhyāyah śiṣyāya karnacapetam adāt* offered by Puruṣottama denotes the sense of placing (the palm on the cheek of the disciple). But, it does not denote the sense of giving. It is clear from these illustrations that Puruṣottama does not accept the view of Jinendrabuddhi. This is also proved by the following view of the grammarian.

He says that the expressions *rajakāya vastraṁ dadāti* and *ghnate prathamā dadāti* are correct. But, when the speaker does not intend to use the washerman and the killer in these sentences as the dative case, he uses the expressions *rajakasya vastraṁ dadāti* and *ghnataḥ prathamā dadāti* also.<sup>34</sup>

Puruṣottama accepts the view of Patañjali that the term *Karma* in the Paninian rule *karmanā yam abhipraiti sa Sampradānam* denotes *kriyā* (action) also. He explains the implication of the term *kriyā* in the rule.<sup>35</sup>

#### Sṛatidhara

Sṛatidhara departs from the standpoint of Puruṣottama discussed above. He firmly adheres to the view that the sense of *dāna* or a complete gift is invariably present in the concept of *Sampradāna*. He tries to interpret the illustrations furnished by Puruṣottama accordingly. But, he is unable to interpret the illustrations *śatrave bhayaṁ dadāti* etc. in a satisfactory manner.<sup>36</sup>

He explains the *vṛtti* of Puruṣottama on the other Paninian rules such as *rucyarthanan priyamānaḥ* etc. very clearly. But, he does not show any originality in them. He explains the terms *krodha*, *droha* etc. in the same manner as Kaiyata.<sup>37</sup>

Śrītiṭhara divides Sampradānakāra into three sub-groups. He follows Bhartṛhari in this matter.<sup>38</sup>

### Rāmacandra

Rāmacandra follows the Vṛttikāra in interpreting the Paninian rule *karmanā yam abhipreiti sa Sampradānam*. He interprets the term *karmanā* in the rule as *dānasya karmanā*.<sup>39</sup> It signifies that the grammarian accepts the etymological meaning of the term Sampradāna. The expression *dānasya Karmanā* immediately reminds us of the expression *dadāti-Karmanā* in the Kāśikā.

He finds that the above definition of Pāṇini does not cover such examples of Sampradāna as *patye śete* etc. Therefore, he gives a supplementary rule namely *kriyayāpi yam abhipreiti sa Sampradānam*. He follows the Vṛttikāra in the rule.<sup>40</sup>

He explains the other definitions of Sampradāna also as given by Pāṇini. These explanations are very clear and elaborate. But, he does not discuss any significant point in the explanations.<sup>41</sup>

Rāmacandra does not offer any new idea on Sampradāna kāra. He rigidly follows the Vṛttikāra in concept of Sampradāna presented by him.

### Vitthalācārya

Vitthalācārya shows that Rāmacandra accepts the definition *samyak pradīyate yasmāi sa Sampradānam* in his interpretation of the rule *karmāṇā yam abhipraiti sa Sampradānam*. He interprets this definition very clearly. But, he shows no originality in this interpretation. He merely follows the well known traditional views in it.<sup>42</sup>

He also discusses the utility of the terms used in the definition of Pāṇini cited above.<sup>43</sup>

The commentator classifies Sampradāna kāraka into three types. He follows Bhartṛhari in the classification.<sup>44</sup>

### Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita

Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita accepts the etymological meaning of the term Sampradāna. It is clear from his interpretation of the rule *karmāṇā yam abhipraiti sa Sampradānam* in the *Siddhāntakumudī*.<sup>45</sup> Bhaṭṭoji states that the Bhāṣyakāra does not accept the above meaning of Sampradāna. He quotes the passages *khandikopādhyāyas tasmāi capetāṃ dadāti* and *na Śūdrāya matim dadyat* from the Bhāṣya in support of his statement. He says that according to the followers of the Kāśika, the expression *rajakaya vāstraṃ dadāti* is incorrect, because the etymological meaning of Sampradāna is not denoted

by the word rajaka in it. But, he also says that this expression can be easily justified with the help of the above passages of the Mahābhāṣya.<sup>46</sup>

Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita accepts the amendment of Kātyāyana on the rule *karmaṇā yam abhipreiti sa Sampradānam*.<sup>47</sup>

### Kaundabhaṭṭa

Kaundabhaṭṭa commences his discussion on Sampradāna-kāraka by explaining the significance of the fourth inflexion which is used in this case. He says that the fourth inflexion used in Sampradāna-kāraka denotes uddēśya. He critically interprets the Paninian rule *karmaṇā yam abhipreiti sa Sampradānam* in order to clarify the meaning of the term uddēśya. According to this interpretation, when the agent establishes a relation with a particular person through the objective case of a verb, it is called Sampradānakāraka or the uddēśya of the verb.<sup>48</sup>

Kaundabhaṭṭa says that the term uddēśya is otherwise known as śeṣi in the Mīmāṃsā philosophy. He discusses the meaning of the term śeṣi. Like his predecessor Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, he also quotes the passage *krīte some Maṭrāvaruṇāya dandam prayacchati* from the <sup>text</sup> Mīmāṃsā and critically interprets it in order to clarify the concept of śeṣi.<sup>49</sup>

The grammarians like Jinendrabuddhi, Haradatta, Belārāja and Vitthaṭācārya opine that the expression *rajakāya vastraṃ dadāti* is not correct, Kaundabhaṭṭa justifies the above expression by citing a passage from the Mahābhāṣya, that is, *khaṇḍikopādhyāyaḥ śiṣyāya capetāṃ dadāti*. He says that according to the Vṛttikāra's concept of *Sampradāna*, however, *rajakasya vastraṃ dadāti* is the correct expression.<sup>50</sup>

He classifies *Sampradānakāraka* into three sub-groups. This classification is based on the *kārika anirakarantī Kartus tyāgāṅgaṃ karmānepsitam* etc. of the *Vākyapadīya*.<sup>51</sup>

### Harivallabha

Harivallabha interprets the term *uddeśya* used by Kaundabhaṭṭa in the sense of *Sampradāna kāraka* very clearly by citing two suitable illustrations namely, *Viṣṇave gāṃ dadāti* and *vrkṣāyodakam āsiñcati*.<sup>52</sup> He also presents the views of the *Maiyāvīkas* on the dative case in an elaborate manner.<sup>53</sup>

### Nāgeśa

Nāgeśa tries to give us an appropriate idea of the Paninian concept of *Sampradānakāraka* in his *Laghumañjusa* and *Bṛhacodabdenusēkhare*.

He critically interprets the Paninian definition *karmanā yam abhipreṭti sa Sampradānam*. According to his interpretation, when the agent desires to establish a relation with a particular person through the objective case of a verb, the person is called the Sampradāna kāraka. Nāgēśa says that the person acts as an adjective of the result which is located in the objective case of the verb.<sup>54</sup> \*

Let us explain the above concept of Sampradāna with the help of an illustration namely, *Brāhmaṇāya gāṃ dadāti* (i.e. he gives a cow to the Brāhmaṇa). In this illustration, the agent desires to establish a relation with the Brāhmaṇa through the objective case of the verb *dadāti*, namely, the cow. In other words, he desires to give away the cow to the Brāhmaṇa. Thus, the Brāhmaṇa is a case of Sampradāna in the example. Therefore, the fourth case-ending is used in the term. The Brāhmaṇa is an adjective of the result namely, *dāna* which is denoted by the verb *dadāti* in the illustration. This result is located in the cow. The result is exclusively related to the Brāhmaṇa through its locus. We express this idea as *Brāhmaṇa-sampradānakam dānam* or *Brāhmaṇodeśyakaṃ dānam*. This expression clearly shows the adjectival character of the term Brāhmaṇa.

Nāgēśa says that the Sampradānakāraka is known as *uddeśya* or *śeṣi* also in grammar. The grammarians borrow the

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\* This is only a tentative view of the grammarian. He gives a wider meaning of the said definition of Pāṇini in the *Prakaraṇa-danda śekhara* by interpreting the term *karmanā* as it is an action in general.

term *śeṣi* from the *Mīmāṃsā saṃhita*. Like some of his predecessors, Nāgēśa also clarifies the concept of *śeṣi* with the help of the passage *kr̥tā some Maitrāvaruṇāya dāṇḍam prayacchatī* quoted from the *Mīmāṃsā*.<sup>55</sup>

We have already discussed that the grammarian follows the doctrine of *śakti* in the concept of *kāraka*. He says that the *Sampradānakāraka* possesses the *śakti* or the property known as *Sampradānatva*. According to him, the fourth case-ending which is attached to the dative case in Sanskrit grammar itself denotes it.<sup>56</sup>

Nāgēśa criticises the interpretation of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita that the term *karmaṇā* in the Paninian rule *karmaṇā yam abhipreṭti sa Sampradānam* denotes *dāṇasya karmaṇā*. Bhaṭṭoji follows the *Vṛttikara* in this interpretation. Nāgēśa says that the term *karma* in the rule denotes *kriyā* or a verb in general. He stands firmly behind the *Bhāṣyākāra* in this matter. The new interpretation of Nāgēśa serves an important purpose. The definition of *Pāṇini* is now applicable to such examples of *Sampradāna* also as *patya śete*, *śrāddhaya nirahate*, *vr̥kṣāyodekam āśiñcati*, *putrāya <sup>dharmaṃ</sup> brāte* etc.<sup>57</sup>

Nāgēśa also discards the view that the term *Sampradāna* denotes its etymological sense. We have already clarified the etymological sense of the term. Jinendrabuddhi and his followers clearly point out that this particular sense is



not applicable to the word rajaka in the sentence rajakāśya vastraṁ dadāti. Therefore, the term rajaka is not a case of Sampradāna. Nāgeśa says that the etymological meaning of Sampradāna is contrary to the Bhāṣyakāra's concept of the case. Therefore, he does not accept it. He quotes the passage khendīkopādhyāyas tasmā capetām dadāti in order to show that the dative case in Sanskrit grammar does not necessarily denote its etymological meaning. He shows that the expression rajakāśya vastraṁ dadāti is correct. He however, states that when the speaker intends he may use the sixth inflexion also in the term rajaka.<sup>58</sup>

Nāgeśa criticises some other views also. He refers to the phala or the result which is related to the dative case in his definition of the case. But, he says that some grammarians wrongly interpret the term phala. As for example, they refer to the happiness etc. which are derived by the Brāhmaṇa from the cow as the result in the illustration Brāhmaṇāya gāṁ dadāti. Nāgeśa says that such an interpretation is wrong. He also states that some grammarians interpret uddeśya as iochāviśaya or a desideratum. He indirectly refers to Kaundabhaṭṭa here. He says that the above interpretation of uddeśya is also wrong. He cites the example Devo rūpavān in order to clarify his point. He states that the word Deva in this example is the uddeśya in relation to

the term rūpavān which is the vidheya or the predicate. But, the term Deva is not the case of lochāvisaya.<sup>59</sup>

The grammarian clearly explains the meanings of the verb dadāti in different examples of Śampradānakāraṇa. He says that the verb denotes the renunciation of the ownership of the giver over the cow and the transference of the same to the Vīpra in the sentence Vīprāya gāṁ dadāti.<sup>60</sup> In the sentence, pitṛbhyah śrāddham dadyāt, the question of transferring the ownership to the deceased fathers does not arise. In this case, the verb denotes the renunciation of the ownership in favour of some other person. He says that the word tyāga or dāna (gift) exactly denotes this sense.<sup>61</sup> In his opinion, the question of receiving the object after the renunciation of the ownership by the giver is immaterial in the concept of dāna. He clarifies this point with the help of an example.<sup>62</sup> He states that when a person dies in a foreign country, the money which is given in his name in his absence by renouncing the possession by another man is shared by his sons as their paternal possession. This shows that the renunciation of the ownership in his favour is sufficient. He shows that the verb dadāti in the example rajakaya vastram dadāti denotes the sense of placing the garment in the hands of the washerman.<sup>63</sup> He also discusses the meaning of the verb in the examples khandikopādhyāyasmā capetam dadāti and na śūdrāya

matiṁ dadyāt. He says that in the example khaṇḍikopādhyāyas tasmai capetāṁ dadāti, the verb dadāti denotes the placing of the palm on the cheek of the disciple while in the last example, dadyāt denotes the sense of imparting knowledge.<sup>64</sup>

Nāgārjuna also explains the meanings of all the verbs which are mentioned by Pāṇini in the rules rucyarthānām pīyamāṇaḥ, sprherīpsitaḥ etc. in an appropriate manner.<sup>65</sup> He shows the exact relation of these verbs with the dative case in his explanation. In this way, the grammarian gives us an appropriate idea of the above definitions of Pāṇini also.<sup>66</sup>

### Sampradāna in non-Pāṇinian schools

#### Kalāpa

Sarvavarṇa defines Sampradāna by the rule yasmai ditsā rocate dhārayate va tat Sampradānam.<sup>67</sup> A critical examination of the above rule shows that the grammarian presents the etymological meaning of the term Sampradāna in it. It is clear from the expression yasmai ditsā itself. The rule further shows that Sarvavarṇa accepts the Pāṇinian rules rucyarthānām pīyamāṇaḥ and dhāreruttamāṇaḥ also. Pāṇini offers some more rules on Sampradāna kāraṇa such as sprherīpsitaḥ, anupratigrahaḥ etc. But, Sarvavarṇa does not accept them.

### Durgasīṅha

Durgasīṅha illustrates the definition of Sampradāna offered by Sarvavarmā with appropriate examples. The commentator clearly explains the terms yasmā ditsā. He shows that the terms yasmā ditsā indicate the etymological sense of the term Sampradāna, that is, sanyak prakarsana dīyate yasmā. We have already shown that this interpretation is offered by the Jinendrabuddhi for the first time. Durgasīṅha gives us a clear idea of the etymological meaning of the term. He reiterates the view of Jinendrabuddhi that this meaning is not applicable to the washerman referred to in the sentence rajakasya vastraṁ dadāti and the murderer meant by the term ghanataḥ in the sentence ghanataḥ prṣṭhaṁ dadāti. Therefore, the dative case is not used in them.<sup>68</sup>

He departs from the established tradition of the grammatical school on an important issue. He says that the dative case is not applicable to puṣpebhyaḥ spṛhayati etc. According to him, the fourth inflexion is used in the terms puṣpebhyaḥ etc. in such sentences in the sense of tadartha only.<sup>69</sup>

### Trilocana

Trilocana accepts the above views of Durgasīṅha.<sup>70</sup>

Suseṇācārya

Suseṇācārya explains the said definition of Sarva-  
varmā in an exhaustive manner. He says that the grammarian  
follows the Paninian rule *karmanā yam abhipreṭti* as *Sampra-*  
*dānam* in his definition. He accepts the view of the *Vṛtti-*  
*kāra* that the term *karmanā* in the rule denotes *dadātikarmanā*  
(i.e. through the medium of the object of the verb *dadāti*).  
Thus, the grammarian shows that the definition *yasmā dītsā*  
*tat Sampradānam* is based on the Paninian rule quoted above.  
Suseṇa clarifies the meaning of the verb *dadāti* in this  
connection. He discusses the view of Jinendrabuddhi that the  
verb *dadāti* or *dāna* means to give up one's ownership over  
an article and <sup>to</sup> transfer it to some other person. He shows  
that this view gives rise to a serious problem. When a man  
renounces his ownership over an article, the article no longer  
belongs to him. Therefore, he cannot transfer the ownership of  
the article to an intended person, because it has no relation  
with him. It shows that the act of donating an object to a  
person is not possible at all. Suseṇa offers an appropriate  
solution to this problem. He says that a person resolves to  
donate an object to another person before he actually donates  
it to him. According to Suseṇa, such a resolution itself  
serves as a connecting link between the act of renouncing the  
ownership over the object and the subsequent transference of

it to the recipient. The resolution is not affected by the renunciation of the ownership. The agent transfers the ownership of the object to the recipient on the strength of this very resolution. After considering the above points, Śuṣeṇācārya arrives at a conclusion that the verb *dadāti* or *dāna* denotes a resolution on the part of the agent by means of which he disowns his possession over an object and transfer it to a donatory intended by him. He shows with the help of the above idea that *Sampradānakāraka* denotes the locus of the result which is generated by the desire of the agent to transfer the title of an object to a person. The grammarian clearly points out that the agent desires to transfer the title of an object to a person in order to show him honour or favour or with the intention of gaining some favour from him. He substantiates this view with suitable illustrations. He says that the verb *dadāti* does not denote such a sense in the sentence *rājñō dandan<sup>1</sup> dadāti* and hence, the word *rājan* is not a case of *Sampradāna*. According to him, the verb *dadāti* denotes only a secondary sense in this sentence. He expresses the same view regarding the sentence *rajakasya vastraṁ dadāti*. On the other hand, he opines that the word *Dāśaratha* (*Rāma*) in the sentence *pradīyatān<sup>2</sup> Dāśarathāya Maithilī* is a case of *Sampradāna* par excellence. Let us examine the sentence properly. After Rāvane has kidnapp<sup>ed</sup> *Sītā* to *Laṅkā*, his brother *Bibhīṣana* wisely advises

him to return her to Rāma with the above words. Now, a problem arises in the case of this sentence. Rāvana is not the possessor of Sītā. She belongs to her husband Rāma and not to her abductor. Therefore, the verb pradīyatām in the sentence apparently does not denote its primary sense. Thus, the use of the dative case in the term Dāśaratha appears to us as incorrect. Sūṣeṇacārya justifies the use of the dative case in the word. He says that Rāvana becomes the possessor of Sītā through the very act of abducting her. He further says that the sense of showing proper honour to Rāma is also suggested by the verb pradīyatām in the sentence. He also states that the term Dāśaratha in the sentence may be treated as a case of tadartha also and a case of tadartha is a case of secondary dative case.<sup>71</sup> Sūṣeṇa makes an all out bid to prove that the word Dāśaratha is a case of Sampradāna. But, his arguments do not appear to us as satisfactory.

### Candra

Candragomī accepts the etymological meaning of Sampradāna. He says that the term rajaka in the sentence rajakaḥ vastraṃ dadāti is not a case of Sampradāna because the sense of sanyak pradāna is not denoted by the verb in the sentence.<sup>72</sup>

The grammarian also accepts the definitions *ruoyar-thāmāṃ priyamāṇaḥ, dhāreruttamāṇaḥ* etc. given by Pāṇini. But, he does not state clearly that the dative case is prescribed by them.<sup>73</sup>

### Saṅkṣiptasāra

Kramadīśvara also accepts the etymological meaning of the term *Sampradāna*. He clearly shows it in his definition of the term namely, *pradānalap Sampradānam*. He offers some other definitions of *Sampradāna* also such as *īpsitādi sprhādeḥ, yad abhipretya dhatvarthaḥ, sādḥurdhārayateḥ* etc.<sup>74</sup> These definitions are meant for those examples of dative case which are not covered by the first rule. He follows Pāṇini and Kātyāyana in these definitions.

### Jumarāṇandī

The commentator Jumarāṇandī explains the term *pradāna* in the definition *pradānalap Sampradānam* as *prakṛṣṭam ātyantikaṃ dānam*.<sup>75</sup> But, he does not clarify the deeper significance of the term. He shows that Kramadīśvara offers the rule *yad abhipretya dhatvarthaḥ* for such examples of dative case as *patye sēte, yuddhāya sannahyate rājā* etc.<sup>76</sup> It implies



that the grammarian follows an important view of Kātyāyana on 'dative case in the rule.

### Goyicandra

Goyicandra clarifies the meaning of the term ātyantika dāna in the commentary of Jamaranandi. According to him, when a person voluntarily gives something to another person and does not take it back from him, it is called ātyantika dāna or an absolute gift. He says that in the sentence bhayēni datta śītāyai and māsaṁ aśmai tilabhyaḥ pratiyacchatī, the verbs datta and pratiyacchatī denote such a gift. Therefore, the terms śītā in the first sentence and the term tila in the second sentence are cases of Sampradāna according to the definition of Kramadīśvara. On the other hand, he shows that the verb dadāti in the sentences rajakasya vastram dadāti, rājño dandam dadāti, ghnataḥ prsthāṁ dadāti etc. do not denote the sense of an absolute gift. Therefore, the terms rajaka etc. are not examples of dative case according to him.<sup>77</sup> Let us clarify the idea of Goyicandra. He means to say that in the first two sentences, the verbs signify that the agent does not take back what he gives to some other person. Moreover, they signify that the agent voluntarily parts with the object. Therefore, the person who receives the object is a

clear case of Sampradāna. But, in the third sentence, the verb dadāti clearly indicates that the washerman returns the garment which is given to him for washing. Again, in the last two sentences, the verb dadāti suggests the sense of compulsion and fear but it does not denote the sense of a voluntary gift. Therefore, the term rajaka etc. in the sentences and not the cases of Sampradāna.

Goyīcandra lays emphasis on giving something to a person voluntarily and not taking it back from him in his concept of dāna. But, even if this view is accepted, the word Sītā in bhayānī datta Sītāyai is not a case of Sampradāna in its primary sense because, the agent in this sentence generates the fear in the mind of Sītā but does not give it.

### Jainendra

The author of the Jainendra strictly follows Pāṇini in defining the term Sampradāna. The definition as given by the grammarian is karmāṇopeyāḥ Sampradānam.<sup>78</sup> A critical examination of the definition clearly shows that Devanandī remodels the Paninian rule karmāṇāṃ yam abhiprāpti sa Sampradānam in it.

### Abhayānandī

Abhayānandī accepts the view of the Vṛttikāra that the term Sampradāna is a significant one. Therefore, he says that the term Karma in the above definition of Devanandī is invariably related to the verb dadāti or an equivalent of it. Abhayānandī, however, corroborates the view of the Bhāṣya-kāra that the term karma in the definition denotes kriyā or an action also. Thus, the grammarian shows that the rule karmānopeyaḥ Sampradānaḥ not only covers such examples of dative case as upādhyāyāya gādadāti but also the examples śrāddhāya nigṛhate, yuddhāya sannahyati, rocate Devadattāya modakah, puṣpebhyah sprhayati, mītrāya krudhyati etc. He says that the sentences rajakaaya vastram dadati, ghnataḥ prathamam dadāti etc. do not signify a complete gift. Therefore, the terms rajaka etc. in these sentence are not cases of Sampradāna.<sup>79</sup> The grammarian shows no originality in this view.

### Śabdānuśāsana

The author of the Śabdānuśāsana strictly follows the Paninian school in the concept of Sampradāna presented

by him. He accepts the Paninian rule *karmāṇā yam abhiprāiti sa Sampradānam*.<sup>80</sup> But, he remodels the rule as *karmābhipreyaḥ Sampradānam*. He interprets the term *karma* in the rule in two different ways namely, as objective case and *kriyā* or action. He follows the *Bhāṣyakāra* in this interpretation. The grammarian says that when a person establishes a relation with another through a verb or through the objective case of a verb (as the rule indicates), he does so with a definite motive. According to him, sometimes he intends to show honour or favour to a person by establishing such a relation with him and sometimes he desires to attain merit etc. through his action.<sup>81</sup> It is clear from this explanation that the grammarian is greatly influenced by Jinendrabuddhi also. But, he does not accept the view of Jinendrabuddhi that the term *Sampradāna* denotes *sanyak pradīyate yasmai tat Sampradānam*.

Hamacandra shows that the prefixes *abhi* and *pra* used in the expression *abhipreya* are significant. He does not explain the significance of the prefixes. But, he says that as a result of the use of the prefixes in the term, the definition does not apply to the terms *rajaka* etc. in the sentences *rajakaḥ vastram dadāti*, *rājño dandam dadāti* and *ghnataḥ pṛsthāṃ dadāti*. On the other hand, he shows that the definition covers the word *vāta* (wind) in the sentence *vātāya cakṣur dadāti* and the word *chātra* in the sentence *chātrāya capetaṃ*

dadāti for these very prefixes.<sup>82</sup> The above explanation shows that the prefixes possess a wide range of meaning. The grammarian offers a new interpretation on the prefixes. This is an important contribution of the grammarian towards the development of the Paninian concept of the dative case. Jinendra-buddhi already states that the use of the prefixes possesses some special significance. He does not explain the significance. Hemacandra explains this significance for the first time very clearly.

He accepts the Paninian rules *spr̥herīpsitah* and *krudhadruherśasūyārthanāṃyam prati kopah* also.<sup>83</sup> But, he says that the dative case is only optionally used with the verb *spr̥hayati*. He presents an illustration in order to clarify his view.<sup>84</sup>

He explains the significance of the terms *yan*, *prati* and *kopah* in the second definition.<sup>85</sup>

Hemacandra does not refer to the remaining definitions of *Sampradāna* offered by Pāṇini. He also does not refer to such examples of the dative case as *śātrave bhayam dadāti* and *bhayani datta śītāyal*.

### Mugdhabodha

Bopadeva introduces the technical term bha for Sampradāna kāraka. He offers a long definition of bha. In this definition, he reiterates the view of Servavarmā that the term Sampradāna denotes a person to whom the agent desires to give a thing completely. He also presents the essence of the Paninian rules such as rucyarthanan prīyamānah, spṛhe-rīpsitah etc. in the definition.<sup>86</sup>

### Durgādāsa Vidyāvāgīśa

Durgādāsa Vidyāvāgīśa critically explains the view of Bopadeva discussed above. The explanation is the same as that of Suṣaṇa already discussed by us. Durgādāsa says that according to the said view, the term Vipra in the sentence Viprāya gāṇḍī dadāti is a case of Sampradāna <sup>par</sup> excellence. But, the term rajaka in the sentence rajakasya vastraṁ dadāti is not a case of Sampradāna at all. The grammarian refers to the sentences śiṣyāya capatāṇī dadāti and śatṛave bhayāṁ dadāti in this connection. He says that the dative case is used in the terms śiṣya etc. in these sentences in a secondary sense only. He means by this that the verb dadāti in these cases does not denote the sense of a complete gift but it denotes some other sense.<sup>87</sup> We have already discussed the meaning of

dadāti in the sentence śīṣyāya capetām dadāti. In the second sentence, again, the verb dadāti denotes the sense of janayati (generating). This analysis shows that the dative case is used in the above sentence in a secondary sense.

### Rāma Tarkavāgīśa

Rāma Tarkavāgīśa also critically explains the view of Bopadeva on Sampradānakāraka. According to him, Bopadeva means by the expression yasmāi dīṭṭā in his definition that the term Sampradāna denotes a person to whom the agent gives an article voluntarily and permanently. He says that Pāṇini also offers the same meaning of Sampradāna in the rule karmaṇā yam abhipraiti sa Sampradānam. He clarifies the above concept of Sampradāna with the help of two appropriate illustrations namely, ūpāyā gāṇ dadāti and māṣān aśmāi tīlebhyaḥ praye-ccati. In this connection, he clearly states that the dative case is not applicable to the terms rajaka etc. in the sentences rajakaśya vastram dadāti, rājño dandam dadāti and ghnataḥ prsthāṃ dadāti according to the concept of Sampradāna presented by Bopadeva. The reason for this is already clear to us. He also refers to the sentences bhayāni datta śītāya, śatrave bhayam dadāti etc. in his discussion. In these sentences, the dative case is used in the terms śītā etc. The

use of the dative case in these terms cannot be justified according to the definition of Bopadeva. Rāma Tarkavāgīśa says that the speaker himself intends the use of the dative case in such instances and therefore, it is justified.<sup>88</sup>

### Sārasvata

The author of the Sārasvata defines Sampradānakāraṇa as dānapatra or a person to whom an object is donated. But, the grammarian is not satisfied with this definition. Therefore, he explains the term Sampradāna more clearly in his vṛtti. He says that when a person completely gives a thing to another person with proper devotion and with a desire to attain the result of his action, the person who receives the object is called the Sampradānakāraṇa. He clearly states that the person must be worthy of such a gift. He cites an appropriate example of the dative case in order to bring home to us his view. The example is Vedavide gāṃ dadāti.<sup>89</sup> It implies that a person gives a cow completely to a Vedic scholar with proper devotion and a desire to attain some merit. The Vedic scholar, as the very term suggests is worthy of the said gift. Thus, the Vedic scholar is a case of Sampradāna par excellence in the said example.



The author of the *Sārvasvata* lays emphasis on *vāsanā* or the desire on the part of the giver to attain the result of his action in his definition. Thus, there is a difference between him and earlier grammarians. He says that the term *rājan* in the sentence *rājño dāṇḍam dadāti* is not a case of *Sampradāna* because, it is not covered by his definition. He clarifies the point as follows. When a person pays an amount to a king as fine, he does so under compulsion. He does not pay the fine out of devotion to the king or with the desire to attain some merit through his act. Therefore, the king who receives the money from him is not the dative case. He also excludes the term *rajaka* in the sentence *rajakasya vastram dadāti* from the scope of the dative case. He shows that sometimes the dative case is used in a word even when it does not denote the regular sense of the case. He quotes the passage (śloka) *vyājena Raghavaḥ karam* from the *Raghu-vaṇśa* of *Kālidāsa* in order to substantiate this view.<sup>90</sup>

The author of the *Sārvasvata* classifies the dative case into three sub-groups namely, *Anumantr*, *Anirākartṛ* and *Preraka*.<sup>91</sup> He follows, *Bhartrhari* in this classification. He places such examples of the dative case as *patye sete* etc. under a separate rule namely *kriyaya yam abhiprāpti so'pi Sampradānam*.<sup>92</sup> The grammarian shows no originality in it.

Candrakīrti

Candrakīrti explains the term *dānapatra* as the person who becomes the owner of the object which is given to him with a pious motive.<sup>93</sup>

Rāmāśrama

Rāmāśrama prefers to remain silent regarding the said views of Anubhūtiśāstrī on the dative case.

Padma

Padmanābha Datta defines *Sampradāna* as *pradānābhisambadhyamānaṁ Sampradānaṁ*.<sup>94</sup> It is clear from his own interpretation of the definition that the grammarian presents the etymological meaning of the term in it. He clarifies the definition with three significant illustrations. One of these illustrations is *śatrave bhayaṁ dadāti*. It deserves our serious attention. The sentence *śatrave bhayaṁ dadāti* indicates that a person causes fear in the mind of his enemy. According to Padmanābha, this is also a case of an absolute gift.<sup>95</sup> This is certainly a controversial issue.

The grammarian accepts the Paninian rules *sprherīp-*  
*sitah* and *dhāraṇuttamānah*. But, he does not refer to the  
other rules of the grammarian such as *rucyarthānāṁ prīya-*  
*māṇah*, *rādhikayor yasya viprasnah* etc.

### Viśnumiśra

Viśnumiśra clearly explains the view of Padmanābha  
on Sampradānakaraka. He offers a critical interpretation on  
the etymological meaning of the term Sampradāna. He mainly  
reiterates the traditional views in it. He clarifies the  
meaning of the term dāna offered by Jinendrabuddhi in the  
interpretation.<sup>96</sup> Viśnumiśra shows that the verb *dadāti*  
in the sentence *śatrave bhayān dadāti* does not denote the  
sense of a complete gift. According to him, the dative case  
is used in the term *śatru* in the sentence and similar other  
sentences such as *bhayān datta śītāyai* only in a secondary  
sense, because, the sense of *abhi* or *ābhimukhya* is not present  
in them.<sup>97</sup>

### Harināmāṁṛta

Jīvaśaṁṣī apparently follows the author of the  
Supadma in the definition of Sampradāna offered by him. The

definition is *pradeyābhīśambadhyamānam* *Sampradānam*.<sup>98</sup> The term *pradeya* in it is synonymous with the term *pradāna* in the definition of *Padmanābha*. It is needless to say that the author of the *Harināmāmṛta* presents the etymological meaning of *Sampradāna* in the definition. He explains the term *pradeya* as *pradeyamātyantikāṁ deyam*. The grammarian does not think it necessary to clarify the exact significance of this expression. He says that the term *pradeya* plays a significant role in the definition. It excludes the terms *rajaka* and *hantr* in the sentences *rajakasya vastrāṁ dadāti* and *hantuḥ pṛsthān dadāti* from the scope of the dative case.<sup>99</sup>

*Jīvagoswāmī* accepts the Paninian rules *rucyarthāmāṁ prīyamāṇaḥ sphērīpsitah*, etc. But, he remodels them.<sup>100</sup>

It is clear from the above discussion that the grammarian has no original contribution to the concept of *Sampradāna*. He merely presents the traditional ideas on *Sampradānakāṛaka* in his grammar.

#### Prayogaratanmālā

The author of the *Prayogaratanmālā* also subscribes to the view that the term *Sampradāna* denotes *samyak pradīyate yasmāi tat Sampradānam*. He presents the above idea in the following *kārikā* in his grammar.

Samyag dānam yamuddiśya.....Sampradānam tadīsyate.<sup>101</sup>

The grammarian appropriately explains the idea in his commentary. He rigidly follows Jinendrabuddhi in this explanation.<sup>102</sup> He offers a separate rule namely, kriyāyoge yannimittam etc. in order to justify the use of the dative case in the examples patye sete etc. He accepts the Paninian rules racyarthānām prīyamāṇaḥ, sprheṣīpsitāḥ and the like and also the vārtika Karmaṇaḥ Karaṇasāhajāḥ etc.<sup>103</sup>

#### Sampradāna in philosophical schools

##### Kāraṇasakṛa

Bhavanānda Siddhāntavāgīśa accepts the Paninian definition Karmaṇaḥ yam abhipraīti as Sampradānam as the appropriate definition of Sampradāna. He critically explains the concept of Sampradāna presented in the definition. According to this explanation, the term Sampradāna denotes a particular being which acts as the locus of the result that is generated by the objective case of a verb. But he says that the objective case must be the kāraṇa or the cause of the action denoted by the verb. According to him, the said being is the uddēśya of the agent because, the agent intends to make it the locus of the result.<sup>104</sup> Let us clarify

the view with the help of an illustration namely, *Viprāya gām̐dadāti*. In this illustration, the cow is the objective case of the verb *dadāti*. It is the *kāraṇa* or the immediate antecedent of the act of giving as denoted by the verb. When the cow is given away by its owner to the Brahmana, the Brahmana becomes the new owner of it. This ownership is the result of the act of giving which is generated by the cow. Thus, the Brahmana is the *Sampradāna kāraka* or the dative case in the illustration. He is the *uddeśya* of the agent because the agent intends to make him the locus of the said result.

Bhavananda says that the objective case is predicated in the definition as *kāraṇabhūta* karma in order to exclude such a locus of a result as *Caltra* in the sentence *Caltro grām̐gacchati* from the scope of the definition.<sup>105</sup> He means by this that *Caltra* in the sentence *Caltro grām̐gacchati* is the locus of the contact which is generated by his act of going and the *grāma* or the village is the cause of the contact which is a part of the act. But, it is not the cause of the operational part. Therefore, *Caltra* is not a case of *Sampradāna*.

Bhavananda divides *Sampradāna* into principal and secondary. He accepts the etymological meaning of the term *Sampradāna*. He says that according to this meaning, when the

agent intends to transfer the ownership of an object to another person, he becomes a case of Sampradāna or a dative case. He says that this is the primary meaning of Sampradāna.<sup>106</sup> This is applicable to such examples of Sampradāna as Viprāya gāmīdadāti, yācākāya bhikṣāṃdadāti etc. Therefore, the terms Vipra etc. in the above examples are cases of primary Sampradāna. But, Bhavananda says that there are some examples of dative case like vrkṣāyodaḥśāśīncati, śatrave estraṇ muñcati and mitrāya dūtaṃ preṣayati in which Sampradānakāraka is not used in its so called primary sense. According to the primary sense, the term Sampradāna invariably denotes a person who acts as the locus of the ownership which is transferred to him by another person. But, in the above examples the Sampradānakara denotes some other senses. The sentence vrkṣāyodaḥśāśīncati means that the agent pours water at the root of a tree. The water which is poured by him generates blossoms, fruits etc. in the tree. The tree is only the locus of such results. Thus, it is a case of secondary Sampradāna. The meaning of the second sentence is that a warrior shoots arrows at an enemy. The arrows pierce his body and generates pain, wounds etc. in his body. The enemy is thus the locus of these results. Hence, it is also a case of secondary Sampradāna. The third sentence means that a particular king sends a messenger to a friendly king with a message. The

friendly king knows the message through the messenger. Thus, he is the locus of the knowledge of the message. It shows that he is also a case of a secondary Sampradāna.<sup>107</sup>

Bhavananda Siddhāntavāgīśa opines that when the śrāddha ceremony is performed in honour of the deceased ancestors, they derive pleasure from the articles which are offered to them. But, they do not become the owners of the articles. Therefore, they are not the cases of Sampradāna. On the other hand, when a devotee offers a cow to god Rudra, he becomes the owner of it. Therefore, he is a case of Sampradāna. It is for this reason, we use the expression Rudrāya gāṁśadāti.<sup>108</sup>

The philosopher explains that a particular person becomes a case of Sampradāna either by accomplishing the result which is denoted by the verb or by inspiring the agent to accomplish the act of giving by formally approving the proposed act. He says that according to a section of scholars, again, a person becomes a case of Sampradāna by formally accepting the ownership of an object which is transferred to him by another person. They opine that the deceased ancestors do not accept the ownership of the articles which are offered to them in the śrāddha ceremony. Therefore, they are not cases of Sampradāna. They also maintain the view that Lord Rudra is a case of secondary Sampradāna only in the example Rudrāya gāṁśadāti. They do not clarify the view.<sup>109</sup>



Bhavananda refers to the Paninian rules *ruçyar-  
thānām priyamāṇaḥ* and *dhārer uttamārṇaḥ*. He illustrates  
these rules with two suitable illustrations namely, *Nārādāya  
rocate kalahāḥ* and *Vaiśyāya śatam dhārayati*. He shows that  
the terms *Nārada* and *Vaiśya* in the sentences are not cases  
of *Sampradāna* at all. He says that they actually denote a  
non-specified relation. He thus proves that these two rules  
have no contribution to the concept of the dative case.<sup>110</sup>

It is clear from the above discussion that Bhava-  
nanda tries to give us a very clear and comprehensive idea  
of the dative case in Sanskrit grammar. He shows great origi-  
nality in his concept of the dative case. He lays emphasis  
on the intention of the agent in the concept. He is probably  
guided by the view of Baradatta that the term *abhipraiti* in  
the Paninian definition denotes *īpsati*. The philosopher is  
silent regarding such examples of *Sampradānakāraḥ* as *patye  
śete* or *yuddhāya samnabhyate*. The philosopher nicely distin-  
guishes between a case of *Kartā* and a case of *Sampradāna*. He  
certainly excels the grammarians in this matter.

### Śāramañjarī

The author of the *Śāramañjarī* accepts the defini-  
tion *karmaṇā yam abhipraiti sa Sampradānam* as given by Pāṇini

as the appropriate definition of Sampradāna. He interprets the definition exactly in the same manner as his predecessor Bhavananda Siddhāntavāgīśa.<sup>111</sup>

Bhavananda gives two distinct meanings of the verb dadāti which is inseparably related to the concept of Sampradāna presented by him. Jayakṛṣṇa accepts both these meanings.<sup>112</sup>

The philosopher shows that the fourth inflexion which is used in the terms Nārada etc. in such sentences as Nārādāya rocate kalahah, nr̥pāya ślāghate, Viprāya śataṃ dhārayate Śūdraḥ and the like denote various senses. According to him, in the sentence Nārādāya rocate kalahah, the fourth inflexion used in Nārada denotes sambandhitva. In other words, it denotes that the term kalahah (quarrel) has a non-specified relation with Nārada. Jayakṛṣṇa says that the fourth inflexion attached to the word nr̥pa in the sentence nr̥pāya ślāghate vanti denotes viśayatva while it denotes sambandhitva in the Vipra in the sentence Viprāya śataṃ dhārayate Śūdraḥ. He further says that in the sentences Devadattāya krudhyati and putrāya sprhayati, the fourth inflexion is used in the sense of the objective case.<sup>113</sup>

The above discussion shows that the author of the Bāraṇasījarī does not treat the words Nārada etc. in the said sentences even as cases of secondary Sampradāna kāraka.

Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā

Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra offers an independent definition of Sampradāna kāraka. According to this definition, the meaning of the fourth inflexion which is related to the meaning of a root in a sentence is known as Sampradānakāraka or the dative case. Jagadīśa, however, shows that the definition does not cover a few specified roots. He also specifies the fourth inflexion in his definition.<sup>114</sup>

He clarifies his concept of Sampradāna with the help of a few suitable illustrations. He first cites the illustration Brāhmaṇāya dānam dhanāya in order to show that the fourth inflexion which is attached to the word Brāhmaṇa in it is the Sampradānakāraka. He says that the root dā in the term dāna denotes the renunciation of one's ownership over an article which makes another person the owner of it. In the above illustration, such an article is the wealth. The Brāhmaṇa acquires the ownership of this wealth from its previous owner through the gift. Jagadīśa shows that the meaning of the fourth inflexion which is attached to the word Brāhmaṇa is related to the said ownership. The fourth inflexion denotes the pratiyogitva or the nirūpakatva of the ownership. The term pratiyogitva here denotes the correlative of the ownership while the term nirūpakatva indicates that the ownership is related to a specified person. Now, we can

explain the sentence Brāhmaṇāya dānaṁ dhanasya as follows. A person gives up his ownership over his wealth in favour of a Brāhmaṇa. Thereby the Brāhmaṇa acquires the ownership of this wealth. Thus, he becomes the correlative of the ownership of the wealth. The sentence also means that a person renounces his ownership over his wealth in favour of another person. The person who acquires the ownership over the wealth after it is renounced by its previous owner is a Brāhmaṇa. Jagadīśa says that the meaning of the fourth inflexion as discussed above is thus the Sampradānakāraka or the dative case in the illustration.<sup>115</sup>

Jagadīśa Tarkālakāra does not lay emphasis on the formal transference of the ownership of an article to a person in his concept of dāna. He says that the renunciation of the ownership in favour of another person with the resolution 'this object is not mine but of so and so' is itself dana. According to him, the ownership of the article is automatically acquired by the other person through this act of the previous owner. He cites an example to justify this view. He shows that sometimes a person sends money or some other article to another person living in a foreign country by giving up his ownership over it. But, the person dies before accepting the money or the article. In such a case, the sons of the deceased person should divide it among them-

selves as the property inherited from their father. It is clear from this that the renunciation of the ownership of an object in favour of a person itself establishes the ownership of the person upon the object. Jagadīśa, however, says that though the formal acceptance of an object from its giver is not an essential condition of dāna, when a person formally accepts an object from the giver, the giver earns some special religious merit by his act. He quotes a passage from the smṛti in support of his statement.<sup>116</sup>

He distinguishes between two types of gifts, namely the gift which is conducive to merit and the gift which is not so. He says that when wages are paid or the food is given to the slave, these are also cases of dāna or gift. But, such gifts are not meritorious.<sup>117</sup> He also states that when something is sold for a certain price, it is also a case of dāna. Thus, the person who buys the object becomes a case of primary sampradāna.<sup>118</sup> This discussion clearly shows that Jagadīśa attributes a wider meaning to dāna and thereby to sampradāna than the grammarians.

Jagadīśa does not accept some important views of Śūlapāṇi. Śūlapāṇi says that the formal acceptance of a gift by the intended person is an essential condition of dāna. According to him, when a person renounces his ownership over some possession in favour of a person but it is not accepted

by the person, it is not a case of *dāna*. It is simply a case of renouncing the possession. But Jagadīśa says that this concept is gratuitous. He, therefore, lays emphasis on his own definition of *dāna* or a gift.<sup>119</sup>

The philosopher clearly discusses the point that whenever the meaning of the fourth inflexion is related to the meaning of a root, it is not a case of *Sampradāna*. He says that in the example *grāmāya gataḥ*, the meaning of the fourth inflexion which is attached to the word *grāma* is related to the meaning of the root *gam* (to go) in the word *gataḥ*. But, the word *grāma* in the example is not a dative case. Therefore, Jagadīśa excludes a few specified roots like *gam* etc. from the scope of the definition. He also says that in the sentence *vrkṣāya secakaḥ*, the fourth inflexion which is attached to the term *vrkṣa* denotes the sense of a verb ending in the suffix *tumun*, namely, *saṁvardhayitum*. It is related to the meaning of the root *śic* in the word *secaka*. But, the term *vrkṣa* is not a case of *Sampradāna*. Similar is the case of *phalāya yati* etc. Therefore, Jagadīśa uses the predicate *vigrahasṭhaya* in his definition. The term *vigrahasṭhā* indicates the fourth inflexion which remains independently.<sup>120</sup>

He critically interprets the examples of *Sampradānakaraka* like *Matrāya rocate modakaḥ*, *gurave gāṁ dhārayate*,

putrāya pādhyati etc. in his vṛtti on the definition of Sampradāna<sup>They are not treated as cases of Sampradāna</sup> by the logicians Bhavananda and Jayakṛṣṇa. But, they are regular examples of Sampradānakāraka according to the definition of Jagadīśa.<sup>121</sup>

Jagadīśa offers a definition of Sampradāna which is different from the earlier definitions. But, it is clear from his interpretation of the definition that he also lays emphasis on the etymological meaning of the term already known to us. He offers an illuminating discussion on the definition in his vṛtti. A great advantage of the definition is that it covers all the examples of Sampradāna in Sanskrit grammar.

### Vyutpattivāda

The author of the Vyutpattivāda accepts all the definitions of Sampradāna given by Pāṇini. He interprets these definitions in an appropriately critical manner. The philosopher gives us a very clear and comprehensive idea of the dative case in his interpretations.

Gadādhara lays special emphasis on the first and the most important definition of Sampradāna given by Pāṇini namely, karmanā yam abhipraiti sa Sampradānam. The grammarians like Haradatta, Kamadabhaṭṭa etc. explain the term abhipraiti

as *īpsati*. When this interpretation is accepted, the meaning of definition stands as *Sampradāna* or the dative case denotes one with whom the agent intends to establish a relation through the objective case of the verb. But, this interpretation does not give us a clear idea of the term *Sampradāna*. Gadādhara gives us the exact idea which is presented by the grammarians in the above interpretation in an implicit manner. He states that according to the above interpretation, the term *Sampradāna* denotes one whom the agent intends to make the possessor of the result which belongs to the objective case of the verb used in the sentence.<sup>122</sup> He refers to the sentence *Brāhmaṇāya gām dadāti* in this connection and states that the above meaning of the definition is applicable to the word *Brāhmaṇa* in the sentence. The agent (i.e. the giver) intends to transfer the ownership of the cow to the *Brāhmaṇa* through *tyāga* or the act of giving and thus, the *Brāhmaṇa* is a clear case of *Sampradāna*.<sup>123</sup>

Gadādhara explains *tyāga* or the act of giving very clearly. He says that *tyāga* indicates the desire to renounce one's ownership over an object and to transfer it to another person. According to the philosopher, the person who becomes the object of such a desire of the agent is the case of *Sampradāna* par excellence.<sup>124</sup> He shows that there are some cases of secondary dative case also. He refers to such sen-



tences as *śātrave bhayaṃ dadāti* in order to give us a clear idea of such a dative case.

Let us now explain his views on the secondary dative case. He says that in the sentences *śātrave bhayaṃ dadāti* etc., the verb *dadāti* does not denote the sense of *tyāga* discussed above. But it denotes some other sense. He explains the sentence *śātrave bhayaṃ dadāti* itself in order to clarify the point. He shows that the verb *dadāti* in it denotes the sense of generating fear. Thus, the word *śātru* (enemy) in the sentence is not a primary case of *Sampradāna*. But, he states that it is otherwise covered by the rule *karmanā yam abhipraiti sa Sampradānam*. We have already discussed the clarification given by him on the interpretation of the rule offered by the grammarians. He shows that the meaning of the rule as given by him applies to the word *śātru* and similar other words. Thus, the word *śātru* and such other words are cases of *Sampradāna* in a secondary sense.<sup>125</sup>

Gadādhara opines that the verb *dadāti* in the sentences *rajakasya vastraṃ dadāti*, *saṅvāhekāya caraṇam dadāti* etc. also denote a secondary meaning only. Therefore, the words *rajaka* etc. in the sentences are not cases of *Sampradāna*. He clearly explains the meaning of the verb in the sentences.<sup>126</sup>

We are surprised to learn that in certain cases even when the verb *dadāti* denotes a secondary sense, the

person related to the verb is a case of Sampradāna while in some other cases, it is not so. It appears to us that such a discrimination is shown by the philosopher and many of his predecessors in the philosophical and the grammatical school under the impact of tradition.

The author of the Vyutpattivāda opines that the terms yuddha etc. ending in the fourth inflexion in the sentences yuddhāya sannahyate, patye śete and the like are not cases of Sampradāna. This is a significant departure from the well known view of Patañjali that the above terms are cases of Sampradāna.<sup>127</sup>

Gadādhara critically explains the sentences Nārādaya rocate kalahah, puṣpebhyah sprhayati, putrāya krudhyati etc. He states that the words Nārada etc. in these sentences are cases of Sampradāna. He cites the relevant Pāṇinian rules in order to justify his view. But, Gadādhara clearly shows that the Sampradānakāraka is used in them in various senses such as āśrayitva viśayitva, Karmatva etc.<sup>128</sup>

### Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi

Gāṅgā Bhaṭṭa defines Sampradāna as dhātvarthakarmajanyavyāpāroddesyatvaṃ Sampradānatvaṃ.<sup>129</sup> The meaning of this definition is as follows. When the agent intends to

make a person the locus of the operation or operations generated by the objective case of a verb, the said person is called *Sampradāna*. Gāgā Bhaṭṭa clarifies the above idea with the help of the illustration *Vipraḥ gām dadāti*. He says that in this example, the term *Vipra* is the *uddeśya* of the operations namely, milking etc. which are generated by the objective case of the verb *dadāti*, that is, the cow. In other words, he means to say that the agent intends to make the *Vipra* or the *Brāhmaṇa* the locus of the said operations. According to him, the *Vipra* is a case of *Sampradāna* in this particular sense.<sup>130</sup>

Let us clarify the import of the above statement of Gāgā Bhaṭṭa. He means by the statement that the agent gives away the cow to the *Vipra* with the intention that the *Vipra* will milk the cow in order to obtain the milk required by him and will utilise other services of the animal. It is clear from this interpretation that the definition of *Sampradāna* as given by Gāgā Bhaṭṭa is applicable to the word *Vipra* in the example. We have already shown that Nāgeśa deplores such a concept<sup>of</sup> *Sampradānakāreka*.

The philosopher probably realises that his definition has become cryptic. Therefore, he offers a simpler definition of *Sampradāna*. According to this definition, the person who formally receives a cow or some other object which

is donated to him by another person is known as Sampradāna. He says that the Paninian definition *karmaṇā yam abhipraiti* sa Sampradānam also denotes this very sense.<sup>131</sup>

Gāgā Bhaṭṭa says that the modern Mīmāṃsakas define Sampradāna in a different way. Their definition is *dr̥ṣṭa-vāraka-dhātvarthoddeśyatvaṁ Sampradānatvam*. According to this definition, the locus of the visible result or results as generated by an action is the Sampradānakāraka. The philosopher shows that this definition is applicable to all the examples of Sampradāna.<sup>132</sup>

He discusses the concept of śeṣa and śeṣi. He clarifies the concept of śeṣi with the help of the example *Maitravaruṇāya dandaṁ prayacchati* quoted from the Mīmāṃsā<sup>text</sup>.<sup>133</sup>

He also explains the Paninian rules *rucyarthānām prīyamāṇaḥ*, *dhāreruttamāṇaḥ* etc. in an appropriate manner.<sup>134</sup>

Gāgā Bhaṭṭa has very little original contribution to the concept of Sampradānakāraka. He follows the Paninian concept of Sampradāna in his discussion. He, however, furnishes the different views of the Mīmāṃsakas on the term Sampradāna. He does not reject the sentence *rajakāya vastraṁ dadāti* as incorrect. But, he says, that it is only a secondary use.<sup>135</sup>

Reference note

1. Pā 1.4, 32-41
2. Mbh. p.246.
3. Ihāpi Tathā syāt.....patya ēte iti. Ibid. p.256.
4. Ibid. p.257.
5. Yam abhiprāiti sa Sampradānam.....Karmaṇa eva Sampra-  
dānasamjñā prasaṁjyeta. Ibid. p.256.
6. Atha yam sa grahaṇam kimartham?.....abhiprayata eva  
Sampradānasamjñā prasaṁjyeta. Ibid. p.256.
7. Athābhipragrahaṇam kimartham?.....sarvatra siddhā-  
bhavati. Ibid. p.256.
8. Kriyā hi nāma loke karmetyupacaranti..... karisyasīti.  
Ibid. p.257.
9. Ibid. p.257.
10. Kaiścidanvarthasamjñāviḥṅānād dadāti viśaya eva Sampradāna-  
samjñetyabhyupagatam. Dānaṁ ca.....khandikopādhyāyas  
tasmai cepetām dadāti ca. Ibid. p.257.
11. Kopapūrvanām sarveṣām.....Teneha na bhavati, bhāryām  
īṛṣati. Parair drśyamāṇam na saḥate.....Ibid. p.258.
12. Ibid. p.258.
13. Asmān dveṣṭi.....Yathauṣadham dveṣṭīti. Ibid. p.258.
14. Anirākaraṇāt kartustyāgāṅgam karmaṇepsitam  
Preraṇānumatibhyām vā labhate Sampradānatām Vāk. Sā.129.
15. Bhedasya ca vivakṣayāṁ.....na kriyāgrahaṇam kṛtam Sā.132.

16. Hetutve karmasamjñāyaṁ.....Sampradānākhyam  
ucyate 88 130.
17. Anavarthatvāt Sampradānasābdasya tyāgāṅgaṁ iti lakṣaṇa-  
lābhah. Tyāgo dīyamāṇasya svatvaniṣṭya parasvatāpādanam.  
Tatra sāṅgaṁ nimittam.....Ibid. p.331.
18. Rajkasya vastraṁ dadāti ghnataḥ prṣṭhaṁ dadātītyādeu tu  
dadātyarthonāsti. Tyāgo hi sah. Tena ca hānātmakena  
mamatāvicchedasyākṣepāt paropayogābhisandhinā parasvatāpā-  
pādanamāpi svīkṛtam. Atra ca tadabhāva iti gaṇḍoḥ  
dadāteḥ prayogaḥ. Ibid. p.332.
- 19.(i) Na Śūdrāya matim dadyāt ityatrāpi matisantānasyāpakra-  
matostyeva paropayogaḥ.....Anye tu mater dātṛsam-  
bandhānāvagamād gaṇa ityānuh. Ibid. p.332.
- (ii) Khandikopādhyāstasmai.....dātuh svamitābhisandhir  
astyeva. Yadyapi pratikūlarūpatvāccapetāyās tadānām  
upayogo nāsti tathāpi phaladvāreṇāstyeva paropayogitvam.  
Ibid. p.333.
20. Nānu ca dāṇasya tadarthatvāt.....Sampradānasamjñā  
nyāya. Ibid. p.332.
21. Anvarthatvāt Sampradānasābdasya laukika eva.....  
dvi vidhaṁ Sampradānam vyākhyātam. Ibid. p.335.
22. Anvarthasamjñāviññānād dadātikarmaṇeti viññāyate Kāś.  
p.546.
23. Ibid. pp.548-549.

24. Ibid. p.549.
25. Ibid. p.546.
26. Dānam hi nāma pūjanagrahakāmyaya svakīyadravyaparitṛyāgah  
parasvatvāpattih. Ibid. p.546.
27. Ibid. p.546.
28. Karmaneti kimartham?.....abhipragrahanāt. Asti hyatrā-  
cāryasya kaścidadhiko artho abhimataḥ yasyāvabhāsanāyā-  
dhikam śabdāntaram prayuktam iti gamyate.....Ibid. p.546.
29. Ibid. pp.546-546.
30. Samyak pradiyate yasmāi sa Sampradānam iti arvarthatvāt  
saśūnyāḥ dadātikarmaṇa yam abhipraiti sa Sampradānam  
ityarthah.....Evam api rajakasya vastram dadāti,  
ghnataḥ prathan dadātītyatra kasmā na bhavati?.....  
Dānam kinciduddiśyāpunargrahanāya svadravyatyāgah, yathā  
vrkṣāya jalam dadāti, devebhyah sumanas yācakaya bhikṣām  
.....Ibid. p.543.
31. Ibid. p.547.
32. Karmaneti Kim?.....abhipragrahanam kartavyameva.  
Ibid. p.547.
33. Bhāṣā p.43.
34. Katham rajakasya.....avivakṣitatvāt. Ibid. p.43.
35. Tat kriyayā yad abhisambdhyate.....sūtrenai va.  
Yuddhāya sannahyate, patye sate.....Ibid. p.43.

36. Abhi sarvatobhāvenābhilāṣeṇa ca sambandham āha.....  
śatreva bhayaṁ iti. Tathā ca bhayāni datta Sītāyai iti  
Bhaṭṭiḥ. Etena pūjanagrahakāmyābhīh sudravasya parār-  
paṇaṁ dānaṁ tasyarpanastham. Sampradānam..... VBY. p.96.
37. Ibid. p.99.
38. Ibid. p.98.
39. Dānasya karmaṇa yam abhipraiti Sa sampradānasaṁjñāḥ  
syāt. Pr. Kau. p.412.
40. Kriyayā yam abhipraiti soḥi Sampradānam. Ibid. p.413.  
of. Kriyayāpi yam abhipraiti sa Sampradānam. Kās.  
pp.548-549.
41. Pr. kau. pp.414-418.
42. Ibid. pp. 412-413.
43. Ibid. p.413.
44. Sampradānam tri vidham Anirākartr, Prerakam Anumantr ca  
Tathokātam Bhartrharipā anirākaraṇāt Kartus tyāgāṅgam  
Karmaṇepsitam prerānumatibhyāṁ ca labhate Sampradānatām  
iti. Ibid. p.413.
45. Dānasya Karmaṇa yam abhipraiti sa Sampradānasaṁjñāḥ syāt.  
SKK. p.436.
46. SK. pp.120-121; PMR p.517-518.
47. SKM. p.436.
48. Uddesyaścatusthyarthah.....uddesyaṁ VBS. p.186.



49. Idameva śeṣitvam.....dandādānam na pratipattiḥ  
kintu caturthīśrutyarthakarmeti tatra nirṇītam. Ibid.  
pp. 187-188.
50. Ibid. p. 188.
51. Ibid. p. 190.
52. Ibid. pp. 185-186.
53. Ibid. pp. 186-187.
54. Sā śaktiśca tattaddhātvarthakarmenisthaphalanirūpakat-  
venācchaviśayo yas tannisthā LMS. Ibid. p. 126.
55. Ibid. p. 1261.
56. Kāraṇacaturthyāḥ Sampradānetā-śaktimān arthah. Ibid.  
p. 1261.
57. Karmanā yam. Dānasyeti. Dādhatvarthasyetyarthah. Idam  
upalekṣaṇam kriyāmatrasyatyāham.....pratyākhyānaparāṇa  
bhāṣyaṃ saṅgacchate. B&S. p. 882.
58. Ibid. p. 882.
59. Yattu taddhātvarthakarmasambandhajanyaphalam.....  
padārthāntaram eva. LMS. p. 1262.
60. Ibid. pp. 1262-1263.
61. Pitr̥bhyāḥ śrāddham dadyād.....parasvatvahetuśca  
tyāga eva. Ibid. p. 1263.
62. Ata eva videsasthapatram uddiśya.....iti vyavahārah.  
Ibid. p. 1263.
63. Ibid. p. 1266.

64. Ibid. p.1263.
65. Ibid. pp.1263-1275.
66. Ibid. pp.1268-1274.
67. Kalāpa. Sū. 216.
68. Dātum icchetyādi. Tathā rajakasya vāstram dadāti ghnatah  
prsthān dadāti.....svāmitvam labhate yadi. Ibid.  
p.198.
69. Ibid. p.197.
70. Ibid. p.197.
71. Tathā sam upasargena sanyak pradiyate yasmāi tat sampra-  
dānam.....yadvā tādarthya vi vakṣyāmevātra caturthī.  
Ibid. pp.198-199.
72. Cāndra. p.176.
73. Ibid. p.176.
74. SKS. kāraka. Sū. 17.
75. (1) Ipsitādi sprhādah. <sup>kāraka</sup> Ibid. Sū. 18. Sprhesipsitah.  
[a] Pa. 1.4.38.
- (ii) Yādabhipretya dhātvarthah SKS. kāraka. sū.19.  
Kriyāgrahanam - vārtika.
- (iii) Yat prītirucyarthakartā SKS. kāraka sū 20 Rucyar-  
thanāṃ prīyamanah. Pa. 1.4.33.
- (iv) Sādhurdharayateh SKS. kāraka sū 21 Dhāreruttamarnah  
Pa 1.4.35.
- (v) Krudhadruherśāsūyarthanāṃ yatrārthah kope SKS. kāraka  
sū 22 Krudhadruherśāsūyarthanāṃ yam prati kopah  
Pa 1.4.37.

- (vi) Ślāghāder yajñāpsā ŚKŚ kāraka sū. 23. Ślāghahnūnī-  
thāsāpāṃ jñāpsamānāḥ Pā. 1.4.34.
- (vii) Radhikṣorvividhaprasnā yasya. ŚKŚ kāraka sū. 24.  
Radhikṣor yasya viprasnāḥ Pā. 1.4.39.
- (viii) Pratyāñbhyāṃ anupratigrahasca ganyapūrvakriyā Kartā  
ŚKŚ. kāraka sū. 25.  
(a) Pratyāñbhyāṃ aruḥ purvasya Kartā Pā. 1.4.40  
(b) Anupratigrahasca Pā. 1.4.41.
76. <sup>(b)</sup> ŚKŚ. p. 1006.
76. Ibid. p. 1007.
77. Yasya punarādānam nāsti.....Kim punar dānam Kartrā  
kriyamānam? Yattena svechayā dīyate na tu bhayādina.  
Ata eva ghnataḥ prarthanaṃ dadāti rājño danḍaṃ dadatītyāu  
na Sampradanatvam. Ibid. pp. 1006-1007.
78. Jainendra 1.2.110.
79. Ibid. pp. 92-93.
80. ŚS. 2.2.25.
81. Karmanā vyāpyena kriyayā vā śraddhānugrahādikāmyayā yam  
abhisambadhnāti. Ibid. p. 74.
82. Abhipragrahaṇād iha na bhavati-ghnataḥ prarthanaṃ dadāti,  
rajakasya vastraṃ dadāti.....iha ca bhavati vātāya  
cakṣur dadāti, chaṭāya capetāṃ prayacchatī. Ibid. p. 74.
83. Ibid. p. 74.

84. Sprhayater dhātor vyāpyam̐ vā Sampradānasañjñam̐ bhavati.  
Puṣpabhyah puṣpāni vā sprhayati. Ibid. p.74.
85. Ibid. p.74.
86. Yasmāi ditsāsūyakrodhergāruci.....dharyarthā bham...  
Mugdha. kāraka. su. 15.
87. Ibid. p.65.
88. Ibid. p.67.
89. Dānapātre Sampradanakārake caturthī. Samyak śreyobuddhyā  
pradiyate yasmāi tat Sampradānakāraṁ. Vedavide gām  
dadāti Sāra. p.84.
90. Anyatra - rājño dandam̐ dadāti, rajakasya vastrem̐ dadāti  
.....vyājena Raghava karam̐ iti mahākavi prayogadarśnat.  
Ibid. p.84.
91. Ibid. p.84.
92. Ibid. p.84.
93. SRC. p.155.
94. Supadma. p.73.
95. Ibid. p.74.
96. Nanu rājño dandam̐ dadāti gmatēh pratham̐ dadatītyādeu  
.....Sampradanam̐ iti mahatīyam̐ sanjñā samyak pra-  
karsena yasmāi diyate tat Sampradānam̐.....sveochayā  
pūjānugrahaśāmyayā eva tatra dānābhisambandhaḥ tatraiva  
yathā syāt. Ibid. p.74.
97. Śātrave bhayam̐ dadāti.....gaunam̐ Sampradānatvam̐.  
Ibid. p.75.

98. HNM. sū. 1039.
99. Ibid. pp. 449-450.
100. (i) Rucyarthairicchan. HNM. sū. 1041.  
 (ii) Sprherabhīṣṭam. Ibid. sū. 1042.  
 (iii) Bhārerāhanikah. Ibid. sū. 1043.  
 (iv) Krudhādyarthānam yam prati kopah. Ibid. sū. 1044.  
 (v) Ślāghannūnāthāśapam jñāpayitumīṣṭah. Ibid. sū. 1047.  
 (vi) Pratyābhyāṃ śruvaḥ prārthayitā. Ibid. sū. 1048.  
 (vii) Anupratigrahaḥ prasasyamānavacanah. Ibid. sū. 1049.
101. PR. . . p. 370.
102. Vāśuddhābhisandhipūrvakasvasvatvadhamśa-phalakavyāpāro  
 yam uddiśya tat Sampradānam. Ibid. p. 370.
103. Ibid. pp. 376-380.
104. Karmaṇā yam abhipraiti sa Sampradānam..... Evañca tat -  
 kriyākāraṇībhūtakarmajanyaphalabhāgitvenoddeśyatvam  
 Sampradānatvam....., Kār. caṅk. p. 64.
105. Grāmaṃ gacchatītyādaḥ.....Karaṇatvābhāvāt. Ibid.  
 p. 64.
106. Karmaṇā- dānakarmaṇā yam abhipraiti- svatvabhāgitvenodde-  
 śyīkaroti Sa Sampradānam iti. Evañca Sampradīyate yasmāi  
 iti vyutpattiyā Sampradānasamjñāpyanvarthaiva. Ibid.  
 pp. 70-71.
107. Ata eva śātrave astraṃ nūceti.....vārtājñā<sup>nā</sup>di phala-  
 śālī<sup>h</sup>venoddeśyatvameva gauna-caturtharthah. Ibid. p. 71.

108. Śrāddhādeṣu pitrādeḥ na svatvabhāgitvenoddēśyatvaṃ kintu prītibhāgitayeti.....Ruḍrādeḥ svatvabhāgitvenoddēśyatvaṃ. Ibid. p.70.
109. Sampradānasya kāraṇatvaṃ.....uddēśyatvasvarūpaṃ ityānuh. Ibid. pp.73-74.
110. Nārādāya rocate kalahah.....rucirākhyātens viśaya-  
tābhidhīyate. Ibid. p.73.
111. SMJ. p.52.
112. Dādhatoh svasvatvadhvaṃsapūrvakaparasvatvotpattyavacchi-  
nontyāgah athavā uddēśyagatasvānitvasampādekatyagor-  
thah. Ibid. p.52.
113. Nārādāya rocate kalah<sup>34</sup> ityatra caturthyāḥ sambandhitvaṃ  
arthah.....Īpsitakarmatvaṃ arthah. Ibid. p.54-55.
114. Gatyādibhinne dhātvarthe caturthyā viḡrahasthayaḥ yaḥ  
svārthe bodhanīyastat Sampradānatvaṃ Īritam. SSP,  
kārika. 70.
115. Gatyādibhinne.....svatve Brāhmanādeḥ prātiyogi-  
tvaṃ nirūpitatvaṃ vā caturthyā bodhyata iti tadeva  
tatra Sampradānatvaṃ. Ibid. p.306.
116. Sampradānasābdastu śvārāyagocaratyāgajanyasvatvasya  
.....labdhvā caṣṭagunaṃ phalam ityādismrteḥ  
pratigrhītadravāḍānasya phalaviśeṣaṃ prati hetutvena  
tādṛśadānasampattyarthameva pratigrahasya prayogāt.  
Ibid. p.307.

117. Dāśya bhakṣyam dadāti, bhṛtākāya vetanam dadātītyā-  
dāvapi svatvajanakatyāgam pratipādayan dadātīr mukhya  
eva. Panyajanakantu na tādrśam dānam avaidhatvāt.  
Ibid. p.300.
118. Mūlyagrahanapūrvakam dānam eva ca vikṛaya iti tatrāpi  
mukhyameva sampradānatvam.....Ibid. p.300.
119. Yattu svīkārājanyasya svatvasya janakas tyāgo dānam  
.....Maithilair uktaṁ tanna yuktaṁ lāghaveṇa  
svatvajanakatyāgasyaiva dadātyarthāt. Ibid. p.308.
120. Grāmaya gata ityādeu viśrahasṭhacaturthyā.....  
samvardhayitum artho na viśrahasṭhayati na prasangaḥ.  
Ibid. pp.309-311.
121. Ibid. pp.309-311
122. Sampradānatvañce.....kriyājanyaphalabhāgitayā  
Karturicchāviśayatvam paryavasannaṁ VTP. p.279.
123. Karmanā yam abhipreṭti.....tyāgarūpakriyājanya-  
goniṣṭhasvatvabhāgitayā dātur icchāviśayo Brāhmaṇaḥ  
.....Ibid. p.279.
124. Ibid. p.282.
125. Śātrave bhayam dadātītyādeu janayatīti bhāktorthaḥ,  
Evañce.....śātrvādeḥ sampradānatvam. Ibid. p.292.
126. Rajakaśya vastram dadātītyatra dadātīr na tyāgārthako-  
pita parāyattīkaranārthako gaunaḥ.....Evaṁ samvāha-  
kaśya caranam dadāti.....Ibid. p.283.

127. Ibid. p. 233.
128. Ibid. pp. 283-284.
129. Ibid. pp. 99-100.
130. Evañca dāṣkarmābhūtagavādi pratigrahīṭṭvam Sampradānatvam. Ibid. p. 100.
131. Abhinavāstu dr̥ṣṭadvāṣadhātvarthoddeśyatvam Sampradānatvam.....Kṛṣṇāya rocate bhaktir idyādau mukhyaḥ prayogaḥ.
132. Ibid. p. 100.
133. Ibid. p. 100.
134. Ibid. p. 100.
135. Ibid. p. 100.



## CHAPTER VI

### Apādāna

#### Apādāna in the Paninian school

##### Pāṇini

Pāṇini defines Apādānakāraka or the ablative case as dhruvam apāye Apādānam.<sup>1</sup> But, the grammarian thinks that this definition alone is not able to cover all the cases of Apādānakāraka. Therefore, he offers seven other definitions of it. They are : bhītrārthanāṁ bhayaḥetuḥ, paraḥerasodhah, vārānārthanāṁ īpsitah, antardhau yenādarśanamiochatī, ākhyātopayoge, janikartuḥ prakṛtiḥ and bhūvaḥ prabhavaḥ.<sup>2</sup>

##### Kātyāyana

Kātyāyana adds a supplementary rule, namely jugup-sāvīramapramāḍarthānāṁ upasankhyānam to the rules offered by Pāṇini on the ablative case.<sup>3</sup>

##### Patañjali

Patañjali shows that the first definition of Apādāna given by Pāṇini namely, dhruvam apāye Apādānam is very signi-

ficant. There is the term dhruva in the definition which literally means a static object. Therefore, it appears to us that the definition is applicable only to a static object such as a tree or a mountain. But, Patañjali interprets the term dhruva in the definition in an entirely different manner. He shows in this interpretation that Apādānakāraka not only denotes a static object but also a moving one such as a running horse. He examines the other definitions of Apādāna also given by Pāṇini. He clearly shows that these definitions are redundant.

Patañjali gives us a clear idea of the term dhruva. He first says that the term dhruva denotes such an object as a tree which remains static when a leaf is separated from it or a wall which does not move from its place when a part of it collapses.<sup>4</sup> But, he immediately realises that if the term is used in such a rigid sense, a moving object will not be a case of Apādāna. Therefore, he gives a new interpretation of dhruva. He presents a few illustrations in which some moving objects become the cases of Apādāna. Two of these illustrations are *asvat trastat patitah* (i.e. he has fallen from the back of a running horse) and *rathāt pravṛtat patitah* (i.e. he has fallen from a moving chariot). Patañjali says that in these two illustrations, the moving horse and the moving chariot are also cases of dhruva. It is a fact that

they are not dhruva or static in the popular sense of the term. But, Patañjali shows that there is a deeper significance of the term dhruva beneath the superficial meaning of the term in such cases. According to him, a horse possesses the connotations namely aśvatva and āśugāmitva which do not lose their essence as a result of the motion of the horse. The term aśvatva denotes a universal by dint of which a horse becomes a horse. The term āśugāmitva denotes the speediness of a horse. These two characteristics remain unchanged even in a moving horse. Patañjali says that the moving horse is a case of dhruva in such a sense. He shows that a chariot gives pleasure to its rider. This quality of the chariot is not lost even when it is in motion. Thus, a moving chariot is also a case of dhruva. Similarly, he states that when a person etc. is separated from a group that is in motion, it also becomes a case of dhruva. The group possesses the universal called sarthatva which is not <sup>lost if</sup> even it is in motion.<sup>5</sup> He further shows that the sense of dhruva is applicable in a similar manner to a running horse also when a rider falls from its back.<sup>6</sup>

According to Patañjali, the term apāya in the rule dhruvam apāye Apādānam denotes either a real separation between two or more objects or an ideal one. He clearly shows that the sense of a real separation or an ideal separation

between two or more objects is invariably present in the illustrations of the rules bhītrārthanān bhayaḥetuḥ, parā-jerasodhah, vāranārthanān īpsitah etc. Therefore, he rejects these rules as redundant.

He critically examines two illustrations of the rule bhītrārthanān bhayaḥetuḥ. These illustrations are vṛka-bhyo bhīhetī (he is afraid of wolves) and caurebhyas trāyate (i.e. he saves a person from falling into the hands of thieves). According to him, the first illustration indicates that there is an ideal separation between the man and the wolves of which he is afraid and the second illustration indicates that there is an ideal separation between the person and the thieves from whose hands he is saved by another man. Patañjali says that when a man is afraid of wolves, he thinks "if wolves see me, they will surely kill me" and then parts with wolves by his mind. Thus, there is both an ideal contact and an ideal separation between the man and the wolves he fears for. According to Patañjali, the rule dhruvan apāye Apadanam is applicable to the illustration in this particular sense. He shows that the rule is applicable to the second illustration also in a similar sense. He states that when a person saves another person from falling into the hands of thieves, he thinks of the danger which will befall him if he is seen by thieves and keeps him away from them. In the view

of Patāñjali, when the man keeps the other man away from thieves in this way, he separates the man from these miscreants by his mind. Therefore, he says that the rule *dhruvam apāye Apādānam* is applicable to the illustration *caurebhyas trāyate*.<sup>7</sup>

The *Bhāṣyakāra* gives one illustration of the rule *parājerasodhah* namely, *adhyayanāt parājayate*. According to him, *adhyayanāt parājayate* means that a student seriously thinks of the difficulties which he faces as a student and gives up his studies. Thus, there is an ideal separation in this case also between the student and his studies. Therefore, the *Bhāṣyakāra* places the illustration *adhyayanāt parājayate* also under the rule *dhruvam apāye Apādānam* itself.<sup>8</sup>

He shows that the same mental process is involved even in the illustrations of the rules *vāranārthanām īpsitah* and *antardhau yenādarsanam icchati* such as *māṣebhyo gā vārayati* (i.e. he restrains the cows from entering into the pulse field of another man) and *upādhyāyād antardhatte* (i.e. he hides himself from his preceptor).

He says that a person restrains his cows from entering into the pulse-field of another person because, he thinks that if his cows enter into the pulse-field of the other man, they will surely spoil the pulses and thus, he will commit a sin and the king will also punish him for his

carelessness. According to Patañjali, when the man thinks so, he brings about an ideal contact between the cows and the pulses of the other man. Again, when he restrains the cows, he separates them from the pulses by his mind. Therefore, the grammarian opines that the illustration *māsebhya gā vāreyati* also falls within the scope of the rule *dhruvam apāye Apādānam*.<sup>9</sup>

He gives the following view on the illustration *upadhyāyāt antardhatte*. When a student hides himself from the sight of his teacher, he thinks "if my teacher sees me, he will surely rebuke me for not attending my classes. He may also send me to some place. Therefore, let me hide myself from his sight". Thus, there is both an ideal contact and an ideal separation between the student and the teacher in the illustration and hence, it is also covered by the rule *dhruvam apāye Apādānam* itself.<sup>10</sup>

Patañjali says that there is a real separation between a teacher and the knowledge which he imparts to a student. Therefore, he opines that the rule *ākhyātopayoge* is redundant.<sup>11</sup>

He rejects the rules *janikartuḥ prakṛtiḥ* and *bhuvah prabhavaḥ* also on a similar ground. He gives two illustrations of the first rule. These illustrations are *gomayād vṛściko jāyate* (i.e. scorpions originate from cowdung) and

golomāvilomabhyo durvā jāyate (i.e the durvā grass originates from the hairs of a cow or a goat). He presents one illustration of the second rule, that is Himavato Gaṅgā Prabhavati.

He says that when scorpions originate from cowdung or durvā grasses originate from the hairs of a cow or a goat, there is a real separation between the cause and the effect. Thus, he shows that the rule janikart<sup>ku</sup> prakṛtiḥ is redundant. But, he realises that sometimes, the separation between the cause and the effect is not complete. Moreover, in some illustrations of the rule such as dughdhā dādhi bhavati, there is apparently no real separation between the cause and the effect. Therefore, he <sup>in direct way</sup> refers to the philosophical concepts such as kṣaṇikātvā etc. which indicate an ideal separation between the cause and the effect 12.

He shows that the illustration Himavato Gaṅgā prabhavati also indicates a real separation between the Himalayas and the waters of the Ganges which constantly flow from it. We may, however, raise an objection against this interpretation because, ~~we~~ we do not see any such separation between the mountain and the waters of the river. Patañjali anticipates such an objection. Therefore, he says that this separation exists but because the waters are continuously appearing from the mountain, we do not see this separation. 13 It is clear from his interpretation that the river Ganges in reality, is

not one river. It reminds us of a famous observation of the Greek philosopher Heraclitus that a man cannot step twice into the same river.

Patañjali critically interprets the vārtika *jagup-sāviraṃapramādārthānām upasāṅkhyānam* also. He clearly shows in this interpretation that this rule is also redundant. He gives a few appropriate illustrations of the rule such as *dharmād viraṃati*, *dharmāt pramādyati* etc. According to him, the sense of an ideal separation between two objects is invariably indicated by these illustrations also. As for example, he says that *dharmād viraṃati* implies that an atheist considers religion as non-existent and keeps aloof from religious activities. Thus, there is an ideal separation between the person and the religious activities.<sup>14</sup> Similar is the case in the case of other illustrations of the vārtika presented by him such as *adharmaād viraṃati*, *adharmaāt pramādyati* etc. In the case of *adharmaād viraṃati*, *adharmaāt pramādyati* etc., the person who keeps away from irreligious deeds is invariably a natheist.

The Bhāṣyakara

He states that when we use such expressions as *sāṅkṣīyakebhyah Pāṭaliputrakā abhikrūpataṛāh*, we bring about a separation between the objects compared by our mind.<sup>15</sup> This shows that the Paninian rule *pancamē vibhakte* is redundant.

Patañjali also opines that when a person sees something from a chair etc. there is a separation between the



organ of sight and the object which acts as the locus of the person and thus, the object is a clear case of Apādāna. He indirectly refers to the Nyāya philosophy and the Buddhist philosophy of momentariness in the discussion. He cites two illustrations namely, āsanāt prekṣate and śayanāt prekṣate in order to clarify the idea.<sup>16</sup> Thus, the grammarian shows that the vartika pañcamīvidhāne lyablope Karmanyupasaṅkhyānam.

### Kaiyaṭa

Kaiyaṭa explains every important view of the Bhāṣyakāra on the Pāṇinian rules of Apādānakāraka most appropriately. We can refer in this connection to the interpretations given by him on such views of the Bhāṣyakāra as yattadaśve aśvatvam āśugāmītvam taddhruvam tatra vivakṣitam under dhruvam apāye Apādānam,<sup>17</sup> athavā jyotirvaḥ jñānāni bhavanti<sup>18</sup> under the rule ākhyātopayoge, and athavā anyāścānyāśca prādurbhavanti under the rule janikartuḥ prakṛtiḥ.<sup>19</sup>

He explains the term dhruva in the same manner as Bhartrhari.<sup>20</sup> But, this is probably not the meaning intended by Patañjali.

Kaiyaṭa gives us a very clear idea of the three types of Apādānakāraka mentioned by Bhartrhari in his Vākya-padīya.<sup>21</sup> The learned commentator shows that the Bhāṣyakāra

accepts the logical meaning of the term *Ipsita* in the rule  
*vāraṇārthānām Ipsitah.*<sup>22</sup>

### Bhartrhari

Like the author of the *Mahābhāṣya*, *Bhartrhari* also critically interprets the definitions of *Apādāna* given by *Pāṇini*. The grammarian properly utilises the views of his great predecessor *Patañjali* on the definitions in his interpretations. He excels the *Bhāṣyakāra* in some of the interpretations. He interprets the definition *dhruvam apāye Apādānam* in a more critical and exhaustive manner than the *Bhāṣyakāra*. He also explains some other views of the *Bhāṣyakāra* in a critical manner.

*Bhartrhari* accepts the view of *Patañjali* that the term *dhruva* in the *Pāṇinian* rule *dhruvam apāye Apādānam* denotes not only a static object but also a dynamic one. *Patañjali* shows that even a dynamic object possesses some essential qualities which are not destroyed by its motion and in such a sense, it is a case of *dhruva*. But, *Bhartrhari* gives a different interpretation of *dhruva*. He says that the term *dhruva* denotes that particular object which does not act as a locus of the operation which generates the separation between it and another object. Therefore, a dynamic object

can be a case of dhruva.<sup>23</sup> He interprets the term dhruva more clearly as avadhi (i.e. <sup>limit to</sup> point of separation). He gives us a broad idea of dhruva. He says that when the rider falls from the back of a horse (either static or in motion), the horse is a case of dhruva or avadhi. But, when the horse also falls along with the rider from the top of a wall or some other object, the object from which it falls is a case of dhruva. Then, the grammarian states that when two lambs move away from each other, each of them is a case of dhruva or avadhi in relation to the motion of the other lamb.<sup>24</sup> In this way, he shows that the concept of dhruva is relative. He refers to another example in order to show this relative nature of dhruva. He says that when the emphasis is laid on the motion of the horse from the back which the rider falls, the rider is a case of dhruva but, when the emphasis is laid on the falling of the rider, the horse becomes a case of dhruva.<sup>25</sup>

Bhartṛhari accepts another important view of Patañjali that the term apāya in the rule dhruvam apāye Apādānam denotes ideal separation also. He shows that an ideal separation is indicated by the Paninian rules bhītrārthanāya bhayaśhetuḥ, parāḥjerasodhaḥ, pañcamī vibhakte etc.<sup>26</sup> Helārāja explains the point appropriately.

Patañjali says in his commentary on the Paninian rule *kārake* that we can use the expressions *balāhake vidyotate* and *balāhake vidyotate* also in stead of *balahakād vidyotate*. But, he does not show the difference of their meanings. Bhartṛhari clearly explains the distinction in meaning among them.<sup>27</sup> Patañjali also refers to a significant expression namely, *dhanusā vidhyati* under the Paninian rule *sādhakatamen karanam*. Bhartṛhari says that two distinct *śaktis* are present in the bow referred to in the sentence and thus, it may be used as both an instrumental case and an ablative case.<sup>28</sup>

The grammarian divides *Apādānakārake* into three distinct groups namely, *Nirdiṣṭaviṣaya*, *Upāttaviṣaya* and *Apekṣitakriya*.<sup>29</sup> Helārāja and other grammarians properly explain these terms.

### Helārāja

Helārāja appropriately explains the concept of *Apādāna* presented by Bhartṛhari. Bhartṛhari lays emphasis on the term *dhruva* given by Pāṇini in the rule *dhruvam apāye Apādānam* in his illuminating discussion on the ablative case. Helārāja clearly explains the meaning of *dhruva* discussed by Bhartṛhari. He gives us a very clear idea of Bhartṛhari's concept of *dhruva*.<sup>30</sup>

We have said that Bhartṛhari divides *Apādāna* into three groups namely, *Nirdiṣṭaviṣaya*, *Upāttaviṣaya* and *Apekṣitakriya*. Helārāja clearly explains the above terms and gives

a few suitable illustrations of each groups of Apādāna.<sup>31</sup> Bhartṛhari presents the concept of apekṣitāpāya in the kārīkā nirdhāraṇe vibhakte yah etc. Helārāja appropriately interprets this term.<sup>32</sup> He shows that the author of the Vākyapeḍīya refers to ideal separation by this term. He clarifies the meaning of the above kārīkā by properly presenting the concept of ideal separation of Patañjali.<sup>33</sup>

### Kāśikā

We have shown that Patañjali accepts only one definition of Apādāna given by Pāṇini namely, dhruvam apāya Apādānam and rejects the other definitions of the term given by him as redundant. But, the Vṛttikāra accepts all the definitions of Apādāna presented by Pāṇini. He appropriately interprets the definitions. The grammarian furnishes almost all the illustrations of these definitions from the Mahābhāṣya.<sup>34</sup>

He interprets the term prakṛti in the Pāṇinian rule janikartuh prakṛtiḥ as hetu.<sup>35</sup> But, the Bhāṣyakāra accepts the term exclusively in the sense of the potential cause. It is clear from the commentary of Jinendrabuddhi that the interpretation of the Vṛttikāra is more reasonable than that of Patañjali.

Jinendrabuddhi

Jinendrabuddhi shows in the same manner as Patāñjali that the Paninian rule *dhruvam apāye apādānam* is itself able to cover all the illustrations of *Apādānakāraḥ*. But, he does not reject the other rules of *Apādāna* given by Pāṇini. According to him, these rules serve an important purpose. He says that Pāṇini gives us a comprehensive idea of different types of *Apādānakāraḥ* with the help of these rules.<sup>36</sup>

The grammarian explains the significance of the seventh inflexion which is used in the term *antardhau* in the Paninian rule *antardhau yanāḍarsanam icchati*. He says that seventh inflexion is used in the term in the sense of *nimitta*.<sup>37</sup>

He also discusses the utility of the term *prakṛti* in the Paninian rule *janikartuḥ prakṛtiḥ*. According to him, the term denotes both potential cause and the auxiliary cause in the rule. He shows that if the term *prakṛti* is not mentioned in the rule, it will be applicable to the potential cause alone. As a result of this, the term *putra* in the sentence *putrat pramode jāyate* (i.e. he derives joy from his son) and similar other cases will not be covered by the rule.<sup>38</sup>

### Haradatta

Haradatta reiterates the view of Jinendrabuddhi that Pāṇini gives us a comprehensive idea of various types of Apādāna through the rule *bhīṭvārthanāṃ bhayaahetuḥ* etc.<sup>39</sup>

He does not agree with his predecessor that the seventh inflexion used in the term *antardhan* denotes *nimitta*. According to him, it denotes either *viśaya* or it is a case of *sateṣṭamī*.<sup>40</sup>

### Puruṣottama

Puruṣottama also accepts all the definitions of Apādānakāraka given by Pāṇini. He interprets the definitions very briefly. He does not offer any new idea in the interpretations.<sup>41</sup>

Puruṣottama classifies Apādāna into three distinct groups namely, *Nirḍiṣṭaviśaya*, *Upāttaviśaya* and *Apekṣitskriya*. The grammarian rigidly follows Bhartrhari in this classification.<sup>42</sup>

### Śrīdharaśārya

Śrīdharaśārya critically explains the definitions of Apādāna presented by Pāṇini. His explanations are more

useful for us to understand the definitions than the brief interpretations of Puruṣottama.<sup>43</sup> The commentator, however, does not throw new light on the concept of Apādāna.

### Rāmacandra

Rāmacandra is another grammarian who ignores the view of the Bhāṣyakāra that the definitions of Apādāna such as bhittārthanānī bhayaśetuh, parājerasodhah etc. given by Pāṇini are redundant. He presents all the definitions of Apādāna given by Pāṇini and also the vārtika jugupsāviraṃśa etc. and briefly interprets them.<sup>44</sup> He does not refer anywhere in his interpretations to the said view of the Bhāṣyakāra.

### Vitthalācārya

Vitthalācārya interprets the said definitions of Pāṇini and the vārtika more clearly than Rāmacandra. He synthesises the views of Jinendrabuddhi and Bhartṛhari in his interpretations.<sup>45</sup>

### Bhattojī Dīkṣita

Bhattojī Dīkṣita interprets the term dhruvaṃ in the Paninian rule dhruvaṃ apāye Apādānaṃ very clearly. There



are some verbs in Sanskrit grammar which denote motion. Sometimes, the motion indicated by such a verb generates a separation between two objects. According to Bhaṭṭoji, the object which acts as a locus of this separation but does not act as a locus of the motion is denoted by the term *dhruva* in the said Paninian rule. Thus, the term *vrkṣa* (tree) in the sentence *vrkṣāt pāṇam patati* (i.e. a leaf is falling from a tree) is a case of *dhruva*. Bhaṭṭoji further states that the term *dhruva*, in brief, denotes *avadhi* or the <sup>limit to</sup> point of separation of a particular object.<sup>46</sup> The grammarian does not offer any new idea in the above interpretation. He merely presents the meaning of the *kārikā* of Bhartṛhari namely, *apāye yad udāsīnam calaṇ vā yadi vā calaṇ* etc. in it. Bhartṛhari says in this *kārikā* that even a moving object can become a case of *dhruva*. Bhaṭṭoji justifies this view. He clearly shows in his interpretation of *dhruva* that a case of *dhruva* does not act as the locus of the motion which generates the separation referred to the interpretation. A moving object can possess this negative quality. Therefore, he does not feel any difficulty in justifying the view of his predecessor. He gives us a concrete idea of a moving object playing the role of *dhruva* or *avadhi* by furnishing a suitable illustration namely, *dhāvato aśvāt patati*.<sup>47</sup> Bhartṛhari shows that when a pair of lambs part with each other, each of the lambs is a

case of dhruva in relation to the motion of the other lamb. Bhaṭṭoji explains this view also appropriately.<sup>48</sup>

Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita refers to the well known view of the Bhāṣyākāra that the first definition of Apādāna given by Pāṇini is sufficient for all the illustrations of Apādānākāra. But, he does not subscribe to this view.<sup>49</sup>

### Kaundabhaṭṭa

Kaundabhaṭṭa says that the term dhruva in the Pāṇinian rule dhruvam apāye Apādānam denotes avadhi. According to him, the fifth inflexion which is used in the ablative case itself denotes avadhi. He does not offer any new idea in the interpretation. He clearly states that Bhartṛhari himself gives the above meaning of dhruva in his kārīkās apāye yad udasānaṁ calaṁ vā yedivā calaṁ etc. Kaundabhaṭṭa critically explains these kārīkās in order to give us an appropriate idea of the concept of dhruva or Apādānākāra presented by Bhartṛhari in them.<sup>50</sup> According to this explanation, Bhartṛhari means by the term dhruva or Apādāna an object which acts as a locus of the separation generated by a kriyā or an operation but it is not the locus of the kriyā or the operation.<sup>51</sup> The same explanation of the term is given by Bhaṭṭoji also. Kaundabhaṭṭa says that the term kriyā here does not mean the movement of an object but the

meaning of a root. Therefore, in the opinion of the grammarian, we can use the expression *vrkṣāt vastram patati* even when a garment falls from a tree as a result of the movement of the tree.<sup>52</sup> This is certainly an important observation of the grammarian.

Kaundabhaṭṭa divides *Apādāna* into three distinct groups. He follows the author of the *Vākyapadīya* in dividing the *karaka*. He gives three suitable illustrations of these three groups of *Apādāna*.<sup>53</sup>

He refers to one illustration of *Apādāna* in which the sense of an ideal separation between two objects is involved.<sup>54</sup>

#### Harivallabha

Harivallabha explains the views of Kaundabhaṭṭa on *Apādānakāraka* very clearly. He has no other contribution to the concept of *Apādāna*.<sup>55</sup>

#### Nāgeśa

Nāgeśa says that the term *Apādāna* denotes the possessor of the particular *śakti* or property known as *Apādānatva*. According to him, the fifth inflexion which is used in *Apādānakāraka* by the Paninian rule *Apādāne pañcamī*

itself denotes this property. We have already shown that Nāgesa treats śakti and its locus as non-different. Therefore, in his view, Apādāna and Apādānatva are the same. He accepts the definition of Apādāna given by Pāṇini namely dhruvam apāye Apādānam. Nāgesa critically interprets this definition in order to give us a clear idea of Apādānakāra. We have discussed the meaning of the term dhruva in the rule as given by Bhaṭṭoji and Kaundabhaṭṭa, the two predecessors of Nāgesa. According to Nāgesa also, this is the meaning of dhruva or Apādānatva in the rule.<sup>56</sup> He explains the term apāya also very clearly. He reiterates the view of the Bhāgya-kāra that the term apāya in the definition denotes both a real and an ideal separation.<sup>57</sup>

Nāgesa explains in a clear and systematic manner the concept of dhruva presented by Bhartrhari in his discussion on Apādāna.<sup>58</sup>

The grammarian also critically interprets the illustrations of Apādāna given by Bhaṭṭoji in his Siddhānta-kaumudī.<sup>59</sup>

### Apādāna in non-Paninian schools

#### Kalāpa

Sarvavarma defines Āpādānakāreka with the help of two rules namely, yato apaiti bhayaṃ ādatte vā tad āpādānam and ipsitañce rakṣārthanām.<sup>60</sup> A critical examination of the first rule shows that the grammarian presents the meanings of three distinct definitions of Apādāna given by Panini namely, dhruvaṃ apāye āpādānam, bhītrārthanām bhayaśhetuḥ and ākhyātopayoge in it. He presents the meaning of another Paninian definition namely, vārenārthanām īpsitah in the second rule. He is silent regarding the other Paninian definitions of Apādāna.

#### Durgasthāna

Durgasthāna says that the term yataḥ in the first definition of Apādāna given by the author of the Kalāpa denotes <sup>limit to</sup>avadhi or the point of separation. He accepts the view of the Bhāṣyakāra that the separation which is involved in Apādānakāreka is not only real but also ideal. He presents such illustrations of Apādāna as adharmaḥ jupāpsate, adharmaḥ viraṃsati etc. in his interpretation of the first definition of Apādāna given by Sarvavarma and shows that the sense of an ideal separation is present in them.<sup>61</sup>

Durgasiṅha says that both the potential cause and the auxiliary cause are the avadhi or the <sup>limit to</sup> points of separation of their effect and thus, they are clear cases of Apādāna in relation to their effect. He gives us an idea of these two types of ablative case with the help of two appropriate illustrations namely, bījād ankura jāyate (i.e. the sprout appears from the seed) and putrāt pramodo jāyate (i.e. the father derives joy from his son).<sup>62</sup>

The celebrated commentator shows that the sentences āsanāt prekṣate and prāsādat prekṣate indicate a separation between the organ of sight and the seat or the palace from where the agent sees something and thus, the seat or the palace is a clear case of Apādāna. He rigidly follows the Bhāṣyakaṛa in the interpretation.<sup>63</sup>

### Trilocana

Trilocana corroborates the views of Durgasiṅha discussed above.<sup>64</sup>

### Suśenācārya

Suśenācārya accepts the view of Durgasiṅha that the expression yataḥ in the definition yato apaiti etc. given by Sarvavarmā denotes avadhi. He explains the term avadhi in

the traditional manner. He reiterates the view of Bhartr̥hari that avadhi may be either static or dynamic. He states that the sense of an ideal separation is present in such illustrations of Apādāna as vyāghrād bibhetti and hence, the expression yato apaiti in the definition of Sarvavarṇa is able to cover such illustrations also. But, the grammarian uses the terms bhayaṁ and ādatte in the definition in order to show it clearly that an object of fear and a person who imparts knowledge to another person are also the cases of Apādāna.<sup>65</sup>

#### Cāndra

Candragomī substitutes the term Apādāna by the term Avadhi. The term Avadhi denotes the limit<sup>AG</sup> of separation. He illustrates Avadhi in a comprehensive manner. It is clear from his illustrations that the term is uniformly applicable to all the cases of Apādāna in the Sanskrit literature.<sup>66</sup>

#### Saṅkṣiptasāra

Kramadīvara accepts all the definitions of the ablative case offered by Pāṇini. But, he remodels the definitions.<sup>67</sup>

### Jumarānandī

Jumarānandī briefly but appropriately interprets the definitions of the ablative case given by Kramadīśvara. Kramadīśvara remodels the Pāṇinian rule *vāraṇārthanām īpaitah* as *vāraṇāder yannimittam*. Jumarānandī shows in his interpretation of the rule that it covers even such illustrations of *Apādāna* as *pāpād vīramati* and *dharmaṭ pramadyati*.<sup>68</sup>

### Govīcandra

Govīcandra divides *Apādānakāraṇa* into primary and secondary. He suitably illustrates the second type of *Apādāna*.<sup>69</sup>

The commentator says in his interpretation of the definition *janyartha-kartuḥ prakṛtiḥ* that the term *prakṛti* in it denotes *samavāyi kāraṇa*, *asamavāyi kāraṇa* and *nimitta kāraṇa*. It implies that he accepts the three fold division of *kāraṇa* presented by the *Nāilyāyikas*. Thus, the definition is applicable to all the causes.<sup>70</sup> He shows in the interpretation that there are four distinct groups of living beings.<sup>71</sup>

### Jainendra

The author of the *Jainendra* defines *Āpādāna* as *dhyāpaye dhruvam Apādānam*.<sup>72</sup>



### Abhayānandi

The commentator Abhayānandi properly explains the terms dhyapāya and dhruva. The term dhī denotes idea. He says that there are some cases of Apādāna such as vyāghrād bibheti etc. which convey the sense of only an ideal separation. According to him, after the term dhī is used in the definition, it becomes applicable to such cases also. He explains the term dhruva as avadhī and says that it is either static or dynamic.<sup>73</sup> The above discussion clearly shows that the commentator presents the views of his two great predecessors Patañjali and Bhartṛhari in it. He appropriately illustrates the definition.<sup>74</sup>

### Śabdānuśāsana

The author of the Śabdānuśāsana defines Apādāna-kāraka as apāye avadhīr Apādānam.<sup>75</sup> He interprets the term apāya as both real and ideal separation.<sup>76</sup> He shows that avadhī or the <sup>limit is</sup> point of separation may be either static or dynamic.<sup>77</sup> It is clear from the above discussion that the grammarian does not present any new concept of Apādāna in his definition.

He classifies Apādāna into three distinct groups. He follows the established tradition in the classification.<sup>78</sup>

The grammarian gives us a comprehensive idea of different types of ablative case in Sanskrit grammar.<sup>79</sup>

#### Muzdhasbodha

Bopadeva substitutes the term Apādāna by a new technical term ja. He gives a long definition of ja in which he presents the essence of all the definitions of Apādāna given by Pāṇini.<sup>80</sup>

#### Durgādāsa Vidyāvāgīśa

Durgādāsa Vidyāvāgīśa tries to give us a clear idea of the definition by citing appropriate illustrations. He also briefly discusses the meaning of the term Apādāna.<sup>81</sup>

#### Rāma Tarkavāgīśa

Rāma Tarkavāgīśa briefly explains the said definition of Bopadeva. Like his predecessor Durgādāsa, he also furnishes all the necessary illustrations of Apādānakāraka in order to give us a comprehensive idea of it. He classifies Apādānakāraka into three types in the traditional manner.<sup>82</sup>

### Sārasvata

The author of the Sārasvata reiterates the well known view of Bhartrhari that the term Apādāna denotes the limit <sup>to</sup> of separation which is either static or dynamic. He does not accept the view of Patañjali that the separation which is involved in Apādānakāraṇa may be ideal also.<sup>83</sup> Pāṇini shows in the rule bhītrārthānāṁ bhayaḥetuḥ that an object of fear becomes a case of Apādāna. Similarly, he states in the rule ākhyātopayage that a teacher also becomes a case of Apādāna. Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya reiterates these views of Pāṇini. He also accepts the definition janikartuḥ prakṛtiḥ given by Pāṇini.<sup>84</sup> But, he interprets the term prakṛti as upādānakāraṇa or the potential cause.<sup>85</sup>

A critical examination of the concept of Apādāna presented by the author of the Sārasvata shows that the grammarian accepts only some rules of Apādāna given by Pāṇini directly and indirectly.

### Candrakīrti

The celebrated commentator Candrakīrti gives the etymological meaning of the term Apādāna.<sup>86</sup> He corroborates the view of the Bhāṣyakāra that the separation which is involved in Apādānakāraṇa is both real and ideal.<sup>87</sup>

Rāmāśrama

The commentary of Rāmāśrama on the Sārasvata vyākaraṇa is conspicuous by its silence regarding views of its author on the ablative case.

Supadma

Padmanābha defines Apādāna as avadhīr apayācīśva-pādānam. It is clear from the definition and also from its interpretation that the grammarian accepts Apādānakāraka as avadhī or a limit but he does not think that it is invariably a limit <sup>to</sup> of separation. He presents the essence of all the Paninian definition of the ablative case in the interpretation of his definition.<sup>88</sup>

Viṣṇumīśra

Viṣṇumīśra clearly shows in his interpretation of the said definition of Padmanābha that Apādānakāraka is the limit <sup>to</sup> of either a real separation or an ideal one. Thus, the commentator differs from the standpoint of his master on the meaning of Apādāna.<sup>89</sup> He explains the term avadhī in the same manner as Bhartṛhari.<sup>90</sup>

### Harināmaṇṭa

Jīvagosvāmī is another grammarian who remains loyal to Pāṇini and Kātyāyana in defining Apādānakāreka. He gives twelve definitions of Apādāna in order to give us a comprehensive idea of the case. He mainly presents the views of Pāṇini and Kātyāyana in the definitions.<sup>91</sup> He offers two distinct definitions in order to convey the meaning of the vārtika jugupsāvirāma-pramāḍārthanām upasaṅkhyānam. These definitions are pramāḍajugupsāyāñca tad viśayah and atha virāme tyājyah. The reason for this is best known to the grammarian himself. He also gives another definition namely, pratigrahe dāte in order to show that the person from whom something is accepted by somebody becomes an ablative case.<sup>92</sup> This definition is also redundant. The grammarian probably gives this definition in order to show the use of the ablative case in such cases. Jīvagosvāmī does not refer to the concept of ideal separation presented by Patañjali anywhere in his discussions on the ablative case.

### Pravogaratnaṃālā

Puruṣottama Vidyāvāgīśa offers a long definition of Apādāna like his predecessor Bopadeva. He rigidly follows Pāṇini in this definition. He presents the essence of the

Paninian definitions of the ablative case except bhuvaḥ prabhavaḥ in it.<sup>93</sup> He gives a separate definition namely, prabhuvah in the sense of bhuvaḥ prabhavaḥ. He also presents a third definition of Apādāna in which he gives the meaning of the vārtika jugupsāvirāṇa etc.<sup>94</sup> Puruṣottama explains the definitions very clearly by citing appropriate illustrations.<sup>95</sup>

### Apādāna in philosophical schools

#### Kāraṇakakra

Bhavanānda Siddhāntavāgīśa considers the definitions of Apādāna given by Pāṇini as the appropriate definitions of the term. The philosopher interprets these definitions in an appropriately critical manner in order to bring home to us the exact significance of them. He follows the author of the Vākyapāṇīya in the interpretation of the first definition, that is, dhruvam apāye apādānam. He does not accept the view of Fataṇjali that the term apāya in the definition denotes ideal separation also. Bhavanānda interprets the rules bhīṭā<sup>ṛ</sup>thānān bhaya<sup>ḥ</sup>hetuḥ etc. in an entirely different manner from the Bhāgyakāra. He shows that these rules given by Pāṇini actually denote various senses other than that<sup>of</sup> the ablative case.

We have discussed the meaning of the definition *dhruvam apāye apādanam* given by Bhartrhari. This meaning is accepted by a number of grammarians like Bhaṭṭoji, Kaṇḍa-bhaṭṭa etc. Bhavānanda also accepts this meaning of the definition. He interprets the definition as *parakīyākriyājanya-vibhāgāśrayatvam Apādanatvam*.<sup>96</sup> He clearly shows that he presents the meaning as given by his predecessors in this interpretation.<sup>97</sup> According to the interpretation of Bhartrhari, the term *dhruva* in the definition denotes that particular object which does not act as the locus of the operation which generates the separation between it and another object. Bhavānanda says that even a dynamic object such as a running horse may possess such a characteristic. Therefore, a dynamic object may be a case of *dhruva* or *Apādāna* according to him.<sup>98</sup> We already know that this is not an original view of the philosopher. He reiterates an important view of Bhartrhari without referring to him. He explains the term *dhruva* more appropriately as *avadhi* or the point of separation.<sup>99</sup> We have already known that this is also the view of Bhartrhari. Bhavānanda, however, says that *avadhī* is nothing but a *svarūpa* relation.<sup>100</sup>

Siddhāntavāgīśa opines that the sense of separation which is invariably present in the concept of *Apādānakāraka* must not be denoted by a verb. He shows that in the sentence

vrkṣaṇ tyajati khagaṇ i.e. the bird is leaving the tree, the verb tyajati itself denotes the separation between the tree and itself. Therefore, the term vrkṣa is not a case of Apā-dāna. According to him, only such a separation is meant by the term apāya in the said definition as is generated by an act other than the act of leaving.<sup>101</sup>

The author of the Kāraṇacakra offers two important original views in his interpretation of the definition. He says that the expression svasmāḍ vibhajate (i.e. one is separated from one's self) is absurd because, the separation of a person from himself is practically impossible. He also says that the term kriyā in the interpretation parakṛīyakriyāṇānyaphelāśrayatvaṁ denotes only a transitive verb and not an intransitive verb. Therefore, the expression vrkṣāt parṇaṁ spandate is not correct.<sup>102</sup>

Bhavananda says that the fifth inflexion used in the terms vyāghra etc. in such sentences as vyāghrād bibhēti does not denote the ablative case. According to him, the fifth inflexion used in such sentences denotes the sense of hetu etc. He shows that in the sentences vyāghrād bibhēti, śatroḥ paritrāyate and the like, the fifth inflexion denotes hetu or condition while in the expressions, adhyayanāt parājayate, adharmājjugupsate etc. it denotes Karmatva. According to him, in the sentences kupād andhaḥ vārayati and savigṛhṇād



mitram<sup>4</sup> vārayati, the fifth inflexion denotes the acts of falling and eating and also the negation of these acts. He states that in the sentence Himavato Gangā prabhavati, the fifth inflexion denotes the contact of the Ganges with the earth which immediately follows the separation of it with the Himalayas. He also states that in such sentences as dharmāt pramādyati, the fifth inflexion denotes viśayitva while in the sentences such upadhyāyād antardhatte etc. it denotes simply a non-specified relation.<sup>103</sup>

Bhavananda Siddhāntavāgīśa departs from the grammatical tradition in the above interpretations. He shows great originality in the interpretations. But, it is upto the scholars to accept or reject his views.

### Sāraṃjārī

The author of the Sāraṃjārī also accepts the Paninian definition dhruvam apāye Apādānam as the appropriate definition of Apādānakāraka. He interprets the definition in the same manner as the author of the Kārakacakra.<sup>104</sup>

Like the author of the Kārakacakra, Jayakṛṣṇa also critically explains the significance of the fifth inflexion used in the sentences Himavato Gangā prabhavati, adhyayanāt parājayate etc. But, he does not agree with his predecessor in some of the interpretations.<sup>105</sup>

Śabdasaṅkīrti-prakāśikā

Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra presents a new concept of Apādāna. We always use the fifth inflexion in a word in order to indicate Apādānakāraka. Jagadīśa says that the fifth inflexion used in the word conveys a specified meaning which is related to the meaning of the root of the verb in the sentence. According to him, this meaning of the fifth inflexion is the ablative case.<sup>106</sup> This is entirely a new concept of the case. But, the philosopher also accepts another well known view that the term Apādāna denotes the locus of the separation which is generated by a particular operation but it is not the locus of the operation.<sup>107</sup> Jagadīśa clarifies his definition of Apādāna with the help of a suitable illustration namely, *vrkṣāt patitaḥ* (i.e. he has fallen from the tree). He says that the fifth inflexion used in the word *vrkṣa* in the sentence denotes separation and this separation is related to the act of falling indicated by the root *pat* in the verb *patitaḥ* as its adjective.<sup>108</sup> The adjectival character of the separation is clearly shown by Jagadīśa in the interpretation of the illustration, that is, *vrkṣāvadhikavibhāgā-nukūla-patanakartā*.

Some scholars use the predicate *parasamaveta* with the term *kriyā* in their definition of *Apādānakāraka* in order to avoid such expressions as *svasmāt patitaḥ* Caitraḥ etc. But,

Jagadīśa says that such a predicate is unnecessary. According to him, the expressions *svamāt patitah* etc. are utterly absurd because, nothing in this world is separated from itself.<sup>109</sup>

The philosopher reiterates the view of his predecessor Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa that the separation involved in *Apādānakāraka* is not denoted by the root of the verb used with it. He agrees with his predecessor that the root *tyaj* denotes separation and therefore, the ablative case cannot be used with the verb *tyajati*.<sup>110</sup> He says in this connection that the verb *apaiti* in the sentence *vrkṣād apaiti* denotes the act of falling but not the act of separation and hence, the use of the ablative case with it is not wrong.<sup>111</sup>

Bhavānanda opines that the verb which is related to the ablative case is always transitive. Therefore, according to him, the expression *vrkṣat spandate* is incorrect because, the verb *spandate* is intransitive. Jagadīśa does not accept this view. He says that the above expression is correct. He shows that in the sentence *vrkṣāḥ calati*, the verb *calati* is intransitive. But, the ablative case is used with it. He argues that if there is no irregularity in this sentence, there is no irregularity in the sentence *vrkṣāt spandate* also.<sup>112</sup>

Jagadīśa differs from Bhavānanda on another very important point. Bhavānanda clearly states that the expressions vyāghrād bibhēti etc. are not cases of Apādāna. According to him, the fifth inflexion is used in such cases with the words vyāghra etc. in entirely different senses. But, Jagadīśa does not subscribe to this view. He remains loyal to the grammatical tradition.<sup>113</sup>

Bhavānanda clearly explains the significance of the fifth inflexion used in the terms vyāghra etc. in the sentences vyāghrād bibhēti, śetroḥ parājayate and the like. Jagadīśa follows him. He says that the fifth inflexion used in the terms vyāghra etc. in the sentences vyāghrād bibhēti, vyāghrāt trasati and similar other sentences denotes the sense of the condition of the act to which the ablative case is related. Again, in the sentences pāpān divartate, adharmā viramati, raṇāt parājayate etc., it denotes dṛveṣa or malice while in such illustrations of ablative case as valmīkāgrāt prabhati dhanuḥ-khaṇḍam akhaṇḍalagya, it indicates either the sense of the locative case or the sense of located on. He states that the fifth inflexion attached to the words pāpa etc. in such sentences as pāpāḥ jugupsate indicates viśayatva.<sup>114</sup>

Vyutpattivāda.

Gadādhara Bhaṭṭasārya offers a critical discussion on Apādānakāraṇa. He clarifies the meaning of Apādānakāraṇa with his original interpretation on it. At first, the philosopher interprets Apādānakāraṇa as *evanīsthābheda-pratīyogitāvachchedakībhūtakriyājanyavibhāgādayatva*.<sup>115</sup> But, he finds after a critical examination that the above interpretation is not an accurate one. He shows the inadequacy of it by citing two illustrations namely, (i) *vrkṣāt parṇam patati na bhūtalāt* and (ii) *vrkṣāt parṇam patati na parṇāt*.<sup>116</sup> Therefore, he finally reasserts the view of the grammarians on Apādānakāraṇa with his own interpretation on it. According to this interpretation, the meaning of the fifth inflexion which is *a* attached to a stem in the sense of the ablative case denotes *vibhāga* and *janaka* and the meaning of the stem denotes the relation of being a limit to *vibhāga* (separation).<sup>118</sup> By virtue of this relation, <sup>the</sup> separation which is qualified by the meaning of the stem is related to *janakatva* by the distinct relation of *nirūpītatva*.<sup>117</sup>

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\* Most probably, Gadādhara is ignorant of the views of Panini on the definition of Apādāna given by Pāṇini. He nowhere refers to his views in his discussions on Apādānakāraṇa.

the universal known as *dirghatva*, *taratva* and the like. *Sādhara* says that a word cannot act as the *avadhi* or the point of separation of a *jāti* or a universal. <sup>147</sup>

### Bhāttacintāmaṇi

Gāgā Bhaṭṭa defines *Apādānakāraka* as *parasamaveta-kriyājanayavibhāgāśrayatva* or the object which acts as the locus of the separation generated by the operation of another object. He says that the meaning which he presents in the definition follows from the Paninian rule *dhruvam apāye Apādānam* itself. He gives a suitable illustration of the definition, namely, *vrkṣāt parnam patati* and critically interprets<sup>it</sup> in order to give us a clear idea of the definition. He first discusses the meanings of the verb *patati* and then shows the relation of this verb with the term *vrkṣa* in the illustration. According to him, the verb denotes two distinct meanings. Sometimes, it denotes an operation which brings an object into a contact with the surface below and sometimes, it denotes an operation which separates an object from another object and brings it into a contact with the surface below. Gāgā Bhaṭṭa accepts the second meaning of the verb in the illustration. He says that the term *vrkṣa* in the illustration is related to the verb as the locus of the result namely, the

separation which is generated by the operational part of the verb but it is not the locus of the operational part. In this way, he presents a clear idea of the definition with the help of the illustration. The term *vrkṣa* in the illustration acts as a predicate of the operation and the result denoted by the verb. Gāgā Bhaṭṭa states that the other cases of *Apādāna* also are the predicates of the operation and the result denoted by the verb used with them. This is a new interpretation of the term *Apādāna* given by Pāṇini in the definition *dhruvam apāye Apādānam*.<sup>118</sup> Gāgā Bhaṭṭa does not accept the concept of ideal separation presented by the Bhāṣyakāra. He also opines that there is no secondary ablative case in Sanskrit grammar.<sup>119</sup>

The philosopher discusses two important views of the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā schools. He says that according to the Mīmāṃsakas the expression *arāṇā bibhēti* is incorrect. He also says that the Naiyāyikas consider the words *vyāghra* etc. in such expressions as *vyāghrād bibhēti* as cases of secondary ablative case only or they opine that the fifth inflexion used in such words is a case of *upapada vibhakti*.<sup>120</sup>

Reference note

1. Pā 1.4.24.
2. Pā 1.4.25-31.
3. Mbh p.248.
4. Idam tarhi vrksasya parṇam patati, kuḍyasya pindaḥ patatīti. Mbh. p.247.
5. Jha tāvat aśvat trastāt patita iti yat tad aśve aśvatvam .....tad dhruvam vivakṣitam. Ibid. p.249.
6. Ibid. p.249.
7. Ibid. 250.
8. Ibid. pp.250-251.
9. Ibid. pp.251-252.
10. Ibid. pp.252-253.
11. Katham upādhyāyād aśhiteiti?  
Apakrāmati tasmād adhyayanam .....santatavāt.  
Athavā jyotirvaḥ jñānāni bhavanti. Ibid. p.254.
12. Ibid. p.255.
13. Apakrānti.....athavānyāścānyāśca prādurbhavanti.  
Ibid. p.255.
14. Ibid. p.248.
15. Iha ca Sāṅkāsyaśekhyaḥ.....etat prayunkte.  
Ibid. p.248.
16. apādāha ityeva siddham.....anyā cānya ca prādurbhavati. Under Pā 2.3.28. Ibid. p.303.



17. Ayamarthah vyutpattimātram.....śvātvamevoocyate.  
Ibid. p. 249.
18. Śabdasya vyāñjakā.....santatānyucyante. Ibid.  
p. 254.
19. Kṣaṇikapakṣam dravyāntarārambhapakṣam vā pariṇāmapakṣam  
vā śrītyaitad uktam.....kāṛakārūpopagamāt. Ibid.  
p. 255.
20. Tato apāye yad anāviṣṭam tad apāye dhruvam ucyate.  
Ibid. p. 240.
21. Ibid. p. 248.
22. Īpsitasābdaḥ kriyāsābda āśriyate na tu ruḍhisābdaḥ.  
Ibid. p. 251.
23. Apāye yad udāsīnam calam vā yadi vā calam. Dhruvam  
evātedāvesāt tad Apadānam ucyate Vāk. sā. 140.
24. Patato dhruva evāśvo.....avadhītvam prṭhak prṭhak  
Ibid. sā. 141.
25. Ibid. sā. 139.
26. Ibid. sā. 147.
27. Ibid. sā. 146.
28. Ibid. sā. 146.
29. Ibid. sā. 136.
30. Ibid. pp. 340-341.
31. Ibid. p. 336.
32. Ibid. p. 345.
33. Ibid. p. 345.

34. Kās. pp.535-545.
35. Ibid. p.544.
36. Tasmāt pūrvasyāyaṃ prapañcaḥ evaṃ uttarepi yogāḥ pūrvasyaiva veditavyāḥ..... under <sup>Pa</sup>1.4.25, Ibid. p.539.
37. Antardhāvitī nimittasaptamīyam, Ibid. p.541.
38. Atha prakṛtigrāhaṇam kimarthaṃ?.....prakṛtigrāhaṇa tu sati sarvasyaiva kāraṇamātrasya bhavati, Ibid. p.544.
39. Pūrvasyāyaṃ prapañcaḥ under <sup>Pa</sup>1.4.25, Ibid. p.538.  
Ayamapi prapañco..... siddham, under 1.4.27.  
Ibid. p.540.  
Ayamapi prapañcaḥ, under <sup>Pa</sup>1.4.26, Ibid. p.542.
40. Nāyaṃ nimittāt karmayoge iti saptamī.....viśeṣasaptamyēṣā satsaptamī vā.....Ibid. p.541.
41. Bhāṣā. p.42.
42. Ibid. p.42.
43. BVV. pp.89-94.
44. Pr. kau. pp.425-429.
45. Apāya iti. Viśleṣo vibhāgaḥ.....tas-min sādhyā iti viśeṣasaptamī.....Yadyapi dhruvasabdo loke ekarūptam acaste dhruvam aya rūpamiti tathāpyapayam kativiseṣaṃ prati yā dhruvatopayujyate saivehopādīyate. Sa ca.....avadhibhāvaeva. Pr.kau. p.425 cf. Apāyaḥ viśleṣaḥ vibhāga ityarthah.....Sa cāvadhibhāva eva. Jinandrabuddhi. Kās. p.535.

Yad dhruvam avadhibhūtam iti.....Tathā cōktaṃ :

Apāye yad udāsī<sup>īnam</sup>ṇam.....Apādānamucyate iti.

Patato dhruva evāś<sup>ī</sup>va.....Kartṛtvañca prthak

prthak. Pr. kau. p.425.

Purvasyāyama prapañcaḥ.....Uttarepiyagāḥ pūrvasyaiva  
prapañcā veditavyāḥ under Pā 1.4.25. Ibid. p.426.

cf. Evaṃ tarhi pūrvasyāyama prapañcaḥ.....Evaṃ uttarepi  
yogāḥ pūrvasyaiva prapañcā veditavyāḥ. Jinendrabbuddhi.  
Kās. p.539.

46. Dhruvaṃ sthiraṃ prakṛtadhatūpāttagatyanāviṣṭatve sati  
tajjanyavibhāgāsrayaḥ. PMR. p.526.

47. EK. under Pā 1.4.24.

48. PMR. p.527.

49. Bhāṣyakārastu jugupsādīnaṃ.....Evaṃ uttarasūtrānyapi.  
Ibid. p.528.

50. Avadhiḥ pañcamyarthah. Apādane pañcami. Tacca.....  
avadhibhūtam iti bhāvaḥ. Uktañca Vākyapadīye : apāye  
yad udāsīnaṃ.....,prthak prthak. iti VBS. pp.178-179.

51. Evañca viślesahetukriyānāśrayatve sati viślesāśrayatvam  
phalitam. Ibid. p.179.

52. Kriyā cātra dhatvartho.....vrkṣād vastreṃ patatīti  
sangacchate. Ibid. p.180.

53. Ibid. p.184.

54. Ibid. pp.183-184.

55. Ibid. pp.178-184.
56. Pañcāmyā Apādānatvam arthah.....dhruvam apāya  
Apādānam iti sūtrāt. LMS. pp.1284-1285.
57. Ibid. p.1285.
58. Ibid. p.1287.
59. Ibid. pp.1289-1298.
60. Kalāpa kāraka. sū. 214, 215.
61. Ibid. p.190.
62. Janikartuḥ kāraṇam apyavadhireva.....tathā bhūkartuḥ  
prabhavo orthopyadhireva. Ibid. p.190.
63. Yatra tu.....evam Adhikarānasyāpīti. Ibid. p.190.
64. Ibid. p.191.
65. Yata ityavadhau pañcamī.....prapañcārtham idam  
ucyate. Ibid. p.193.
66. Avadhau pañcamī. Padārthāvadhoḥ pañcamī bhavati.  
Grāmād agacchati. Corebhyo bibhēti.....Adharmāt  
pramādyati. Cāndra pp.178-179.
- 67.(i) Calatprāgbhūrapādānam. SKS. kāraka. sū.26.  
Dhruvam apāya Apādānam Pā.1.4.24.
- (ii) Gurvādingarthādeḥ. SKS. kāraka. sū.28. Ākhyātopayoge  
Pā 1.4.29.
- (iii) Parājeḥ soḍham asakyaḥ. SKS. kāraka. sū. 30.  
Parājerasoḍhah Pā.1.4.26.
- (iv) Bhītrārthayor bhīhetuḥ. SKS. kāraka. sū.31.  
Bhītrārthānam bhayaḥetuḥ Pā 1.4.25.

- (v) Antardhyartham yedīyedarśanamicchati. SKS. kāṛaka. sū. 32.  
Antardhan yēnādarśanamicchati Pā 1.4.28.
- (vi) Vārenāder yannimittam SKS. kāṛaka. sū. 33.  
Vārenārthanam īpsitah Pā 1.4.27.
- (vii) Janyarthakartuḥ prakṛtiḥ SKS. kāṛaka. sū.34.  
Janikartuḥ prakṛtiḥ Pā 1.4.30.
- (viii) Bhuvā ādyopalambhasthānam SKS. kāṛaka. sū.35.  
Bhuvah prabhavaḥ Pā 1.4.31.
68. SKS. p.1014.
69. Yatascalatvam iha mukhyam gaunānce grhyate.....  
bhavati. Ibid. p.101.
70. Karamaṁ trividham.....nimittam kāraṇam. Ibid. p.1015.
71. Nanu caturvidhāḥ prāṇino jāyamaṇā bhavanti - jarāyujā,  
andajā, udbhijjā uṣmajāśca. Ibid. p.1015.
72. Jainendra. 1.2.109.
73. Dhīr buddhiḥ.....Dhruvam avicalam avadhibhūtam vā.  
Ibid. p.91.  
Also see dhiyāpāyasya viśeṣaṇam kim? adharmājjugupsate  
etc. Ibid. p.92.
74. Ibid. pp.91-92.
75. SS. 2.2.29.
76. Apāyāśca kāyasaṁsargaḥpūrvako buddhisāṁsargaḥpūrvako vā  
vibhāga ucyate. Ibid. p.75.

77. Ibid. p.75.
78. Tad etat tri vidham.....apekṣitakriyāñca. Ibid. p.75.
79. Ibid. p.75.
80. Yatopāya-bhījugupsā.....vāraṇam jam pī. kāraka.  
sū. 20.
81. Mugdha. p.73.
82. Apāyo viśleşah.....tridhāpādānamucyate. Ibid. p.74.
83. Viśleşāvadhau pañcamī. Viśleşe vibhāgastatra yo avadhīh  
sa caletayā acalatakayā vā vivakṣitastatrāpādāne pañcamī  
Sāra. p.85.
84. Bhayaḥetau pañcamī ca vaktavyā Sāra. sū.446, janikartuh. prakṛ. 21.  
Ibid. sū.480. and Vidyāsvikāre. Ibid. p.89.
85. Jāyamānasya kāryasyopādānam apādānasañjñam bhavati.  
Ibid. p.89.
86. apādīyate prthak kriyate yasmāt tad apādānam. SRC. p.115.
87. Buddhyā svarūpaṇa vā ekāśrayāt prthag bhavanamityarthah.  
Ibid. p.155.
88. Supadma. p.78.
89. Ibid. pp.78-80.
90. Ibid. p.78.
91. HNM. sūtras. 1026, 1028, 1029, 1030, 1031, 1032, 1033,  
1034, 1035, 1036, 1037, 1038.
92. Ibid. sū. 1036.
93. PR. Yato apāyādanarakṣā.....Apādānarakṣakam. Ibid.  
p.387.

94. Ibid. p.367.
95. Yato avadhibhūṭād apāyo vidhāgas tad - Apādānam.....  
dharmāt premādyati dharmam nānutiṣṭhati. Ibid. pp.357-359.
96. Kār. cak. p.74.
97. Evañ ca grāmādāgeccatītyādaṁ gamanādijanyavibhāgāsrayatvaṁ grāmāder apādānatvaṁ.....tad vibhagajenakakriyāsūnyam ityarthah. Ibid. pp.76-77.
98. Vastutastu.....dhāvato aśvāt patatītyādaṁ na kāpynupapattih. Ibid. pp.76-77.
99. Ibid. p.77.
100. Ibid. p.77.
101. Atra ca.....vrkṣaṁ tyajati khaga ityādaṁ vrkṣāder nāpādānatvaṁ. Ibid. p.75.
102. Ka cāivaṁ svamād vibhajate.....sakarmakadhātvarthasya vivekṣitatvāt. Ibid. p.78.
103. Ibid. pp.79-82.
104. Dhruvaṁ apāye Apādānamiti sūtram.....Parakīyakriyājanyavibhāgāsrayatvaṁ Apādānatvaṁ iti Naiyāyikalakṣaṇam  
EW. pp.55-56.
- 105.(1) Adhyayanāt parājayate chātra ityādaṁ pañcamyartho  
viśayatā. Ibid. p.59. cf. adhyayanāt parājayate bāla  
ityādaṁ pañcamyāḥ Karmaṭvaṁ.....arthāt Kār. cak.  
p.69.

- (11) Upādhyāyād antardhatte chātra ityatrāpi pañcamyā  
hetutvam.....SMJ. p.62. cf. Upādhyāyād  
antardhatta ityādaḥ.....pañcamyāḥ sambandhitvam  
.....Kār. cak. p.89.
106. SSP. kārika 89. Also : Kriyā dhātvarthah.....  
Apādānam ucyate. Ibid. p.293.
107. Apādānasābdastu tattatkarmānādhikaranatve sati tattat-  
karmajanyavibhāgāśraye śakta iti.....Ibid. pp.298-299.
108. Ibid. pp.297-298.
109. Na ca vṛkṣādīva.....1ṣṭatvāt. Ibid. p.299.
110. Ibid. p.299.
111. Ibid. p.299.
112. Ibid. p.299.
113. Ibid. p.300.
114. Ibid. pp.300-301.
- \* 115. VTP<sup>P 177</sup> pp.294-295.
- \* 116. Ibid.<sup>P 177</sup> pp.298-301.
- \* 117. Ibid. pp.301-302. → Atrāḥviḥvāgo janakatvance pañcamyāśch  
.....nirupitakavivāsa sambodha janakatvanyāḥ  
118. Apādānatvañca.....ceti nīkṛṣṇa. BCM, p.104. Ibid P 177
119. Evañ corād vyāghrād vibhetti.....mukhyamevāpādānatvam.  
Ibid. p.104.
120. Ibid. p.104.



## CHAPTER VII

### Adhikaraṇa

#### Adhikaraṇa in the Pāṇinian school

#### Pāṇini

Pāṇini defines Adhikaraṇa or the locative case as ādhāro Adhikaraṇam.<sup>1</sup> He means by the term ādhāra the locus or the substratum of an activity. Bhartṛhari shows that this substratum is always <sup>a remote</sup> ~~an indirect~~ one. Let us clarify the meaning of ādhāra with the help of an illustration; namely, Devadattaḥ sthālyāṁ odanaṁ pacati (i.e. Devadatta is cooking rice in a cooking pot). In this illustration, the agent Devadatta is the locus of the inner effort which expresses itself in the outer activity of the act of cooking. The result of the act of cooking belong to odana or the boiled rice and the vessel is the substratum of the rice which is being boiled. The vessel of cooking is indirectly related to the act of cooking or the result of the act of cooking through the medium of the rice being boiled and it will remain so till the act is accomplished. Hence, it is a case of ādhāra of the act of cooking. Similarly, when we say Rāmaḥ kate ṣṭe (Rāma is sitting on a mat), the mat is the substratum of the act of sitting through the medium of the agent of the act.

Patāñjali

Patāñjali explains the rule ādhāro Adhikaraṇam given by Pāṇini in a suggestive manner. He draws a contrast between the Paninian rules sādhakatamaṃ Karaṇam and ādhāro Adhikaraṇam. Pāṇini uses the taddhita suffix tamap to the stem sādha in the first sūtra. According to Patāñjali, the use of the suffix to the stem is significant. It indicates that when such a superlative suffix is not attached to a stem, it may denote both a primary and secondary sense. Now, in the rule ādhāro Adhikaraṇam, no superlative suffix is attached to the word ādhāra. Patāñjali suggests that the absence of the suffix indicates that it is applicable to both a primary and a secondary substratum or receptacle of an activity. Let us clarify the point with the help of two illustrations namely, tileṣu tailam and Gangāyān gāvaḥ. The first illustration indicates that the season seeds remains pervaded by oil. Thus, the term tila is a case of primary locative case in the illustration. But, the second illustration does not indicate such a sense. In spite of this difference, the rule ādhāro Adhikaraṇam covers both the illustrations.<sup>2</sup>

Patāñjali divides Adhikaraṇakāraka into three distinct groups namely, Aupaślesika, Vaisayika and Abhivṛtṭapaka.<sup>3</sup> The term Aupaślesika is derived from the term upaśleṣa

meaning contact. Patañjali gives two significant illustrations of *Āpaslesika Adhikarāṇa* namely, *māse dīyate* and *iko yan aci*. According to him, the word *māsa* (month) in the first illustration indicates a contact of the first day of the month with the last day of the last month,<sup>4</sup> while in the second illustration, there is a contact between *ik* (i.e. *i, u, ṛ, ḷ*) and *ac* (vowel) when there is sandhi between them.<sup>5</sup> He gives two appropriate illustrations of the *Abhi-vyāpaka* type of locative case. These illustrations are *tilaṣu tailam* and *dadhni sarpiḥ*. He neither defines nor does he illustrate the third type of *Adhikarāṇa*.<sup>6</sup>

### Kaiyaṭa

Kaiyaṭa primarily devotes himself to the job of clearly and critically interpreting the views of the *Bhāṣyakāra* on the locative case. We clearly notice it in his interpretation of the passage *yatra kṛtana ādhārāt* etc. of the *Bhāṣya* in which the *Bhāṣyakāra* presents the concepts of primary and secondary locative case.<sup>7</sup>

### Bhartrhari

Bhartrhari defines *Adhikarāṇakāraṇa* as <sup>a rāmoḥ</sup> an indirect locus of an activity. He says that an activity is directly

located either on the subjective case or on the objective case. The locative case holds either of them and thus, it becomes an <sup>a remote</sup> indirect locus of the activity located on them.<sup>8</sup> This is a very important original interpretation of the definition of the locative case given by Pāṇini.

Patañjali divides Adhikaraṇa into Upasāṅga, Vaisayika and Abhivyāpaka. Bhartṛhari clearly shows that the sense of upasāṅga is present in all these three types of the locative case.<sup>9</sup> According to the grammarian, the term upasāṅga denotes sambandha or a relation. He says that the container and the contained must be related to each other. The relation, however, may vary. That is why, varieties of containers are shown in the grammatical literature.

Let us now clarify the view of Bhartṛhari referred to above. When we say *tilaṃ tailam*, it means that tila or oil inheres in all parts of tila or sesamum. Thus, there is the relation of inherence (*samavāya*) between the container and the contained. Again, when we say *kate āste Devadattaḥ*, it means that a part of Devadatta comes into a contact with a part of the mat. The relation which holds between Devadatta and the mat is that of contact. Similarly, when we use the expression *ākāśe śakunayḥ* (there are birds in the sky) it indicates that a part of the sky is the container of the birds. In this case, the speaker imagines a part of the sky and this part of the sky is actually the conventional part

of the space. There is a contact between it and the birds. The speaker imagines that this conventional part of space or sky being stationary it sustains the birds spreading their wings in it and protects them from falling down.

The last illustration of the locative case is a case of the *Vaiṣayika* type. Now, a question arises : "How does *Vaiṣayika* come under *upasāṅga*?" Here, the relation is neither contact nor inherence in the proper sense of these two terms. Therefore, the ancient thinkers have accepted a special kind of relation in this case. According to them, *Vaiṣayika* denotes either a place of locality or the condition of staying of any animate or inanimate being. Let us express the meanings of the term *Vaiṣayika* by citing a few illustrations. At first, let us take the illustration *gurau-vasati*. It indicates that a particular disciple lives in the residence of his preceptor in order to carry on his studies under his guidance. Therefore, this residence is conditional. His existence means here his dependence on his preceptor. This is another kind of relation between the teacher and the taught. Let us now take a second illustration, that is, *jale matsyā vidyante* (i.e. fish dwell in the water). The water is the locality of different types of fish and thus, it is another case of *Vaiṣayika*. There exists the *ādhāra* and the *ādheya* relation between the fish and the water in the illustration. We have already discussed the illustration

ākāśe śakunāyaḥ santi clearly. The speaker means by it that the birds belong to a part of the sky. It indicates the relation of viśaya between the birds and the sky.

The above views are very clearly presented by Halārāja in his commentary.<sup>10</sup>

Bhartrhari is the first Sanskrit grammarian who rightly interprets the term ādhāra in the Paninian rule ādhāro Adhikarṇas as an indirect locus of an action. He also correctly shows that there is a common bond among all the cases of Adhikarṇa and this bond is upasāṅga or a relation holding between the locative case and the object located upon. These two are his very important original contributions to the concept of the locative case. His first view is very popular and it is accepted by the grammarians coming after him.

#### Halārāja

The celebrated commentator Halārāja clearly explains the definition of Adhikarṇa given by Bhartrhari. He selects two examples of Adhikarṇa namely, kaṭe āste and sthālyam pacati in order to clarify the view that Adhikarṇa'kāraka is <sup>a temple</sup> an indirect locus of an action through the medium of either the subjective case or the objective case. In the example kaṭe āste, the agent or the subjective case (not

shown in the sentence) is the direct locus of the act of sitting. The mat (kata) holds the agent and thus, it sustains the activity which is located in him indirectly through the medium of him. Similarly, in the second illustration, the term sthāli (cooking pot) is an <sup>अव्यक्ता</sup> indirect locus of the act of cooking through the medium of the object of cooking. In the above illustrations, the mat and the cooking pot are cases of ādhāra only in such a sense. Helārāja expresses the above idea as Kartrkarmadhāraṇāt tatsamavetāyāṁ kriyāyām upakāraṇaṁ Adhikaraṇaṁ pāramparyeṇa. He says that the locus of an action does not necessarily means a direct locus. Further, a condition of an action may be an indirect one. Therefore, an <sup>अव्यक्ता</sup> indirect locus of an action can be a regular case of a kāraka.<sup>11</sup>

Helārāja clarifies the view that the sense of upas'leṣa is present in all the illustrations of Adhikaraṇa by citing a few appropriate illustrations. He gives us an appropriate idea of the Vaiśyika type of Adhikaraṇa in his discussion on the above view. Jinendrabuddhi gives two illustrations of Vaiśyika Adhikaraṇa, namely, garau vasati and Gaṅgāyān ghoṣaḥ. Helārāja accepts the first illustration as a case of Vaiśyika Adhikaraṇa. But, he says that there is a sense of ideal contact in the illustration between the preceptor and the disciple. He presents a similar illustration to the second one of Jinendrabuddhi namely, Gaṅgāyān

gāvah. This illustration is taken from the Bhāṣya. He says that it is a clear case of *Aupaślesika*, because there is a clear contact between the river Ganges and its bank and the illustration indicates that the cows dwell on the bank of the river.<sup>12</sup>

### Kāśikā

The *Vṛttikāra* reiterates the view of Bhartṛhari that *Adhikaraṇa* *Kāraka* denotes an <sup>a tamolā</sup> indirect locus of an action. He says that the subject and the object are the direct locus of an action. *Adhikaraṇakaraka* or the locative case contains either of these cases and thus, it becomes an <sup>a tamolā</sup> indirect locus of the action located on them through the medium of them.<sup>13</sup>

### Jinendrabuddhi

The *Vṛttikāra* presents in a suggestive manner the idea that the locative case plays only a subordinate role to that of the subjective case or the objective case in a sentence. The celebrated commentator Jinendrabuddhi independently interprets this suggestive idea of the *Vṛttikāra* in an exhaustive manner. He says that Pāṇini does not use the superlative suffix *tanap* with the term *ādhāra* in the rule *ādhāro Adhikaraṇam*. Therefore, the term *ādhāra* should be



taken only in a sense which denotes its subordinate place. He clearly points out that the principal locus of an action is either the subject or the object but never a locative case.<sup>14</sup>

Now, a question arises "How is an ādhāra in the above sense a case at all?" We can give the following reply to this question. The locative case invariably acts the locus of either the subjective case or the objective case in every sentence. It is a fact that these two cases are the direct locus of an activity. But, neither the operation nor the result of the act is possible without the locative case. In other words, the act is impossible without the help of the locative case. Let us take an example in order to clarify our point. When we say Devadatta odanaṁ pacati, Devadatta becomes the locus of the operational part of the act of cooking and the boiled rice acts as the locus of the result called viklitti. But, the agent Devadatta must remain in particular locus such as the earth in order to accomplish the act. Similarly, the cooking pot is essentially necessary for accomplishing the act of cooking. The cooking pot must contain the unboiled rice for a definite period and only through this process, we attain the intended result. Thus, the locative case is an essential factor in the accomplishment of an act. Hence, it is treated as a kāraka.

Jinendrabuddhi says that the subject and the object are the direct locus of an action and hence, the definition *ādharo Adhikaraṇam* should be applicable to these two cases alone and not to the so-called locative case which is only <sup>a remote</sup> an indirect locus of an action. But, Pāṇini himself suggests by using the suffix *tanap* in the word *sādhakatana* in his definition of the instrumental case that the term *ādharo* in the rule *ādharo Adhikaraṇam* denotes a secondary locus. Moreover, the definitions of *Kartā* and *Karma* are given by Pāṇini after the definition of the locative case and these definitions convey some specified meanings. Therefore, the question of the locative case occupying their place does not arise at all.<sup>15</sup>

The celebrated commentator classifies *Adhikaraṇa-kāraṇa* into three sub-classes namely (1) *Upasālesika*, (2) *Vaiśayika* and (3) *Abhivyāpaka*. In this classification, he follows the tradition of the *Mahābhāṣya* and does not subscribe to the view of Bhartṛhari. He says that *Abhivyāpaka Adhikaraṇa* is the inherent cause of an object. As for example, *taila* or oil inheres in *śaśum*. In every case of *Abhivyāpaka* the relation of inherence is absolutely necessary. He identifies *upasālesika* with *samyoga* or contact. Therefore, *kate āste* (i.e. he is sitting on a mat) is a typical example of *Upasālesika Adhikaraṇa*. Jinendrabuddhi does not define *Vaiśayika* appropriately. It has been explained by modern logicians

after much progress of thought. In the explanation of the term *Vaiśayika Adhikaraṇa*, he shows that *Gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ* is a case of this type of the locative case.<sup>16</sup> It is not clear how this illustration comes under *Vaiśayika*.

#### Haradatta

Haradatta briefly but clearly explains the views of the *Vṛttikāra* on the Paninian rule *ādharo Adhikaraṇam*. He reiterates the main views of Jinendrabuddhi on the locative case in his explanation.<sup>17</sup>

#### Puruṣottama

Puruṣottama interprets the Paninian rule *ādharo Adhikaraṇam* very briefly. The interpretation does not give us a clear idea of the term *Adhikaraṇa*. But, the grammarian presents two suitable illustrations of *Adhikaraṇa* from which we can understand the meaning of it.<sup>18</sup>

#### Sṛṣṭidharācārya

Sṛṣṭidhara states that the term *Adhikaraṇa* denotes the direct locus of the agent or the object and thus, it is <sup>as a result</sup> an indirect locus of an action which is contained by these two cases.<sup>19</sup>

The commentator divides Adhikaraṇakāraṇa into three sub groups. He rigidly follows the Bhāṣyakāra in dividing the kāraṇa. He gives us a clear idea of these three sub-groups.<sup>20</sup>

Śrītiḥvara discusses the concept of secondary Adhikaraṇa appropriately.<sup>21</sup>

### Rāmacandra

Rāmacandra presents the traditional meaning of the term Adhikaraṇa in his interpretation of the Paninian rule adhāro Adhikaraṇam. He, however, presents this meaning in a suggestive manner.<sup>22</sup>

The grammarian classifies Adhikaraṇa kāraṇa into four sub-groups namely, Anpaślesika, Sāmīpika, Viśaya and Vyāpta.<sup>23</sup> The terms Viśaya and Vyāpta denote the Vaisayika and the Abhiwyāpaka types of the locative case already discussed by us. The Sāmīpika type of the locative case is a new type which is accepted for first time by Rāmacandra. The term sāmīpika is derived from the word samīpa meaning nearness. Rāmacandra gives a suitable illustration of the Sāmīpika Adhikaraṇa namely, nadyām āste.<sup>24</sup> The term nadyām in it denotes on the bank of the river. The bank of the river indicates the nearness of the river. It shows that the term sāmīpika is correctly coined by Rāmacandra. The

expression nadyām āste conveys the sense of a secondary locative case like the expressions Gangāyām ghoṣaḥ, Gangāyām gāvaḥ etc. Rāmacandra finds that nadyām āste etc. are not covered by any of the three sub-groups of the locative case given by Patañjali. Moreover, they give us an idea of the nearness to the object in which the sign of the locative case is actually used. Therefore, he accepts a fourth ~~dis-~~ distinct sub-groups for such cases.

#### Viṭṭhalācārya

Viṭṭhala appropriately explains the concept of Adhikaraṇa presented by Rāmacandra in his commentary on the rule ādhāro Adhikaraṇam. He shows that the grammarian follows the author of the Vākyapadya in his interpretation.<sup>25</sup>

Viṭṭhalācārya explains the terms Aupaślesika etc. very clearly. He says that the illustration nadyām āste is neither a case of Aupaślesika nor a case of Viśaya, and hence, it is placed under a separate sub-group by Rāmacandra. The grammarians like Halārāja etc. express an entirely different view from that of Viṭṭhala regarding such instances of the locative case. Viṭṭhala reiterates the view of Jinendrabuddhi that a person who keeps a person under his control also becomes a locus of him.<sup>26</sup>

Vitthala mainly devotes himself to the very responsible job of clarifying and justifying the views of Rāmacandra instead of presenting any new idea of Adhikaraṇa kāraka.

### Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita

Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita clearly presents the well known traditional view that the term Adhikaraṇa denotes an <sup>A remote</sup> indirect locus of an action in his interpretation of the Paninian sūtra ādharo Adhikaraṇam. He says that Adhikaraṇakāraka acts as a direct locus of the subjective case and the objective case. But, these two cases invariably possess some activity. Thus, Adhikaraṇakāraka or the locative case becomes an indirect locus of this activity through the medium of either of these two cases.<sup>27</sup> If we closely examine the interpretation of Bhaṭṭoji, it appears to us as a mere clarification of the suggestive sense of the vṛtti of Rāmacandra on the said sūtra of Pāṇini.

Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita classifies the locative case into Aupaślēṣika, Abhivyaṇaka and Vaiṣayika. He rigidly follows the Bhāṣyakāra in the classification.<sup>28</sup>

Kaundabhaṭṭa

Kaundabhaṭṭa says that the term Adhikaraṇa denotes āśraya or ādhāra (locus). According to him, this is the meaning of the Pāṇinian rule ādhāro Adhikaraṇam. He opines that the seventh inflexion is used in the locative in this very sense.<sup>29</sup> He clarifies the meaning of the term āśraya. He states that the term āśraya in the present context denotes the locus of an action. But, such an interpretation is applicable only to the subjective case or the objective case in the proper sense of the term because, an action is invariably located in either of them. Kaundabhaṭṭa accepts this view and says that the locative case is also another locus of the action but it is an <sup>a remote</sup> indirect locus of the action through the medium of either the subject or the object. He refers to the kārīkā of Bhartrhari namely, Kartr-karmavyavahitām etc. in order to justify his view.<sup>30</sup> In fine, Kaundabhaṭṭa also does not offer any new concept of the locative case.

He classifies the locative case into Aupaślesika, Vaiśayika and Abhivyāpaka. This shows clearly that he follows the Bhāṣyakāra in his classification of the case and rejects the fourth sub-group of the case namely Śāṃpika presented by Rāmācandra. He cites four suitable illustrations of the sub-groups of the locative case.<sup>31</sup>

### Harivallabha

Harivallabha renders a very valuable service to us by clearly explaining the views of Kaundabhatta on the locative which are presented by him primarily in the language of the Nyāya school.<sup>32</sup>

The commentator briefly but clearly discusses the view of the Naiyāyikas on the relation which holds between the locative case and the object located upon.<sup>33</sup>

### Nāgeśa

Nāgeśa says that Adhikaraṇa Kāraka denotes the locus of the śakti known as Adhikaraṇatva.<sup>34</sup> According to him, the seventh inflexion which is used in Adhikaraṇakāraka denotes this particular sense.<sup>35</sup> We all know that Nāgeśa treats śakti and its locus as non-different in his concept of kāraka. Thus, Adhikaraṇa and Adhikaraṇatva are identical in sense in his view. He gives us a clear idea of Adhikaraṇatva. Like his predecessors, he also critically interprets the Paninian rule ādhāro Adhikaraṇam for this purpose. He reiterates the well known view of Bhartṛhari on Adhikaraṇakāraka in this interpretation.<sup>36</sup> Thus, Nāgeśa, the last statwart in the field of Sanskrit grammar also follows tradition in the concept of the locative case presented by him.



Nāgeśa says that time is the direct locus of an action. But, because there is no hard and fast rule that the locus of an action as denoted by the term *ādhāra* in the Paninian rule must be a direct one, even an <sup>a remote</sup> indirect locus is readily acceptable to us. Moreover, if time is accepted as the locus of an action, it will be a case of *Kartā*.<sup>37</sup>

The grammarian accepts the classification of *Adhikarāṇa* given by Patañjali. But, he reiterates the view of Bhartrhari that the sense of *upaślessa* or a certain relation is common to all the sub-groups of it. He cites a few familiar illustrations of them such as *kaṭe āste*, *tilaṣu tailam*, *khe śakunayaḥ*, ~~ataḥ~~ *guraṇa vaṣati* etc. and critically interprets them in order to clarify the view of Bhartrhari. He strictly follows Helārāja in these interpretations.<sup>38</sup>

### Adhikarāṇa in non-Paninian schools

#### Kalāpa

Sarvaramā considers the definition *ādhāro Adhikarāṇam* given by Panini as the appropriate definition of *Adhikarāṇa*. But, he presents it in a new form as *ya ādhāras tad Adhikarāṇam*.<sup>39</sup>

### Durgasiṅha

Durgasiṅha<sup>\*</sup> reiterates the view of Bhartṛhari that Adhikaraṇakāraka is <sup>a remote</sup> an indirect locus of an action which is possessed by the subject and object and thus contributes to the accomplishment of it.<sup>40</sup>

The commentator classifies Adhikaraṇa kāraka into four sub-classes namely, Aupaslesika, Vaisayika, Abhivyāpaka and Sāṃpika.<sup>41</sup> We have shown that Rāmacandra, the author of the Prakriyakaumudī also classifies the locative case in the same manner. Durgasiṅha discusses in this connection the view of his celebrated predecessor Bhartṛhari that the sense of upaslesha or a specified relation between the locus and the object located upon is common to all the cases of Adhikaraṇa and hence, the classification of it is immaterial.<sup>42</sup> But, the grammarian thinks that the classification is essentially necessary.<sup>43</sup> He explains the terms Aupaslesika etc. and gives a few suitable illustrations of the different sub-classes of Adhikaraṇa. According to him, Gangāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ is a case of Sāṃpika.<sup>44</sup>

### Trilocana

Trilocana reiterates the traditional view of the grammatical school that the locative case is <sup>a remote</sup> an indirect

locus of an action.<sup>45</sup> The grammarian accepts only three types of locative case namely, *Āpaslesika*, *Valṣayika* and *Abhivyaṇṣika*.<sup>46</sup>

### Suśeṇācārya

Suśeṇācārya presents some new ideas in his commentary on the definition of *Adhikarṇa* given by Sarvararmā. He does not subscribe to the view that the locative case is invariably an indirect locus of an action. He shows that there are such usages as *Calitre sthitiḥ* or *gale baddhvā gaur nīyate* in which the locative case acts as a direct locus of the action. Therefore, even a direct locus of an action may be the locative case.<sup>47</sup> But, we cannot subscribe to such a view of the grammarian. He himself states that in the first sentence, the verb *asti* may be supplied<sup>48</sup> and this appears to us a correct view. It shows that the locative case is only an indirect locus of the act of being. Further, such expressions as *Calitre sthitiḥ* in which there is a direct relation between the locus and the object located upon are generally not used in the Sanskrit literature. Again, in the sentence *gale baddhvā gaur nīyate*, there is only an indirect relation between the cow and the act of tying through the medium of the rope. It is impossible to locate the act of tying on the bare neck of the cow without the help of a rope.

Suśeṣa accepts the view of Trilocana that there are only three types of locative case namely, Aupaślesika, Vaisayika and Abhiwyāpaka. He rejects the Sāṃpika type because, it is covered by the Aupaślesika type. According to him, the seventh inflexion used in the so called Sāṃpika type of the locative case primarily indicates nearness and there is no scope for lakṣaṇā in it. Therefore, it is included in Aupaślesika itself. He clearly explains the essential nature of the remaining types of the locative case.<sup>49</sup>

Suśeṣācārya is the first Sanskrit grammarian who discusses the relation of negation and its <sup>vanvāṇā</sup> indirect locus. The earlier grammarians do not consider the case of negation in their concepts of the locative case. They always show either a relation of contact or a relation of inherence between the locative case and the object which is located upon it. But, such a relation does not hold between negation and the locative case. This is clearly explained by the Naiyāyikas like Bhavananda and his followers. Let us clarify the point with the help of an example, that is, bhutale ghaṭābhāvaḥ (i.e. there is the negation of the jar on the earth). There is neither the relation of contact nor the relation of inherence in it between the jar and the negative of the jar because, such relations are possible only between two substances or a substance and its <sup>a</sup> quality.<sup>50</sup> The Naiyāyikas discover a different kind of relation between the

ādhāra and the ādheya in such instances of the locative case. Suśeṇācārya says that such cases of the locative case are the examples of the Vaiṣayika type in the primary sense. He explains the term Vaiṣayika appropriately in order to justify it. The term Vaiṣayika is derived from the word viśaya. Jinendrabuddhi explains the term Viśaya as ananyatrabhāva. Suśeṇa clarifies the meaning of ananyatrabhāva<sup>50</sup> not covered by the relation of contact or inherence.<sup>51</sup>

#### Cāndra

Candragomī uses the term ādhāra for Adhikaraṇa-kāraka. He does not define ādhāra nor does he clarify the meaning of it.<sup>52</sup>

The grammarian accepts four types of ādhāra or Adhikaraṇa namely, Aupaślesika, Vaiṣayika, Abhivyāpaka and Sāṃpika. He does not mention these names. But, it is clear from the illustrations given by him. According to him, the term adhīti in the sentence adhīti vyākaraṇe is also a case of the locative case.<sup>53</sup>

#### Śrīkaṭtasāra

Kramadīśvara defines Adhikaraṇakāraka as Vaiṣayikādyadhikaraṇam.<sup>54</sup> It is clear from the definition that the

grammarian gives a description rather than a definition of the term. The expression *Vaiṣayikādi* apparently means *Vaiṣayika*, *Abhivyāpaka* etc. But, a problem arises in this case also. According to *Rāmacandra*, *Durgasiddha* etc. there are four sub-classes of the locative case. We do not understand clearly from the definition whether *Kramadīśvara* means three sub-classes of the locative case or four subclasses of it.

#### Jumaranandi

The commentator *Jumaranandi* says that the expression *Vaiṣayikādi* means the three types of the locative case namely, *Vaiṣayika*, *Āpaslesika* and *Abhivyāpaka*. He does not accept the fourth type of the locative case called *Sāmpika*. According to him, it is a case of *Āpaslesika* itself.<sup>56</sup>

#### Goyīcandra

*Goyīcandra* explains the term *Adhikaraṇa* appropriately. He shows that it is an <sup>arimāli</sup> ~~in~~ <sup>small</sup> ~~in~~ <sup>locus</sup> ~~locus~~ of an act.<sup>56</sup> He follows *Bhartrhari* in this explanation. According to him, *Gangāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ, śūgulyagre kṛṣīṭam* (i.e. there are a hundred elephants in the place indicated by the finger), are examples of the *Āpaslesika* type of the locative case. He says that the terms *Gangā* etc. in these illustrations denote a secondary sense.<sup>57</sup>

Jainendra

The author of the Jainendra follows Pāṇini to a great extent in defining Adhikaraṇakāśka. He defines the term as ādhāro Adhikaraṇah.<sup>58</sup>

Abhayanandi

Abhayanandi explains the above definition in the most exhaustive manner. The commentator says that the term ādhāra in the definition denotes a secondary locus of an action. He reiterates the view of the Vṛttikāra that the locative case acts as a direct locus of either the subject or the object and through the medium of them it becomes an indirect locus of the action located in these two cases. He accepts the view of Jinendrabuddhi that the suffix tatap used by Pāṇini in the rule indicates that even a secondary locus of an action can be the locative case.<sup>59</sup> As well all know, these are not the original views of Jinendrabuddhi. But, the grammarian has an important original contribution to the concept of the locative case. He says that sometimes, the direct locus of an action namely, the subject and the object also become the locative case. He presents two appropriate illustrations of it.<sup>60</sup>

Abhayānandi accepts only the three sub-classes of the locative case given by the Bhāgyakāra. According to him, Gangāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ and guraḥ vasati are cases of Vaiṣayika Adhikarāṇa.<sup>61</sup>

### Sabdānuśāsana

Hāmacandra accepts the definition of the locative case offered by Pāṇini. But, he interprets the term ādhāra in the definition before presenting it in his grammar.<sup>62</sup>

The grammarian classifies the locative case into six distinct types namely, Vaiṣayika, Aupaśleṣika, Abhivyaṅga, Sāmīpyaka, Waimittika and Aupaśārika. According to him, yuddhe sannhyate, śaradī puṣpanti saptaśchadāḥ etc. are cases of Waimittika while angulyaḥ karīṣatam, sa me muṣṭinādhye tiṣṭhati etc. are cases of Aupaśārika.<sup>63</sup>

### Mudhabodha

Bopadeva substitutes the term Adhikarāṇa by a new technical term namely, da in his grammar. He defines da as kālabbhāvādhāra.<sup>64</sup> The definition shows that the term da indicates time (kāla) and action (bhāva) also apart from ādhāra or locus which stands for Adhikarāṇa Kāraka.



The author of the *Mugdhabodha* classifies the locative case into four sub-classes namely, *āpaslesika*, *Vaiṣayika*, *Abhivyāpaka* and *Sāṃpika*.<sup>65</sup>

#### Durgadāsa Vidyāvāgīśa

Durgadāsa Vidyāvāgīśa shows that the term *ādhāra* denotes its etymological meaning namely, *ādhriyate padārtho yasmin*.<sup>66</sup> But, he does not clarify it. It has been already accepted by the grammarians that the term *ādhāra* indicates an indirect locus of an action. The commentator does not discuss it in his interpretation of the term.

#### Rāma Tarkavāgīśa

Rāma Tarkavāgīśa reiterates the view of Bhartṛhari that the locative case acts as a locus of an action only indirectly through the medium of *Kartā* or *Karma*.<sup>67</sup>

He gives us a clear idea of the different types of the locative case.<sup>68</sup>

#### Sārasvata

The author of the *Sārasvata* accepts the Paninian rule *ādhāro Adhikaraṇam*. He says that the seventh inflexion

is used in the sense of ādhāra and then explains ādhāra as ādhāro nārma Adhikaraṇam.<sup>69</sup>

The grammarian classifies Adhikaraṇa into six distinct sub-classes namely, Aupaślesika, Sāṃpika, Abhivyāpaka, Vaisayika, Naimittika and Aupaśārika. This classification is exactly the same as that of Hemacandra. He illustrates these sub-classes with appropriate examples. He gives a new example of Sāṃpika namely, vate suśerate gāvah.<sup>70</sup> He says that according to some grammarians there are three sub-divisions of Aupaślesika also. They are ekādeśavṛtti, abhivyāpyavṛtti and vyangyavṛtti.<sup>71</sup>

### Candrakīrti

Candrakīrti says for the first time that Adhikaraṇakāraka is an indirect locus of an action which belongs to the agent.<sup>72</sup> He does not refer to the objective case in his interpretation of the term. The author of the Sārasvata does not present a single illustration in which the locative case is shown as the locus of an objective case. Probably for this reason, Candrakīrti thinks that the locative case is not the locus of the objective case according to the author of the Sārasvata.

Candrakīrti explains the terms Aupaślesika, Vaisayika etc. very clearly.<sup>73</sup>

Rāmāstrama

Rāmāstrama accepts the six types locative case presented by the author of the *Sārasvata*.<sup>74</sup>

Padmanābha

Padmanābha chooses the Paninian definition *ādhāro Adhikaraṇam* as the definition of the locative case in his grammar.<sup>75</sup>

Viṣṇumīśra

Viṣṇumīśra clearly explains the above definition. But, he reiterates the traditional views in this explanation.<sup>76</sup>

The commentator accepts only three types of locative case namely, *Apaslesika*, *Vaisayika* and *Abhivyāpaka*. He shows that *aṅgulyagre karīṣaṭam* is a case of the first type of the locative case.<sup>77</sup>

Harināmāṇḍa

Jīvaśwāmī defines *Adhikaraṇa* as *Kartrkarmaṇor ādhāro Adhikaraṇam*.<sup>78</sup> It shows that the grammarian follows Pāṇini in his definition. But, he gives us a clear idea of the term *ādhāra* in the Paninian rule in the definition.

The grammarian classifies Adhikaraṇa into Aupaś-lesika, Sāmīpika and Vyāpta.<sup>79</sup> He does not accept the Vaiśa-yika type of the locative case which is so famous in Sanskrit grammar. The reason for this is not clear to us.

### Pravocaratnamālā

Puruṣottama Vidyāvāgīśa defines Adhikaraṇa by the very definition of Pāṇini on the term.<sup>80</sup>

He classifies Adhikaraṇakāraka into four sub-groups namely, Samavāyi, Saṃyogi, Viśaya and Aupaśārika.<sup>81</sup> He further classifies the first two sub-groups into Abhivyāpta and Anabhivyāpta. According to him, such illustrations of the locative case as tīleṣu tailaṃ and dugdhe navañītaṃ belong to the Abhivyāpta type of Saṃyogi.<sup>82</sup> This shows that he accepts the relation of contact in such illustrations between the locative case and the object located on.

### Adhikaraṇa in philosophical schools

#### Kārikacakra

Bhavananda Siddhāntavāgīśa presents an illuminating discussion on the locative case. He throws new light on the relation between the locus and the object located. The philo-

sopher very clearly shows that the old ideas regarding the relation holding between them are not scientific. He presents an entirely new idea of Adhikarana and ādheyatva.

The grammarians show that there is either the relation of contact or the relation of inherence between the locative case and the object that is located on it. Bhavānanda critically examines the standpoint of the grammarians and finds that this is wrong. He refers to the case of a badara fruit being contained by a bowl in this connection. According to the grammarians, there is the relation of contact between the badara and the bowl. Bhavānanda rightly points out that a contact is a bipartite affair. If the contact between the badara and the bowl is accepted as the medium of their relation, in that case, even the fruit may also be a case of Adhikarana. But, such a view is absurd.<sup>83</sup> Similarly, the relation of inherence also cannot be the medium of the relation between the locative case and the object located. Bhavānanda clearly states that the relation of inherence is confined to <sup>substance</sup> quality, action, and universal (jāti) <sup>and viśeṣa</sup>. But, it is never related to abhāva or (negation) <sup>and</sup> samavāya <sup>and viśeṣa</sup>. Therefore, when we say bhūtale ghaṭābhāvaḥ (i.e. there is the negation of the jar on the ground), it does not indicate that there is the relation of inherence between the locus and the located.<sup>84</sup> It goes without saying that the medium

of relation between the locus and the located in such cases is not the relation of contact because such a relation is possible only between two substances.

Some scholars anticipate the above objections against the view of the grammarians. Therefore, they define Adhikaranatva as the *apekṣanīyatva* for the origination, <sup>of an object</sup> the existence and <sup>the</sup> knowledge of an object. The term *apekṣanīyatva* denotes that which is <sup>invariably</sup> ~~(essentially)~~ necessary. Bhavānanda explains it appropriately. He says that for the origination of something, the inherent cause (*samavāyi kāraṇa*) is necessary. Again, for the existence of a thing such as a jar, the earth is necessary, and for the knowledge of a universal etc. whatever is inherently related to it is necessary. In the case of *abhāva* and *samavāya*, that which is related to them through the relation of *svarūpa* is necessary for their knowledge. Thus, the things which are shown as *apekṣanīya* or <sup>invariably</sup> necessary in the above cases are the locative case.

There are some other thinkers who opine that the locative case is a concrete object which is related to another object through the relation of contact and resists it from falling down.

Bhavānanda finds that the above definitions are not acceptable to him. He shows that according to the first definition, the sense of the locative case differs in each

case discussed by him. It is not possible for us to frame a common concept of the locative case when a number of senses as shown by him are indicated by it. Further, when the sense of *apakṣaṇīyatva* is accepted, the definition of the locative case becomes a gratuitous one. The second definition again, is not applicable to *abhava*, *samavāya* etc.<sup>84</sup>

It is for the above reasons, Bhavaṇanda Siddhānta-vāgīśa states that there is the *avarūpa sambandha* or the relation known as *avarūpa* between *ādharma* and *ādheya*. There is no equivalent term in the English literature of *avarūpa sambandha*. It may be explained as an aspect of the container and the contained acting as a certain relation with each other. We can roughly express it as one-term relation. The existence of *avarūpasambandha* is evident to our experience. We cannot deny the existence of *Adhikarāṇatva* and *ādheyatva*. But, we cannot explain it following the footsteps of the earlier thinkers. *Adhikarāṇatva* and *ādheyatva* can be explained as particular types of *avarūpasambandha* and nothing else. This is the sum and substance of Bhavaṇanda's contention.<sup>85</sup>

Let us now clarify it by means of a few illustrations. When there is a jar on a particular spot, the spot is the *Adhikaraṇa* or the locus of the jar. The spot is not a case of *Adhikaraṇa* in its absolute sense. It is a case of *Adhikaraṇa* only in terms of the presence or absence of the jar. When the jar is present on the spot, it is *Adhikaraṇa*.

Again, when it is absent from the spot, it becomes equally a case of Adhikarana kāśka in relation to the negation of the jar. We express these two ideas as bhutale ghaṭo vidyate and bhutale ghaṭābhāvo vidyate. The term bhutala in the above sentence is a case of Adhikarana neither by dint of the relation of contact nor by dint of the relation of inherence with the jar. The reason for this is already clear to us. Bhavānanda holds that if we accept Adhikaranatva as svarūpasambandha, we can explain it very correctly. We have explained svarūpasambandha as a particular aspect of the container. It is through the medium of this aspect, the particular spot on which the jar exists acts as the locus of the jar. It can act as a locative case to some other object also by means of the same svarūpasambandha. Like Adhikaranatva, ādheyatva is also nothing but the svarūpasambandha according to Bhavānanda. We can justify this view also of the philosopher. We may place the jar referred to above in the water or on a hook in the wall or on some other object. In that case also, it will remain a case of ādheya as before. Similarly, the negative of the jar is also a case of ādheya. Now, if we consider all these cases and form a general concept of ādheyatva, we shall see that it is also an independant concept. It may be explained only if it is taken in the sense of svarūpasambandha, that is, it is an aspect of ādheya itself.



Bhavananda Siddhāntavāgīśa clearly shows that Adhikaranatva and ādheyatva are not related to each other. He states that if we try to show such a relation between the two, the fallacy of mutual dependence is inevitable.<sup>86</sup>

### Sāraṇī

Jayakṛṣṇa presents a brief discussion on the locative case. He accepts the meaning of the term Adhikaraṇa given by Bhartṛhari in his Vākyapadīya. He says that this meaning follows from the Paninian rule adharo adhikaraṇam itself and it is accepted by the logicians.<sup>87</sup>

### Śabdasaṃskṛti-prakāśikā

Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra accepts the new concept of Adhikaranatva presented by his predecessor Bhavananda Siddhāntavāgīśa and clarifies it with the help of an illustration. He first defines Adhikaraṇa kāraṇa and then shows with the help of a very systematic discussion that Adhikaranatva is nothing but a relation known as svarūpasambandha. According to him, the meaning of the seventh inflexion which is related to the meaning of the root in a sentence is Adhikaraṇakāraṇa. He says that in the sentence grāme gantā, the meaning of the seventh inflexion used in the word grāma is related to the

meaning of the root gam in the word ganta. The root gam denotes motion. According to Jagadīśa, the seventh inflexion used in the word grāma indicates that the village acts as the locus of the said motion or the motion is located on the village. Thus, the village is a case of Adhikaraṇa by virtue of its relation to the meaning of the root.<sup>89</sup> Now, the question arises : "What is the specific relation between the village and the motion by virtue of which the village becomes the locative case?" Jagadīśa clearly states that it is neither the relation of contact nor the relation of inherence. We have already shown the reasons for which such relations are not acceptable in the case of Adhikaraṇa. Jagadīśa also states that time is not the relation between the village and the motion because, in the Sanskrit literature such illustrations as spande gacchati are conspicuous by their absence. Therefore, he accepts another type of relation namely, svarūpasambandha.<sup>90</sup> This particular relation is otherwise known as Adhikaraṇatva.

It is clear from the discussions of Jagadīśa and his predecessor Bhavananda that these two logicians do not reject the view of the grammarians that the locative case contains the subjective case and the objective case and thus it becomes indirectly related to the action possessed by them. But, they explain the concept of Adhikaraṇatva more clearly and accurately. Jagadīśa excels his predecessor in

this matter. The grammarians except Suṣeṇa do not consider the cases of substance, action etc. in their discussions on the locative case. They ignore the fact that even the negative fact can be a case of ādhāra or ādheya. Therefore, they refer to such relations only between ādhāra and ādheya as the relation of contact, inherence, viśayatā etc. But, these relations never hold between a negative fact and its locus. Similarly, when the negative <sup>fact</sup> is the locus of something, this relation does not hold between the locus and the located. Suṣeṇa refers to a case in which the negative fact is located on a substance. But, he also states that there is the relation of viśayatā between the two. Bhavānanda and Jagadīśa considers the case of a negative fact properly and then draws the conclusion that Adhikarṇatva is nothing but the svarūpasambandha.

### Vyutpattivāda

Gaḍādhara Bhaṭṭācārya <sup>ultimately</sup> accepts the well known view of the grammatical school that the term Adhikarṇa denotes <sup>a remote</sup> an indirect locus of an action.<sup>91</sup> He says that the seventh inflexion which is <sup>attached to the stem</sup> used in Adhikarṇa denotes ādheyatva or <sup>being</sup> an object located upon. He shows with the help of two illustrations that this object is a kriyā or an action and it is indirectly located on the locative case.<sup>92</sup>

The philosopher <sup>starts with</sup> offers an illuminating discussion on the relation which holds between ādhāra and ādheya or the locus and the object located. He first states that this relation is different from the relation of contact, inherence etc. Then, he specifies the relation as ādhāratva. He opines that ādhāratva is determined by means of the relation of contact or inherence. Thus, when we say *kunḍe badaram asti* (i.e. there is a plum in the bowl), the ādhāratva of the *kunḍa* or the bowl is determined by means of the relation of contact holding between the *kunḍa* and the *badara*. Similarly, when we say *pate rūpaṃ* (i.e. there is colour in the cloth), the ādhāratva of the *pata* or the cloth is determined by means of the relation of inherence which exists between the cloth and its colour.<sup>93</sup>

We have already discussed that the celebrated logician Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa rejects the above idea because he thinks that in that case even the plum which is contained by the bowl will be a case of *Adhikarṇa* and the bowl will be a case of *ādheya*. A similar problem will arise in the case of *pate rūpaṃ* and similar other cases also. Gaḍādhara refutes the objection of his predecessor in an intelligent manner. He shows that in the sentence *kunḍe badaram*, the relation of contact which holds between the bowl and the plum is a *prati-yogi* of the *ādheya*, that is, the plum and it is an *anuyogi* of

the bowl. Thus, the problem does not arise. Similar is the case in the sentences *pate rūpaṁ* etc.<sup>94</sup>

Gadādhara finally shows with the help of an illustration namely, *bhūtaḥ vartate ghataḥ* that the root of the verb used in the sentence denotes *ādhāratva* and the word which is treated as the locative case in the sentence is related to the meaning of the root through the agent.<sup>95</sup>

It is clear from the above discussion that the author of the *Vyūtpattivāda* shows great originality in the concept of *Adhikaraṇa* presented by him.

### Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi

Gāgā Bhaṭṭa reiterates the view of the grammatical school that the term *Adhikaraṇa* denotes a remote locus of an action. He states that the locative case acts as a locus of an action through the medium of either *Kartā* or *Karma*. According to him, this is the meaning of the Paninian rule *Ādhāro Adhikaraṇam*.<sup>96</sup>

Gāgā Bhaṭṭa accepts the three fold classification of the locative case presented by *Paṭaṅjali*.<sup>97</sup>

Reference notes

1. Pā 1.4.45.
2. Pāthādhāram acāryaḥ kiṃ nyāyyaṃ neanyate? Yatra kṛtsna ādhārātmavyāpto bhavati. Tensehaiva syāt-tileṣu tailaṃ dadhmi sarpiriti. Gāṅgāyaṃ gāvah kupe sargakūlaṃ ityatra na syāt.....ityatrāpi siddham bhavati. Mbh. p.251.
3. Adhikaranam nāma triprakāram..... Vaiśayikam iti.  
Mbh. under Pā 6.1.72.
4. Na taṃnāse dīyate. Kim tarhi? Māse gate. Evaṃ tarhi  
Upasāślesikaḥ Adhikaranam vijñāsyate. Ibid. under Pā 5.1.96.
5. Ibid. under Pā 6.1.72
6. Ibid. p.251.
7. Yatra kṛtsna iti. Sarvairavayavaiḥ saha.....sa  
bhavati. Ibid. p.251.
8. Kartṛkarmavyavahitām asākṣād dhārayat kriyām.  
Upakurvāt kriyāsiddhau sāstredhikraṇam smṛtem  
Vāk. Sā. 149.
9. Upasāślesasya cābhiedas..... sanyogasaṃavāyinām.  
Ibid. Sā. 149.
10. Vāk. p.349.
11. Kṛte āste..... vyavahānena kāraṇatvam aviruddham.  
Ibid. p.348.
12. Upasāślesā ādhārasyādhayena sambandhaḥ..... Gurau-  
vasatīti gurvadhīnāyaṃ vṛttau Vaiśayikam Adhikaranam

- guruḥ.....Upasāleśasopyatra baudāhah.....  
 Gaṅgāyaṁ gāva iti Gaṅgāśabdah sāmīpyāt.....,Upasāle-  
 sikam Adhikaranam. Ibid. p.349.
13. Kās. p.561.
14. Ibid. p.562
15. Mukhyasyāpi Kartuh Karmasācā.....Daratvād anavakā-  
 satvācca Kartṛkarmasamjyābhyam bādhyamanatvāt. Ibid. p.362.
16. Ibid. p.362.
17. Ibid. p.361.
18. Āsraya Adhikaranam ucyate. Grhe tiṣṭhati, sthālyam pacati.  
 Bhāṣā. p.45.
19. BVV. p.101.
20. Ibid. p.101.
21. Ata eva Gaṅgāyaṁ ghoṣa iti.....bhavatyeva. Ibid.  
 p.101.
22. Kriyāśrayayoh Kartṛkarmānorādharo Adhikaranasamjñah syāt.  
 Pr. kau p.455.
23. Ibid. p.455.
24. Ibid. p.456.
25. Kriyāśrayayoriti. Tathoktam Bhartṛhariṇā : Kartṛkarma-  
 vyavahitām.....smṛtam iti. Ibid. p.455.
26. Adhārādheyayor anyatrasidheyoh prādeśikah sambandha  
 upasāleśa. Tatra bhavo upasāleśikah.....Nadyā saha  
 ghoṣasāyasa sanyogabhāvamupasāleśikam. Nāpi Vaiśayiko  
 vyāpto vā. Viśayādyebhāvāt. Atayam prthak. Ibid. pp.455-  
 456.

26. <sup>(11)</sup>Yato yadadhīnā yasya sthitiḥ..... tasyāśrayo bhavati.  
Ibid. p.456.
27. Kriyāśrayayoḥ Kartṛkarmaṇor dhāraṇāt..... Adhikaraṇam  
syāt. 6X p.127.
28. Ibid. p.127.
29. Saptamā apyāśrayorthaḥ..... sūtrad ādhāraḥ  
VBS. p.176.
30. Kārake ityadhikṛtya..... sūtre dhikaraṇam amṛtam iti.  
Ibid. pp.176-177.
31. Etacca trividham. Apaslesikaḥ, Vaiśayikaḥ Abhivyāpakaḥ.  
Kāte sete, gurau vasati, mokṣe icchāsti tileṣu tailam  
..... Bhāṣye spastam. Ibid. p.177.
32. Ibid. pp.176-178.
33. Naiyāyikēṣu..... bhāṣāt ityāhuḥ. Ibid. p.178.
34. LMS. p.1322.
35. Ibid. p.1322
36. Sā ca śaktiḥ Kartṛkarmadvārā..... sūtre dhikaraṇam  
amṛtam iti. Ibid. pp.1322-1323.
37. Yadyapi kālaḥ śakṣāt kriyādhāraṣṭathāpi.....  
Kartṛtvavattvat. Ibid. p.1323.
38. Adhikaraṇaṭṭridhā..... Gaṅgāsabdah sāmīpyāt  
deśavṛttirityalpaslesikameva tat. Ibid. p.1325.
39. Kalāpa. sū. 217.
40. Ibid. p.201.
41. Ibid. p.201.



42. Anyestvāha upaslesasyābhedeatilākāsakatādisu.....  
bhedahetava iti. Ibid. p.201.
43. Gangādīnam sahyogasamavāyalakṣaṇo na ghoṣādiriti Sāṁpiko  
bhidyate. Ibid. p.201.
44. Ibid. p.201.
45. Ibid. p.201.
46. Sa cādhārastrivīdheḥ..... Vaiśyikeś ceti. Ibid.  
p.201.
47. Ibid. p.202.
48. Caitre sthitirityādaḥ tu astikriyādhyanāraṇa<sup>o</sup> na doṣaḥ.  
Ibid. p.201.
49. Tatheti tanmate.....lakṣaṇa na kriyata iti  
ādhārastrivīdho jñeya iti. Ibid. p.203.
50. Ibid. p.203.
51. Asya mukhyodāharaṇam bhūtaḥ ghaṭābhāva iti.....  
nāpi samavāyah..... Ibid. p.203.
52. Cāndra sū. 2.1.88.
53. Ibid. p.181.
54. ŚKS. Nāraka. sū. 36.
55. Ibid. p.1016.
56. Ibid. pp.1016-1017.
57. Nanu katham Gaṅgāyam ghoṣaḥ..... Gangāsādhena  
tiraṁ saṁpam lakṣyate..... Evam aṅgulyagre kari-  
śatam vasatityatrāpi aṅgulyagranīrdiṣṭam deśam.....  
lakṣayati. Ibid. 1017.

58. Jainendra sū. 1.2.115.
59. Ewantarhi Kartṛkarmāṇoh..... Adhikarāṇatvam. Ibid.  
p.98.
60. Āśāṇakriyā Devadatte vartate. Vikledana tādūleṣu.  
Ibid. p.95.
61. Ibid. pp.95-96.
62. Kriyāśrayasyādhāro Adhikarāṇam.. SŚ sū. 2.2.30.
63. Ibid. p.76.
64. Muḡdha. kāṛaka sū. 30.
65. Ibid. p.93.
66. Ibid. p.93.
67. Ādhriyate parāmparayā kriyā yatra sa adhāraḥ.....  
Yaduktam Kartṛkarma-vyavahitām..... smṛtam iti.  
Ibid. p.94.
68. Ibid. p.94.
69. Sāra p.86.
70. Ibid. p.86.
71. Aupaślesikam trīvidham..... Keṣāñcinmatam. Ibid.  
p.86.
72. SRC, p.156.
73. Ibid. p.156.
74. SRR p.314.
75. Supadma p.81.
76. Ibid. p.81.

77. Ibid. p.81.
78. HNM. sū. 1020.
79. Ibid. pp.438-439.
80. PR. p.381.
81. Ibid. p.381.
82. Ibid. p.381.
83. Adhikaranatvañ ca.....kuṇḍādhāratāpatteḥ Kār.  
Śak. pp.75-76.
84. Ibid. p.77.
85. Nāpi utpattaya sthitaya.....gauravād ananugata-  
tvācca. Ibid. 77.
86. Kintu..... svarūpasambandhaviśeṣaḥ. Ibid. p.78.
87. Svadhyatvañca yad.....anyonyāśrayaḥ Ibid. p.78.
88. Tatra Pāṇini sūtrāṃ ādhāro Adhikaranam.....iti  
Naiyāyikāh. SMJ p. 63.
89. Kriyā dhātvarthah..... Adhikaraṇskāraḥ. SS p.314.
90. Yadyapi Caitrādini sthāyā gateḥ samavāyādīnā grāmadivya-  
ttitvaṃ bādhitam kālīkādinā..... svarūpasambandha-  
viśeṣeṇa tathātvam bodhyam Ibid. pp.314-315.
- \* 91. Ādhārasaptamā adhyatvaṃ antah. VSP p.341.  
→ VSP p.188
- \* 92. Ibid. p.342, 187.
- \* 93. Athavoktaprasaṅgabhīyā saṃyogenādhāratvaṃ.....  
→ Ibid p.187.  
samavāyādīrūpameva. Ibid. p.341.
- \* 94. Ibid. pp. 341-342.  
→ Ibid p.187.

\* 95. ~~Ibid. p. 312.~~ Bhutale. vartale ghatāh . . . . . nī rīpatvamava  
ghatādes tātkaṭṭvān Ibid 187

96. Adhikāraṇatvañ cādhāratvam . . . . . Paramparākartr-  
karmāśrayadvāra . . . . . BCM. p. 105.

97. Ibid. p. 105.

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\* Vyākṛtīvāda . Bombay, 1911.

### CONCLUSION

We have discussed all the views on the meaning of the term *kāraka* and on *Kartā*, *Karma*, *Karana* etc., that is, the six cases. Our discussion may be clearly understood if it is critically examined. Our arrangement of the subject matter has been followed by a definite plan. The underlying plan is this :

1. We have tried to interpret the *sūtras* of *Pāṇini* mainly by following the tradition of interpretation propounded by the great commentator *Patañjali* after having closely examined the standpoint of the *Vārtikakāre*.

2. We have discussed the views of *Patañjali* on the definitions of *kāraka*, *Kartā*, *Karma* etc. given by *Pāṇini* in his *Aṣṭādhyāyī* and also the *vārtikas* related to them as clearly and elaborately as possible in order to give an appropriate idea of his standpoint on different issues.

*Patañjali* is the first grammarian who defines the term *kāraka*. His definition namely *karotīti itī kārakam* is accepted by many grammarians coming after him including some modern grammarians like *Bhattoji*, *Kaundabhatta* and *Nāgesa*. But, this definition is not accepted by many other grammarians and also the philosophers mentioned by us. The definition, however, paves the way for further discussions on the

topic and thus helps greatly in the development the concept of kāraka. Patañjali gives a second meaning also of the term kāraka. Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita and Kaundabhaṭṭa accept this meaning. But, they explain it further in order to show that kāraka denotes kriyānvayi or that which is syntactically related to a verb.

Patañjali shows with the help of a few suitable illustrations such as kāsthāni pacanti and sthāli pacati that the locus of the principal operation indicated by a verb is the agent. He also justifies indirectly by citing the above illustrations that an inanimate object also can be the agent in a sentence. These two ideas presented by the grammarian are accepted by all the grammarians coming after him. But, they are not accepted by the logicians. Patañjali also states under the Paninian rule kārake that the agent is the mover of other kārakas. This view is also accepted by Bhartṛhari and some other grammarians.

The Bhāṣyakāra explains the significance of the use of the suffix <sup>Karma</sup>tanap by Pāṇini in his definition of Karma. This explanation is accepted by the grammarians flourishing after him including the Vṛttikara who offer an original interpretation on the definition. The Bhāṣyakāra also explains the term Karma in the definition of Sampredāna given by Pāṇini as kriyā and rejects the vārtika kriyāgrahanam. Further, the

grammarian states that the term *apāya* in the definition *dhrum apāye Apādānam* denotes ideal separation also. The above views are accepted by many latter grammarians.

It is clear from the above discussion that the views of Patañjali on *kāraka*, *Kartā*, *Karma* etc. greatly influence his successors and play a major role in the development of the concept of *kāraka* and the different groups and sub-groups of it.

3. Bhartrhari, the celebrated author of the *Vākya-padiya* who flourishes a few centuries after Patañjali accepts some important views of his predecessor. We have shown it clearly in the proper contexts in our thesis. The grammarian also explains some of the views of Patañjali on *kāraka*, *Kartā* etc. in an explicit manner. Let us cite a few instances. Patañjali defines *kāraka* as that which accomplishes a *kriyā* or an act. But, this view is not clear to us unless the term *kriyā* is clarified. Bhartrhari explains the term *kriyā* most appropriately in his definition of *sādhana*. Patañjali states that *Kartā* is the mover of other cases. Bhartrhari presents this view very clearly by explaining the role of *Kartā* appropriately in the *kārikās prāganyatah śakti-lābhāt* etc. But, Bhartrhari does not <sup>finish</sup> his duty as a grammarian by merely interpreting the view of Patañjali. He has some other important contribution to the concepts of *kāraka*, *Kartā*, *Karma*,

Karana etc. He says for the first time that Kāraka is sarnar-thya or sakti. He shows in his interpretation of the Paninian rule svatantra Karta that the agent is an animate being which controls the activities of other cases properly. But, he realises that even the inanimate objects are used as agents in innumerable sentences in the Sanskrit language. He is unable to ignore this peculiarity of the language. Therefore, he states that the sense of Kartā as discussed by him should be imposed on the inanimate object used as the agent in a sentence. This view of the grammarian appears to us as the correct view. He appropriately defines Nirvartya Karma, Vikārya Karma and Prāpya Karma. He also divides Vikārya Karma into two distinct types. Bhartrhari lays due emphasis on the viveka or the intention of the speaker in his definition of Karana. He offers an original interpretation on the term dhrva in the definition of Apādāna given by Pāṇini. He also states that Adhikarana is only an indirect locus of an action. The above views of Bhartrhari are not only accepted by the grammarians but also by the philosophers.

4. We have discussed the view of Kaiyata and Helārāja elaborately in the proper contexts of our thesis.

(a) Kaiyata mainly clarifies the views of the Bhāṣyakāra. He maintains a firm view that the term Sampradāna does not denote its etymological meaning. He quotes two passa-



ges from the Mahābhāṣya in support of his view. His view appears to us as the rational one. The etymological meaning of Sampradāna is not applicable to a number of instances of Sampradāna. But, the majority of the grammarians and also the logicians firmly stand behind the Vrttikāra. They accept only the etymological meaning of Sampradāna, presented by the Vrttikāra.

(b) Helārāja has some contributions to the concepts of kāraka and Sampradāna. He agrees with Bhartrhari that kāraka is a śakti or efficiency. But, he states that this śakti and its locus are non-different. This view is accepted by Nāgeśa and Rāma Tarkavāṅśa, the celebrated commentator on the Mugdhabodha. Helārāja clearly distinguishes between Sampradāna and tadārtha. He states that the purpose of dana is to benefit a person.

5. The sutras of Pāṇini are interpreted by Jayāditya and Vāmana under the name of the Kāśikā. The Kāśikā is known as the Vrtti or the Kāśikāvrtti also. Many of the interpretations in this work bear the stamp of original and independent thinking of its authors. We see a number of such interpretations in the kāraka chapter of the work. In this connection, we can refer to the interpretation of the term kāraka, the interpretation of the term svatantra in the Paninian rule svatantraḥ Kartā, the interpretation of the term Ipsitatama in the Paninian rule Kartur ipsitatamaḥ Karma etc. These

interpretations greatly influence the latter grammarians.

(a) Jinendrabuddhi is a great commentator on the Kāśikā. He shows great originality in his interpretations on the views of the Vṛttikāra on kāraka, Kartā, Karma etc. Jinendrabuddhi does not agree with the Bhāṣyakāra on many important points and gives his own views on them. We have clearly discussed the above merits of Jinendrabuddhi in appropriate places. Many of the views of Jinendrabuddhi are accepted by his successors. Let us cite a few instances. Jinendrabuddhi explains the term *dāna* clearly and states that the sense of *dāna* is invariably involved in the concept of *Sampradāna*. He shows that the sentences *rajaśya vastram dadāti* and *ghnataḥ prṣṭham dadāti* do not indicate *dāna*. Therefore, the terms *rajaś* and the term *ghnat* are not cases of *Sampradāna* in the sentences. The meaning of *dāna* given by Jinendrabuddhi and his concept of *Sampradāna* are accepted by almost all the grammarians coming after him. Jinendrabuddhi distinguishes between the meanings of the roots *yāci* and *bhikṣi* in his discussion on *Akathita Karma*. The distinction shown by him is accepted by his successors. The commentator says that the verbs *jayati* and *dandayati* also govern the indirect object. This view is reiterated by many grammarians flourishing after him.

The above discussion clearly shows that Jinendra-buddhi has a major contribution to the development of the concept of *kāraka* and different *kāra*kas.

(b) Haradatta's *Padmañjarī* is an outstanding commentary on the *Kāśikā*. Haradatta tries to bring about a compromise between the two distinct views of the *Vṛttikāra* and the *Bhāṣyakāra* on the meaning <sup>of</sup> *kāraka*. The grammarian synthesises the views of the *Bhāṣyakāra*, *Bhartrhari*, Jinendra-buddhi and *Kaiyata* with those of the *Vṛttikāra* in his interpretations of the views of the *Vṛttikāra* on different *kāra*kas.

6. The *Bhāṣāvṛtti* of *Puruṣottama* is a short commentary on the *sūtras* of *Pāṇini* excluding only those *sūtras* which are exclusively devoted to Vedic grammar. He mainly follows the *Vṛttikāra* in his interpretations on the *sūtras* of *Pāṇini* devoted to *kāraka*. There is not much exhibition of original thinking in the work on the topic of *kāraka*. Simplicity and lucidity are the special features of the commentary of *Puruṣottama*.

(a) *Br̥ṣṭidhara* is a renowned commentator on the *Bhāṣāvṛtti*. He is noted for his scholarship and accurate thinking and also hair-splitting discussions. He mainly presents the well-known views of earlier grammarians in his interpretations on the views of *Puruṣottama* on different aspects of *kāraka*. He however, offers for the first time a

very valuable discussion on the objective case of illusory knowledge.

7. Rāmacandra who flourishes after Purusottama briefly interprets the sūtras of Pāṇini in his Prakriyākaumudī. His example is followed by Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita. He also briefly interprets the sūtras of Pāṇini in his Siddhāntakaumudī. The grammarian, however, elaborately explains the sūtras in his two other works namely, the Śabdakaustubha and the Prādhānamāraṇa.

Rāmacandra rearranges the sūtras of Pāṇini in his grammar. His new arrangement is accepted by Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita. There is some disadvantage of the arrangement of the sūtras. This disadvantage is duly felt in the kāraka chapter in the work of both the grammarians. Some of the rules of kāraka given by Pāṇini are related to a previous rule in the Astādhyāyī. But, when as a result of the new arrangement, the two rules are separated, it becomes difficult for us to attain the correct meaning of the subsequent rule. Such a difficulty arises in the cases of the rule divaḥ Karma ca (Pā 1.4.43) in both grammars.

Let us now speak a few words regarding the interpretations given by Rāmacandra on sūtras of kārakas presented by Pāṇini. Rāmacandra mainly follows the Vṛttikara in his interpretations of these sūtras. He, however, follows the

Bhāṣyakāra in his classification of Adhikaraṇa. But, he presents a fourth type of Adhikaraṇa namely, Sāṃpika.

(a) Viṭṭhalācārya critically interprets the brief commentary of Rāmacandra. He nicely synthesises the views of Patañjali, Bhartṛhari and Jinendrabuddhi in his interpretation on the views of Rāmacandra on various kārakas. The conspicuous feature of the commentary of Viṭṭhala is the simplicity and the lucidity of the language he uses in it. The commentator mainly presents the traditional views on kārakas. But, he presents <sup>partly</sup> a new definition of Kartā.

8. Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita is an eminent Sanskrit grammarian. He does not show much originality in the interpretations of the Paninian rules on kārakas in the Siddhāntakaumudī. He rigidly follows Rāmacandra in these interpretations. Let us cite few instances in order to clarify our statement. Rāmacandra interprets the Paninian rule sādhakatasmāṃ Kāraṇaṃ as kriyāśiddhau prakṛṣṭopakāraṇaṃ Kāraṇaṃ syāt (Pr. kau p.405). Bhaṭṭoji explains the above rule almost in the same manner. He explains it as kriyāśiddhau prakṛṣṭopakāraṇaṃ kārakaṃ Kāraṇa-saṃjñāṃ syāt (SKM pp.431-432). Rāmacandra interprets an important definition of Apādāna given by Pāṇini namely, janikartuḥ prakṛtiḥ as jāyamānasya prakṛtiḥ hetur Apādānaṃ syāt (Pr. Kau p.428). Bhaṭṭoji interprets the rule as jāyamānasya hetur Apādānaṃ syāt (SKM pp.448-449).

Bhattoji is, however, an entirely different grammarian in his *Śabdakaustubha* and *Pradhamaṇoramā*. He does not follow Rāmacandra in his interpretations in these two works. He offers illuminating discussions on the terms *kāraka*, *Karma*, *Apādāna* etc. in these works. He lays emphasis on the philosophy of grammar in these discussions. He says that *Sampradānakāraka* or dative case remains ideally present in the mind of the agent before the act of giving is accomplished by him. He gives a philosophical interpretation of the definition of *Karma* presented by Pāṇini namely, *Kartur īpsitatamam Karma*. He opines that *Karma* denotes *kriyāphaleśālī* or the locus of the result of an operation. He also gives a philosophical interpretation of the term *dhruva* in the Paninian rule *dhruvam apāye Apādānam*. This interpretation is however, based on the concept of *dhruva* presented by Bhartrhari.

The grammarian does not follow the order of the Paninian rule as given by Rāmacandra in the *Śabdakaustubha* and the *Pradhamaṇoramā*.

He presents some important views of Patañjali and Bhartrhari in some of his interpretations on the Paninian rules of *kāraka*. The views of Bhattoji are clearly explained by Hariḍikṣita.

9. Kaundabhaṭṭa accepts the definition of *kāraka* offered by Bhattoji Dikṣita. He also accepts the meanings of

the terms Karma, Apādāna etc. given by his predecessor. The grammarian lays great emphasis on the philosophy of grammar in his interpretations on different kārakas. He makes much improvement upon Bhaṭṭoji in some of his interpretations. He explains the term Apādāna more critically and clearly than Bhaṭṭoji.

(a) Harivallabha interprets the views of Kaunda-  
bhaṭṭa on kāraka, Kartā, Karma etc. in the most appropriate manner. He corroborates these views with the help of brilliant arguments. He also presents the views of the Naiyāyikas on different kārakas in the most elaborate manner. This has made a comparative study of cases in the grammatical school and the logical school easier for us.

10. Nāgasa is an immediate predecessor of Harivallabha. He is widely renowned for his versatile knowledge of various subjects and specially modern logic. He imports many ideas of modern logic into the philosophy of grammar. Nāgasa adopts the technic of the modern school of logic in interpreting the terms Kartā, Karma etc. We also see some influence of the Navyanyāya school in his interpretation of the term Karma, that is, Karmatvaṁ Kartṛgataprakṛtadhātvarthavyāpāra-prayojyavyāpāravadyadhikarāṇaphalāśrayatvena Kartur uddēśyatvaṁ. There is a similar influence of the Mīmāṃsā school in the interpretation of Śampradāna given by him. But, he is primarily

a follower of the Paninian tradition. He rigidly follows the Bhāṣyakāra in defining kāraṇa. He accepts the view of Bhartr̥hari that kāraṇa is a śakti. But, he agrees with Helārāja that this śakti is non-different from its locus. Nāgeśa also accepts all the important views of Bhartr̥hari on Karana, Apādāna etc.

11. Paṇḍitarāja Jagannathais another great Sanskrit grammarian of the modern age. But, he has not been taken into consideration because his Praḍhānanoramakucamardinī is not worth a critical study from the scientific standpoint.

Let us now discuss the views of the grammarians of the non-Paninian schools and the interpreters of their views.

The grammarians who do not accept the sūtras of Pāṇini but frame their own sūtras in their grammatical works and the grammarians who present mainly their own sūtras in their grammar and accept only a few sūtras of Pāṇini are the grammarians of the so called non-Paninian schools. We have shown that the following sūtrakaras belong to the non-Paninian schools in our discussions.

- (1) Sarvavarṇa, the author of the Kalāpa or the Kātantra,
- (2) Candragomī, the author of the Cāndra grammar,
- (3) Kramadīśvara, the author of the Saṃkṣiptasāra,
- (4) Devanandī, the author of the Jainendra,
- (5) Hemacandra, the author of the Śabdānuśāsana,



- (6) Bopadeva, the author of the Mugdhabodha .
- (7) Annabhūtiśaṅkṛpācārya, the author of the Sārasvata .
- (8) Padmanābha Datta, the author of the Supadma .
- (9) Jīvagośwāmī, the author of the Harināmāmṛta .
- (10) Puruṣottama<sup>vidyāvaśīṣa</sup>, the author of the Prayogarātna-mālā .

The commentators on the works of the above sūtra-kāras also naturally belong to the non-Paninian schools.

12. Among the above sūtrakāras, Devanandī and Hemacandra are Jains and Jīvagośwāmī is a Vaiṣṇava. But, there is very little trace of the Jaina religious and philosophical views in the kāraṇa chapter of the works of Devanandī and Hemacandra. On the other hand, the kāraṇa chapter of the work of Jīvagośwāmī clearly displays the religious motive of the grammarian. Jīvagośwāmī writes his Harināmāmṛta in order to teach grammar to the students and also to impart salvation to them through an easy process. In this Kali age, the uttering of Harināmā or the names of Lord Viṣṇu or performing japas with them is thought to be one of the best means of attaining salvation. The students who do not possess the eagerness or the tenacity for practising these two methods can easily attain salvation by frequently reading or reciting his grammar for a practical purpose because, the names of Lord Viṣṇu are frequently used in it.

13. The grammarians of the non-Paninian schools accept many important views of the grammarians of the Paninian school. Thus, these grammarians are not free thinkers in the absolute sense of the term. We have shown in the proper contents that the grammarians of the non-Paninian schools accept the important views of Pāṇini, Patañjali, Bhartṛhari, the Vṛttikāra and some other grammarians of the Paninian school in defining the terms kāraka, Kartā, Karma etc. or in interpreting the definitions of these terms. They also accept the classification of Karma, Adhikaraṇa etc. presented by the grammarians of the Paninian school. Let us clarify the above statement by citing a few instances.

(a) Hemacandra defines kāraka as kriyāhetuḥ Kārakam. He follows the Vṛttikāra in his definition. He further shows in his interpretation of the definition that this definition is identical in meaning with the definition of kāraka given by Patañjali. He also reiterates the views of Bhartṛhari that kāraka is a śakti. Padmanābha rigidly follows the Vṛttikāra in defining kāraka. He defines the term as kriyānimittam kārakam. Jīvagoswāmī, again, synthesises the views of Patañjali and Bhaṭṭoji in the definition of kāraka given by him namely, kriyāśambandhaviśeṣi kārakam. All the sūtrakāras of the non-Paninian schools accept the logical meaning of Karma given by the Vṛttikāra.

(b) Devanandī, Hemacandra, Padmanābha and Anubhūtiśaṅkṛāya define Kārṇa as sādhanakāraṇam. Kramadīśvara presents the very sense of the above definition in the sūtra kriyātsādhanaṁ Kārṇam.

(c) All the grammarians of the non-Paninian schools except Hemacandra accept the etymological meaning of Sampradāna. Hemacandra remains loyal to Patañjali.

(d) The grammarians Candragomī, Hemacandra, Padmanābha and Jīvagoswāmī accept the view of Bhartrhari that Apādānakāraka is the avadhi or the point of separation. Sarvavarṇa partly follows Pāṇini and partly follows Patañjali in defining Apādānakāraka. Devanandī shows his allegiance to Patañjali in his definition of Apādāna. Bopadeva, Kramadīśvara and Jīvagoswāmī accept all the definitions of Apādāna given by Pāṇini. Of course, these grammarians twist these definitions.

(e) All the sūtrakāras belonging to the non-Paninian schools accept the view of Bhartrhari that Adhikāranakāraka is only an indirect locus of an action through the medium of either the subject or the object.

(f) Hemacandra and Padmanābha follows their predecessors of the Paninian school in classifying Karma. Padmanābha and Jīvagoswāmī accept the three-fold classification of Adhikāraṇa presented by the Bhāṣyakāra.

(g) The above discussion does not imply that the sūtrakāras of the non-Paninian schools have no original contribution to the concepts of kāraka, Kartā etc. Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya gives an entirely new definition of kāraka namely, kriyāsiddhyupakārakaṁ kārakam. The definition deserves our proper attention. We have already stated clearly that this definition is an improvement of some other definitions of kāraka. He also presents a fourth type of Karma namely, Samskārya Karma. Of course, we have shown that it is redundant. Hemacandra gives us a comprehensive idea of Kartā in his illustrations of the rule svatantraḥ Kartā. The grammarian has another major contribution to the concept of Adhikaraṇa. Hemacandra divides Adhikaraṇa into six distinct types namely, (1) Aupadesika, (2) Vaisayika, (3) Abhivyāpaka, (4) Sāmīpyaka, (5) Naimittika and Aupacārika. The author of the Sārasvata accepts this division.

14. Now, we shall critically examine the commentaries on the said sūtra works.

(a) Durgasiṅha writes one brief commentary and one elaborate commentary on the sūtras of the Kātantra or the Kalāpa. He shows great originality in some of his interpretations on the sūtras of the Kalāpa on different kārakas. Let us cite a few instances. He says that the verb karoti in the sūtra yah karoti sa Kartā denotes that the agent is not

related to a present act alone but also to a past or a future act. He also opines that the term *yataḥ* in the definition *yato apaiti* etc. indicates both the limit of real and ideal separation. We have discussed these views clearly on previous occasions. Durgasiṃha exerts a great influence upon a major section of commentators coming after him. We have shown in a previous section of this thesis that Durgādāsa Vidyāvāgiśa and Rāma Tarkavāgiśa accept a very important view of him.

(b) Trilocana also writes a commentary on the sūtras of the Kalāpa known as *Pañjī*. He explains many important views of Durgasiṃha on cases critically in it.

(c) Suṣeṇācārya, the third commentator on the sūtras of the Kalāpa deserve special mention. The commentator is a great critical thinker. He presents illuminating discussions on *Kartā*, *Karma*, *Sampradāna* etc. Suṣeṇa is greatly influenced by the philosophers of the Navyanyāya school and particularly Bhavaṇanda Siddhāntavāgiśa. He mainly presents the views of the Navyanyāya school in his discussions on *Kartā*, *Karma*, *Sampradāna* etc. He is the first grammarian to refer to the locative case of a negative factor.

(d) Candragomī is an eminent Sanskrit grammarian. But, no good commentary on the sūtras of Candragomī are available to us up till now.

(e) Jumarānandī and Goyīcandra critically interpret the sūtras of the Saṅkṣiptasāra. They have some important contributions to the concepts of Karma and Sampradāna. Both commentators philosophically interpret the term Karma as the locus of the result of an operation of the agent. According to Goyīcandra, pāpaṃ tyajati and ādityam paśyati are illustrations of Anīpsita Karma. This is an entirely new idea of the grammarian. He gives a new interpretation on Sampradāna Kāraka. He cites a few instances of secondary Sampradānakāraka in this connection.

(f) We have discussed the views of Durgādāsa Vidyāvāgiśa and Rāma Tarkavāgiśa, the commentators on the Mugdhabodhā on kāraka and Karta, Karma etc. in the previous sections on cases. Rāma Tarkavāgiśa offers an exhaustive critical discussion on the meaning of kāraka which is certainly worth noting.

(g) The commentators on the Sārasvata grammar have no mark of originality to be noted. The Laghubhāṣya, a big commentary on the Sārasvata is a popular representation of Patañjali's views. The commentaries of Candrakīrti and Rāmāśrama are of very little importance for us in a critical study of kāraka.

(h) Abhayānandī mainly presents the important views of the Paninian school in interpreting the terms

kāraḥ, Karta, Karma etc. He defines kāraḥ as the condition and the generator of an action. This shows that the commentator accepts the views of both Patañjali and the Vṛttikāra on kāraḥ. He presents the important views of the Pāṇinian school in his interpretations of the terms Karta, Karana, Adhikarana etc.

(i) Hemacandra writes a short commentary on the sūtras of his Śabdānuśāsana. We have discussed the views presented by the grammarian in it. Vijayagani also writes a commentary on the Śabdānuśāsana. But, the commentator does not present any important view in it deserving mention in our thesis.

(j) Padmanābha writes a short commentary on the sūtras of his Supadma. We have discussed the views offered by the grammarian in it in different sections of our thesis.

(k) Viṣṇuśiṣya critically interprets the sūtras of Padmanābha and also the said views. Viṣṇuśiṣya is a scholar and a critical thinker. But, his interpretations do not bear the stamp of original thinking.

(l) Jīvaśvāmī also writes a commentary on his Narinaṁāmṛta. We have critically examined some of the important views offered by him in it in appropriate contexts.

(m) Puruṣottama Vidyāvāgīśa appropriately explains his views on kāraḥ and the different cases in his

Prayogartnamālā. The grammarian follows the Paninian tradition in many of his interpretations.

A review of the views of the commentators of the non-Paninian schools shows that they are more or less influenced by the author of the Mahābhāṣya, the author of the Vākyapadīya, Jinendrabuddhi and Helāraja. We have already shown the influence of Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa upon Suṣeṇa.

15.(a) We have not discussed all the views of the Nyāya school from the ancient time to the most modern period in our thesis. We have discussed only those views which are presented by the author of the Kārakacakra, the author of the Sāraṃśārī, the author of the Śabdasaṃskṛti-prakāśikā and the author of the Vyutpattivāda. The reason for this is that these views are constantly referred to by the grammarians in general. Moreover, many of these views are more scientific than the earlier views. We have shown the gradual evolution of the views which we have discussed in this thesis. These views have a great influence upon modern grammarians. They are compelled to reshape the concepts of cases so that they become easily acceptable to critical thinkers.

The logicians whom we have referred to above offer exhaustive critical discussions on different kārakas in order to clarify the concept of them. Their discussions greatly help us to understand the meaning of Karmakāraka



appropriately. They have also some important contributions to the concept of Karana and Adhikarana. The definition of Karana as accepted by the grammatical schools is not applicable to the term atma in the sentence ātmanā jānāti. Therefore, the third definition of Jagadīśa is essentially necessary for us. The Naiyāyikas present some new ideas on Adhikarānakāraka.

We have discussed above of the influence of Bhavananda Siddhāntavagīśa, Jayakṛṣṇa etc. on the grammarians. But, these philosophers are also not entirely free from the influence of the grammarians. They accept the views of the Kāśikā school on Sampradānakāraka. They also rigidly follow Bhartrhari in defining Apādānakāraka. This shows that the concepts of different cases have developed through mutual give and take between the logicians and the grammarian.

(b) We have not discussed all the views of the Mīmāṃsā school on the topic of kāraka. We have discussed the views of only Gāgā Bhaṭṭa, the celebrated author of the Bhaṭṭa-cintāmaṇi because, his views alone are important for us for the present study on kārakas. Gāgā Bhaṭṭa devotes a chapter of his work exclusively on kārakas. The philosopher accepts some important views of the grammatical school and the logical school on kārakas.

In fine, we come to the conclusion that we should open our eyes and take into consideration all the views of different authoritative works dealing with cases for a comprehensive view of cases in general. If we confine ourselves to a part of the different grammatical and philosophical schools, we shall attain a limited idea of cases but we shall fail to trace the development of the concept of different cases. For instance, we do not attain appropriate ideas of the development of the concepts of Karmakāra and Adhikarānakāra<sup>ka</sup> unless we study the views of the new logicians.

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